

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**



**FILED**  
08-29-11  
04:59 PM

Order Instituting Investigation on the )  
Commission's Own Motion Into the Planned ) I.11-06-009  
Purchase and Acquisition by AT&T Inc. of )  
T-Mobile USA, Inc., and its Effect on California )  
Ratepayers and the California Economy )  
\_\_\_\_\_ )

**ATTACHMENT A  
TO  
REPLY COMMENTS OF SPRINT NEXTEL**

Letter from Senator Herb Kohl, Chairman, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 20, 2011)

Letter from Al Franken, U.S. Senator, to Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, and Eric Holder, Attorney General, Department of Justice (July 26, 2011)

and

Letter from Edward J. Markey, Member, U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee; John Conyers, Jr., Ranking Member, U.S. House Judiciary Committee; and Anna G. Eshoo, Ranking Member, U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 20, 2011)

# United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275

July 20, 2011

The Honorable Eric Holder  
Attorney General  
United States Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20530

The Honorable Julius Genachowski  
Chairman  
Federal Communications Commission  
445 12th Street, S.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20554

Dear Attorney General Holder and Chairman Genachowski:

I write to you concerning the proposed acquisition by AT&T of T-Mobile USA, now under review at the Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission. The Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights recently held a hearing to examine the competitive issues surrounding this transaction, and we have now completed our examination of this deal. I have concluded that this acquisition, if permitted to proceed, would likely cause substantial harm to competition and consumers, would be contrary to antitrust law and not in the public interest, and therefore should be blocked by your agencies.

This acquisition would have enormous consequences for consumers. Cell phones are now ubiquitous in American life, with over 274 million subscribers, and have become almost a utility necessary for daily life. Therefore, in this industry, perhaps more than any other, full and vibrant competition is essential so that all consumers realize the benefits of this technology at the best prices and with the most choices. Much more than for voice calling, consumers now rely on their cell phones to access the Internet, exchange e-mail, watch TV and movies, and manage their busy lives. As you know, AT&T and T-Mobile are direct head-to-head competitors<sup>1</sup> and two of the only four wireless phone providers with national networks in the United States.<sup>2</sup> If this acquisition were to proceed, it would amount to a four-to-three merger among national cell phone providers in an already highly concentrated market. Today, the top four competitors – AT&T, Verizon, Sprint and T-Mobile – control over 90% of the cell phone market as measured by revenue. Should this proposed acquisition proceed, AT&T and Verizon will control nearly 80% of this market.

---

<sup>1</sup> The CEOs of T-Mobile and AT&T both acknowledged at our hearing that they were direct competitors of each other. Phillip Humm, CEO of T-Mobile, stated that “we are competing in the same markets.” Randall Stephenson of AT&T, when asked if the two companies were “major competitors,” stated “yes, sir, we are.”

<sup>2</sup> Each of these four nationwide service providers have mobile networks that cover more than 87.5 % of the U.S. population. FCC “Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Service” (released June 24, 2011) (hereinafter “2011 Wireless Competition Report”) ¶ 27.

T-Mobile has been a price leader in the cell phone market, offering prices and rate plans significantly less expensive than the other three national cell phone providers. According to a recent price analysis survey of voice and data plans conducted by Consumer Reports, “T-Mobile wireless plans typically cost \$15 to \$50 per month less than comparable plans from AT&T.”<sup>3</sup> Removal of such a maverick price competitor from such a highly concentrated market – a competitor that disciplines price increases from all three other national cell phone competitors, not only AT&T – raises a substantial likelihood that prices will rise following this merger. Such a result is unacceptable under antitrust law and as a matter of communications policy.

Under antitrust law, a merger or acquisition from four to three main competitors in an already significantly concentrated market is highly suspect under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the statute that forbids mergers and acquisitions which “may tend to substantially lessen competition.” Indeed, just last year in comments to the FCC on the proposed national broadband plan, the Justice Department stated that “based on its extensive experience in evaluating horizontal mergers, the Department starts from the presumption that in highly concentrated markets consumers can be significantly harmed when the number of strong competitors declines from four to three...”<sup>4</sup> There can be no doubt that the wireless phone market – with four national competitors controlling over 90% of the market – is a highly concentrated market.<sup>5</sup>

An acquisition which would decrease the number of national competitors from four to three in an already highly concentrated market, and one that eliminates the low price competitor from this market, is in my view highly dangerous to competition and consumers. It will likely tend to substantially lessen competition, lead to consumers paying high prices with fewer choices, as well as lessen the innovation that has been the keystone of this industry in the last decade. It is my judgment that this acquisition in such a vital consumer service should be blocked by your agencies as contrary to antitrust law and not in the public interest under communications law.

AT&T and T-Mobile defend this acquisition on several grounds, all which are without merit in my view. First, they contend that this acquisition should not be evaluated on a national basis, but instead on a local market-by-market basis. They contend that there are several other mobile phone providers in many local markets beyond the four national carriers, so that this is not a four to three merger in the majority of local markets.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Blyskal, Jeff, *CR analysis: T-Mobile is cheaper than AT&T*, Consumer Reports Online (April 8, 2011) found at <http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2011/04/cr-analysis-t-mobile-is-cheaper-than-att.html>

<sup>4</sup> *Ex Parte* Submission of the U.S. Department of Justice, “In the Matter of Economic Issues in Broadband Competition: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future,” FCC GN Docket No. 09-51 (Jan. 4, 2010), at page 15. The leading antitrust treatise, summarizing the existing case law and government precedents, notes that significant mergers in highly concentrated markets “bear a strong presumption of illegality.” It adds that mergers “reducing the number of ‘significant’ firms from four to three, or five to four, typically fall into this classification.” Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Vol. IV, ¶ 925c at p. 131 (3d Ed. 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Under the joint Justice Department/Federal Trade Commission merger guidelines, a market is considered “highly concentrated” when the Hirschman-Hirschfeld Index (HHI, the standard measure of market concentration) is over 2500. U.S. Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (issued Aug. 19, 2010)(hereinafter “DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines”) at p.131. According to the FCC, the weighted average HHI index for the cell phone industry was 2848. 2011 Wireless Competition Report ¶ 52.

<sup>6</sup> However, in prior wireless mergers, AT&T and its predecessor companies strongly argued that the wireless market was properly considered to be a national market. In its FCC filings, AT&T Wireless argued that its 2004 merger with Cingular “should be analyzed as national,” and AT&T argued that, in its 2008 merger with Centennial that “the evidence shows that the predominate forces driving competition among wireless carriers operate at the national level.”

However, I believe the market is properly evaluated on a national basis, and that the local competitors are not competitively significant players in this national market. Unlike landline phones, which are fixed in one location, consumers purchase wireless phone service because the phones are mobile and travel with the consumer. Therefore wireless phone companies must provide service throughout the United States, not merely in the localities in which they are based.

No other cell phone companies beyond the four national carriers have their own national networks on which to provide nationwide coverage. Therefore, when a local or regional carrier – such as Leap/Cricket, Metro PCS, US Cellular, or Cellular South – seeks to provide service to customers travelling outside that company’s local or regional service area, it must “roam” on the network of another carrier, typically one of the four national carriers, and pay substantial roaming fees to these carriers.

In addition, the local and regional cell phone companies have stated that they often have difficulties in gaining roaming agreements with the national carriers, despite these carriers’ legal obligations to do so. Until recently, there was not even a legal right to roam for non-voice applications such as internet connections (so-called “data roaming”) so vital for the operation of smartphones. Although the FCC in April enacted new rules requiring the national carriers to offer limited data roaming at commercially reasonable rates, these rules have been challenged by Verizon in court as being outside the FCC’s authority. Even if the FCC’s authority is upheld, it is unclear what will constitute “commercially reasonable” rates.<sup>7</sup> The bottom line is that the smaller local and regional cell phone companies will be paying their national competitors large sums of money in order to provide their customers nationwide cell phone service. Placing such a key input in the hands of their national competitors unquestionably will hamstring these smaller carriers in their efforts to compete with the national cell phone companies.

A similar issue arises with respect the local wireless carriers’ need to connect to the incumbent phone companies’ (principally AT&T and Verizon) landline networks in order to complete phone calls. In order to do so, they must pay large amounts in what is known as “special access” charges. In fact, one industry expert estimated that AT&T and Verizon collect profits of at least \$ 10 billion in special access charges annually.<sup>8</sup> It has been estimated that AT&T and Verizon collectively collect 81% of all special access revenues within their service territories.<sup>9</sup> Indeed, at

---

See Cingular and AT&T Wireless Public Interest Statement in the Cingular/AT&T Wireless Merger (March 2004) at p. 30; AT&T Public Interest Filing, Merger of AT&T, Inc. and Centennial Communications, November 21, 2008 at p. 28.

<sup>7</sup> It is also highly questionable under the FCC Order whether data roaming rights will extend to the next generation of smartphones. “In the Matter of the Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services (FCC April 7, 2011) ¶ 47 (“it is also commercially reasonable for a provider to refuse to enter into a data roaming arrangement for a particular data service where it is not technically feasible to provide roaming for such service and where any changes to its network that are necessary to accommodate such data roaming are economically unreasonable”).

<sup>8</sup> Declaration of Lee J. Selwin on behalf of The Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee, “In the Matter of Application of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG For Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorization,” FCC WT Docket No. 11-65 (hereinafter “FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding”) ¶ 33 (filed May 31, 2011).

<sup>9</sup> Written Testimony of Paul Schieber, Vice President of Access and Roaming, Sprint Nextel, Hearing of the House Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet On An Examination of Competition in the Wireless Industry, May 7, 2009, at p. 5 (citing 2007 FCC ARMIS Report 43-01, Table 1). Even T-Mobile complained last year regarding special access charges, stating “in areas where ILECs continue to enjoy a monopoly, backhaul costs remain unreasonably high.” May 6, 2010 Letter from Kathleen O’Brien Ham, Vice President, T-Mobile to Marlene H. Dortch,

our hearing, Dan Hesse of Sprint testified that “30 percent of the cost of putting in a new cell site goes back to a local landline carrier in the form of payments for special access, and those rates are very, very high.” The fact that the local and regional wireless phone companies effectively subsidize their national competitors to access their landline networks is another factor that strongly restrains these local and regional competitors from serving as full-fledged competitors.

Additionally, the local and regional phone companies are further handicapped from competing fully with the national competitors because they cannot offer consumers many of the most in-demand smartphones, including for example, the iPhone. Cell phones have undergone substantial technological advancements in recent years. Consumers now rely on their wireless devices for far more than making phone calls, but use them instead to search the Internet, to exchange emails, and to run numerous applications. According to the 2011 FCC Wireless Competition Report, in April 2009, 69% of American adults had used some type of non-voice, mobile data service. Wireless Competition Report, ¶164. Further, during the third quarter of 2010, an estimated 41% of recent handset purchases were of advanced smartphones, and this number is growing. *Id.* ¶ 2, p. 20. Offering the most up to date smartphones is crucially important to being a competitive cell phone carrier, and these smaller carriers cannot get access to many of these devices because only the national carriers have the subscriber base and the leverage to get multi-year exclusive contracts for these smartphones. The fact that many of the most in-demand smartphones are not available to carriers other than the four national cell companies is, therefore, another reason that the local and regional companies cannot be considered to be full-fledged competitors.

Another important indication that competition occurs on the national, and not local, level is the fact that the major carriers all have national pricing plans. T-Mobile forthrightly admitted this in its answers to my written follow-up questions after the hearing, stating that “T-Mobile’s pricing plans have historically been set on a nationwide basis.”<sup>10</sup> Likewise AT&T’s pricing plans for voice and data services are set on a national basis. This is strong evidence that competition for cell phone services is national. Common sense dictates that if local competition was relevant, one would see different pricing plans offered in different localities. The absence of such local price competition belies the parties’ contention that the cell phone market is a local, not national, market.<sup>11</sup>

In summary, on the issue of national vs. local market, I believe this acquisition is properly analyzed on a national basis as a merger of two of the four national cell phone companies. The local competitors that AT&T cites are not full-fledged competitors to the four national carriers, as they are hamstrung by their need to pay their national competitors large sums in roaming and special access charges (and their ability to obtain data roaming for new technologies is seriously in question) and their inability to access many of the most in-demand smartphones. Moreover, the

---

Secretary, FCC (Re: Notice of Ex Parte Communication: *Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers*, WC Docket No. 05-25).

