II. Background
A. Background To Rulemaking (R.) 04-04-003
There are numerous principal sources of guidance regarding what the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC/Commission) should direct the three IOUs to do in this decision as a response to the LTPP each IOU filed on July 9, 2004: Assembly Bill (AB) 57,1 EAP,2 Decision (D.) 03-12-062,3 D.04-01-050,4 Order Initiating R.04-04-003, and the Assigned Commissioner Ruling/Scoping Memo (ACR) issued by Commissioner Peevey on June 16, 2004, as amended June 29, 2004,5 in R.04-04-003. These guidance principles were to be used by the utilities in the drafting and design of their LTPPs.
Specifically, the ACR stated "[a]s indicated in the OIR [R.04-04-003], review and adoption of the utilities' long-term procurement plans is the centerpiece of this proceeding. . . . This exercise, including the adoption of upfront standards and criteria for rate recovery constitutes the last major step remaining for implementation of AB 57. Completion of this review and approval of utility plans by the end of this year is of critical importance so that the utilities can make the investment decisions that are crucial to the reliable energy future of this state."6
In summary, that is the purpose of this decision: to give the three IOUs authorization to plan for and procure the resources necessary to provide reliable service to their customer loads for the planning period 2005 through 2014. In addition, this decision also has to work in concert to coordinate and incorporate
Commission and legislative efforts from other proceedings, in particular:
Community Choice Aggregation (CCA),7 Demand Response (DR),8 Distributed Generation (DG),9 Energy Efficiency (EE),10 Avoided Cost and Long-term Policy for Expiring Qualifying Facility (QF) Contracts,11 RPS,12 Transmission Assessment13 and Transmission Planning.14 In addition, on October 28, 2004, the Commission issued D.04-10-035, the Resource Adequacy (RA) decision in this docket.
The OIR instructed the utilities to incorporate the Commission's policy direction from these other proceedings into their LTPPs and to inform the Commission how the utilities intended to meet the established goals from the other proceedings through its procurement decisions between now and 2014. In addition to including these policy directives in their LTPPs, the utilities were directed to prioritize their resource procurements following the "loading order" of preferred resources established in the EAP. The EAP's "loading order" framework identifies certain demand-side resources as "preferred" because they work towards optimizing energy conservation and resource efficiency while reducing per capita demand, as well as certain preferred supply-side resources. The EAP loading order is: energy efficiency and demand response; renewables (including renewable DG); clean fossil-fueled DG; and finally clean fossil-fueled central-station generation. Sensible transmission investments should be made in concert with these other resource commitments.
Because the Commission recognizes that the utilities face many demand and resource uncertainties in planning for the next ten years, the ACR instructed the utilities to prepare three supply/demand scenarios: high-, medium-and low-incremental need. The medium-load plan is to be the preferred resource plan of each utility that meets the needs identified in its Alternative Base Case load-forecast scenario, or its CEC Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR) base case scenario. The high-load plan should be a reasonable guess at how great the burden of service could become under high future growth load and an optimistic view of economic growth, assuming modest customer migration for CCA. The low-load should be based on reasonable assumptions about progress in conservation and pessimistic assumptions about the economy and generous assumptions about the development of core/non-core and CCA. The utilities were to use these scenarios to demonstrate how they planned to accommodate the many possible outcomes. Additionally, the utilities were instructed to employ a risk management approach vis-à-vis future commitments by incorporating long, mid and shorter-term contract terms so as to remain flexible to refine resource portfolios as certainty increases.
PG&E, SCE and SDG&E filed their respective LTPPs on July 9, 2004. For the most part, each utility followed the direction provided in the OIR and the ACR for their plans.15 In particular, each utility prepared the three supply/demand scenarios, incorporated Commission orders and directives from the other related proceedings, planned for a mixed portfolio of resources, contract terms and ownership types and followed the EAP loading order. What is apparent, however, is that the more than twenty intervenors had differing expectations on what the LTPPs ought to include, their function and their relation to annual procurement plans, applications, advice letters and other planning activities-notably transmission planning. Many intervenors complained that the LTPPs did not meet their expectations and wanted the Commission to remedy the situation.
In addition, each utility chose differing assumptions regarding their medium case and the boundaries of high and low scenarios. This caused some difficulty in direct comparisons across the three utilities.
