

Investigation No. 17-04-019
Exhibit PAC/1600-I
Witness: Rick T. Link

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PACIFICORP

Rebuttal Testimony of Rick T. Link

Redline Version

ERRATA
December 2018

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1 **Q. Are you the same ~~Shayleah LaBray~~Rick T. Link who previously submitted**
2 **testimony in this proceeding on behalf of PacifiCorp d/b/a Pacific Power?**

3 A. Yes.

4 **I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

5 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

6 A. The purpose of my testimony is to rebut Dr. Fisher's testimony on behalf of Sierra
7 Club related to PacifiCorp's system-wide least-cost, least-risk integrated resource
8 planning (IRP) process.

9 **Q. Please summarize your testimony.**

10 A. As described in my opening testimony, PacifiCorp engages in least-cost, least-risk
11 planning on a system-wide basis through its IRP, which is prepared on a biennial
12 basis in odd-numbered years and updated in even-numbered years. The IRP requires
13 extensive modeling and analysis of multiple scenarios, which examine projected fuel
14 costs and market prices, possible dispatch options, potential regulatory compliance
15 costs, and theoretical retirement of generating assets before the end of their
16 depreciable lives. The IRP also takes into account input from stakeholders, including
17 commissioners and commission staff, ratepayer and environmental advocates, market
18 participants, and customers.¹ PacifiCorp's 2017 IRP shows that Dr. Fisher's
19 conclusions are incorrect. Moreover, my testimony addresses factual inaccuracies in
20 Dr. Fisher's testimony.

¹ PacifiCorp routinely has nearly 100 or more stakeholders participate in its IRP public input meetings. Formal proceedings before state commissions allow for interventions and additional discovery.

II. PACIFICORP'S LEAST-COST SYSTEM-WIDE PLANNING

Q. Does Dr. Fisher's testimony agree that PacifiCorp engages in least-cost planning on a system-wide basis?

A. No. While Dr. Fisher does acknowledge that PacifiCorp's planning is done on a system-wide basis, he does not believe that PacifiCorp plans on a least-cost basis.² Instead, he asserts that PacifiCorp's IRP "entirely follows the Company's business interests" and does not represent least-cost portfolio planning.³

Q. The first justification Dr. Fisher gives to support his view on PacifiCorp's portfolio planning is that the IRP is not conducted transparently or in an open public process. Is Dr. Fisher correct?

A. No. PacifiCorp's biennial IRP undergoes an extensive public input process spanning at least a nine- to ten-month period during which open discussion occurs with stakeholders, where feedback on planning assumptions is provided to the company. For example, beginning in June 2016, PacifiCorp held five state-specific meetings and seven public input meetings, many spanning two days, to facilitate information sharing and collaboration around the 2017 IRP. The public input process covered all facets of the IRP, ranging from specific modeling input assumptions to the portfolio modeling and risk analysis.

² Revised Direct Testimony of Jeremy Fisher, PhD, on Behalf of Sierra Club (February 7, 2018) (Fisher Direct), p. 19 (lines 10–15).

³ *Id.* at pp. 19 (line 20)–20 (line 2).

1 **Q. Specific to the study of coal plants in the 2017 IRP, Dr. Fisher states that the**
2 **company designed a process that assessed coal plants in “non-transparent**
3 **‘alternative scenarios.’” Do you agree?**

4 A. No. Dr. Fisher misrepresents the open and transparent stakeholder process that
5 developed and evaluated potential early retirement of PacifiCorp’s coal generating
6 assets. In addition to a reference case and five other regional haze scenarios
7 developed and modified with input from stakeholders,⁴ PacifiCorp also conducted an
8 endogenous retirement case specifically in response to a request from Sierra Club
9 (Regional Haze Case 6, or RH-6) that allowed its capacity expansion model to choose
10 early retirement or selective catalytic reduction (SCR) equipment installation. This
11 study selected one plant for early retirement and installed SCR equipment on the
12 remaining plants, demonstrating that installation of SCR equipment is lower cost than
13 retiring these coal units early. This scenario, and all regional haze scenarios and
14 supporting assumptions, are detailed in the public input meeting presentation
15 materials⁵ and were discussed at the public input meetings by the company’s senior
16 vice president of strategy and development, who also responded to stakeholder
17 questions regarding the assumptions and how they were initially developed.

⁴ PacifiCorp developed and conducted an endogenous retirement case (RH-6) in response to feedback discussed at its January 26-27, 2017 public input meeting. See slides 5, 7-9 and 17 in presentation at: http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2017_IRP/PacifiCorp_2017_IRP_PIM07_1-26-17_Presentation.pdf. RH-6 was conducted in response to comments from the Oregon Commission Staff, cited in Fisher Direct, p. 21, footnote 46 (Sierra Club cites an excerpt from Oregon Commission Staff’s comments, stating that if early retirement “is not preferred because of higher cost and risk, the commission expects quantitative analysis that supports that assertion....”).

⁵ All public input meeting presentations are available at: <http://www.pacificorp.com/es/irp.html>. PacifiCorp discussed regional haze compliance and scenarios at its July 20, August 25–26, and September 22–23, 2016 public input meetings. Detailed portfolio results for the regional haze compliance cases were presented at the January 26–27, 2017 public input meeting.

1 Dr. Fisher’s statement that “[t]he company uniformly refused to answer” when Sierra
2 Club sought to “understand whether and how the company had assessed the economic
3 value of its coal fleet and to learn how the company had created the alternative
4 scenarios” is simply not accurate.

