3. Standard for Ruling on a Motion to Dismiss
Over the years, the Commission has developed two similar standards for ruling on a motion to dismiss and we address and apply each standard in this decision.
3.1. The First Standard: Do the Undisputed
Facts Require the Commission to Rule
in the Moving Party's Favor as a Matter
of Law?
In Raw Bandwidth Communications, Inc. v. SBC California, Inc. and SBC Advanced Solutions, Inc., the Commission stated that a Motion to Dismiss "requires the Commission to determine whether the party bringing the motion prevails based solely on undisputed facts and matters of law. The Commission treats such motions as a court would treat motions for summary judgment in civil practice."5 A motion for summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence presented indicates there are no triable issues as to any material fact and that, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civil Procedure, § 437c; Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, 10:26-27.) While there is no express Commission rule for summary judgment motions, the Commission looks to California Code of Civil Procedure § 437(c) for the standards on which to decide a motion for summary judgment. (Id.)6 Section 437(c) provides:
The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers . . . and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, which raise a triable issue as to any material fact."
A further beneficial purpose of such a motion is "that it promotes and protects the administration of justice and expedites litigation by the elimination of needless trials." (Westcom Long Distance, supra, 54 CPUC2d, 249.) As such, where appropriate, the Commission regularly grants motions for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (See D.07-07-040 [granting Chevron judgment against Equilon "as a matter of law"]; D.07-01-004 [granting Cox Telecom judgment against Global NAPs of California]; and D.02-04-051 [granting summary adjudication of a claim by County Sanitation District against SoCal Edison].)
3.2. The Second Standard: Is Defendant Entitled
to Prevail Even if the Complaint's Well-Pleaded
Allegations are Accepted as True?
In Re Western Gas Resources-California, Inc., D.99-11-023 (November 4, 1999), we articulated another standard for dismissing complaints and applications that is slightly different than what we adopted in Raw Bandwidth:
On a motion to dismiss a complaint, the legal standard against which the sufficiency of the complaint is measured is whether, taking the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, the defendant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. (E.g., MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Pacific Bell, D.95-05-020, 59 Cal. PUC 2d 665, 1995 Cal. PUC LEXIS 458, at *29-*30, citing Burke v. Yellow Cab Co. (1973) 76 Cal. PUC 166.) 3 CPUC 3d, 301.
This standard was employed more recently in Everyday Energy Corporation v. San Diego Gas & Electric Company, D.12-03-037 (March 29, 2012) wherein the Commission added: "By assuming that the facts as alleged in the complaint are true for the purpose of deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, we assume that Complainant will be able to prove everything alleged in its complaint." (Slip Op., 7.)
In determining if the complaint's allegations are "well pleaded," we are guided by the standards set forth in Pub. Util. Code § 1702, which provides that the complainant must allege that a regulated utility has engaged in an act or failed to perform an act in violation of any law or commission order or rule:
Complaint may be made by the commission of its own motion or by any corporation or person, chamber of commerce, board of trade, labor organization, or any civic, commercial, mercantile, traffic, agricultural, or manufacturing association or organization, or anybody politic or municipal corporation, by written petition or complaint, setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public utility, including any rule or charge heretofore established or fixed by or for any public utility, in violation or claimed to be in violation, of any provision of law or of any order or rule of the commission.
As demonstrated by past precedent, the Commission will dismiss a complaint that fails to meet this two-pronged standard. (See Monkarsh v. Southern California Gas Company, Decision 09-11-017, at 3 (November 24, 2009); Pacific Continental Textiles, Inc. vs. Southern California Edison Company, Decision 06-06-011, at 4 (June 15, 2006); Watkins v. MCI_Metro Access Transmission Services, Decision 05-03-007, at 4 (March 17, 2005); Rodriquez v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Decision 04-03-010, at 3-4 (March 16, 2004); AC Farms Sheerwood v. So. Cal Edison, Decision 02-11-003 (November 7, 2002); and Crain v. Southern California Gas Company, Decision 00-07-045 (July 20, 2000).)
In addition to the requirements of § 1702, Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 4.2(a) requires that complaints be drafted with specificity so that the defendant and the Commission know precisely the nature of the wrong that defendant has allegedly committed, the injury, and the relief requested:
The specific act complained of shall be set forth in ordinary and concise language. The complaint shall be so drawn as to completely advise the defendant and the Commission of the facts constituting the grounds of the complaint, the injury complained of, and the exact relief which is desired.
In sum, while the first and second standards for deciding a Motion to Dismiss differ slightly (one looks at the undisputed facts while the other assumes the well-pleaded facts to be true), both standards require the Commission to examine the factual allegations and to make a legal determination regarding whether judgment should be entered in the moving party's favor. In applying both standards to BudSco's complaint, we conclude that Alco's Motion must be granted.
5 D.03-05-023 (September 11, 2003) [Scoping memo and Ruling of Assigned Commissioner on Motion to Dismiss and Preliminary Matters at 3, citing to Westcom Long Distance, Inc. v. Pacific Bell et al., Decision 94-04-082, 54 CPUC 2d 244, 249].
6 See Westcom, supra, 54 CPUC 2d, 249-250.