What further complicates review of the LTPPs is that much of the detail of the plans is confidential, so some parties identified as "Market Participants"16 (MP) did not have access to specific forecasts and projections and were only able to respond to the plans in general terms. While members of each utility's Procurement Review Group (PRG) did have access to the confidential files and other intervenors had access pursuant to confidentiality and non-disclosure rules, MPs who did not conform to the terms of the Amended Protective Order17 did not have such access. The ever vexing and complicated issue of confidentiality and how it relates to ratepayer protection and public access to the Commission's decision making process is addressed further in this decision.
B. Procedural History
The OIR to Promote Policy and Program Coordination and Integration in Electric Utility Resource Planning was issued April 8, 2004, the initial Prehearing Conference (PHC) was held April 30, 2004, a second PHC was held August 25, 2004, and evidentiary hearings (EH) were held August 30 through September 24, 2004.
In preparation for the EH, the utilities filed their respective LTPPs on July 9, 2004. Intervenor testimony was received on August 6, 2004, from the Border Generation Group (BGG), Cogeneration Association of California (CAC), California Independent System Operator (CAISO), Calpine Corporation (Calpine), California Cogeneration Council (CCC), Center for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Technologies (CEERT), City of Chula Vista (Chula Vista), City of San Diego (CSD), California Manufacturers & Technology Association and the California Large Energy Consumers Association (CMTA/CLECA), Constellation Power Source (Constellation), County of Los Angeles (LA), Duke Energy North America (DENA), California Department of Water Resources (DWR), Independent Energy Producers (IEP), Modesto Irrigation District (Modesto), Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), South San Joaquin Irrigation District (SSJID), Strategic Energy and Constellation New Energy (Strategic Energy), The Utility Reform Network (TURN), Utility Consumers Action Network (UCAN), Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), West Coast Power (WCP) and the Western Power Trading Forum (WPTF).
On August 20, 2004, rebuttal testimony was received from PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, CAISO, Calpine, NRDC, ORA, Strategic Energy, TURN and UCS.
During the almost four weeks of evidentiary hearings there was extensive cross-examination of utility and intervenor witnesses and 128 documents were received in evidence. Post hearing briefs were received on October 18, 2004, from PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, BGG, CAC, CCC, Calpine, CAISO, CEERT, Chula Vista, CSD, CMTA/CLECA, Constellation, DENA, IEP, Modesto, NRDC, ORA, Sempra Energy Global Enterprises (SEGE), SSJID, Strategic Energy, TURN, UCAN, UCS, WCP and WPTF.
Reply briefs were received on November 1, 2004, from: PG&E, SCE, SDG&E, CAC, CCC, Calpine, CAISO, CEERT, Chula Vista, Constellation, DENA, IEP, Modesto, NRDC, ORA, SSJID, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group (SVMG), Strategic Energy, TURN, UCS and WCP, and a letter was received from the DWR.
The proposed decision (PD) was mailed on November 16, 2004. On November 30, 2004, SCE filed a timely request for Final Oral Argument (FOA) before the whole Commission. FOA was held on December 13, 2004.
C. Motions
During the course of the proceeding numerous motions were filed. Motions regarding requests to strike or limit testimony and/or to exclude exhibits from the record were ruled on orally by the ALJ during the EH. There are a few motions that have yet to receive rulings and they will be addressed. Any motions not previously resolved or addressed in this decision are deemed denied.
UCAN and CEERT filed Notices of Intent to Claim Compensation (NOI) for their participation and contributions to the proceeding. Both of those motions will be ruled on in separate rulings independent of this decision.
On October 8, 2004, WCP filed a Motion for Official Notice, and followed that motion with a supplement on October 12, 2004. In sum, WCP asks the Commission to take official notice of the CEC Committee Draft Report in the IEPR: 2004 Update, dated September 2004 and posted on the CEC's web site. WCP attached a copy of the Committee Draft Report to its motion. In its supplemental filing, WCP advises the Commission that it is not asking the Commission to accept the factual statements in the Report, but rather seeks clarification that all parties may refer to the Report for policy conclusions of the IEPR Committee. At its November 4, 2004 Business Meeting, the CEC formally adopted the 2004 update.
No opposition was received to WCP's motion. The conclusions and policies of the CEC's 2004 Update to the IEPR may be incorporated into the IOUs LTPPs.