5 **Q. Did the outcome of the endogenous retirement case RH-6 show that coal plant
6 early retirement was least-cost on a system-wide basis?**

7 A. No. The overall portfolio combination of resources in case RH-6 had higher net costs
8 relative to the other regional haze compliance cases that reflected a range of potential
9 negotiated compliance alternatives, and PacifiCorp’s analysis of alternative regional
10 haze compliance outcomes demonstrated that customers would benefit from potential
11 negotiated environmental compliance alternatives whereby costly SCR equipment can
12 be avoided by retiring certain units before the end of their depreciable life, but later
13 than the currently established regional haze compliance deadlines for SCR
14 installation. Consequently, the least-cost combination of resources that was
15 ultimately selected in the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio includes early retirement of
16 five of PacifiCorp’s coal plants over the 20-year study period and did not include any
17 incremental SCR equipment installations. PacifiCorp’s 2017 IRP preferred portfolio
18 coal-unit capacity is reduced by 3,650 MWs over the 20-year planning horizon.

1 **Q. Dr. Fisher claims that after PacifiCorp filed its 2017 IRP, “parties immediately**
2 **issued discovery” seeking to understand the basis of the coal plant scenarios and**
3 **economic value of the fleet but that PacifiCorp “provided no meaningful**
4 **response.”⁶ Is Dr. Fisher correct?**

5 A. No. Dr. Fisher’s statement implies that the issues he is presenting here were
6 ubiquitous among multiple parties, and that a high volume of discovery was issued
7 specific to the treatment of coal plant analysis to which PacifiCorp did not
8 substantively respond. This is factually inaccurate.

9 Among the intervening organizations that participated in formal state
10 commission proceedings on PacifiCorp’s 2017 IRP, 13 of them submitted in
11 aggregate over 250 discovery questions. Among those, only two intervening
12 organizations (other than Sierra Club) submitted questions that addressed the
13 company’s regional haze analysis, either as part of the question or tangentially as part
14 of the company’s response. Those two intervening organizations submitted fewer
15 than 10 questions related to the regional haze analysis, and PacifiCorp provided a
16 substantive response to all of those requests. Dr. Fisher specifically references a
17 request from Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Oregon Commission) Staff to
18 conduct unit-specific coal analysis, which was not submitted to PacifiCorp until
19 September 2017, over five months after the 2017 IRP was filed.⁷

⁶ Fisher Direct, pp. 21(lines 15-16)–22(line 1).

⁷ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 12–13); Exhibit JIF-14.

1 **Q. In regards to the September 2017 Oregon Commission Staff discovery request**
2 **referenced by Dr. Fisher, he states that the Oregon Commission Staff was**
3 **seeking an economic analysis of the coal fleet and “was refused.”⁸ Is this**
4 **statement accurate?**

5 A. No. PacifiCorp’s response to Oregon Commission Staff’s discovery request, which
6 Dr. Fisher included as an exhibit to his testimony, contains a detailed explanation of
7 why the Oregon Commission Staff’s requested analysis was unworkable.⁹ As
8 PacifiCorp explained in its response, the requested analysis would require
9 establishing as many as 24 unique data sets that would take several months to develop
10 and apply to the IRP model runs (Oregon Commission Staff asked if the analysis
11 could be done in 17 days).¹⁰ Moreover, the company explained that the structure of
12 the proposed unit-by-unit analysis did not capture system cost impacts that would
13 result from early retirements at more than one facility, and the results therefore would
14 have limited utility in establishing a least-cost, least-risk resource portfolio. The
15 hypothetical retirement dates at the end of 2022 were also unlikely to influence the
16 2017 IRP action plan, which identifies resource actions required over the near-term
17 two- to four-year period. For these reasons, PacifiCorp offered to hold a series of
18 stakeholder workshops in early 2018 to define parameters for future coal-unit
19 retirement analysis, with input and engagement from all IRP stakeholders.¹¹

⁸ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 3–4).

⁹ Exhibit JIF-15.

¹⁰ See Exhibit JIF-14 (OPUC Data Request 65 [submitted September 13, 2017].)

¹¹ Exhibit JIF-15.

1 **Q. Dr. Fisher claims that PacifiCorp agreed to undertake the coal asset-retirement**
2 **analysis only after the Oregon Commission “expressed mounting concern” over**
3 **PacifiCorp’s “continuous refusal.”¹² Is this accurate?**

4 A. No. As described above, PacifiCorp expressed concern regarding the initial 17-day
5 period to undertake the analysis proposed in the data request due to the greater
6 amount of time required to establish data sets for the modeling requested and to
7 conduct the studies. Notwithstanding PacifiCorp’s other concerns regarding the
8 studies described above, following further discussion with Oregon Commission Staff
9 around timing of the studies, PacifiCorp agreed to complete the studies within a
10 reasonable timeframe by June 30, 2018, and align the results of the studies with its
11 2019 IRP public input process which will start around that same time frame.

12 **Q. Did the Oregon Commission agree with PacifiCorp’s proposal and timing when**
13 **it acknowledged the company’s 2017 IRP in December 2017?**

14 A. Yes.

15 **Q. Dr. Fisher states that PacifiCorp inserted \$3 billion of new projects into the 2017**
16 **IRP a month before the resource plan was finalized and questions the**
17 **transparency of the process, claiming that large-scale planning assumptions**
18 **were altered outside an ongoing public process.¹³ Do you agree?**

19 A. No. Dr. Fisher mischaracterizes the nature of the resources selected in PacifiCorp’s
20 2017 IRP preferred portfolio and the public process by which the resource scenarios
21 were reviewed with stakeholders. In his critique, Dr. Fisher is specifically referring
22 to the new wind, transmission, and wind repower projects selected in the 2017 IRP

¹² Fisher Direct, p.22 (line 5).

