3. DRA Opposition to the Petition
DRA opposes the PG&E Petition on several grounds, both procedural and substantive, and urges the Commission to deny the Petition and contract expansion. DRA first asserts that the Petition is procedurally deficient because it does not comply with Commission Rule 16.4,5 which requires an applicant to file a Petition for Modification within one year of the effective date of the original decision, or to explain why the petition could not have been presented within that time. DRA contends that PG&E did not justify why this Petition was filed more than a year after the original decision, and notes that Petitions that do not meet this requirement are subject to summary denial. DRA also suggests that PG&E should have included this request to expand its existing contract within its Application (A.) 08-06-0036 for approval of 2009-2011 demand response budgets and activities, rather than asking for "piecemeal evaluations" of the demand response portfolio.
In addition to these procedural concerns, DRA objects to several substantive aspects of the proposed contract modifications. Specifically, DRA claims that PG&E has not demonstrated the cost effectiveness and total cost of its requested modification to the ECS contract. DRA notes that the cost effectiveness of programs and aggregator contracts reviewed recently in proceeding A.08-06-001 et al., was assessed using a Consensus Framework methodology proposed in Rulemaking (R.) 07-01-041. DRA asserts that it would be inconsistent to use a different cost effectiveness approach for this contract expansion. DRA also notes that the PG&E claim of cost effectiveness depends on the fact that the modification does not raise administrative costs of the aggregator contract, and PG&E's assertion that the contract was cost effective before the proposed change. DRA contends that PG&E does not provide documentation of these claims. DRA asserts that PG&E should provide documentation that shows the assumptions used in its cost effectiveness analysis of this contract, and redo its analysis using the same framework used in A.08-06-001 et al.7 DRA also notes that the total cost of the expanded contract is not specified in the Petition, making it difficult to review the incremental costs of the proposed contract modification.
In addition to concerns about the cost and cost effectiveness of the modified contract, DRA asserts that the ECS contract "acts mainly as an emergency resource," despite being classified as price responsive and using, in part, non-emergency triggers.8 DRA notes that in 2007 and 2008, this contract was only dispatched a total of three times, and that at least one of these dispatches was for a test event. Other price responsive programs, such as PG&E's SmartRate and Critical Peak Pricing, were called much more frequently. DRA asserts that the small number of events called under this contract, which was approved in part due to its "flexible trigger mechanisms," implies that the contract acts more as an emergency program than as one that is truly price responsive.9
5 Unless otherwise noted, all references to rules are to the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/published/RULES_PRAC_PROC/105138.htm.
6 PG&E's A.08-06-003 was consolidated with A.08-06-001 filed by SCE and A.08-06-002 filed by SDG&E.
7 DRA Protest to PfM, 3/16/2009, at 4.
8 DRA protest, at 4-5.
9 DRA Protest, at 5.