On December 6, 2004, San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) filed a Motion to Intervene with comments to the PD attached. SANDAG filed its motion pursuant to Rule 45 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure and requests Interested Party status. SANDAG comprises 18 cities and county governments and serves as the forum for regional decision-making. It seeks to intervene in the LTPP rulemaking so its Energy Working Group (EWG) can work with the community and SDG&E to update the regions LTPP in 2006. SANDAG will strive to involve the community in regional energy planning.
SANDAG indicates that its participation in this proceeding will not prejudice any party, delay the schedule, or expand the scope of this matter.
SANDAG's motion, with attached comments, was filed the day comments were due on the PD mailed on November 16, 2004. While SANDAG's representative was on the service list for the proceeding, SANDAG did not actively participate in the proceeding. With this understanding, SANDAG's motion to intervene is granted, and its comments will be read and considered. However, SANDAG is cautioned that while they are now an Interested Party to the proceeding and may participate as it wishes in subsequent phases of R.04-04-003, this phase of the proceeding was submitted November 1, 2004, with the filing of reply briefs, and the record will not be reopened and the schedule will not be delayed due to SANDAG's intervention.
D. Summary of Parties' Positions
While there were twenty-seven plus18 active parties to this proceeding, most of the parties can be catalogued into one of the following categories: IOU; consumer/ratepayer advocate; environmental group; municipal/community choice proponent; co-generation facility; wholesale marketer and energy producer, the CAISO and "other." While each party brought a different perspective and advocacy position to this proceeding, there are common threads that connect many of these parties' points of view vis-à-vis the utilities' LTPPs and we summarize those positions below.
1. IOUs
To begin, each IOU had the responsibility for drafting a LTPP that met the criteria established in the OIR, the ACR/Scoping Memo and the EAP. For the most part, the IOUs did not "advocate" a position on their LTPPs, but rather presented them as compliance filings. Within each LTPP, however, there were a few specific positions that a utility took, primarily on the topics of planning and procuring for CCAs, recognition of debt equivalency, future contracting with QFs, length of contracting authority, appropriate policies regarding renewable generation procurement, use of aging power plants/reuse of brownfield sites and whether independent third-party observers were a necessary component of bid solicitations. To summarize the IOUs requests: they each seek approval of their LTPPs and cost recovery assurance.
2. Consumer/Ratepayer Advocates
TURN, ORA and UCAN, while all consumer advocates, each focused on different topics in the LTPPs. UCAN, for example, only reviewed SDG&E's plan and criticized the plan for not following the EAP's loading order, not addressing Reliability Must Run (RMR) costs, congestion, transmission losses and load pocket needs, using a projected price for natural gas that was too low, failing to extend many short-term contracts that could provide potentially viable resources, especially in regards to EE, DR, DG and renewables-while criticizing the need for a new 500 kilovolt (kV) transmission line.
TURN's primary goal is to have the utilities procure adequate resources for all customers, with all customers paying, not just bundled load customers. In point of fact, TURN is concerned that the utilities have too many resources tied up in long-term contracts, and the Commission should enable them to enter into power contracts for terms up to five years. TURN is mindful that the IOUs, in their roles as load serving entities (LSE), want to avoid over procuring in the face of "great uncertainty regarding the magnitude of their future bundled loads."19 However, TURN is also concerned that if commitments are not made now by PG&E and SCE that new capacity will not be built to be on line by 2008, and the utilities will be left resorting to short-term contracts and the spot market to fill the net-short position-to the detriment of ratepayers. To avert this potential crisis, TURN urges the Commission to order PG&E and SCE, acting as "interim agents" of RA policy on behalf of all customers in the state, to each procure 500 megawatts (MW) of new capacity by contracting with non-IOU generators for periods of up to ten years, with deliveries to start in 2008. The net costs of these resources should be recovered via a non-bypassable charge paid by all customers.
In summary, ORA argues that the following topics do not need to be resolved in this proceeding: approval of any transmission plans, especially SDG&E's proposed new transmission line, debt equivalence, a mechanism for comparing power purchase agreements (PPA) with utility-owned generation, use of IEs in the bid solicitation process and stranded costs from customer departing load. Instead, ORA urges the Commission to adopt its aggregate analysis in the appendix to ORA's report, Exhibits 40 and 41, in drawing its conclusions on the IOUs' planning scenarios, which ORA posits do not differ significantly from the IOUs' conclusions for their procurement needs. In the future, ORA would like to see the Commission address the fact that there were inconsistencies in the use by the utilities of assumptions, especially regarding departing load, and if the utilities used the same forecast assumptions it would be easier to compare and contrast them.
