GNAPs argues that, because the traffic at issue is IP-enabled and/or VoIP traffic, it is jurisdictionally interstate in nature and the Commission may not exercise jurisdiction over AT&T's claim. GNAPs' argument is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel and, in any event, entirely without merit.
AT&T originally brought this claim before a federal court, but GNAPs successfully obtained its dismissal on the ground that this Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims for breach of the interconnection agreement. The federal court agreed with GNAPs that AT&T's interconnection agreement claims must be presented to the Commission for interpretation of the parties' agreement in the first instance.
The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars GNAPs from taking a contrary position here. The doctrine applies when "(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (4) the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake." (Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997), 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 183.) These factors apply here.
In any event, the Commission previously rejected GNAPs' arguments, when it denied GNAPs' application for rehearing of D.07-06-044, in which the Commission suspended GNAPs' Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity until it pays Cox California Telcom, LLC (Cox) amounts due under those parties' interconnection agreement. D.07-09-050 affirmed our authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to arbitrate, interpret and enforce interconnection disputes, and went on to address GNAPs' specific arguments as follows:
GNAPs relies on two primary sources to support for its contention that this Commission is without jurisdiction to adjudicate this complaint case that resulted from GNAPs' failure to honor its Interconnection Agreement with Cox. The first source is the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") on IP-Enabled Services (2004) 19 FCC Rcd 4863, 4864-68. GNAPs asserts that the NPRM preempted all regulation of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic. The other source is In the Matter of Vonage Holdings Corp (2004) 19 FCC Rcd 22404, aff'd by Minn. Pub. Util. Comm'n v. FCC (8th Cir. 2007) 483 F.3d 570, 579. In Vonage, the FCC preempted a regulation promulgated by the Minnesota PUC that required Vonage (a VoIP provider) to comply with state regulations governing telephone services. The Eighth Circuit upheld the FCC's ruling as reasonable because it was impractical or impossible to separate VoIP service into interstate and intrastate components.
GNAPs asserts that Minn. PUC upheld the FCC's determination that VoIP is jurisdictionally interstate and subject to the FCC's exclusive jurisdiction. [Fn. omitted.] While Vonage and Minn. PUC did indicate that state commissions cannot require VoIP providers to comply with state statutes and regulations governing telephone service within their jurisdiction, they did not conclude that state commissions cannot enforce interconnection agreements that require the payment of interconnection charges on VoIP calls that terminate on the PSTN. Thus, GNAPs' reliance on Vonage is misplaced. Vonage was solely a VoIP provider which sought to avoid regulation by the Minnesota PUC, whereas GNAPs is not a VoIP provider. The federal district court concluded in its Order Denying Motion for Preliminary Injunction in this proceeding that "[t]he fact that Global NAPs may use Internet protocols to receive traffic from its ESP customers before transmitting that traffic to an end point on the PSTN through Cox's facility does not make it a VoIP provider." [Fn. omitted.] Rather, GNAPs is a certificated carrier, licensed by this Commission, and subject to its jurisdiction.
Moreover, just because traffic may be jurisdictionally interstate does not preempt the Commission from review and enforcement of the interconnection agreements. GNAPs claimed that interstate traffic was preempted in the context of ISP-bound traffic, which is deemed to be interstate, and the Court rejected it. [Fn. omitted.] The Court noted that the ISP Remand Order "reserve[d] state commission authority in certain relevant matters," including the arbitration, review and enforcement of interconnection agreements, even where they dealt with ISP-bound (interstate traffic). [Fn. omitted.] This Commission also rejects GNAPs' argument.
Nor does the use of IP-enabled services in the transport of a call result in the states being deprived of jurisdiction. [Fn. omitted.] The AT&T IP Decision involved calls that were transported in part over IP circuits, although they began and ended as landline-based phone calls over the PSTN. It was argued that the pending NPRM on IP-enabled services preempted state access charges for such calls, similar to GNAPs' argument here. Recognizing that the issue of applying access charges to traffic that uses IP was being considered in the NPRM, the FCC nevertheless held that intrastate access charges applies to these calls:
We are undertaking a comprehensive examination of issues raised by the growth of services that use IP, including carrier compensation and universal service issues, in the IP-Enabled Services rulemaking proceeding. In the interim, however, to provide regulatory certainty, we clarify that AT&T's specific service is subject to interstate access charges...AT&T obtains the same circuit-switched interstate access for its specific service as obtained by other interexchange carriers, and, therefore, AT&T's specific service imposes the same burdens on the local exchange as do circuit-switched interexchange calls. It is reasonable that AT&T pay the same interstate access charges as other interexchange carriers for the same termination of calls over the PSTN, pending resolution of these issues in the Intercarrier Compensation and IP-Enabled Services rulemaking proceedings. [Order, In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T's Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services are Exempt from Access Charges (2004) 19 FCC Rcd 7457, 7464-65, ¶ 15.]
This statement makes clear that the mere use of IP in the transport of calls does not result in federal preemption, nor does the pendency of the NPRM on IP-enabled services.
(D.07-09-050, pp. 8-12.)
GNAPs makes the same jurisdictional arguments here that the Commission addressed and rejected in D.07-09-050. We do not find them any more persuasive in their repetition.3
GNAPs supplements its previous argument with citations to two recent decisions, the New York PSC order discussed previously, and Vonage Holdings, Corp. v. Nebraska Public Service Commission, 2008 WL 584078 (D.Neb. 2008). Both of these decisions concern similar facts and appear to follow the earlier Vonage decision, and GNAPs' reliance on them is misplaced for the same reasons as is its reliance on Vonage. Specifically, these decisions merely reiterate that state commissions may not assess statutory or regulatory charges against VoIP providers; they do not deny the state commissions' authority under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to arbitrate, interpret and enforce interconnection disputes. Indeed, the New York PSC Order affirms the state commissions' authority: rather than allow the complaining carrier to block traffic from the other for lack of compensation, the New York PSC exercised jurisdiction over the dispute by ordering the carriers to work out a traffic exchange agreement establishing rates, charges, terms and conditions for the VoIP traffic at issue there.
GNAPs argues that the billed amounts are intrastate access charges, which cannot be applied to its VoIP or IP-enabled traffic. GNAPs maintains that it should not be penalized for AT&T's failure to provide an interconnection option that reflects that the traffic is jurisdictionally interstate but not subject to access charges. GNAPs' argument is without merit. First, as the FCC determined in the AT&T IP Decision, intrastate access charges may apply to VoIP traffic that begins and ends as landline-based phone calls over the PSTN. (AT&T IP Decision, 19 FCC Rcd 7457, 7464-65, ¶ 15.) Even assuming that the traffic at issue here is VoIP (which we cannot determine on this record), it ends on the PSTN. The bar against intrastate access charges does not apply to this traffic. Second, the charges are not regulatory charges. Rather, they are contractual charges arising out of the parties' interconnection agreement.
3 Although AT&T does not raise it as an offense, the doctrine of collateral estoppel might reasonably be held to bar GNAPs' litigation of this jurisdictional issue, as it was conclusively determined as against GNAPs in D.07-09-050. (Vandenburg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815; see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979) 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, upholding the trial court's discretion to use the doctrine offensively against the defendant.)