<sup>10</sup> Phillipp Humm Answer to Question # 3, “Follow-Up Questions of Sen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on ‘The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?’”

<sup>11</sup> AT&T and Verizon contend that they offer local promotions for such items as new phone pricing. T-Mobile asserts that they have created “locally-focused operations teams in 23 discrete local areas.” Phillipp Humm Answer to Question 3, “Follow-Up Questions of Sen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on ‘The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?’” Whatever the companies’ occasional local promotions with respect to telephone handsets or their creation of “locally-focused operations teams” in their corporate bureaucracy, the fact remains that the pricing of the fundamental service at issue here – the price of voice minutes and internet data connections – is set on a national, not local, level.

fact that prices for the basic components of cell phone service – voice and data connections – are set on a uniform national basis is strong support for analyzing this acquisition on a national basis.

AT&T and T-Mobile also justify this acquisition by arguing that it will improve the service offered to current customers of both AT&T and T-Mobile. Specifically they claim the deal will (i) solve the alleged problem of T-Mobile not having a “clear path” to the newest wireless technology, so-called 4G LTE, (ii) enable AT&T to serve more customers in rural areas, and (iii) enable AT&T to better serve customers in urban areas, where it contends AT&T is running out of spectrum. I find none of these arguments convincing to justify such a clearly anti-competitive acquisition.

We must be mindful of the fact that in evaluating these asserted merger efficiencies, under the Justice Department/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, antitrust enforcers “credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects... Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.”<sup>12</sup> In my view, AT&T and T-Mobile have not made the requisite showing and many of their asserted efficiencies are highly speculative at best.

First, the argument that T-Mobile does not have a sufficient plan to serve consumers with 4G LTE services is contrary to T-Mobile’s own business plans immediately prior to the announcement of the acquisition. On January 20, 2011, at an investor conference, T-Mobile’s Chief Technology Officer Neville Ray stated, “I think there has been a belief that there is spectrum shortage at T-Mobile. That is not the case in the near term or the medium term. If you look at your volume of spectrum that T-Mobile has today, our ability to grow in the wireless data space is much stronger than our competition. So we are in a good spot, and do not have a shortage of spectrum.” It appears that T-Mobile indeed has a well developed plan to serve consumers with 4G services, and extensive spectrum holdings to do so, without the need to enter into this acquisition.<sup>13</sup>

Second, AT&T’s claim that it needs this acquisition to serve rural areas with advanced wireless services is not a sufficient reason to support this merger. While we of course recognize the vital importance of wide broadband deployment to underserved rural communities, the record simply does support the notion that this acquisition is necessary to achieve this goal. Specifically, AT&T claims it will be able to serve 97% of the nation’s population with the next generation 4G LTE’s services within six years after this acquisition<sup>14</sup>, up from the 80% it now plans to serve in the future. AT&T’s assertion that the deal will help it expand by 17% a new generation of cell phone service not yet deployed *six years from now* is plainly too speculative and uncertain to justify this merger under the antitrust laws. Further, it appears that much of the spectrum to be acquired

---

<sup>12</sup> DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010) at p. 30.

<sup>13</sup> Moreover, it is clear that T-Mobile is a highly profitable company. The FCC reports that T-Mobile had an EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization, a common industry measure of profits) margin of 29.1% for the fourth quarter of 2009. FCC Wireless Competition Report at p. 137. T-Mobile reported an OIBDA (Operating Income Before Depreciation and Amortization) margin of 29% for all of 2010. See <http://www.tmobile.com/Cms/Files/Published/0000BDF20016F5DD010312E2BDE4AE9B/5657114502E70FF3012FD6A0635D5CAB/file/TMUS%20Q1%202011%20Press%20Release-Final.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Randall Stephenson Answer to Question 1(d), Questions for the Record of Sen. Al Franken, Hearing on “The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty-Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?”

by AT&T does not even serve the rural areas that AT&T claims will benefit from the transaction.<sup>15</sup> Thus the deployment of rural wireless cannot be considered a “merger specific” efficiency under the Merger Guidelines. The FCC national broadband plan shows that there are many ways to achieve the laudable goal of widespread broadband deployment to rural areas without the market consolidation and risks to competition inherent in AT&T’s acquisition of T-Mobile.

AT&T’s claims regarding the enhancement of service in urban areas as a result of this acquisition are likewise unpersuasive. There was considerable testimony at our hearing that service enhancements could be achieved by investing in new equipment and cell sites and other technological upgrades.<sup>16</sup> It seems that AT&T could achieve the goal of improving service by spending a portion of the \$39 billion it plans to spend to acquire T-Mobile, and without seriously injuring competition in the process.

Another serious concern posed by this proposed acquisition is the future of the third national competitor – Sprint – should this deal take place. There is considerable doubt as to whether Sprint could survive as an independent competitor should AT&T and Verizon capture a combined 80% market share after this acquisition. The CEO of Sprint, Dan Hesse, testified at our hearing that this acquisition would make “the competitive environment... much more difficult for Sprint” and that Sprint would be “much more of a takeover target.” When asked directly if, after this acquisition, there was a danger in the market going “from three to two,” Hesse replied “[t]hat is correct, Senator.” Hesse pointed out Sprint would be at a significant disadvantage in getting access to advanced smartphones, as AT&T and Verizon would have “tremendous scale advantages” over Sprint with the device manufacturers. Further, he argued, Sprint would be subsidizing its competition substantially with special access fees paid to AT&T and Verizon.<sup>17</sup>

While we recognize that antitrust policy is not designed to protect any specific competitor, but competition generally, we cannot turn a blind eye to the dangerous possibility that this acquisition could ultimately result in a duopoly in the national cell phone market. In my view, a duopoly in this crucial marketplace would be a wholly unacceptable outcome.

Having concluded that this proposed acquisition would seriously harm competition, I find no feasible or practical merger conditions that could significantly remedy this harm. Further, placing far reaching conditions on this deal would involve extensive regulatory supervision and interference with the complex, on-going business operations of AT&T. A structural solution to the competition problems posed by the proposed acquisition – that is, simply prohibiting the proposed acquisition –

---

<sup>15</sup> According to the Consumers Union and other public interest groups’ FCC filing, T-Mobile’s spectrum holdings “would appear to be largely duplicative of AT&T’s holdings when it comes to geographic coverage.” Joint Petition to Deny of Center for Media Justice, Consumers Union, et. al., FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding at p. 33 (filed May 31, 2011). And according to Sprint Nextel, “AT&T’s spectrum footprint already covers 97 percent of the U.S. population; the addition of T-Mobile’s spectrum would produce very little further coverage.” Reply Comments of Sprint Nextel, FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding at p. 69 (filed June 20, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> For example, Gigi Sohn of Public Knowledge asserted that “Verizon has fewer spectrum holdings compared to AT&T and has more customers, but it has clearly stated that it does not envision having capacity issues until 2015 at the earliest. . . . AT&T still has significant amounts of unused spectrum capacity available and has not taken full advantage of technologies that would make more efficient use of its existing spectrum assets and capacity.” Gigi Sohn Answer to Question 7, “Follow-Up Questions of Sen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on ‘The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?’ ”

<sup>17</sup> See also, New York Times Dealbook, “T-Mobile Deal Leaves Sprint’s Future Unclear,” (March 20, 2011) <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/t-mobile-deal-leaves-sprints-future-unclear/?pagemode=print>


is far preferable. In general, taking necessary action to preserve competition is a much better course of action than extensive governmental regulation and entanglement with complicated and quickly changing technology markets.

In sum, the proposed acquisition of T-Mobile by AT&T would, in my view, create a substantially lessening of competition, and therefore is contrary to antitrust law and should be enjoined. It will eliminate the head-to-head competition between AT&T and T-Mobile, reduce an already concentrated national cell phone market from four to three competitors, and result in two of these competitors – AT&T and Verizon – controlling about 80% of the cell phone market. It will pose a substantial danger to consumers of higher cell phone bills and fewer choices for service at exactly the wrong time – when consumers are relying more and more every day on wireless phone services to make and receive voice calls, exchange emails and text messages, search the Internet, and use many other applications.

Approval of this acquisition would also reverse the historic triumph of competition policy of three decades ago – the breaking up of the AT&T phone monopoly into numerous competitors, unleashing an explosion of innovation that led to such technologies as cell phones and the Internet. To replace the AT&T phone monopoly of the last century with a near-duopoly of AT&T and Verizon today would be harmful to consumers, contrary to antitrust law and not in the public interest under communications law, and I therefore urge your agencies to take all necessary actions to deny approval of this merger.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Herb Kohl". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

HERB KOHL

Chairman, Subcommittee on  
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and  
Consumer Rights

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-2309

July 26, 2011

Chairman Julius Genachowski  
Commissioner Michael J. Copps  
Commissioner Robert M. McDowell  
Commissioner Mignon Clyburn  
Federal Communications Commission  
445 12<sup>th</sup> Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20554

The Honorable Eric Holder  
Attorney General  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

Dear Chairman Genachowski, Commissioners, and Attorney General Holder:

I am writing to encourage the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to reject the proposal of AT&T, Inc. (AT&T) and Deutsche Telekom AG to transfer control of the licenses held by T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) and its subsidiaries to AT&T. Allowing this merger to proceed would lead to an effective duopoly in the national wireless market that would result in higher prices for consumers and potentially thousands of job losses. My examination of this transaction has led me to conclude that AT&T's acquisition of T-Mobile would substantially lessen competition in the already highly concentrated wireless communications market. In addition to my antitrust concerns, I am convinced that this type of horizontal consolidation does not serve the public interest. Consumers, businesses, regional wireless service providers, and handset manufacturers all depend on a competitive wireless market. The destruction of that competition would have grave repercussions for the economy as a whole and cannot be ameliorated by the application of conditions. I urge you to deny this proposal in its entirety. Below is a more detailed list of my specific concerns.

### **I. THE MERGER WOULD UNDERMINE COMPETITION IN THE NATIONAL WIRELESS MARKET**

When considering an acquisition of this size, it is important to remember the history of telecommunications in this country. In the early twentieth century, AT&T convinced President Woodrow Wilson to support its monopoly using the argument that the country would benefit and telecommunications services would spread more rapidly if the services were developed and controlled by a single government-sanctioned monopoly. The DOJ began its attempts to regulate this monopoly when it entered into the 1913 Kingsbury Commitment, which purportedly facilitated competition by local service carriers. Over the next 70 years, AT&T was permitted to acquire hundreds of small companies and enjoyed a near total monopoly on long distance telephone service in the United States. This monopoly also allowed "Ma Bell" to control a majority of local telephone service, and it gave Ma Bell the ability to require customers to lease standard telephones from AT&T, rather than permitting third parties to connect telephones to AT&T's network. This monopoly came at great cost to consumers, who were charged exorbitant rates for long distance service. Eventually, after an antitrust suit that began in 1949 and a

subsequent suit in 1974, the DOJ managed to secure a court order that directed AT&T to split its local service operations into seven separate companies in 1984. The clear intent of this suit was to end Ma Bell. But AT&T has managed to reacquire four of the seven companies it was forced to divest in 1984, and through a series of other acquisitions of companies and spectrum purchases, it has re-established dominance in the wired market and gone on to establish dominance in the wireless market.