3. Environmental Groups
NRDC, with its interest in minimizing the societal costs of reliable energy services, focused on the delivery of cost-effective EE programs, renewable energy resources and other suitable energy alternatives in reviewing and analyzing the IOUs' LTPPs. NRDC found that the LTPPs lacked adequate information as to whether they would minimize economic and environmental impacts, failed to follow the EAP's loading order, did not compare different generation resource options and did not adequately address carbon dioxide emissions. To remedy these deficiencies, NRDC urges the Commission to require the IOUs to account for the financial risk associated with carbon emissions; develop a strategy to reduce global warming pollution emissions; plan and procure renewable resources above and beyond the minimum established in the RPS; and implement policies on investing in EE and renewable resources.
CEERT shares similar goals with NRDC, such as improving air quality and reducing dependence on fossil fuels. CEERT found PG&E and SCE's LTPPs to be deficient especially regarding their renewable procurement plans and asks that the Commission direct these two utilities to supplement or amend their plans to be consistent with that submitted by SDG&E. CEERT would like to see a more detailed analysis from PG&E and SCE as to how they intend to reach their RPS goals, more information as to the specific resource profiles they intend to procure, similar to the "portfolio stack" submitted by SDG&E, an incorporation of each utility's goals concerning the environment and a ten-year planning horizon so the renewable industry can plan ahead. Even though many other parties criticized SDG&E's inclusion of a 500 kV transmission as part of its LTPP, CEERT applauds the proposed line as a means to bring more renewables into the SDG&E service territory. Although PG&E and SCE justified the ambiguity in the renewable portion of their LTPP as to an actual renewable portfolio stack on the ground that the market would decide the portfolio stack, CEERT argues that PG&E and SCE have sufficient information from previous RPS RFO/RFPs to make more detailed projections than they did.
UCS also did not find the IOUs' LTPPs sufficient for demonstrating the utilities' commitment to climate change and related topics and asks the Commission to require supplemental filings that model potential cost impacts of carbon regulation and gas price risk, along with a more detailed analysis of renewable resource potential over the next ten years. In addition, if the Commission adopts a debt equivalency factor for long-term contracts, UCS requests that the factor for renewables be lower than for non-renewable, and that the IOUs incorporate the EE goals adopted in D.04-09-060. In particular, UCS urges the Commission to insist that the IOUs account for the cost of emissions associated with particular resource choices.
4. Potential CCA/Municipalization/Direct Access
Five intervenors could be described as parties representing potential "departing load" by way of CCA, municipalization, direct access (DA) or a core/non-core structure; Chula Vista, Modesto, SSJID, Strategic Energy and CMTA/CLECA.
These parties are all particularly concerned that the IOUs will over procure and then departing customers will be obligated to pay for their share of stranded costs so their departure will not over burden the bundled ratepayers remaining with the utilities. Chula Vista wants SDG&E to include CCA for the city as a likely case scenario, and only use short-term contracts to fill in for any net short in the near term. SSJID plans to provide service to its irrigation district customers in January 2007 and wants PG&E's LTPP to recognize this so PG&E does not procure energy for these customers. Modesto finds itself in a similar situation to SSJID and urges the Commission to instruct PG&E to make "wise" procurement decisions by using short-term power contracts to meet its 90% year ahead obligation, so there is no need for the non-bypassable surcharge. Modesto argues that changing weather conditions alone cause more fluctuation than Modesto's departing load, and so PG&E should not look to Modesto's customers for the collection of stranded costs.
CMTA/CLECA also want the IOUs to be mindful of over-procuring in light of the uncertainty of departing load for DA or a core/non-core structure and want the utilities to minimize the risk of stranded costs by using a mix of contract lengths. From CMTA/CLECA's perspective, it is the IOUs responsibility to plan properly, so there should be no non-bypassable surcharge. CMTA/CLECA recognize that there might have to be limits on departing load, such as annual limits on net migration to or from the utility, but advocate there should be no surcharge. CMTA/CLECA also want more access to confidential IOU data [see discussion under "Confidentiality"], support an open and transparent RFO process and support the use of an IE for the RFO if an affiliate is involved in the bidding.