¹³ Fisher Direct, p.22 (lines 11–12).

1 preferred portfolio. Specifically, the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio includes 1,100
2 MWs of new wind and a new 500 kV 140-mile transmission line in Wyoming, which
3 are expected to be in service by the end of 2020. The 2017 IRP preferred portfolio
4 also includes repowering 905 MWs of existing wind by the end of 2020. The new
5 wind, transmission, and repowered wind are collectively referred to as the Energy
6 Vision 2020 projects and were selected as part of the least-cost, least-risk
7 combination of resources to offset other more costly resource combinations to meet
8 system-wide load and resource needs over the 20-year planning horizon. Discussion
9 of these projects and related analysis was part of the 2017 IRP public process.

10 **Q. Please describe the timing of PacifiCorp's analysis that included the Energy**
11 **Vision 2020 projects in the 2017 IRP.**

12 A. In December 2016, PacifiCorp concluded that repowering wind units could generate
13 cost savings if implemented on at least a subset of wind facilities in the fleet. To
14 preserve the repowering option for application at additional facilities and to preserve
15 the option to qualify new wind facilities for the full value of federal production tax
16 credits (PTCs), subject to further review and analysis, PacifiCorp made safe harbor
17 wind equipment purchases at that time. PacifiCorp completed its additional review
18 and expanded economic analysis of wind repowering in early 2017, toward the end of
19 the IRP's public input process. In February 2017, PacifiCorp finalized its IRP
20 analysis of wind repowering.

21 Also in late 2016 and early 2017, PacifiCorp continued to study and refine its
22 resource portfolios, all of which contained new Wyoming wind resources. In
23 reviewing these resource portfolios, it became clear that the amount of Wyoming

1 wind was limited by transmission constraints. This led PacifiCorp to assess whether
2 additional wind resources enabled by sub-segments of PacifiCorp's Energy Gateway
3 West transmission line, which extends from eastern Wyoming to western Idaho,
4 would further lower system costs. Consequently, after the January public input
5 meeting, PacifiCorp incorporated the sub-segment Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline
6 transmission line as a specific sensitivity case in its broader Energy Gateway
7 sensitivity analysis. In late February, PacifiCorp's modeling of four Energy Gateway
8 transmission sensitivities indicated there were potential benefits to including the
9 Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission line in the portfolio.

10 PacifiCorp rescheduled the February 2017 public input meeting to the first of
11 March to enable the company to complete and share its wind repowering analysis,
12 initially incorporated into the IRP process as a portfolio scenario referred to as OP-
13 REP, as well as its analysis of the Energy Vision 2020 new wind and transmission
14 projects. PacifiCorp expedited its analysis of the Energy Vision 2020 projects in the
15 IRP process even though these resource opportunities emerged just a few months
16 before the IRP's filing date; simultaneously, PacifiCorp was also completing its
17 analysis of 32 other potential resource portfolios initially presented in the January
18 2017 public input meeting.

19 At the March 2017 public input meeting, PacifiCorp presented this analysis to
20 stakeholders, where it communicated its intention to further refine key assumptions
21 for this sensitivity case. While the pre-filing stakeholder review process of Energy
22 Vision 2020 projects was necessarily limited by the timing of PacifiCorp's analysis, it
23 was in customers' interest to consider these resources and ultimately include them in

1 the 2017 IRP. PacifiCorp explicitly chose to share the results of its analysis with
2 stakeholders as they were being produced. Given the time-sensitivity of these
3 resource opportunities, delaying the IRP to allow additional pre-filing review was not
4 a viable option. Instead, PacifiCorp expeditiously completed the necessary analysis
5 and shared it with IRP stakeholders in real-time. Filing of the 2017 IRP on
6 April 4, 2017, signaled a new stage in the stakeholder review process, not the end of
7 it.

8 **Q. The second argument Dr. Fisher makes in support of his conclusion that**
9 **PacifiCorp does not engage in least-cost planning is that PacifiCorp does not**
10 **assess resources on a “consistent and comparable basis.”¹⁴ Is this accurate?**

11 A. No. Contrary to Dr. Fisher’s claims, PacifiCorp does not only assess new resources
12 against other new resources while ignoring comparative analysis of new resources in
13 relation to the existing coal fleet.¹⁵ First, Dr. Fisher’s assertion is based on a
14 misrepresentation of PacifiCorp’s response to a data request. The data request from
15 Sierra Club asked if the purpose of an IRP is “to identify the best mix of resources
16 system wide’ as ‘least-cost, least-risk’ or ‘to fill any gap between changes in loads
17 and existing resources.’”¹⁶ PacifiCorp’s response plainly states that “[t]he IRP
18 identifies the best mix of least-cost, least-risk resources system wide, *including* the
19 best mix of least-cost, least-risk resources to fill the gap between load and existing
20 generation.”¹⁷ This response does not indicate that PacifiCorp believes resource

¹⁴ Fisher Direct, pp. 23 (line 13)–24 (line 19).

¹⁵ Fisher Direct, p. 24 (lines 4–19).

¹⁶ Exhibit JIF-7, Data Request 1.3(b).

¹⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added).

1 planning is only valuable in identifying new resources and not evaluating
2 PacifiCorp's existing resource base.¹⁸ More importantly, contrary to Dr. Fisher's
3 claim, the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio assumes the early retirement of five existing
4 units (a 3,650 MW reduction in coal capacity) in addition to selecting new, least-cost
5 resources, as discussed above.