AT&T and T-Mobile now request that you ignore this history and approve a transaction that will concentrate wireless competition into two enormous corporations, essentially creating a duopoly market. AT&T argues that “[t]his transaction will leave the wireless marketplace fiercely competitive.”<sup>1</sup> This claim could not be further from the truth. On June 27, 2011, the FCC issued its annual report on competition in the mobile wireless industry. For the second year in a row, the FCC found that the market was highly concentrated.<sup>2</sup> The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a measure of market concentration, is used by both the DOJ and the FCC to measure the concentration of markets. The DOJ guidelines categorize a market with an HHI over 2,500 as “highly concentrated.”<sup>3</sup> The FCC, employing the same guidelines, found that the HHI for the wireless market “remains above the threshold for a ‘highly concentrated’ market. It also appears that consumers are no longer enjoying falling prices, according to the CPI [consumer price index] for cellular services.”<sup>4</sup> Industry analysts calculate that the merger will increase the HHI for the entire wireless market from 2,500 to 3,200,<sup>5</sup> and the HHI for the national post-paid wireless market could reach as high as 3,600.<sup>6</sup> Increasing the HHI by 700 points would transform an already highly concentrated market into an incredibly concentrated market. Furthermore, Verizon and AT&T currently own six of the seven “Baby Bells” between them, and they also control 70 percent of the postpaid national wireless market. After an acquisition of T-Mobile, economists cited by Sprint estimate that AT&T and Verizon would control 82 percent of the postpaid national wireless subscriber base.<sup>7</sup>

AT&T further contends that if this merger is approved, it will enable the company to deploy LTE broadband to more than 97 percent of Americans and “help fulfill this Administration’s pledge to ‘connect[] every part of America to the digital age.’”<sup>8</sup> This pledge is not unlike the promise AT&T made in the Kingsbury Commitment to interconnect its phone

---

<sup>1</sup> Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 1 (FCC filed April 21, 2011) (“Description of Transaction”).

<sup>2</sup> Michael J. Copps, Statement, *Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services*, 15 FCC CMRS COMPETITION REP. 1, 305 (June 24, 2011), available at [http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=cmrs\\_reports](http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=cmrs_reports).

<sup>3</sup> U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1 (issued Aug. 8, 1997), <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf> (“HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES”).

<sup>4</sup> Copps, *supra* note 2, at 305.

<sup>5</sup> Sarah Barry James, *Regulatory Outlook for AT&T/T-Mobile: Cloudy with Chance for Approval*, SNL KAGAN (Mar. 24, 2011).

<sup>6</sup> The HHI for the national, post-paid wireless market would be 3,595 based on the estimates that AT&T would control 43% of the market, Verizon would control 39%, and Sprint would control 15%. *See also* Sprint Nextel Petition to Deny, Attachment A, Economic Analysis of the Merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, Joint Declaration of Steven C. Salop et al., Charles River Associates, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 37-8 (FCC filed May 31, 2011)

(“Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny”).

<sup>7</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 37-8.

<sup>8</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 1.

system with other independent companies to promote and foster universal telephone service. But as we learned during the Ma Bell era, when power is concentrated in the hands of a single company, consumers suffer. AT&T's broadband commitments are not sufficient to mitigate the competitive harms of this deal, and I am skeptical that AT&T will adhere to these commitments. Mergers in highly concentrated markets such as this have historically been rejected by both the FCC and the DOJ. For example, the proposed merger between Sprint and WorldCom was rejected because it would have concentrated the control of 80 percent of the long distance telephone service market in the hands of three companies.<sup>9</sup> In this case, the merger of T-Mobile and AT&T would consolidate 82 percent of the wireless market in the hands of only two companies. In the Sprint and WorldCom merger trial, the DOJ cited the facts that the merger would result in an HHI of 3,000 in the Internet backbone market and 3,800 in the long distance market as the primary reasons to reject the merger.<sup>10</sup> In this case, the merger would result in an HHI of 3,600 in the national, post-paid, wireless market.<sup>11</sup> By any metric, the proposed merger between AT&T and T-Mobile falls within the range of mergers that the DOJ and the FCC have historically rejected.

Competition is much easier to preserve than to restore once it is destroyed. After AT&T was allowed to secure a monopoly over the wired telephone market in the early twentieth century, it took the DOJ and the FCC ninety years to restore competition. Even today the market is still greatly controlled and affected by the infrastructure that was built during AT&T's monopoly years. If the limited competition that currently exists in the wireless market is shattered by approval of this deal, I fear it will take decades to recreate.

**a. The Relevant Market is the National, Postpaid, Wireless Data and Voice Market**

AT&T's products compete with other national, postpaid services that support both data and voice. When considering the competitive impact of this deal, I urge both the DOJ and the FCC to consider its impact on the national market in addition to its impact on local and regional markets. Analyzing the impact on the national market is important for several reasons. First, the dynamics of the wireless industry have changed dramatically in the last several years, and this is reflected in how wireless carriers manage their business and market their products. National carriers, such as AT&T, Verizon, Sprint, and T-Mobile, sell their products in the national marketplace. They promote handset deals, rate plans, and service coverage by relying on national maps and national comparisons. The national carriers generally do not differentiate prices by region or offer different packages in different regions. In fact, the advertising campaigns of the national carriers are primarily focused on the very fact that they are national. Competing ads featuring coverage maps of the United States have become the mainstay of both Verizon and AT&T. AT&T emphasizes the national size of its network by using the slogan "More Bars in More Places,"<sup>12</sup> while Verizon contends that it offers "America's largest and most reliable wireless network."<sup>13</sup> Sprint markets itself as "America's Favorite 4G Network;"<sup>14</sup> and

<sup>9</sup> John Borland, *DOJ Files to Block WorldCom-Sprint Merger*, CNET (June 27, 2000), [http://news.cnet.com/DOJ-files-to-block-WorldCom-Sprint-merger/2100-1033\\_3-242457.html](http://news.cnet.com/DOJ-files-to-block-WorldCom-Sprint-merger/2100-1033_3-242457.html).

<sup>10</sup> Complaint, *U.S. v. WorldCom*, No. 1:00CV02789 (Dep't of Justice filed Dec. 21, 2000).

<sup>11</sup> *Supra* note 6 (describing HHI calculated based on market share projections).

<sup>12</sup> Bryan Gardiner, *AT&T 'More Bars in More Places' is the New 'Fewest Dropped Calls'*, WIRED (Aug. 23, 2007), available at <http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2007/08/att-more-bars-i/> (last visited June 30, 2011).

<sup>13</sup> *America's Most Reliable Wireless Network*, VERIZON WIRELESS, <http://www.verizonwireless.com/its-the-network.shtml> (last visited June 30, 2011).

T-Mobile uses the slogan “America’s Largest 4G Network.”<sup>15</sup> These advertisements run nationally and are supplemented by product placement arrangements with the national and international media. The national carriers would not spend so many resources on marketing and promoting the national nature of their networks if this was not an important and relevant factor in how consumers make purchasing decisions.

Second, national carriers are able to gain significant efficiencies as a result of their national coverage. As AT&T stated in its declaration in support of its acquisition of Centennial Communications Corporation, “[p]roviding the same plans across the country is more cost-efficient: national plans eliminate the administrative costs that were associated with local plans, which required customized training for sales and customer service personnel, and also permit AT&T to contract more easily with national retailers to sell AT&T wireless service, an additional efficiency.”<sup>16</sup> Customers expect their phones to function across the United States, which requires regional and local carriers to enter into national roaming agreements. This places regional carriers, which struggle to negotiate reasonable roaming rates with the national carriers, at an enormous disadvantage when competing for customers who travel or business customers that have employees outside of a single region. Regional carriers cannot discipline the prices of the national carriers because those prices are part of their own costs. As Leap Wireless noted in its Petition to Deny this merger, when national carriers raise prices both on service plans and roaming, regional carriers have no choice but to raise their own prices to cover the increased roaming rates.<sup>17</sup>

Third, the national carriers consistently have exclusive arrangements to offer the most desirable handsets. Many mobile phone customers today select a provider based on the handsets offered. National carriers have the ability to secure exclusive agreements with the manufacturers of the most popular handsets, but regional carriers do not.<sup>18</sup> This puts the national carriers in a very different market. Regional carriers end up only being able to offer less desirable and less marketed mobile phones, which the national carriers have rejected or do not deem worthy of an exclusive deal.

I urge your agencies to investigate this issue thoroughly, and I strongly encourage you to meet with handset manufacturers to ask them detailed questions that will uncover more information about the nature of their negotiations and agreements with national wireless carriers. Companies like Apple are in a unique position to explain the history of their negotiations with AT&T and Verizon prior to the launch of the iPhone in 2007, and what, if any, concerns they had about entering into an exclusive deal. Handset manufacturers, including Motorola, Samsung, and Nokia, should be able to provide relevant information about why and how they

---

<sup>14</sup> *Sprint-All Together Now*, SPRINT, <http://now.sprint.com/alltogethernow/?pid=2> (last visited June 30, 2011).

<sup>15</sup> *Get 4G Mobile Data Plans on America’s Largest 4G Network*, T-MOBILE.COM, <http://t-mobile-coverage.t-mobile.com/4g-network-coverage> (last visited June 30, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, Attachment, Declaration of David A. Christopher, WT Docket No. 08-246 at 2 (FCC filed Nov. 21, 2008).

<sup>17</sup> Petition to Deny of Leap Wireless International and Cricket Communications, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 19 (FCC filed May 31, 2011).

<sup>18</sup> See, e.g., *id.* at 2; Petition of Cincinnati Bell Wireless LLC to Condition Consent or Deny Applications, WT No. 11-65 at ii (FCC filed May 31, 2011); *Tier 2 Wireless Carriers Clamoring for More Smartphones*, FIERCE WIRELESS, <http://www.fiercewireless.com/special-reports/tier-2-wireless-carriers-clamoring-more-smartphones> (last visited May 24, 2011).

were compelled to enter into exclusive deals with national wireless carriers. They should also be able to explain why it is not financially feasible for most manufacturers to launch their newest innovative technology with a local or regional carrier. Most of these companies have not come forward publicly, but I strongly urge your agencies to hold confidential discussions and diligently investigate how this deal will impact their future negotiations with AT&T and other national wireless companies. This understanding is critical to assess the overall impact of this merger on the national, postpaid wireless data and voice market.

Finally, prior to filing this application, AT&T has consistently acknowledged that the market it operates in is national, not regional.<sup>19</sup> For it to now reverse course and contend that Cellular South, Metro PCS, and Leap Wireless are true competitors<sup>20</sup> seems disingenuous. These and other regional carriers cannot compete with the national carriers either in terms of the handsets they offer, the national coverage they can provide their customers, their ability to set prices, or the economies of scale they can gain from marketing at a national level. The four national wireless providers inhabit a distinct market.

Furthermore, prepaid, voice only, or data only plans are very different products and are marketed and sold to very different customers. Service providers that lack either a data or a voice capability cannot support smartphones or provide the same range of features that the national providers supply. Postpaid plans require a credit check and a commitment for a term, whereas prepaid plans are month-to-month and are available to consumers with problematic credit.<sup>21</sup> Prepaid plans cannot subsidize handsets to nearly the extent that postpaid plans can, and as a result, they offer the least expensive and least complicated handsets. Prepaid phones generally target a low-income market while postpaid phones generally target a higher income market.

Proponents of the merger have chosen to include some or all of these ancillary markets in their analysis to alter the apparent effect on market concentration. This is misleading. The customer who is on the Internet researching the purchase of a two-year AT&T contract for an iPhone with an unlimited data plan is not simultaneously considering purchasing the voice only, regional, prepaid, “candy bar” telephone. While the market for regional, prepaid, mobile phones is substantial, AT&T and T-Mobile do not focus on this market nor does AT&T expect to see the most growth in this market in the coming years. As AT&T stated in its reply brief, “in the fourth quarter of 2010, integrated devices accounted for more than 80 percent of AT&T’s device sales in connection with contract plans.”<sup>22</sup> The national, prepaid, voice and data market must be considered in addition to the impact on the other affected markets.

---

<sup>19</sup> See *The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?* Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Dan Hesse, CEO, Sprint-Nextel); Applications of AT&T Inc. and Celco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless, Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, WT Docket No. 09-104 (FCC filed May 22, 2009); Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, WT Docket No. 08-246 (FCC filed Nov. 21, 2008); Description of Transaction, Public Interest Showing and Related Demonstrations, WT Docket No. 07-153 (FCC filed July 13, 2007).

<sup>20</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 12-3.

<sup>21</sup> Sprint Nextel Petition to Deny, Declaration of William Souder, *supra* note 6, at 9-10.

<sup>22</sup> Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc., Deutsche Telekom AG, and T-Mobile USA, Inc. to Petitions to Deny and Reply to Comments, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 20-21 (FCC filed June 10, 2011) (“Joint Opposition”).