Strategic Energy is also concerned with the utilities over procuring and argues that the IOUs did not make reasonable assumptions in their LTPPs about departing load for CCA/DA/core/non-core and therefore if there are stranded costs, the utilities should be at risk. From Strategic Energy's vantage point, the IOUs' failure to properly plan for departing load almost ensures that any migration of load will result in stranded costs. Strategic Energy urges the Commission to not institute any charge for departing customers as that removes risk from the utilities for over procurement, removes any incentive for the utilities to resell excess power, gives the benefit of increased reliability to bundled customers at the expense of departing load customers and frustrates competition by slowing down migration.
5. Co-Generation Facilities
CAC and CCC are concerned with the inclusion/exclusion of QF contracts in the IOUs' LTPPs. While CAC and CCC understand that the Commission is not determining the future fate of QFs in this proceeding, they still argue that the Commission must insist that the IOUs reserve a place in their LTPPs for QFs as baseload resources and to sign up to five-year contracts with these resources. Both co-generation associations fear that the IOUs will be fully "resourced" without any QF contracts in excess of one year. Without longer-term contracts the QFs might not continue to exist, and because of their unique properties they cannot participate competitively in an RFO that is not seeking base load power. None of the utilities anticipate needing baseload resources in the near term. Instead, their projected need is for dispatchable peaking or shaping resources. Co-generation QFs run 24/7 to supply their hosts, and without a contract to sell that 24/7 power they would have to use steam boilers to meet their host's needs.
6. Energy Marketers and Independent Energy Producers
WCP, WPTF, IEP, DENA, Constellation, BGG and Calpine are all identified as MPs and as such did not have unfettered access to the IOUs' confidential data supporting their LTPPs and referenced this information deficit in their briefs. Refer to the section in the decision on Confidentiality for further discussion. However, even without reviewing the confidential background data for the LTPPs these MPs were able to effectively cross-examine the IOU and intervenor witnesses and advance their position.
WCP, IEP, DENA and BGG all focused on the need for long-term contracts and an open and transparent solicitation process. BGG supports SDG&E's proposed new 500 kV transmission project because it would increase import capability and system reliability, decrease RMR costs and give access to out-of-area resources, including renewables. DENA, on the other hand, argues against SDG&E's 500 kV transmission project and wants the Commission to direct the utility to explore more in-area generation. Specifically, DENA could re-power its South Bay facility in the same time frame as the new transmission lines, if it can compete in a RFO for a three to five year contract.
WCP advances similar arguments to those of DENA: the Commission should recognize the value of aging power plants as providing needed RMR, peaking and intermediate power in the three to five year range, and most importantly, recognizing the value of using existing brownfield sites for new generation facilities - especially before approving a new 500 kV transmission line. All costs should be considered in comparing brownfield sites with greenfield sites, especially those that are hard to quantify, such as location near the load pocket, and WCP even argues that brownfield sites should be given a recognized priority in the loading order. WCP contends that building on a brownfield site is cheaper than building a new combustion turbine (CT) or combined cycle (CC) facility, provides deliverability without long-distance transmission and provides reduced costs to society as compared with the siting of a new location.
IEP favors a fair and equal field for competitive bidding and recommends that the Commission not adopt a debt equivalency factor for bid comparisons, allow short-term capacity procurement and utilize an IE to monitor an RFO when there are competing bids from PPAs and utility-owned projects.
Calpine, WPTF and Constellation all advocate for an open, fair and competitive RFO process with some protections to keep the playing field level for PPAs competing against utility owned projects. First and foremost, they argue vociferously against establishing recognition of debt equivalency as part of the bid evaluation. Under almost all scenarios where debt equivalency is a factor, all bids except the utility-owned option fail the least-cost best-fit (LCBF) criteria. Next, Calpine wants any IOU bid to be a binding commitment with the shareholders, not the ratepayers, at risk for overruns. Then, the Commission should allow long-term contracts, not just short-term as the CCA/DA intervenors request, because the marketers and IPPs need the financial security of long-term contracts to get the financing to refurbish old facilities and to build new resources. And, finally, no preference should be given to any bid outside of those preferences established by the EAP, Commission decisions or the legislature.
WPTF also proposes a tradable capacity market because then there would be no need for a non by-passable surcharge for departing load. WPTF recommends the use of an IE if a utility option is one of the bids and wants utility winning bids to be binding and non-recourse, with no cost overruns.
