12. Regulation and Commission Oversight
12.1. RAM Program Modifications and Reports
As we have said elsewhere in this order, we adopt necessary design elements and details for the initial rollout of the RAM. We expect ED and parties to continually monitor the RAM, and recommend modifications based on evidence, if and as necessary. ED may act on its own motion to revise any aspect of the RAM program through resolutions proposed for Commission approval. Respondents and parties may seek modification by request to the Executive Director pursuant to Rule 16.4 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. Any modifications proposed should be based on evidence that the modification is necessary to improve the RAM program.
Regular reports on the RAM program are also necessary and we require each IOU to provide an annual report on the RAM. The IOUs may combine RAM reports with other reports, such as the annual compliance filings required in the IOU Solar PV Programs. In addition, the IOUs will work with ED to determine the content of the RAM report before filing. Among other things, the RAM report shall address the competitiveness of the auctions; auction timing and design issues; and project status, including the time and the cost necessary to interconnect and bring projects on-line.
Since the purpose of RAM is the procurement of projects that can come online quickly, in order to ensure that the procurement protocols and program design result in that outcome, we require the IOUs to report on the project development milestones. The IOUs must work with Commission staff to develop a simple methodology to measure the status of project development and include this in their implementation advice letter.
The report must also include any other relevant information, data, and analysis to present a complete report to the Commission. IOUs must work with ED to design a report template that includes these elements.
We have rules regarding confidentiality of electric procurement data. (See D.06-06-006 as modified by D.07-05-032.) Those rules presume "that information should be publicly disclosed and that any party seeking confidentiality bears a strong burden of proof." (Id. at 2.) Due to strong public interest in RPS, we require greater public access to RPS data than other data. (Id. at 3.) We reaffirm the importance of greater public access to RPS data here. We emphasize, for the reasons explained below, that this is particularly true for the RAM program.
ED proposes that it release RAM data on an aggregated basis to the extent consistent with our rules. ED says individual bid prices will remain confidential.131
Parties present a range of views. FIT Coalition argues that winning prices for each project must be revealed or the key aspect of RAM identified by ED (i.e., that RAM provides a long-term investment signal) will not be fulfilled.132 Vote Solar, TURN and others recommend maximum disclosure of pricing bids.133 Absent complete transparency, Solar Alliance proposes an after-the-fact review by a designated PRG.134 PG&E points out that limited aggregate information (i.e., number of projects, megawatts per resource type) may be disclosed, but information on offers received in a solicitation may not be made public for three years.135
Information is vital to an effectively functioning competitive market. We expect IOUs and ED to make the maximum amount of information public. In fact, all data must be public unless a party carries a strong burden of proof otherwise. It is particularly important for the RAM due to our reliance on the underlying market being competitive.
It is also important that the maximum amount of price information be available in order to gain public acceptance of the RAM. The majority of parties recommending a fixed price FIT, for example, do so because they assert it is open, transparent and objective, while RAM, absent adequate price and other information, is closed, opaque and subjective. The goal of RAM may be lower prices (compared to a fixed price FIT), but without price data, and market information on the degree of competition, the public must take on faith any statement (including those made by an IOU or the Commission) that costs have been reduced or competition achieved. RAM program credibility requires that IOU and Commission administration provide full opportunity for the public to assess the merits of the RAM and reach its own conclusions.
We expect ED, respondents, and parties to explore all reasonable means to make price and other information widely available. At a minimum, we require specific information to be revealed publicly. For all bids received and shortlisted, we require the IOUs to provide the following information: names of participating companies and the number of bids per company; number of bids received and shortlisted; project size, participating technologies, quantitative summary of how many projects passed each project viability screen, and location of bids by county provided in a map format. Finally, the IOUs must release information on the achievement of project development milestones for all executed RAM contracts. Pursuant to the program goal to select projects that can come online quickly, we believe this information is essential to verify that the program protocols and design are achieving the intended outcome. This transparency will allow the Commission to make changes to the program in order to increase its efficiency and effectiveness.
12.2. Cost Recovery
AreM proposes that costs related to the RAM should be borne by bundled service customers, and not customers of ESPs or CCAs. IOUs, TURN and others believe all customers should bear the costs of the RAM, including customers of ESPs and CCAs.
We currently permit an IOU to recover costs incurred in meeting its RPS obligations (including Existing FIT costs) from its bundled customers. These are typically part of generation or procurement costs recovered via each utility's annual Energy Resource Recovery Account proceeding. We also permit recovery of appropriate non-bypassable costs (including stranded costs associated with RPS resources) from certain customers that depart from the utility bundle after those new resources are procured.136 We are not persuaded to make any change for the RAM. We recently reached the same conclusion regarding a similar program,137 and know of no reason to reach a different result here.
131 August 2009 Proposal at 10.
132 Pricing Comments at 5.
133 Vote Solar Pricing Comments at 10; TURN Pricing Reply Comments at 9.
134 Pricing Comments at 18.
135 Pricing Comments at 13-14.
136 Those are departing direct access customers, CCA customers, new Western Area Power Administration and split wheeling departing load customers, and departing load associated with a large municipalization. (D.08-09-012, Ordering Paragraphs 1 and 3.)
137 D.10-04-052 at 69.