6 **Q. Does PacifiCorp only evaluate whether to retire its coal resources when faced**
7 **with the decision to make a significant capital investment, as Dr. Fisher claims?**

8 A. No. As PacifiCorp's responses to Sierra Club's data requests plainly show,
9 PacifiCorp considers early retirement of existing coal units based on economic
10 analysis of early retirement relative to continued operation, in addition to evaluating
11 early retirement as an alternative to major capital investments.¹⁹ PacifiCorp's 2017
12 IRP also considered the economic retirement of coal resources, which assesses run-
13 rate operating costs and potential resource replacement costs on a present-value
14 revenue requirement basis.

15 PacifiCorp addressed its process for considering early retirement of existing
16 coal resources in its supplemental response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4(d).²⁰

17 This is the same data response that Dr. Fisher claims makes PacifiCorp sound like a
18 "secretive government agency."²¹

19 This inappropriate characterization is refuted by the data response itself.

20 Sierra Club asked if PacifiCorp "ever evaluated" potential early retirement of coal

¹⁸ Fisher Direct, p. 24 (lines 15–19).

¹⁹ See Exhibit JIF-16, First Supplemental Response 1.4(d).

²⁰ Exhibit JIF-16, Request 1.4(d).

²¹ Fisher Direct, pp. 24 (line 28)–25 (line 2).

1 resources for purposes other than a comparison to major capital investments.²²

2 PacifiCorp responded that, after reviewing the available information and knowledge
3 of its current employees involved in resource planning, it could not confirm or deny
4 what studies may have been completed *over the existence of the utility*, which was the
5 scope of Sierra Club's question.²³ PacifiCorp then proceeded to provide a substantive
6 answer on its decision-making drivers, and confirmed that it does, in fact, consider
7 early retirement of coal resources independent of potential capital investments in its
8 resource planning.²⁴ PacifiCorp did not refuse to answer Sierra Club, nor was its
9 answer evasive. Dr. Fisher is attempting to re-write facts contained in his own
10 Exhibits.²⁵

11 **Q. Dr. Fisher draws three conclusions about PacifiCorp's evaluation of its coal**
12 **assets: that PacifiCorp views the IRP as a mechanism for evaluating new**
13 **resources only, not its long-term commitments to its coal plants; that PacifiCorp**
14 **does not conduct, or intend to conduct, least-cost planning regarding its coal**
15 **fleet, inside or outside of the IRP; and that PacifiCorp only evaluates its coal**
16 **fleet on a piecemeal basis when faced with impending capital investment**
17 **decisions.²⁶ Are Dr. Fisher's conclusions correct?**

18 A. No. As my rebuttal testimony shows, Dr. Fisher's conclusions are based on
19 misrepresentations or omissions. PacifiCorp uses the IRP as a mechanism to evaluate
20 its existing resources, including early retirement of coal plants, in addition to

²² Exhibit JIF-16, Request 1.4(d).

²³ Exhibit JIF-16, First Supplemental Response 1.4(d).

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ Fisher Direct, p. 25 (lines 2–5).

²⁶ Fisher Direct, pp. 24 (line 20)–25 (line 6).

1 evaluating how new resources can be used to meet our customer needs over a 20-year
2 planning time frame. Contrary to Dr. Fisher's claims, PacifiCorp conducts least-cost,
3 least-risk planning that considers the disposition of its existing coal fleet in the IRP,
4 and intends to continue doing so in future IRPs. And PacifiCorp evaluates its coal
5 fleet holistically in the IRP process under scenarios other than those that assume
6 impending large capital investments. For example, the regional haze scenarios in the
7 2017 IRP examine PacifiCorp's entire generation fleet using flexible compliance
8 scenarios to determine the optimal system-wide least-cost, least-risk resource
9 portfolio. These scenarios appropriately consider, as applicable, whether early
10 retirement of a specific unit can avoid the need for large capital investment.

11 **Q. Has Dr. Fisher, or Sierra Club, made arguments in other state utility**
12 **commission proceedings that are similar to the arguments being made in this**
13 **docket?**

14 A. Yes. Dr. Fisher filed similar comments on behalf of Sierra Club at the Public Service
15 Commission of Utah (Utah Commission) in response to PacifiCorp's 2017 IRP
16 challenging the company's coal analysis and requesting unit-specific economic coal
17 studies. Sierra Club also filed comments in the 2015 IRP at the Oregon Commission.

18 **Q. How were those arguments addressed by the commissions in other states?**

19 A. The Utah Commission found that PacifiCorp's approach to modeling coal resources
20 was reasonable for the 2017 IRP because PacifiCorp refined its analytical approach
21 beyond that used in the 2015 IRP. In addition, the Utah Commission found that
22 PacifiCorp presented regional haze obligations and incorporated stakeholder feedback
23 in developing its regional haze cases during the public input process and used

1 reasonable legal assumptions related to future compliance requirements, and that
2 PacifiCorp increased the number of modeled scenarios.²⁷ The Utah Commission also
3 acknowledged the voluntary commitment PacifiCorp made in its reply comments to
4 conduct additional unit-specific coal plant analysis by June 30, 2018, to inform the
5 2019 IRP public process. The Utah Commission went on to note that it was
6 “mindful, though, of the cautions PacifiCorp expressed in connection with that
7 commitment,” and stated that because the “additional analysis will be helpful only if
8 it supplements, rather than replaces, the type of coal plant modeling PacifiCorp
9 utilized for its 2017 IRP.”²⁸

10 The Oregon Commission was also unpersuaded by Sierra Club’s claims
11 regarding PacifiCorp’s planning and regulatory compliance related to coal-fired
12 generation in the 2015 IRP. The Oregon Commission acknowledged all aspects of
13 PacifiCorp’s coal resource analysis for compliance with the EPA’s regional haze rule,
14 which identified the need to install emissions control equipment or retire the specific
15 coal plants under evaluation.²⁹ In addition, in its order acknowledging the 2015 IRP,
16 the Oregon Commission directed PacifiCorp to “[u]se the same regional haze
17 assumptions when directly comparing portfolios,”³⁰ which PacifiCorp did in the 2017
18 IRP analysis to which Sierra Club objects.