**b. The Merger Would Risk an Effective Duopoly Forming in the National Marketplace**

If AT&T is allowed to acquire T-Mobile, three major national carriers will remain — AT&T, Verizon, and Sprint. Of these remaining three players, AT&T will be the largest, controlling 43 percent of the market.<sup>23</sup> Verizon will be the second largest provider, controlling 39 percent of the market.<sup>24</sup> Between the two companies, they will control 82 percent of national, postpaid, wireless subscribers. The wireless market is already highly concentrated. To allow this merger would result in a market that is effectively under the control of only two companies.

Sprint would be the third largest provider after AT&T and Verizon. Sprint would initially control 15 percent of the market.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately, Sprint would be unlikely to hold on to that market share. In terms of their 4G strategies, AT&T and Verizon have both committed to LTE technology while Sprint is committed to WiMAX. With T-Mobile removed from the equation, this means that once the companies' 4G rollout plans are complete, the U.S. market would be entirely LTE except for Sprint, which would place Sprint at a significant disadvantage. Handset manufacturers and technology innovators would not be interested in developing hardware that only Sprint could use, and Sprint's customers would face significant problems when travelling because their handsets would be technically unable to roam on other networks. In addition to these disadvantages, AT&T and Verizon would be in a very strong position to use their superior resources and spectrum to push Sprint out of the business. Verizon and AT&T would each have tremendous control over the roaming agreements Sprint would need to support non-4G phones, and they would be able to substantially increase roaming rates in an effort to push Sprint out of business or make it ripe for a takeover.

I fear that if this deal is approved, Sprint will not be able to exert significant competitive pressure on either Verizon or AT&T. In all likelihood, after a merger, Sprint's market share would steadily decline until it was acquired by either AT&T or Verizon. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the day after the merger proposal was announced shares of AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon all showed dramatic increases, while Sprint's shares fell 14 percent in value in a single day.<sup>26</sup> Not only have investors recognized the threat this merger would pose to Sprint, but they also recognize that if this merger is approved, it will benefit Verizon as well as AT&T. If Sprint were to go out of business as the result of this merger, the market would become entirely uncompetitive, prices would go up, and even more jobs would be lost.

**c. The Merger Would Enable AT&T and Verizon to Exclude Competitors from the Market**

I am also concerned that this merger would permit AT&T and Verizon to leverage their resources to suppress competition and prevent any existing or new companies from gaining a foothold in the national wireless market. By limiting competitors' access to popular handsets,

<sup>23</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 37-8.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*

<sup>26</sup> Ian Shapira and Jia Lynn Yang, *AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Blasted*, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 2011, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandt-t-mobile-merger-blasted/2011/03/21/ABHs3Y9\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/atandt-t-mobile-merger-blasted/2011/03/21/ABHs3Y9_story.html).

roaming agreements, and backhaul agreements, or by offering only unfavorable terms to obtain roaming or backhaul access, AT&T and Verizon would be able to further dominate the wireless marketplace to the detriment of consumers and competition.

Wireless service providers depend on access to the most popular handsets to attract and retain customers. Consumers place a high priority on access to the most desirable handsets, and extensive advertising campaigns are conducted to promote the latest, most innovative, handset technology. The national carriers often require that the manufacturers of the most popular handsets enter into exclusive agreements with them. For example, for the first three years of production, consumers wishing to use the extremely popular iPhone could only use AT&T as their service provider.<sup>27</sup> According to the FCC's analysis, AT&T enters into more exclusive handset agreements with manufacturers than any other national carrier.<sup>28</sup> In fact, AT&T has even gone so far as to demand that telephone manufacturers not support frequencies or technologies employed by their competitors so that their competitors are unable to support those handsets in the future.<sup>29</sup> The large market shares of the national carriers give them a great deal of leverage with manufacturers. Handset manufacturers want to work with a large, national player that will help them distribute and promote their product to a large number of customers. For this reason, at present, there is little incentive for a handset manufacturer to work with any company that is not a top four company, especially if the manufacturer is planning to roll out its best and most innovative designs. Today, a handset manufacturer like Apple could access almost the same number of potential customers by signing non-exclusive agreements with regional carriers, prepaid carriers, T-Mobile, and Sprint, as it could by signing a single exclusive agreement with either AT&T or Verizon. However, with T-Mobile removed from the pool of national carriers, this approach would not be nearly as strategically viable.

Roaming agreements are another tool that AT&T will be able to use to suppress competition. According to the regional and prepaid carriers, AT&T has a history of denying smaller carriers roaming agreements in order to marginalize or eliminate these carriers.<sup>30</sup> AT&T is especially reluctant to offer 3G and 4G roaming,<sup>31</sup> which forces regional or prepaid carriers to remain on outdated networks and handsets. This is particularly problematic for the GSM roaming market. Regional carriers employing GSM technology only have a choice between T-Mobile and AT&T for national roaming agreements. If this merger is approved, AT&T would have a monopoly on nationwide 3G GSM roaming service.<sup>32</sup> Even in the 15 cases where AT&T

---

<sup>27</sup> Dan Frommer, *AT&T's U.S. iPhone Exclusive Extended to 2010? Or Shortened from 2012?*, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 1, 2008), available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/8/at-t-s-u-s-iphone-exclusive-extended-to-2010-or-shortened-from-2012-aapl-t->.

<sup>28</sup> See Fed. Comm. Comm'n, *Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services*, 14 FCC CMRS COMPETITION REP. 1, Table C-5 (May 20, 2010), available at [http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs\\_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81A1.pdf](http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81A1.pdf) ("14 FCC REP.") (explaining that AT&T acquired fifteen exclusive smartphone contracts between 2008 and 2009, Verizon acquired nine, T-Mobile acquired five, and Sprint acquired three).

<sup>29</sup> MetroPCS Communications, Ex Parte Notice, Attachment, 700 MHz Band Analysis, WT Docket No. 06-150 (FCC filed May 10, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> See e.g., Petition of Cincinnati Bell, *supra* note 18, at 4; Petition to Deny of Leap Wireless, *supra* note 17, at 20.

<sup>31</sup> Petition of Cincinnati Bell, *supra* note 18, at 4.

<sup>32</sup> *The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. (2011) (Hu Meena, Cellular South, responses to questions for the record from Senator Leahy).

has reluctantly provided 3G GSM roaming agreements to smaller carriers, those carriers have consistently accused AT&T of providing the service at unreasonably high prices, only after severe delays, or only in conjunction with anticompetitive conditions.<sup>33</sup> Allowing the duopoly on 3G GSM roaming service to consolidate into a monopoly would decimate competition in GSM technology and would make it impossible for a regional carrier to compete with AT&T. According to Cellular South, the limited nature of this market even today has dramatically undermined a number of regional carriers.<sup>34</sup>

In its opposition brief, AT&T offers a puzzling response to the concern that AT&T will not accommodate the roaming needs of smaller carriers after a merger. It points out that AT&T is a “net purchaser” of roaming service.<sup>35</sup> Thus, it argues, AT&T has an incentive to keep market prices for roaming low. This contention is questionable because while AT&T only relies on roaming for a small portion of its coverage, many smaller carriers rely on roaming for the vast majority of their national coverage. Hence, AT&T may be better off with high market prices for roaming as that would have only a relatively small impact on its own business, but it would likely have a devastating impact on many of its competitors. The regional carriers contend that AT&T is already extremely resistant to granting them roaming agreements. Rather than facilitating national roaming for smaller providers at reasonable rates, AT&T is actually consuming more of the smaller providers’ spectrum than it is sharing with them. Regardless of whether AT&T is a net purchaser of roaming service or not, AT&T will have the ability to potentially drive some of its competitors out of business by increasing roaming fees. Consolidating ownership of even more of the nation’s spectrum in the hands of a company that essentially refuses to share access to it at reasonable rates would dramatically worsen the prospects of smaller carriers.

Finally, the dominance of AT&T and Verizon’s positions in the backhaul market presents yet another potential tool that could be used to exclude competitors from the wireless market. “Backhaul” refers to the services and connections that wireless towers use to connect to the Internet. Without backhaul services, it is not possible to offer data service. AT&T and Verizon currently control the vast majority of backhaul services, which wireless providers require to offer data service.<sup>36</sup> Independent backhaul providers have only managed to hold on to approximately 10 percent of the backhaul market.<sup>37</sup> Given that the bulk of the potential customer base— AT&T and Verizon— is unavailable to these alternate providers, they depend heavily on the business of T-Mobile and Sprint to survive.<sup>38</sup> Removing T-Mobile from the market would be a substantial blow to alternate backhaul providers. Many alternate backhaul providers have reported to the news media that a merger will force them out of business.<sup>39</sup> This would tighten Verizon and AT&T’s stranglehold on backhaul, potentially establishing a duopoly there as well. Control over the backhaul market is effectively control over the wireless market because wireless service

---

<sup>33</sup> Petition of Cincinnati Bell, *supra* note 18, at 4.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*

<sup>35</sup> Joint Opposition, *supra* note 22, at 157 (FCC filed on June 10, 2011) (“Joint Opposition”).

<sup>36</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 39.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.*

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 40.

<sup>39</sup> See Sara Jerome, *Backhaul Industry Fears AT&T Merger*, HILLICON VALLEY (May 11, 2011, 3:34 PM), <http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/160407-backhaul-industry-fears-atatmerger> (reporting that officials in the alternative backhaul industry fear that the merger could “potentially sink[] some companies . . . leaving AT&T and Verizon to dominate the backhaul market”).

providers require backhaul services to operate. AT&T and Verizon could increase charges for backhaul service in order to raise their remaining competitors' costs. The benefits AT&T and Verizon would gain by eliminating those competitors would easily outweigh any loss of backhaul revenues.

In summary, AT&T and Verizon would have extraordinary control over everything that their competitors need to operate—handsets, roaming agreements, and backhaul. Their competitors' costs, and hence their prices, would be set by AT&T and Verizon. AT&T and Verizon would have the ability to eliminate any of their competitors through the use of any one of these tools. Equipping a company with an arsenal of anticompetitive tools and simply hoping for the best would not be wise. I urge the DOJ and the FCC to consider the significant competitive advantages AT&T will gain if this merger is approved, and how those advantages could be exploited to hurt competition before approving this deal.

## **II. THE MERGER WOULD LEAD TO SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC INTEREST HARMS**

In addition to my concerns about the competitive impact of a horizontal merger of this size, I have no doubt that this deal will harm consumers and is a threat to the public interest. To receive approval for this merger, AT&T must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the merger will serve the public interest. Not only have the applicants failed to meet this high burden, but there is evidence that the merger will have significant anti-consumer effects that will harm—rather than serve—the public interest.

I recognize and appreciate the comments submitted by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) and other labor organizations that represent millions of working families. I have carefully considered AT&T's history of collaboration and cooperation with unions, as well as its respect for worker's rights. While I recognize that this merger may positively impact some workers and may strengthen employee rights for many T-Mobile employees, I believe there are larger public interest harms that will occur if this transaction is approved.