Constellation is in favor of a competitive wholesale market and proposes a "slice of load" concept or standard offer service (SOS) that would be a three to five year contract for wholesale services, bid through a competitive process, with Commission oversight, where the marketer would bid for a percentage of the utility's load and take the risk as the load varies from time to time. The risk of customer uncertainty would be borne by the marketer, not the IOU, so there would be no stranded costs. Constellation urges that this concept would provide ratepayer benefits from competitive prices, diversity of supply, elimination of stranded costs, alignment of customers and utility and application of market rules. The SOS would also include RPS and RA requirements.
7. The CAISO
CAISO finds the IOUs' filings insufficient for its purposes. The CAISO needs the location of a potential resource, the conceptual scenario for resource additions, and the identity of potential new resources and transmission needs. CAISO wants the IOUs to include a with/and/without scenario for new transmission in future LTPPs.
8. Other Intervenors
CSD and SEGE are also intervenors in this proceeding but do not fit into the above categories. CSD focused exclusively on SDG&E's LTPP and argues against approval of the 500 kV transmission line until there has been adequate time to weigh alternatives. The goal of CSD vis-à-vis SDG&E is to advocate for cost-effective reliability through a balance of customer-owned and utility-owned generation plus procured generation. CSD does not see enough flexibility in SDG&E's plan for departing load, sees too much out-of-area renewable power at the expense of local renewable DG, and is not in favor of allowing the utility to meet its RPS through renewable energy credits (REC) unless the RECs have been procured from DG with net-metered renewable generation.
SEGE argues for the Commission to rescind the ban on affiliate transactions since it prevents the utilities' from access to ready built facilities if owned by an affiliate. In addition, SEGE favors competitive solicitations, including for utility-owned generation and affirms the public policy of prudent IOU procurement so as to reduce risk of stranded costs.
1 AB 57, (Stats.2002, Ch.850, Sec.3 Effective September 24, 2004). AB 57 added Section 454.5 to the Pub. Util. Code.
2 Energy Action Plan issued jointly on May 8, 2003, by the CPUC, the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the California Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority (CPA). A copy of the complete EAP is available for downloading on the Commission's website at www.cpuc.ca.gov.
3 D.03-12-062, issued in R.01-10-024, gave the IOUs procurement authority, often referred to as "AB 57 authority" for 2004, including the authority to sign contracts for up to five-years duration for 2005 procurement needs.
4 D.04-01-050 gave continued procurement authority to the IOUs through the first three quarters of 2005, with authority to sign contracts for up to one year's duration for 2005 procurement needs. D.04-01-050 closed R. 01-10-024, and established the parameters for R.04-04-003.
5 The June 29, 2004, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Ruling augmented the June 16, 2004, ACR and directed the utilities to include in their LTPPs responses to specific questions regarding global climate change issues.
6 ACR, June 4, 2004, p. 3.
7 R.03-10-003.
8 R.02-06-001.
9 R.04-03-017.
10 R.01-08-028.
11 R.04-04-025.
12 R.04-04-026.
13 R.04-01-026.
14 R.00-01-001.
15 The June 4, 2004, ACR included an attachment, Attachment A, prepared by the Commission's Energy Division (ED) staff in consultation with staff of the CEC.
16 The protective order signed by the utilities in the 2003 resource planning proceeding, R.01-10-024, defined market participants as follows: "1) an employee of a private, municipal, state or federal entity that engages in the purchase, sale or marketing of energy or capacity, or the bidding on or purchasing of power plants. Or consulting on such matters, or an employee of a trade association comprised of such entities that engage in one or more of such activities: 2) an attorney, paralegal, expert or employee of an expert retained by an MP for the purpose of advising, preparing for participating in Procurement Plan and Compliance Reviews regarding [IOU]."
17 On January 14, 2004, the assigned ALJ in R.01-10-024 issued a ruling adopting an Amended Protective Order that was substantially consistent with an order adopted by a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) judge in FERC Docket Nos. EL02-60-003 and EL02-62-003, and allowed MPs access to Protected Materials following the FERC guidelines. This Amended Protective Order controlled confidentiality issues in this current proceeding.
18 Not all parties participated to the same extent. For example, The County of Los Angeles and DWR served testimony, but did not file post-hearing briefs and SEGE did not serve testimony, but filed a post-hearing brief.
19 TURN opening brief, p. 3.