²⁷ *PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order (March 2, 2018), p. 28
(<https://pscdocs.utah.gov/electric/17docs/1703516/3005351703516rao3-2-2018.pdf>).

²⁸ *PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order, p. 28.

²⁹ *In the Matter of PACIFICORP, dba PACIFIC POWER’s 2015 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Utilities Commission of Oregon Order No. 16-071 (February 29, 2016) pp. 7–8
(<http://apps.puc.state.or.us/edockets/orders.asp?OrderNumber=16-071>).

³⁰ *Id.* at Appendix A, p. 2.

1 **Q. Is there any other information in response to Dr. Fisher’s testimony that you**
2 **have not addressed above or would like to include?**

3 A. Yes. Dr. Fisher makes reference to analysis conducted by Sierra Club that indicated
4 over 40 percent of PacifiCorp’s coal fleet was “likely” non-economic.³¹ I have not
5 reviewed this analysis or its underlying assumptions in detail. However, a cursory
6 review of the structure of the analysis reveals that it cannot be viewed as a credible
7 critique of PacifiCorp’s least-cost, least-risk system-wide planning process. It is
8 based on a static view of the future from a single point in time, it does not
9 appropriately consider resource replacement costs, it does not consider system
10 interactions, and it was performed under numerous assumptions. Dr. Fisher’s
11 analysis is not relevant to PacifiCorp’s demonstration that it conducts its long-term
12 planning on a least-cost, least-risk basis, that this planning is performed system-wide,
13 and that this planning is used to develop the least-cost, least-risk combination of
14 resources to meet projected need across its system over a 20-year planning horizon.

15 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

16 A: Yes.

³¹ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 10–11) (Dr. Fisher made the same claim in the Utah Commission 2017 IRP proceeding, but the Utah commission did not give credence to Dr. Fisher’s argument. *See PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order (March 2, 2018), pp. 23, 28.

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7 interests” and does not represent least-cost portfolio planning.³

8 **Q. The first justification Dr. Fisher gives to support his view on PacifiCorp’s**
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10 **public process. Is Dr. Fisher correct?**

11 A. No. PacifiCorp’s biennial IRP undergoes an extensive public input process spanning
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14 For example, beginning in June 2016, PacifiCorp held five state-specific meetings
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5 **Q. Did the outcome of the endogenous retirement case RH-6 show that coal plant
6 early retirement was least-cost on a system-wide basis?**

7 A. No. The overall portfolio combination of resources in case RH-6 had higher net costs
8 relative to the other regional haze compliance cases that reflected a range of potential
9 negotiated compliance alternatives, and PacifiCorp’s analysis of alternative regional
10 haze compliance outcomes demonstrated that customers would benefit from potential
11 negotiated environmental compliance alternatives whereby costly SCR equipment can
12 be avoided by retiring certain units before the end of their depreciable life, but later
13 than the currently established regional haze compliance deadlines for SCR
14 installation. Consequently, the least-cost combination of resources that was
15 ultimately selected in the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio includes early retirement of
16 five of PacifiCorp’s coal plants over the 20-year study period and did not include any
17 incremental SCR equipment installations. PacifiCorp’s 2017 IRP preferred portfolio
18 coal-unit capacity is reduced by 3,650 MWs over the 20-year planning horizon.

1 **Q. Dr. Fisher claims that after PacifiCorp filed its 2017 IRP, “parties immediately**
2 **issued discovery” seeking to understand the basis of the coal plant scenarios and**
3 **economic value of the fleet but that PacifiCorp “provided no meaningful**
4 **response.”⁶ Is Dr. Fisher correct?**

5 A. No. Dr. Fisher’s statement implies that the issues he is presenting here were
6 ubiquitous among multiple parties, and that a high volume of discovery was issued
7 specific to the treatment of coal plant analysis to which PacifiCorp did not
8 substantively respond. This is factually inaccurate.

9 Among the intervening organizations that participated in formal state
10 commission proceedings on PacifiCorp’s 2017 IRP, 13 of them submitted in
11 aggregate over 250 discovery questions. Among those, only two intervening
12 organizations (other than Sierra Club) submitted questions that addressed the
13 company’s regional haze analysis, either as part of the question or tangentially as part
14 of the company’s response. Those two intervening organizations submitted fewer
15 than 10 questions related to the regional haze analysis, and PacifiCorp provided a
16 substantive response to all of those requests. Dr. Fisher specifically references a
17 request from Public Utility Commission of Oregon (Oregon Commission) Staff to
18 conduct unit-specific coal analysis, which was not submitted to PacifiCorp until
19 September 2017, over five months after the 2017 IRP was filed.⁷

⁶ Fisher Direct, pp. 21(lines 15-16)–22(line 1).

⁷ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 12–13); Exhibit JIF-14.