### **a. The Merger Will Result in Higher Consumer Prices**

A merger between AT&T and T-Mobile would cause a significant rise in prices for wireless consumers. First, T-Mobile offers consistently lower prices than AT&T and is a strong competitive force that keeps AT&T's consumer retail prices from creeping ever higher. By eliminating T-Mobile from the market, AT&T removes a crucial "maverick." T-Mobile pressures the larger providers both to offer better products and to do so at a lower price. It provides smartphones, international roaming, voice and data service, and competitive handsets for a significantly lower price than any of the three other major carriers. T-Mobile's unlimited voice and data plan costs \$25 less per month than either AT&T's or Verizon's plans,<sup>40</sup> and \$20

---

<sup>40</sup> Tony Adam, *The Ultimate Cell Phone Plans Comparison*, BILLSHRINK (Feb. 3, 2011, 7:06 AM), <http://www.billshrink.com/blog/10973/cell-phone-plans-comparison-2>.

less per month than Sprint's plan.<sup>41</sup> This has the impact of disciplining the price of wireless service.<sup>42</sup>

Eliminating T-Mobile from the competitive landscape would remove the main check against an escalation in prices. Consumers Union performed a detailed price analysis of the merger and found that AT&T's existing prices are 43 percent to 64 percent higher than T-Mobile's prices for wireless services.<sup>43</sup> In fact, the removal of a low-cost alternative may ultimately be of more value to AT&T than the spectrum and customers it would acquire in the proposed merger. Without T-Mobile, the market would have no effective check on price increases or technological stagnation by AT&T and Verizon. Sprint places very little pressure on the prices of AT&T and Verizon, because it charges only marginally less than they do.<sup>44</sup> The elimination of the lowest cost national wireless option likely explains why so many T-Mobile customers are opposed to this deal.<sup>45</sup>

The reduction in competitive pricing pressure that follows from removing one of only four national carriers would allow the remaining carriers to raise prices. The transaction, if approved, would allow AT&T to increase its prices above what it normally could absent this acquisition. Competition helps to ensure that prices remain reasonably close to costs. In an already highly concentrated market the removal of one of only four major competitors is certain to be followed by an increase in prices. Charles River Associates did an in-depth analysis of the likely effect of the reduction in competition on consumer prices. It found that if the merger is allowed to go through, consumer prices could increase by 12.2 to 24.6 percent for T-Mobile customers, and 4.9 to 11.2 percent for AT&T customers.<sup>46</sup> AT&T has stated that it does not plan to raise prices for existing T-Mobile customers, but this will only stabilize T-Mobile customers' prices in the very short-term. As you know, the DOJ has defined a five percent safe harbor for

---

<sup>41</sup> Sprint Pricing Plans, SPRINT, [http://shop.sprint.com/mysprint/shop/plan/plan\\_wall.jsp?INTNAV=ATG:HE:Plans](http://shop.sprint.com/mysprint/shop/plan/plan_wall.jsp?INTNAV=ATG:HE:Plans) (last visited June 29, 2011).

<sup>42</sup> 14 FCC REP., *supra* note 28, at 11470-1; *The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (responses to questions for the record from Senator Leahy, Daniel Hesse, CEO, Sprint-Nextel).

<sup>43</sup> *How Will the Proposed Merger Between AT&T and T-Mobile Affect Wireless Telecommunications Competition Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (testimony of Parul Desai, Policy Counsel, Consumers Union).

<sup>44</sup> Sprint Pricing Plans, *supra* note 41.

<sup>45</sup> See Nat Levy, *Customers Unhappy About AT&T/T-Mobile Merger*, PNW LOCAL NEWS (May 18, 2011), available at [http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/east\\_king/bel/business/122171983.html](http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/east_king/bel/business/122171983.html) (explaining that customer satisfaction dropped for both AT&T and T-Mobile customers when the merger was announced, reflecting disapproval of the merger); *Sprint Targeting T-Mobile Customers Unhappy with AT&T Deal*, TMO NEWS (May 12, 2011), available at <http://www.tmonews.com/2011/05/sprint-targeting-t-mobile-customers-unhappy-with-att-deal> (explaining that Sprint has launched an advertising campaign targeting T-Mobile customers that are leaving in anticipation of the merger). Also, a number of Facebook groups have formed for T-Mobile customers that are unhappy about the merger.

<sup>46</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at ¶ 164-165. While AT&T has committed not to raise the prices of existing plans or contracts for T-Mobile customers, it has made no long term commitments to those customers when they renew their contracts, purchase new phones, upgrade or modify service, or add additional lines. It is unlikely that existing T-Mobile customers will be able to retain their current payment plans for long after a merger.

potential mergers.<sup>47</sup> Based on the above analysis, it is extremely likely the merger would raise prices above that safe harbor and may raise prices far above that limit. Mergers that increase prices above this line are not in the public interest. This calculation is based only on the reduction in competition in the wireless market itself. The probability that Verizon and AT&T will raise backhaul and roaming rates as discussed above would cause prices to rise even higher than estimated by Charles River Associates.

Government and corporate accounts are likely to experience the worst of the price hikes. These accounts differ from consumer accounts in two important ways. First, the enterprise demands of these customers limit them to choosing between the national carriers. Secondly, many corporate or government accounts require the capability to roam internationally. The only two national carriers that offer GSM service, which is by far the most dominant network globally, are AT&T and T-Mobile. After the merger, corporate or government customers that require international roaming would only have one choice for their wireless service—AT&T. With a de facto monopoly on large government and corporate accounts, it is inevitable that enterprise customers would face even larger price hikes than individual consumers.

#### **b. The Merger Will Result in Decreased Choice and Customer Service Quality**

AT&T consistently ranks last in customer satisfaction surveys.<sup>48</sup> This merger will only reduce AT&T's incentive to improve its dismal track record on customer service. In the post paid smartphone market, customers are forced to sign on to long-term contracts that contain substantial early termination fees. These early termination penalties, in combination with the desire of consumers to upgrade their handset to obtain the latest technology, create far less of an incentive for wireless companies to compete based on customer service quality. They also decrease the incentive to offer customers numerous choices and price plans.

#### **c. The Merger Will Stifle Innovation**

Allowing AT&T to eliminate T-Mobile as a competitor will significantly slow the pace of innovation in the wireless market. T-Mobile has consistently remained competitive by innovating. T-Mobile was the first provider to offer the Blackberry, the Sidekick, and the Android operating system.<sup>49</sup> T-Mobile has been a major driver of wireless data services, smartphone technology, and WiFi hotspot deployment and integration.<sup>50</sup> The U.S. market has a

---

<sup>47</sup> HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, *supra* note 3; Comments of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, WT Docket No. RM96-6-000 (FCC filed on May 7, 1996) (noting that "the threshold typically used for what is a 'significant' price increase is five percent above levels that likely would prevail absent the merger.").

<sup>48</sup> *Consumer Reports Cell-Service Ratings: AT&T is the Worst Carrier*, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:08 PM), <http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2010/12/consumer-reports-cell-phone-survey-att-worst.html>; Brad Reed, *AT&T Customer Ratings Hit New Low*, PCWORLD (Dec. 2, 2009, 8:44 PM), *available at* [http://www.pcworld.com/article/183590/atandt\\_customer\\_ratings\\_hit\\_new\\_low.html](http://www.pcworld.com/article/183590/atandt_customer_ratings_hit_new_low.html) (stating that "[AT&T] has the lowest level of customer satisfaction in the United States").

<sup>49</sup> Jason Nottle, *5 T-Mobile Innovations and 5 More We Lose*, THE STREET (Mar. 28, 2011, 8:30 AM), <http://www.thestreet.com/story/11060885/1/5-t-mobileinnovations-and-5-more-we-lose.html>.

<sup>50</sup> Fed. Comm. Comm'n, *Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless, Including Commercial Mobile Services*, 13 FCC CMRS COMPETITION REP. 1, 17-24 (Jan. 15, 2009), *available at* [http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs\\_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf](http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf).

tendency to lag behind the rest of the world in introducing new handsets, new wireless technologies, and the adoption of mobile communications.<sup>51</sup> Because T-Mobile, as part of Deutsche Telekom, bridges the gap between the domestic wireless market and the European wireless market, it has been able to pressure domestic providers to keep pace with the innovation in the global market. Without this pressure, the national carriers would have less incentive to develop new technologies, and less incentive to work with handset manufacturers to develop and launch new handsets. As I mentioned above, I hope your agencies will meet with handset manufacturers and ask them whether they have concerns about how this merger may impact their ability to create and distribute innovative devices. I am concerned that the already concentrated wireless market has made it difficult for handset manufacturers and other innovators to create and distribute the most innovative technologies, and I hope your agencies will look into this further.

In addition to technological innovations, T-Mobile also has an established record of offering its customers innovative pricing plans, service packages, and discounts for customers who do not purchase subsidized handsets. Likewise, some innovations have come from smaller competitors. For example, Leap Wireless introduced an unlimited music download service.<sup>52</sup> By reducing the viability of the smaller competitors, a merger would stifle innovation even beyond the elimination of T-Mobile. The FCC has found on numerous occasions that a reduction in competition, particularly to a duopoly, results in less innovation.<sup>53</sup>

#### **d. The Merger Will Result in Job Losses**

The merger of AT&T and T-Mobile would likely involve thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of layoffs. Despite having been asked directly by me and several other members of Congress to provide estimates of the number of layoffs AT&T is expecting to result from the merger, AT&T has refused to release this information. According to recent reports, AT&T employs 266,590 people and T-Mobile employs 37,795.<sup>54</sup> AT&T has calculated that it will reap \$3 billion per year in “operational savings” and “cost synergies” as a result of the merger.<sup>55</sup> While it will not discuss what portion of these “synergies” comes from the elimination of jobs, I think it is fair to assume that layoffs constitute a substantial portion of the cost savings AT&T is promising to its investors.

AT&T and T-Mobile operate many retail stores in the same or adjacent neighborhoods, and it is likely that many of them will be closed if the merger is allowed to proceed. We should also expect the combined company to eliminate many administrative office staff (such as overlapping accounting and legal departments), shut down some call centers, and lay off some technical support staff. The elimination of a substantial portion of the combined workforce would be entirely consistent with AT&T’s track record. According to Free Press, since 2002, a

---

<sup>51</sup> See e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY REPORT 2010-2011 (2011), available at <http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-technology-report>.

<sup>52</sup> Petition to Deny of Leap Wireless, *supra* note 17, at 3-4.

<sup>53</sup> See Application of EchoStar Communications Corp. et al., Hearing Designation Order, CS Docket No. 01-348 at 68 (FCC filed on Oct. 9, 2002).

<sup>54</sup> Leslie Kwoh, *AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Could Mean Big Changes for Customers and Employees*, THE STAR LEDGER (March 22, 2011, 5:39 AM), [http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2011/03/att\\_t-mobile\\_merger\\_39\\_billion.html](http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2011/03/att_t-mobile_merger_39_billion.html).

<sup>55</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 9.

period during which AT&T acquired five firms with more than 180,000 employees, AT&T has seen a net job loss of well above 100,000 workers.<sup>56</sup> AT&T and SBC announced that the merger of the two companies would result in 13,000 lost jobs,<sup>57</sup> but in actuality the merged company had over 20,000 fewer employees by the end of the year and continued downsizing substantially into the next year as well.<sup>58</sup> AT&T eliminated 6,800 jobs as part of its merger with Cingular as well.<sup>59</sup> In fact, over the past eight years, AT&T has had five mergers<sup>60</sup> and has eliminated between 5,000 and 25,000 jobs per year for eight of those nine years.<sup>61</sup>

It is important to note that AT&T has a strong track record of respecting employees' right to organize, and AT&T is the only wireless company with a unionized workforce. AT&T deserves to be commended for this. I strongly considered CWA's comments, which emphasized that "T-Mobile has been hostile to unions and has opposed efforts by workers to organize and exercise their basic rights."<sup>62</sup> I care a tremendous amount about creating and protecting American jobs, and if this merger is approved, I recognize that T-Mobile workers will finally have the benefit of union representation, which is long overdue. I also appreciate that AT&T has publicly committed to maintain a policy of non-interference with respect to the organizing of T-Mobile employees, as sanctioned under the National Labor Relations Act.<sup>63</sup> However, given the current economic environment, these benefits must be weighed against a need to preserve and create jobs in the short-term and against the adverse impact that this merger will have on millions of consumers throughout the country. AT&T contends that building out infrastructure to support LTE nationwide will create jobs,<sup>64</sup> and CWA points to a study by the Economic Policy Institute that estimates that AT&T's increased capital expenditures from the merger will create between 54,834 and 95,959 new jobs.<sup>65</sup> However, as discussed below, AT&T's rollout of support for LTE is essentially unrelated to the merger. It may be true that over the longer term increased investment and growth should spur job creation at the combined company, as noted in CWA's filing.<sup>66</sup> But AT&T's promises to its investors indicate we should expect tens of thousands of net job cuts in the short-term.

---

<sup>56</sup> Petition to Deny of Free Press, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 45 (FCC Files May 31, 2011).

<sup>57</sup> Leslie Cauley, *SBC, AT&T Merger to Cut 13,000 Jobs*, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2005), [http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2005-02-01-att-sbc-jobs\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2005-02-01-att-sbc-jobs_x.htm) (quoting SBC CEO Ed Whitacre).

