3. Commission Orders Based on NTSB Safety Recommendations

On January 3, 2011, the NTSB issued Safety Recommendations to PG&E, this Commission and the United States Department of Transportation, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. All three Safety Recommendations included substantially the same descriptions of findings by NTSB as a result of the initial stages of its investigation of the San Bruno pipeline rupture and fire. The NTSB first explained that PG&E's as-built drawings and alignment sheets showed Line 132 was constructed using 30-inch-diameter seamless steel pipe, but the ruptured pipe segment was in fact constructed with longitudinally seam-welded pipe. The NTSB further explained that accurate pipeline records are critical to establish a valid MAOP below which the pipeline can be safely operated. Although recognizing hydrostatic and spike testing, the NTSB concluded that it was preferable to use available design, construction, inspection, testing and other related records to calculate a valid MAOP.

In the letter to PG&E, the NTSB made the following recommendations, with similar recommendations for this Commission and the federal agency to oversee PG&E's compliance:

1. Aggressively and diligently search for all as-built drawings, alignment sheets, and specifications, and all design, construction, inspection, testing, maintenance, and other related records, including those records in locations controlled by personnel or firms other than Pacific Gas and Electric Company, relating to pipeline system components, such as pipe segments, valves, fittings, and weld seams for Pacific Gas and Electric Company natural gas transmission lines in class 3 and class 4 locations and class 1 and class 2 high consequence areas that have not had a maximum allowable operating pressure established through prior hydrostatic testing. These records should be traceable, verifiable, and complete. (P-10-2) (Urgent)

2. Use the traceable, verifiable, and complete records located by implementation of Safety Recommendation P-10-2 (Urgent) to determine the valid maximum allowable operating pressure, based on the weakest section of the pipeline or component to ensure safe operation, of Pacific Gas and Electric Company natural gas transmission lines in class 3 and class 4 locations and class 1 and class 2 high consequence areas that have not had a maximum allowable operating pressure established through prior hydrostatic testing. (P-10-3) (Urgent)

The Commission's Executive Director, in a letter dated January 3, 2011 (the same date as the NTSB's Safety Recommendations), advised PG&E of the NTSB's Safety Recommendations, and ordered PG&E to complete compliance with the recommendations by February 1, 2011. On January 7, 2011, PG&E responded to the Executive Director's January 3, 2011 letter, indicating that the utility could not comply with the February 1, 2011 date in obtaining all of the requested records, but that it would provide those records by March 15, 2011. The Commission ratified the Executive Director's order on January 13, 2011, in Resolution L-410, and extended PG&E's date for the compliance report filing to March 15, 2011. Thereafter, in Ordering Paragraph 3 of Rulemaking (R.) 11-02-019, the Commission directed PG&E to file and serve its compliance report on all parties to this proceeding when initiating this rulemaking on February 24, 2011.

The purpose and "urgent" nature of the NTSB's Safety Recommendations were made clear in a public speech by NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman on January 26, 2011, before the Transportation Research Board in Washington, D.C. The speech was widely covered in the press, and a copy has been posted on the NTSB's website since January. In discussing the San Bruno pipeline eruption, Chairman Hersman said:

Our investigators were told that the pipe involved in the explosion was a seamless factory manufactured pipe. But even a layperson could see the patchwork of welds marking the pipe. This misinformation was not a minor record-keeping oversight. In the years since the pipe was put into service, decisions regarding inspections, operating pressures, and risk management plans were all based on facts that were just plain wrong.

While the investigation is still ongoing, earlier this month the NTSB issued urgent recommendations calling for hydrostatic pressure testing to establish the safe maximum operating pressure of the pipeline. Some of you may know that requirements for hydrostatic testing already exist - requirements established in 1970. Ironically, the San Bruno pipeline was exempted because it was installed in 1956, so it was grandfathered from the testing requirements. The operator has not been able to produce documentation on the origins of the pipe, the installation of the pipe, or the early inspection of the pipe.

But no one realized this until after the pipeline exploded. And then it was just too late.