1 **Q. In regards to the September 2017 Oregon Commission Staff discovery request**
2 **referenced by Dr. Fisher, he states that the Oregon Commission Staff was**
3 **seeking an economic analysis of the coal fleet and “was refused.”⁸ Is this**
4 **statement accurate?**

5 A. No. PacifiCorp’s response to Oregon Commission Staff’s discovery request, which
6 Dr. Fisher included as an exhibit to his testimony, contains a detailed explanation of
7 why the Oregon Commission Staff’s requested analysis was unworkable.⁹ As
8 PacifiCorp explained in its response, the requested analysis would require
9 establishing as many as 24 unique data sets that would take several months to develop
10 and apply to the IRP model runs (Oregon Commission Staff asked if the analysis
11 could be done in 17 days).¹⁰ Moreover, the company explained that the structure of
12 the proposed unit-by-unit analysis did not capture system cost impacts that would
13 result from early retirements at more than one facility, and the results therefore would
14 have limited utility in establishing a least-cost, least-risk resource portfolio. The
15 hypothetical retirement dates at the end of 2022 were also unlikely to influence the
16 2017 IRP action plan, which identifies resource actions required over the near-term
17 two- to four-year period. For these reasons, PacifiCorp offered to hold a series of
18 stakeholder workshops in early 2018 to define parameters for future coal-unit
19 retirement analysis, with input and engagement from all IRP stakeholders.¹¹

⁸ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 3–4).

⁹ Exhibit JIF-15.

¹⁰ See Exhibit JIF-14 (OPUC Data Request 65 [submitted September 13, 2017].)

¹¹ Exhibit JIF-15.

1 **Q. Dr. Fisher claims that PacifiCorp agreed to undertake the coal asset-retirement**
2 **analysis only after the Oregon Commission “expressed mounting concern” over**
3 **PacifiCorp’s “continuous refusal.”¹² Is this accurate?**

4 A. No. As described above, PacifiCorp expressed concern regarding the initial 17-day
5 period to undertake the analysis proposed in the data request due to the greater
6 amount of time required to establish data sets for the modeling requested and to
7 conduct the studies. Notwithstanding PacifiCorp’s other concerns regarding the
8 studies described above, following further discussion with Oregon Commission Staff
9 around timing of the studies, PacifiCorp agreed to complete the studies within a
10 reasonable timeframe by June 30, 2018, and align the results of the studies with its
11 2019 IRP public input process which will start around that same time frame.

12 **Q. Did the Oregon Commission agree with PacifiCorp’s proposal and timing when**
13 **it acknowledged the company’s 2017 IRP in December 2017?**

14 A. Yes.

15 **Q. Dr. Fisher states that PacifiCorp inserted \$3 billion of new projects into the 2017**
16 **IRP a month before the resource plan was finalized and questions the**
17 **transparency of the process, claiming that large-scale planning assumptions**
18 **were altered outside an ongoing public process.¹³ Do you agree?**

19 A. No. Dr. Fisher mischaracterizes the nature of the resources selected in PacifiCorp’s
20 2017 IRP preferred portfolio and the public process by which the resource scenarios
21 were reviewed with stakeholders. In his critique, Dr. Fisher is specifically referring
22 to the new wind, transmission, and wind repower projects selected in the 2017 IRP

¹² Fisher Direct, p.22 (line 5).

¹³ Fisher Direct, p.22 (lines 11–12).

1 preferred portfolio. Specifically, the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio includes 1,100
2 MWs of new wind and a new 500 kV 140-mile transmission line in Wyoming, which
3 are expected to be in service by the end of 2020. The 2017 IRP preferred portfolio
4 also includes repowering 905 MWs of existing wind by the end of 2020. The new
5 wind, transmission, and repowered wind are collectively referred to as the Energy
6 Vision 2020 projects and were selected as part of the least-cost, least-risk
7 combination of resources to offset other more costly resource combinations to meet
8 system-wide load and resource needs over the 20-year planning horizon. Discussion
9 of these projects and related analysis was part of the 2017 IRP public process.

10 **Q. Please describe the timing of PacifiCorp's analysis that included the Energy**
11 **Vision 2020 projects in the 2017 IRP.**

12 A. In December 2016, PacifiCorp concluded that repowering wind units could generate
13 cost savings if implemented on at least a subset of wind facilities in the fleet. To
14 preserve the repowering option for application at additional facilities and to preserve
15 the option to qualify new wind facilities for the full value of federal production tax
16 credits (PTCs), subject to further review and analysis, PacifiCorp made safe harbor
17 wind equipment purchases at that time. PacifiCorp completed its additional review
18 and expanded economic analysis of wind repowering in early 2017, toward the end of
19 the IRP's public input process. In February 2017, PacifiCorp finalized its IRP
20 analysis of wind repowering.

21 Also in late 2016 and early 2017, PacifiCorp continued to study and refine its
22 resource portfolios, all of which contained new Wyoming wind resources. In
23 reviewing these resource portfolios, it became clear that the amount of Wyoming

1 wind was limited by transmission constraints. This led PacifiCorp to assess whether
2 additional wind resources enabled by sub-segments of PacifiCorp's Energy Gateway
3 West transmission line, which extends from eastern Wyoming to western Idaho,
4 would further lower system costs. Consequently, after the January public input
5 meeting, PacifiCorp incorporated the sub-segment Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline
6 transmission line as a specific sensitivity case in its broader Energy Gateway
7 sensitivity analysis. In late February, PacifiCorp's modeling of four Energy Gateway
8 transmission sensitivities indicated there were potential benefits to including the
9 Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline transmission line in the portfolio.