<sup>58</sup> *Employment T-Mobile v. ATT*, SLIDESHARE (May 18, 2011), <http://www.slideshare.net/sagecast/employment-growth-tmobile-v-att-05-18-2011>.

<sup>59</sup> *After AT&T Merger, Cingular Wireless Expects to Cut 6,800 Jobs*, COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 24, 2004, 12:00 PM), [http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/97843/After\\_AT\\_T\\_merger\\_Cingular\\_Wireless\\_expects\\_to\\_cut\\_6\\_800\\_jobs](http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/97843/After_AT_T_merger_Cingular_Wireless_expects_to_cut_6_800_jobs) (quoting Cingular Wireless CEO Stan Sigman); *Cingular to Ax 10% of Jobs in Merger With AT&T Wireless*, REDORBIT (Nov. 24, 2004), [http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/105916/cingular\\_to\\_ax\\_10\\_of\\_jobs\\_in\\_merger\\_with\\_att/index.html](http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/105916/cingular_to_ax_10_of_jobs_in_merger_with_att/index.html) (quoting Cingular Wireless CEO Stan Sigman).

<sup>60</sup> SBC, Bell South, Cingular Wireless, Dobson Wireless and Centennial Communications have all merged with AT&T.

<sup>61</sup> *Employment T-Mobile*, *supra* note 58.

<sup>62</sup> Reply Comments of Communications Workers of America, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 15 (FCC Files June 20, 2011).

<sup>63</sup> *Id.*

<sup>64</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 1.

<sup>65</sup> Reply Comments of Communications Workers of America, *supra* note 62, at 12.

<sup>66</sup> *Id.* at 14.

I strongly encourage your agencies to look into AT&T's promises to its investors and determine exactly how AT&T anticipates achieving \$3 billion in operational savings per year. I appreciate that AT&T may intend to cut as few jobs as possible, but layoffs are an inevitable consequence of a horizontal merger of this size, which will likely produce a number of redundancies. I also urge you to compel AT&T to publicly release its plans for job cuts in the first, second, and third years following the merger approval. Many proponents of this merger have acknowledged that short-term job losses may occur, but I think it is important for the American public to understand exactly what those numbers will be, especially given the weak state of the U.S. job market.

**e. The Merger Would Undermine Net Neutrality**

The proposed merger would also be harmful to the public interest because it would place de facto control of our nation's information infrastructure in the hands of only two companies. Verizon and AT&T already control the bulk of the wired telephony infrastructure in the United States. If this merger is approved, the same de facto duopoly would also control the wireless infrastructure. This level of control of the entire telecommunications industry would give them the capability to exclude competition not just in the wireless service market, but in other markets that involve dependent or related services. For example, the Dish Network fears that AT&T could bolster its U-Verse product, which provides video programming via the Internet, by undermining the network access of competitive products or offering bundled options that would not be available to its cable, satellite, or online video competitors.<sup>67</sup>

The FCC has opted to apply only very limited net neutrality rules to mobile devices. One of the primary reasons why the FCC found it unnecessary to apply the broader set of protections to wireless broadband is that "consumers have more choices for mobile broadband than for fixed (particularly fixed wireline) broadband."<sup>68</sup> As a result of the limited regulation of net neutrality in the wireless market, consumers are extremely dependent on competitive market forces to provide an open network. Currently, consumers have four options for national mobile voice and data service, so if one of them begins discriminating against competitors, consumers have the option to switch to a more neutral provider. This option would disappear in an effective duopoly. Furthermore, Verizon and AT&T have jointly backed proposals designed to block net neutrality, and individually they have violated and fought net neutrality regulations in court.<sup>69</sup> After a merger, AT&T and Verizon will have less incentive to cater to consumers, and we can expect that they will make more blatant attempts to monitor and discriminate against certain content, websites, or applications in order to further their own financial interests.

---

<sup>67</sup> Petition to Deny of Dish Network, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 10-1 (FCC filed May 31, 2011).

<sup>68</sup> Report and Order in the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No. 09-191 and WC Docket No. 07-52 at 5-6 (FCC adopted Dec. 21, 2010).

<sup>69</sup> See e.g., Alex Chasick, *AT&T Asks Employees to Oppose Net Neutrality*, CONSUMERIST (Oct. 20, 2009, 6:46 PM), <http://consumerist.com/2009/10/att-asks-employees-to-oppose-net-neutrality.html>; Michael Ide, *Verizon Accused of Violating FCC Net Neutrality Rules*, ITPROPORTAL (June 7, 2011), <http://www.itproportal.com/2011/06/07/verizon-accused-violating-fcc-net-neutrality-rules>; M.G. Siegler, *AT&T Crying Over Net Neutrality and Wiping Their Eyes with Piles of Money*, TECH CRUNCH (Aug. 13, 2010), <http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/13/att-net-neutrality>; Ryan Singel, *Verizon Files Suit Against FCC Net Neutrality Rules*, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2011, 5:26 PM), <http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/01/verizon-sues-fcc>.

Americans gather their information about the world, purchase products and services, work, and communicate largely through the wired and wireless information infrastructure. Virtually every sector of the economy relies on evenhanded treatment by network service providers who supply a necessary gateway that enables small and medium sized businesses to sell and promote their products and services online. Allowing two companies to control which websites and applications are available to consumers and what content will stream at a faster speed would be very risky. We should not let an effective duopoly dictate the rules of the road for wireless networks, and I fear that will happen if this merger is approved.

### **III. ALLOWING AT&T TO INCREASE ITS SPECTRUM HOLDINGS DOES NOT SERVE THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

The U.S. is facing a potential shortfall in developed wireless spectrum. The increased demand that smartphones place on wireless networks threatens to outpace the deployment of network infrastructure. AT&T contends that it “faces network spectrum and capacity constraints more severe than those of any other wireless provider, and this merger provides by far the surest, fastest, and most efficient solution to that challenge.”<sup>70</sup> While I recognize that mobile data traffic has exploded in the last several years, I am not convinced by AT&T’s claims, nor am I convinced that allowing AT&T to acquire more spectrum through this merger will serve the public interest.

Spectrum is a finite and precious national resource. It should be used in the most efficient way possible. The economic development of the country depends in part on maximizing the value derived from our spectrum. Once spectrum is allocated to a specific company, the public interest requires that it be developed in a quick and efficient manner. An analysis of the public interest implications of a transfer of spectrum licenses must consider what company would be the best steward for that spectrum, and I am not convinced that AT&T has effectively managed or used its available spectrum to improve service for its customers. AT&T owns more spectrum than any other company, yet AT&T has been plagued with delays in rolling out infrastructure to support spectrum it has been allocated.<sup>71</sup> The quality of the service it provides is consistently ranked last amongst the national carriers,<sup>72</sup> and it continues to use spectrum in an inefficient manner.<sup>73</sup> The question your agencies must consider is not how badly AT&T needs the spectrum, but how effective AT&T would be at making use of that spectrum relative to other carriers. Moreover, I believe the public interest would be far better served if AT&T was required to resolve its spectrum crunch by investing a portion of the \$39 billion it plans to spend on this transaction to build out its existing spectrum and to deploy additional technologies to make more efficient use of its current spectrum holdings.

---

<sup>70</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 1.

<sup>71</sup> Reply of Free Press, Public Knowledge, Media Access Project, Consumers Union, and the Open Technology Initiative of the New America Foundation to Joint Opposition, WT Docket No. 11-18 at 3 (FCC filed Mar. 28, 2011).

<sup>72</sup> *Consumer Reports Cell-Service Ratings: AT&T is the Worst Carrier*, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:08 PM), <http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2010/12/consumer-reports-cell-phone-survey-att-worst.html>; Brad Reed, *AT&T Customer Ratings Hit New Low*, PCWORLD (Dec. 2, 2009, 8:44 PM), *available at* [http://www.peworld.com/article/183590/atandt\\_customer\\_ratings\\_hit\\_new\\_low.html](http://www.peworld.com/article/183590/atandt_customer_ratings_hit_new_low.html) (stating that “[AT&T] has the lowest level of customer satisfaction in the United States”).

<sup>73</sup> Joint Opposition, *supra* note 35, at 33.

### a. AT&T Bears the Responsibility for Its Spectrum Problems

Wireless consumers use much more spectrum today than they did just two years ago. A smartphone generates 24 times as much load on the network as a conventional wireless phone.<sup>74</sup> The enormous popularity of smartphones has placed substantial and increasing demands on the nation's finite pool of spectrum. As a result, all of the wireless carriers, and the nation as a whole, are facing potential shortfalls of spectrum. The other national wireless carriers have been aggressively preparing for this crunch. Sprint, for example, converted all of its customers off of less efficient legacy networks (such as CDMA) and on to more efficient technologies (such as WiMAX) at great expense.<sup>75</sup> Verizon is ramping up its infrastructure spending by about ten percent per year.<sup>76</sup>

AT&T, like every other wireless provider, is also facing the possibility that their existing spectrum may be inadequate to accommodate anticipated demand.<sup>77</sup> However, unlike the other wireless providers, AT&T has not visibly taken decisive steps to prepare for the coming crunch, despite the fact that AT&T should have recognized the need for additional investment shortly after introducing the iPhone in 2007. AT&T had first-hand knowledge that iPhone customers were consuming very large amounts of data on their devices, and it should have anticipated that it would experience congestion in urban areas where iPhones are in high demand. Despite this, AT&T only increased its spending on wireless infrastructure by 1 percent in 2009.<sup>78</sup> Although AT&T will point out that 1 percent is still a significant number, Verizon made the decision to increase its capital spending by 10 percent in 2009,<sup>79</sup> and Verizon is now in a much better position when it comes to spectrum capacity.<sup>80</sup> This is typical. Between 2006 and 2009, Verizon invested 14 percent more per subscriber in its wireless infrastructure.<sup>81</sup> Industry analysts estimate that AT&T would need to spend approximately \$5 billion more per year in wireless infrastructure development to keep up with its competitors.<sup>82</sup> AT&T emphasizes in its opposition brief that it has made large infrastructure investments in recent years, but it does not mention that disproportionately few of these investments have been in its wireless network.<sup>83</sup> While AT&T draws 57 percent of its revenue from wireless service, only 34 percent of its capital

---

<sup>74</sup> Julius Genachowski, Fed. Comm. Comm'n, *Spectrum: American Competitiveness, Opportunity, Dollars and the Cost of Delay* (Mar. 22, 2011, 11:56 PM), [http://www.fcc.gov/Daily\\_Releases/Daily\\_Business/2011/db0322/DOC-305309A2.pdf](http://www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2011/db0322/DOC-305309A2.pdf).

<sup>75</sup> Stephen Lawson, *Sprint's IDEN Finally Heading For Sign Off*, PC WORLD (Dec. 7, 2010, 4:30 PM), [http://www.peworld.com/businesscenter/article/212782/sprints\\_iden\\_finally\\_headed\\_for\\_signoff.html](http://www.peworld.com/businesscenter/article/212782/sprints_iden_finally_headed_for_signoff.html).

<sup>76</sup> Marguerite Reardon, *Is AT&T a Wireless Spectrum Hog?*, CNET NEWS (Apr. 29, 2011, 4:00 AM), [http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686\\_3-20058494-266.html](http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20058494-266.html).

<sup>77</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 3.

<sup>78</sup> Reardon, *supra* note 76.

<sup>79</sup> *Id.*

<sup>80</sup> John Doherty et al., Transcript of Verizon Q1 2011 Earnings Conference Call (Apr. 21, 2011), at 4, *available at* [http://www22.verizon.com/investor/investorconsump/groups/events/documents/investorrelation/event\\_ucm\\_1\\_trans.pdf](http://www22.verizon.com/investor/investorconsump/groups/events/documents/investorrelation/event_ucm_1_trans.pdf) ("Verizon Q1 2011 Earnings").

<sup>81</sup> Stephen Lawson, *Analyst: AT&T Needs to Spend U.S. \$5B to Catch Up*, PCWORLD (Jan. 19, 2010, 4:50 PM), <http://www.peworld.com/businesscenter/article/187216> (quoting Gerard Hallaren, Director of Research, TownHall Investment Research).