10 PacifiCorp rescheduled the February 2017 public input meeting to the first of
11 March to enable the company to complete and share its wind repowering analysis,
12 initially incorporated into the IRP process as a portfolio scenario referred to as OP-
13 REP, as well as its analysis of the Energy Vision 2020 new wind and transmission
14 projects. PacifiCorp expedited its analysis of the Energy Vision 2020 projects in the
15 IRP process even though these resource opportunities emerged just a few months
16 before the IRP's filing date; simultaneously, PacifiCorp was also completing its
17 analysis of 32 other potential resource portfolios initially presented in the January
18 2017 public input meeting.

19 At the March 2017 public input meeting, PacifiCorp presented this analysis to
20 stakeholders, where it communicated its intention to further refine key assumptions
21 for this sensitivity case. While the pre-filing stakeholder review process of Energy
22 Vision 2020 projects was necessarily limited by the timing of PacifiCorp's analysis, it
23 was in customers' interest to consider these resources and ultimately include them in

1 the 2017 IRP. PacifiCorp explicitly chose to share the results of its analysis with
2 stakeholders as they were being produced. Given the time-sensitivity of these
3 resource opportunities, delaying the IRP to allow additional pre-filing review was not
4 a viable option. Instead, PacifiCorp expeditiously completed the necessary analysis
5 and shared it with IRP stakeholders in real-time. Filing of the 2017 IRP on
6 April 4, 2017, signaled a new stage in the stakeholder review process, not the end of
7 it.

8 **Q. The second argument Dr. Fisher makes in support of his conclusion that**
9 **PacifiCorp does not engage in least-cost planning is that PacifiCorp does not**
10 **assess resources on a “consistent and comparable basis.”¹⁴ Is this accurate?**

11 A. No. Contrary to Dr. Fisher’s claims, PacifiCorp does not only assess new resources
12 against other new resources while ignoring comparative analysis of new resources in
13 relation to the existing coal fleet.¹⁵ First, Dr. Fisher’s assertion is based on a
14 misrepresentation of PacifiCorp’s response to a data request. The data request from
15 Sierra Club asked if the purpose of an IRP is “to identify the best mix of resources
16 system wide’ as ‘least-cost, least-risk’ or ‘to fill any gap between changes in loads
17 and existing resources.’”¹⁶ PacifiCorp’s response plainly states that “[t]he IRP
18 identifies the best mix of least-cost, least-risk resources system wide, *including* the
19 best mix of least-cost, least-risk resources to fill the gap between load and existing
20 generation.”¹⁷ This response does not indicate that PacifiCorp believes resource

¹⁴ Fisher Direct, pp. 23 (line 13)–24 (line 19).

¹⁵ Fisher Direct, p. 24 (lines 4–19).

¹⁶ Exhibit JIF-7, Data Request 1.3(b).

¹⁷ *Id.* (emphasis added).

1 planning is only valuable in identifying new resources and not evaluating
2 PacifiCorp's existing resource base.¹⁸ More importantly, contrary to Dr. Fisher's
3 claim, the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio assumes the early retirement of five existing
4 units (a 3,650 MW reduction in coal capacity) in addition to selecting new, least-cost
5 resources, as discussed above.

6 **Q. Does PacifiCorp only evaluate whether to retire its coal resources when faced**
7 **with the decision to make a significant capital investment, as Dr. Fisher claims?**

8 A. No. As PacifiCorp's responses to Sierra Club's data requests plainly show,
9 PacifiCorp considers early retirement of existing coal units based on economic
10 analysis of early retirement relative to continued operation, in addition to evaluating
11 early retirement as an alternative to major capital investments.¹⁹ PacifiCorp's 2017
12 IRP also considered the economic retirement of coal resources, which assesses run-
13 rate operating costs and potential resource replacement costs on a present-value
14 revenue requirement basis.

15 PacifiCorp addressed its process for considering early retirement of existing
16 coal resources in its supplemental response to Sierra Club Data Request 1.4(d).²⁰
17 This is the same data response that Dr. Fisher claims makes PacifiCorp sound like a
18 "secretive government agency."²¹

19 This inappropriate characterization is refuted by the data response itself.

20 Sierra Club asked if PacifiCorp "ever evaluated" potential early retirement of coal

¹⁸ Fisher Direct, p. 24 (lines 15–19).

¹⁹ See Exhibit JIF-16, First Supplemental Response 1.4(d).

²⁰ Exhibit JIF-16, Request 1.4(d).

²¹ Fisher Direct, pp. 24 (line 28)–25 (line 2).

1 resources for purposes other than a comparison to major capital investments.²²
2 PacifiCorp responded that, after reviewing the available information and knowledge
3 of its current employees involved in resource planning, it could not confirm or deny
4 what studies may have been completed *over the existence of the utility*, which was the
5 scope of Sierra Club’s question.²³ PacifiCorp then proceeded to provide a substantive
6 answer on its decision-making drivers, and confirmed that it does, in fact, consider
7 early retirement of coal resources independent of potential capital investments in its
8 resource planning.²⁴ PacifiCorp did not refuse to answer Sierra Club, nor was its
9 answer evasive. Dr. Fisher is attempting to re-write facts contained in his own
10 Exhibits.²⁵

11 **Q. Dr. Fisher draws three conclusions about PacifiCorp’s evaluation of its coal**
12 **assets: that PacifiCorp views the IRP as a mechanism for evaluating new**
13 **resources only, not its long-term commitments to its coal plants; that PacifiCorp**
14 **does not conduct, or intend to conduct, least-cost planning regarding its coal**
15 **fleet, inside or outside of the IRP; and that PacifiCorp only evaluates its coal**
16 **fleet on a piecemeal basis when faced with impending capital investment**
17 **decisions.²⁶ Are Dr. Fisher’s conclusions correct?**

18 A. No. As my rebuttal testimony shows, Dr. Fisher’s conclusions are based on
19 misrepresentations or omissions. PacifiCorp uses the IRP as a mechanism to evaluate
20 its existing resources, including early retirement of coal plants, in addition to

²² Exhibit JIF-16, Request 1.4(d).

²³ Exhibit JIF-16, First Supplemental Response 1.4(d).

²⁴ *Id.*

²⁵ Fisher Direct, p. 25 (lines 2–5).

²⁶ Fisher Direct, pp. 24 (line 20)–25 (line 6).

1 evaluating how new resources can be used to meet our customer needs over a 20-year
2 planning time frame. Contrary to Dr. Fisher's claims, PacifiCorp conducts least-cost,
3 least-risk planning that considers the disposition of its existing coal fleet in the IRP,
4 and intends to continue doing so in future IRPs. And PacifiCorp evaluates its coal
5 fleet holistically in the IRP process under scenarios other than those that assume
6 impending large capital investments. For example, the regional haze scenarios in the
7 2017 IRP examine PacifiCorp's entire generation fleet using flexible compliance
8 scenarios to determine the optimal system-wide least-cost, least-risk resource
9 portfolio. These scenarios appropriately consider, as applicable, whether early
10 retirement of a specific unit can avoid the need for large capital investment.

11 **Q. Has Dr. Fisher, or Sierra Club, made arguments in other state utility**
12 **commission proceedings that are similar to the arguments being made in this**
13 **docket?**

14 A. Yes. Dr. Fisher filed similar comments on behalf of Sierra Club at the Public Service
15 Commission of Utah (Utah Commission) in response to PacifiCorp's 2017 IRP
16 challenging the company's coal analysis and requesting unit-specific economic coal
17 studies. Sierra Club also filed comments in the 2015 IRP at the Oregon Commission.

18 **Q. How were those arguments addressed by the commissions in other states?**

19 A. The Utah Commission found that PacifiCorp's approach to modeling coal resources
20 was reasonable for the 2017 IRP because PacifiCorp refined its analytical approach
21 beyond that used in the 2015 IRP. In addition, the Utah Commission found that
22 PacifiCorp presented regional haze obligations and incorporated stakeholder feedback
23 in developing its regional haze cases during the public input process and used

1 reasonable legal assumptions related to future compliance requirements, and that
2 PacifiCorp increased the number of modeled scenarios.²⁷ The Utah Commission also
3 acknowledged the voluntary commitment PacifiCorp made in its reply comments to
4 conduct additional unit-specific coal plant analysis by June 30, 2018, to inform the
5 2019 IRP public process. The Utah Commission went on to note that it was
6 “mindful, though, of the cautions PacifiCorp expressed in connection with that
7 commitment,” and stated that because the “additional analysis will be helpful only if
8 it supplements, rather than replaces, the type of coal plant modeling PacifiCorp
9 utilized for its 2017 IRP.”²⁸

10 The Oregon Commission was also unpersuaded by Sierra Club’s claims
11 regarding PacifiCorp’s planning and regulatory compliance related to coal-fired
12 generation in the 2015 IRP. The Oregon Commission acknowledged all aspects of
13 PacifiCorp’s coal resource analysis for compliance with the EPA’s regional haze rule,
14 which identified the need to install emissions control equipment or retire the specific
15 coal plants under evaluation.²⁹ In addition, in its order acknowledging the 2015 IRP,
16 the Oregon Commission directed PacifiCorp to “[u]se the same regional haze
17 assumptions when directly comparing portfolios,”³⁰ which PacifiCorp did in the 2017
18 IRP analysis to which Sierra Club objects.

²⁷ *PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order (March 2, 2018), p. 28
(<https://pscdocs.utah.gov/electric/17docs/1703516/3005351703516rao3-2-2018.pdf>).

²⁸ *PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order, p. 28.

²⁹ *In the Matter of PACIFICORP, dba PACIFIC POWER’s 2015 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Utilities Commission of Oregon Order No. 16-071 (February 29, 2016) pp. 7–8
(<http://apps.puc.state.or.us/edockets/orders.asp?OrderNumber=16-071>).

³⁰ *Id.* at Appendix A, p. 2.

1 **Q. Is there any other information in response to Dr. Fisher’s testimony that you**
2 **have not addressed above or would like to include?**

3 A. Yes. Dr. Fisher makes reference to analysis conducted by Sierra Club that indicated
4 over 40 percent of PacifiCorp’s coal fleet was “likely” non-economic.³¹ I have not
5 reviewed this analysis or its underlying assumptions in detail. However, a cursory
6 review of the structure of the analysis reveals that it cannot be viewed as a credible
7 critique of PacifiCorp’s least-cost, least-risk system-wide planning process. It is
8 based on a static view of the future from a single point in time, it does not
9 appropriately consider resource replacement costs, it does not consider system
10 interactions, and it was performed under numerous assumptions. Dr. Fisher’s
11 analysis is not relevant to PacifiCorp’s demonstration that it conducts its long-term
12 planning on a least-cost, least-risk basis, that this planning is performed system-wide,
13 and that this planning is used to develop the least-cost, least-risk combination of
14 resources to meet projected need across its system over a 20-year planning horizon.

15 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

16 A: Yes.

³¹ Fisher Direct, p. 22 (lines 10–11) (Dr. Fisher made the same claim in the Utah Commission 2017 IRP proceeding, but the Utah commission did not give credence to Dr. Fisher’s argument. *See PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan*, Public Service Commission of Utah Docket No. 17-035-16, Report and Order (March 2, 2018), pp. 23, 28.