<sup>82</sup> *Id.*

<sup>83</sup> *Id.*

expenditures are focused on its wireless infrastructure, whereas 65 percent are focused on wired infrastructure.<sup>84</sup>

AT&T has also failed to migrate existing customers on to more efficient network technologies. AT&T continues to support several different inefficient legacy network technologies and admits that it does not plan to discontinue support for them for years to come.<sup>85</sup> AT&T has made it clear that it intends to continue this approach by rolling out new devices that do not support the much more efficient LTE technology rather than deploying dual band handsets that would be able to migrate to the more efficient network as it becomes available.<sup>86</sup> Another example is of particular importance: AT&T has elected to continue using HSPA 7.2 technology on the iPhone rather than HSPA+ technology, despite the fact that HSPA+ is 15 percent more efficient.<sup>87</sup> These business decisions are difficult to explain when juxtaposed with AT&T's assertions that it has network capacity problems that cannot be alleviated without approval of this deal.

Instead of addressing these problems head on by increasing investment in infrastructure and modernizing its new and existing handsets now, AT&T proposes that the American public absorb the cost of its business decisions in the form of higher prices and less competition in our wireless market. This is unacceptable. I understand that AT&T may indeed lose a small number of subscribers to Verizon and other companies if this deal is not approved, but this is fundamentally how competitive markets should function. AT&T failed to accurately plan and invest for the data demands of its iPhone customers, but that is not a sufficient justification for a merger of this size and scope. While AT&T's interests certainly would be served by protecting it from the consequences of its investment decisions, the public interest is better served by allowing the free market to reward other wireless carriers that chose to make better investment decisions.

Moreover, even if AT&T is unable to solve its short-term network problems by investing in infrastructure and handsets, AT&T has the option of avoiding outages for AT&T customers by purchasing additional roaming agreements from other wireless carriers. AT&T contends that it requires T-Mobile's spectrum to sustain its customer base, but AT&T could acquire access to that spectrum with a roaming agreement without creating the competitive harms outlined above. While this might eat into AT&T's profit margins, it would not harm the public interest and would not meet the burden of proof required to justify this merger under antitrust or telecommunications laws. AT&T argues in its application that allowing it to control a huge portion of the spectrum would not harm Sprint or the regional carriers because they could simply rely on AT&T to sell them roaming agreements at reasonable rates.<sup>88</sup> If AT&T believes that roaming arrangements suffice for Sprint and regional carriers, certainly AT&T can meet its own spectrum needs with roaming agreements as well.

---

<sup>84</sup> *Id.*

<sup>85</sup> Joint Opposition, *supra* note 22, at 33.

<sup>86</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 24 (citing *Shop, Wireless, Packages & Deals, Cell Phone Deals and Packages*, AT&T WIRELESS, <http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/packages/packageslist.jsp?wtSlotClick=1-004YXE-0-1&WT.svl=title> (last visited May 24, 2011)).

<sup>87</sup> *Id.* at 24.

<sup>88</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 12, 75, 83, 86, 89, 93.

## **b. The Deployment of an LTE Network in Rural America Does Not Require a Merger**

AT&T states that this merger will give the combined company the scale, resources, and spectrum that are needed to deploy LTE to more than 97 percent of Americans. But AT&T's promise to build an LTE network in rural locations is not related to or dependent on the acquisition of T-Mobile. AT&T already owns large amounts of unused spectrum in rural locations. AT&T's network is far more extensive than T-Mobile's, so the addition of T-Mobile's network to its own would do little to expand the reach of the network to underserved areas. In fact, adding T-Mobile's network to AT&T's would only expand coverage to less than one percent of the U.S. population.<sup>89</sup> The challenge, as AT&T admits, is not in acquiring spectrum in rural areas, but in deploying infrastructure to utilize that spectrum in a cost effective way.<sup>90</sup> AT&T offers no convincing explanation for why the acquisition would help it resolve this challenge. It appears that the claim that the merger would result in the rollout of LTE service to rural America was purely the product of political calculations, not financial or technical ones.

More importantly, AT&T is likely to deploy LTE to rural America regardless of whether the merger is approved or not. AT&T's wireless network covers 97 percent of the population,<sup>91</sup> and AT&T has already announced plans to deploy LTE to 80 percent of the population by the end of 2013. The promise to deploy LTE to 97 percent of Americans within six years of the closing date of this transaction simply amounts to a promise to continue upgrading its network to LTE after 2013. AT&T's primary competitor, Verizon, has announced plans to roll out LTE to more than 92 percent of Americans in its initial rollout.<sup>92</sup> If it makes economic sense for Verizon to upgrade its rural network to LTE, it presumably makes sense for AT&T to as well. This is especially true because AT&T competes directly with Verizon for the title of the largest network, and Verizon is focusing its marketing campaigns in part on its superior LTE deployment.

In short, AT&T appears to be trying to offset the competitive damages the proposed merger would have on the public interest with a benefit that is likely only a marginal increase over what AT&T would build out on its own. More importantly, AT&T is in a position to complete this rural build out today and does not need to acquire T-Mobile's spectrum to deploy LTE to 97 percent of the country. If the Commission wants to see AT&T make good on rolling out LTE in rural areas, it should consider how to incentivize that investment independent of a merger review.

## **c. The Efficiency Gains from the Merger Would Be Minor**

AT&T presents two rationales for how the merger could result in more efficient use of existing spectrum. First, it argues that by merging the two networks, it would be possible to eliminate redundant "control channels," which are used to transfer commands between handsets and base stations. AT&T argues this transaction will allow it to free up a portion of the spectrum

<sup>89</sup> Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 125.

<sup>90</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 55-56.

<sup>91</sup> See Press Release, AT&T, AT&T Sets the Record Straight on Verizon Ads, *available at* <http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=14002> (last visited July 5, 2011).

<sup>92</sup> Dave Burstein, *CTO Dick Lynch on Verizon LTE Coverage*, DSL PRIME (Apr. 2, 2011), <http://www.dslprime.com/a-wireless-cloud/61-w/4214-cto-dick-lynch-on-verizonlte-coverage> (quoting Verizon CTO Dick Lynch).

in each market where the applicants both provide GSM service.<sup>93</sup> Secondly, it argues that by combining the networks, idle spectrum could be used by the customers of the other provider.<sup>94</sup> While these arguments do have some merit, the efficiency gains are unlikely to be significant and cannot justify a merger of this size.

The efficiency gains based on aggregating control channels would be fairly modest. Sprint contends that aggregating them would only diminish the crunch for voice communication bandwidth, not data capacity.<sup>95</sup> Data capacity is, by far, the more pressing issue. It is also unclear how quickly the channels could be aggregated given that they are spread widely across a vast infrastructure. AT&T offers no timeline for the elimination of the redundant control channels. Free Press points out that AT&T has not provided specific details outlining how the channels might be combined or which channels they believe to be redundant.<sup>96</sup>

Pooling the idle spectrum between the two networks is also unlikely to create major gains. According to AT&T, both T-Mobile and AT&T's networks are already nearly fully utilized.<sup>97</sup> This claim is an exaggeration, but to the extent that it is true, it would undermine any efficiency gains from combining the networks. Combining two fully utilized networks would yield no idle spectrum utilization efficiency gain at all. While nationally both networks do have locations where they are not fully utilized, these areas are likely to overlap. Where one network is fully utilized it is likely that the other will be as well, while in locations where one network has spare capacity, it is unlikely that the other network will need it. As a result, the efficiency gained from using the idle spectrum of the other network would likely be very small.

Furthermore, the efficiency gains that could be derived from pooling idle spectrum could also be gained simply by establishing roaming agreements without causing the anti-competitive harms outlined above. The FCC has repeatedly ruled that, "[e]fficiencies that can be achieved through means less harmful to competition than the proposed merger, therefore, cannot be considered to be true pro-competitive benefits of the merger."<sup>98</sup>

Both of these effects of the merger will create modest efficiency gains, but these gains will not offset the elimination of both companies' incentives to develop new spectrum or make more efficient use of their existing spectrum.

**d. The Public Interest Would Be Better Served by Leaving AT&T to Develop Its Existing Spectrum Licenses and Move to More Efficient Network Technologies**

Rather than simply attempting to wrest control over existing spectrum from competitors, AT&T should focus its expenditures on making better use of the spectrum licenses it already owns. Spectrum is a finite national resource that is crucial to innovation and therefore extremely valuable to our economy. The public interest depends on having as much spectrum developed

<sup>93</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 8.

<sup>94</sup> *Id.*

<sup>95</sup> Economic Analysis, Sprint Petition to Deny, *supra* note 6, at 346.

<sup>96</sup> Petition to Deny of Free Press, *supra* note 56, at 56.

<sup>97</sup> Description of Transaction, *supra* note 1, at 29-30.

<sup>98</sup> In the Applications of NYNEX Corporation and Bell Atlantic Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd. 19985, 20063-64 (Aug. 14, 1997). *See also* Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14829 (1999); HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, *supra* note 3, at 1-2.

and efficiently used as possible. The more spectrum that is available, the lower prices will be, and the more use can be supported nationwide. In its discussion of roaming agreements, AT&T concedes that the public interest is served by building infrastructure rather than acquiring existing infrastructure. AT&T argues that rather than acquiring roaming agreements, regional carriers “should be investing in their own networks— which brings with it increased capacity and jobs.”<sup>99</sup> The same logic applies even more forcefully to AT&T’s own situation.

AT&T already owns more spectrum licenses than any other company.<sup>100</sup> Many of these spectrum licenses remain undeveloped, including \$9 billion worth of some of the most valuable “beachfront” spectrum.<sup>101</sup> Concurrently with the merger application, AT&T is seeking permission to acquire an additional \$1.9 billion worth of spectrum licenses from Qualcomm.<sup>102</sup> Given the severity of the spectrum crunch alleged by AT&T, the public interest is directly tied to how rapidly AT&T develops this unused spectrum. Allowing AT&T to solve its spectrum shortfall by acquiring T-Mobile instead relieves the pressure on it to develop the spectrum for which it already has licenses. Furthermore, the expense and effort of integrating T-Mobile’s network into AT&T’s would push these new development efforts even further back on the calendar. Spending \$39 billion on infrastructure development, rather than on the acquisition of infrastructure that is already in use, would be of enormous benefit to the public interest.

In addition to having a large reserve of undeveloped spectrum, the spectrum that AT&T has developed is not being used in an efficient way, as discussed above. Verizon currently sustains a larger share of the market than AT&T with less spectrum than AT&T, but it is not facing a spectrum shortfall.<sup>103</sup> This suggests that AT&T could make much more efficient use of the spectrum it owns. Instead of attempting to increase the efficiency with which it uses its existing network, AT&T is attempting to expand the portion of the existing spectrum it controls. Inefficient use of spectrum should not be rewarded with control of additional spectrum. Spectrum is best controlled by the most efficient stewards, not by those who claim to have the greatest need for it because their use is so inefficient. The public interest depends on AT&T dramatically improving the efficiency with which it uses and develops its spectrum. Allowing it to acquire T-Mobile would remove any incentive to do that.

#### **IV. THE FLAWS IN THE MERGER CANNOT BE ELIMINATED WITH CONDITIONS**

After my thorough review of this transaction, I am convinced that any conditions would be inadequate to mitigate the serious and likely permanent competitive effects of this merger. AT&T has indicated both in its hearings before the House of Representatives and the Senate, and

---

<sup>99</sup> *The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (Timothy McKone, lobbyist, AT&T, responses to questions for the record from Senator Kohl).

<sup>100</sup> Martin Peers, *Spectrum of Choices Confronts AT&T Review*, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2011, at C8.

<sup>101</sup> Reply of Free Press, Public Knowledge, Media Access Project, Consumers Union, and the Open Technology Initiative of the New America Foundation to Joint Opposition, WT Docket No. 11-18 at 3 (FCC filed Mar. 28, 2011).

<sup>102</sup> Maisie Ramsay, *Sprint, MetroPCS Lobby FCC on AT&T’s New 700 Mhz Buys*, WIRELESS WEEK (June 13, 2011), <http://www.wirelessweek.com/News/2011/06/Policy-and-Industry-Sprint-MetroPCS-Lobby-FCC-ATT-700MHz-Buys-Government>.

<sup>103</sup> Verizon Q1 2011 Earnings, *supra* note 76, at 4.

in numerous press reports, that it is willing to make a number of substantial voluntary commitments to gain approval of this merger. But regardless of the size, scope, or duration of the conditions, the reality is that all conditions come to an end. The competitive effects of a merger of this size and scope will reverberate throughout the telecommunications sector for decades to come and will affect consumer prices, customer service, innovation, competition in handsets, and the quality and quantity of network coverage. These threats are too large and too irrevocable to be prevented or alleviated by conditions.

**a. A Competitive Market Cannot be Preserved by Requiring Divestitures**

The most common way to make a potentially anticompetitive merger palatable is to require the merged entity to divest itself of specific holdings in key markets where the merger would create too much concentration. That will not suffice in this case. There are two problems with this approach. First, there is no other competitor to which AT&T could divest assets that would resolve the market concentration problems. Divesting to Verizon would do nothing to alleviate the duopoly concern, as AT&T and Verizon would still have the same total market share between them after a divestiture as before, and the national HHI would be essentially unaffected by the divestiture.<sup>104</sup> Regional carriers would potentially be interested in acquiring portions of the network within their region, but given that the regional market and the national market are so distinct, the impact of divestitures to regional carriers would be very limited. Given the size of the market, divestitures would be insufficient to enable the entry of a new participant into the market.

Divesting to Sprint would be the most advantageous, but a divestiture to Sprint would still be very problematic and may not be possible. Sprint currently has a debt-to-equity ratio of 131 percent.<sup>105</sup> This would make it difficult for Sprint to purchase assets from AT&T and even more difficult for it to develop them properly. Furthermore, T-Mobile and AT&T both use dramatically different technology than Sprint. Sprint primarily uses CDMA and WiMAX whereas AT&T and T-Mobile use primarily GSM.<sup>106</sup> The difficult and expensive process of converting resources divested by AT&T into Sprint's network, combined with Sprint's problematic financial situation, make significant divestitures to Sprint an unrealistic solution.

Secondly, as discussed above, the market is a single, unified, national market. Even if there were an ideally situated party with sufficient resources to purchase the divestitures, isolated divestitures in individual local markets would not significantly reduce the concentration in the national market. Any divestiture smaller than the market share currently held by T-Mobile would not be large enough to offset the elimination of T-Mobile. Given that the wireless market is already highly concentrated, partially offsetting the increase in concentration would only decrease the extent of the harm of this deal. It could not turn a merger that is harmful to the public interest into one that is beneficial to or even neutral with respect to the public interest.

---

<sup>104</sup> Rebecca Arbogast and David Kaut, "AT&T/T-Mo: Data Point to Coming Brawl, Risk; Deal Still Looks Doable," *Stifel Nicholas*, at 4 (Mar. 29, 2011).

<sup>105</sup> *Sprint Nextel Corp Ratios and Returns*, FORBES, <http://finapps.forbes.com/finapps/jsp/finance/compinfo/Ratios.jsp?tkr=s> (last visited July 5, 2011).

<sup>106</sup> Comments of Communications Workers of America, WT Docket No. 11-65 at 39 (FCC filed May 31, 2011).

**b. The Regulation of Anticompetitive Practices Would be Insufficient to Prevent Abuse**

A prohibition on exclusive arrangements with handset manufacturers and restrictions on pricing for roaming services would both be inadequate to prevent the harms of a severely concentrated wireless market. Control over access to new handsets is a major threat to competition in the wireless market. For example, in 2009 AT&T launched 15 smartphones, all of which it had exclusive contracts with.<sup>107</sup> Verizon, T-Mobile, and Sprint launched 17 new smartphones, but none of the regional or smaller carriers launched smartphones.<sup>108</sup> The use of exclusive handset agreements is a devastatingly anticompetitive tool in the wireless market, and the further consolidation of carriers would increase the potency of this tactic. Any attempt to remedy this merger proposal by including conditions would necessarily have to include a prohibition on exclusive handset agreements. However, this would not be sufficient to eliminate the threat to competition. Because the different carriers operate on different frequencies and use different technologies, handsets can be exclusive to a single carrier without formally establishing an exclusivity agreement. For example, AT&T could opt to buy only phones which solely support the frequencies and technologies they deploy and discontinue contracts with any companies that add support for another frequency.<sup>109</sup> While a prohibition on formal exclusivity agreements would be a positive step (and is something the Commission should consider independent of this merger), it would not be sufficient to eliminate the control over the market that a near duopoly could wield through its relationships with handset manufacturers.

Similarly, restrictions designed to ensure that competitors have reasonable access to roaming arrangements are unlikely to be effective. The FCC recently enacted measures designed to prevent the national carriers from excluding regional carriers.<sup>110</sup> Unfortunately, these measures will likely be inadequate to remedy the problems created by the merger. Regional carriers can only acquire national coverage from the national carriers.<sup>111</sup> Were AT&T and T-Mobile to merge, AT&T would be the sole provider of national GSM roaming services.<sup>112</sup> Prior to March 2011, AT&T refused to grant a single GSM roaming agreement to any company.<sup>113</sup> While the measures enacted by the FCC are designed to combat this blatant abuse of market position, they would be very difficult to enforce against an AT&T that holds a monopoly on GSM roaming. There would be no prices to measure AT&T's prices against, and the courts would be forced to rely on internal AT&T information to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether their conduct is commercially reasonable.<sup>114</sup> This would be a slow and expensive mechanism for regional carriers to attempt to employ. An injunction ordering AT&T to sell roaming services to a small provider that takes two years to obtain will come two years too late to save the company.

---

<sup>107</sup> 14 FCC REP., *supra* note 28, at Table C-5.

<sup>108</sup> *Id.*

<sup>109</sup> Petition of Cincinnati Bell, *supra* note 18, at 32.

<sup>110</sup> Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, Second Report and Order, WT Docket No. 05-265 at 1-2, 8 (FCC filed April 7, 2011).

<sup>111</sup> Petition to Deny of Leap Wireless, *supra* note 17, at 21.

<sup>112</sup> *Id.*

<sup>113</sup> Reexamination of Roaming Obligations, *supra* note 110, at 16-7.

<sup>114</sup> Petition to Deny of Leap Wireless, *supra* note 17, at 22.

**c. AT&T Has a Long History of Evading Measures Designed to Curb Its Anticompetitive Behavior**

Any condition would need to be considered in light of the reality that AT&T has historically evaded regulations and conditions that have been applied to it in attempts to restrict its anticompetitive conduct.<sup>115</sup> There is little reason to believe that even the most novel condition would prevent anticompetitive behavior when other attempts have met with little success. AT&T has been sued for the violation of a wide variety of merger conditions, settlements, and competitive agreements over the last several years.<sup>116</sup> AT&T has made it clear that its intention is to push, and even cross, the line created by the letter of the law when conditions are applied to it. AT&T appears to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of whether to comply or contest a condition, and it appears willing to accept some losses in court in order to preserve control over the market.

Fundamentally, conditions mean absolutely nothing if the corporation cannot be trusted to implement them and the regulatory agencies that enacted conditions do not have sufficient resources or capacity to police the companies' adherence to the agreed conditions. I fear that any conditions on this merger will likely be the focus of years of litigation, which ultimately will reduce the duration and effectiveness of these conditions.

**d. Conditions Would Not Apply to Verizon**

A de facto duopoly would not only increase AT&T's ability to abuse its market position, it would also increase Verizon's ability to do so. Conditions attached to an AT&T/T-Mobile merger could not alleviate the threat posed by the possibility of Verizon abusing its own position in an effective duopoly.

**V. CONCLUSION**

Thirty-three million Americans have made the decision to purchase wireless service from T-Mobile rather than AT&T.<sup>117</sup> These consumers prefer T-Mobile over AT&T for a wide variety of reasons. Some of them prefer T-Mobile's less expensive plans, some find its network to be superior, some prefer the handsets that T-Mobile offers, and some prefer T-Mobile's customer service. AT&T can acquire these customers at any time by offering a better product, improving its network, lowering prices, or providing better customer service. Unfortunately, competing for customers has never been AT&T's preferred method of acquiring customers. Instead, it has acquired most of its customers both in the wired and wireless markets through mergers and exclusive agreements. American consumers rely on the DOJ and the FCC to protect competition. It is only through competition that wireless spectrum usage will become more efficient, handsets more innovative, customer service more responsive, network coverage broader, and prices lower. With the expiration of AT&T's exclusive arrangement to distribute the iPhone, AT&T is perhaps realizing that it may have difficulty retaining customers, let alone acquiring new customers, in a competitive market. AT&T should tackle that challenge by

---

<sup>115</sup> Reply of TelLAWCom Labs Inc, WT Docket No. 11-65 (FCC filed May 30, 2011) (describing dozens of incidents in which AT&T has breached various competitive agreements).

<sup>116</sup> *Id.*

<sup>117</sup> Press Release, T-Mobile, T-Mobile USA Reports Fourth Quarter 2010 Results (Feb. 25, 2011), *available at* <http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110224007281/en/T-Mobile-USA-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-2010-Results>.

building out its current spectrum holdings in rural and urban areas and by providing better customer service at a lower price, not by attempting to remove one of the few independent competitors from the wireless industry.

The merger of AT&T and T-Mobile would be a major step towards the creation of an entrenched duopoly in the wireless industry. It would concentrate enormous power over the entire telecommunications sector in the hands of only two companies, and it would incentivize AT&T and Verizon to coordinate prices to the detriment of consumers. I also fear it would only be a matter of months before Sprint is so marginalized that it becomes an acquisition target. Given the central role that telecommunications plays in the 21<sup>st</sup> century American economy as a whole, I urge you to do everything you can to protect competition in the wireless market. It would create an unreasonable risk to the economy to entrust too much power over such a crucial industry to a company that has a history of market domination. This transaction is not in the public interest. If approved, it would result in greatly reduced competition, the potential loss of thousands of jobs, higher consumer prices, and less innovation in technology. I urge the FCC and the DOJ to deny AT&T's application for approval of its acquisition of T-Mobile.

Thank you for your prompt consideration of this matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Al Franken", with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Al Franken  
United States Senator

**Congress of the United States**  
**Washington, DC 20515**

July 20, 2011

The Honorable Eric Holder  
Attorney General  
Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530

The Honorable Julius Genachowski  
Chairman  
Federal Communications Commission  
445 12th Street SW  
Washington, DC 20554

Dear Attorney General Holder and Chairman Genachowski:

We are writing to express our view that AT&T's proposed takeover of T-Mobile raises serious questions regarding the future competitiveness of the wireless industry. We urge the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Justice to conduct a careful, comprehensive and expeditious review of this transaction and its potential effects on the mobile wireless broadband market, innovation and consumers across the country.

We urge the Commission and the Department to analyze the potential effects of the proposed transaction on market structure and performance, consumer welfare, and American jobs. We also encourage you to scrutinize the transaction's supposed coverage and capacity benefits, with an eye towards determining whether the claimed benefits will actually materialize and could be achieved only as a result of this transaction.

We believe that AT&T's acquisition of T-Mobile would be a troubling backward step in federal public policy – a retrenchment from nearly two decades of promoting competition and open markets to acceptance of a duopoly in the wireless marketplace. Such industry consolidation could reduce competition and increase consumer costs at a time our country can least afford it. Further, it could also discourage investment and restrict innovation in both the wireless and wireline infrastructure market as well as in the associated applications and device markets.

Letter to FCC and DOJ  
July 20, 2011  
Page 2

For these reasons, it is critically important that the Commission and the Department comprehensively assess the consequences of the proposed transaction. We appreciate the careful review that the Commission and the Department are undertaking and look forward to the results of your analysis.


Sincerely,



Edward J. Markey  
Member  
Energy and Commerce Committee



John Conyers, Jr.  
Ranking Member  
Judiciary Committee



Anna G. Eshoo  
Ranking Member  
Energy and Commerce  
Subcommittee on  
Communications and  
Technology