Conclusions of Law
1. The administrative allocation of allowances that we are proposing is facially neutral, as between interstate and intrastate commerce, and does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. The allowances allocated to deliverers would be distributed based on fuel-differentiated output, whether the generation of the electricity occurs in California or elsewhere.
2. The auctioning of allowances by ARB or its agent that we are proposing is facially neutral, as between interstate and intrastate commerce, and does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect.
3. Under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. (1970) 397 U.S. 137, 142, a state enactment "will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
4. The use of an allocation based on fuel-differentiated output-based criterion would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
5. The centralized auctioning of allowances by ARB or its agent would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
6. The distribution of allowances to retail providers for subsequent auctioning, transitioning over time from being based initially on historical emissions in the retail providers' portfolios to being based on sales by 2020, would not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
7. Under the California Constitution, Article XIII A, Section 3 a tax can only be enacted by not less than a two-thirds vote of the Legislature.
8. A regulatory fee does not require a Legislative vote of not less than two-thirds because it is enacted under a state's traditional police power, not its taxing authority.
9. Under Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1997 15 Cal.4th 866, 875-876) regulatory fees imposed to pay for the expenses of a regulatory program or to defray the actual or anticipated adverse effects of the payer's action are not taxes imposed for revenue purposes, provided the fees "bear a reasonable relationship to those adverse effects." Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equal., (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 866, 870.
10. Our recommendation that any revenue generated from the auction of allowances be used to further the purposes and goals of AB 32, and not deposited in the State's general fund for non-AB 32 uses, does not violate Article XIII A, Section 3 of the California Constitution.
11. Our recommendation that revenue generated from the auction of allowances be reasonable in relationship to the adverse effects caused by the corresponding emission of GHGs, does not violate Article XIII A, Section 3 of the California Constitution.
12. The auction of allowances that we are recommending does not violate Article XIII, Section 19 or Article XVI, Section 6 of the State Constitution.
13. Using auction revenues to provide bill relief to customers generally, or to low income customers who spend a larger proportion of their incomes on utility services, furthers the goals of AB 32, and is therefore a permissible use of auction revenues.
14. An historical emissions-based distribution of allowances to retail providers can be designed to recognize voluntary early actions these retail providers have taken to reduce emissions, consistent with Section 38562(b)(3). Section 38580(a) requires ARB to monitor compliance with, and enforce, the regulations it issues, but does not prohibit the use of out-of-state offsets or credits.
15. Section 38564 encourages linkage with the GHG-reduction programs of other states and nations.
16. AB 32 permits linkage to other GHG-reduction programs and the use offsets from outside of California.
17. Section 38562(b) describes things that ARB should do in "adopting regulations" "to the extent feasible." It does not require each and every project carried out by private parties under those regulations to have the described effects.
18. Section 38570(b) requires ARB to do certain things "to the extent feasible" prior to the inclusion of any market-based compliance mechanism (such as offsets) in the AB 32 regulations.
19. Sections 38562(b) and 38570(b) require ARB to balance a number of potentially conflicting goals, including providing equity, minimizing cost, maximizing total benefits to California, encouraging early action, not impacting low-income communities disproportionately, complementing efforts to achieve federal and state ambient air quality standards and reduce toxic air contaminant emissions, considering cost-effectiveness and overall societal benefits, minimizing administrative burdens and leakage, minimizing leakage, considering emission impacts, preventing increases in other types of emissions, and maximizing additional environmental and economic benefits.
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. We recommend that the California Air Resources Board (ARB) set electricity and natural gas energy efficiency requirements in its Scoping Plan at the level of all cost-effective energy efficiency, with energy efficiency goals for investor-owned utilities set based on those adopted by the California Public Utilities Commission (Public Utilities Commission) in Decision (D.) 08-07-047, and as may be revised and updated by the Public Utilities Commission from time to time and with energy efficiency goals for publicly-owned utilities set at comparable levels, to be overseen by their governing boards.
2. We recommend that ARB work with the California Energy Commission (Energy Commission) and the Public Utilities Commission to develop approaches using a combination of direct regulatory/mandatory requirements and other potentially market-based strategies to achieve all cost-effective energy efficiency.
3. We recommend that ARB require comparable investment in energy efficiency from all retail providers in California, including both investor-owned and publicly-owned utilities, and assist in the implementation of the California Long-Term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan to maximize energy efficiency savings opportunities Statewide.
4. We recommend that ARB rely on and adopt the Public Utilities Commission's analysis and conclusions in D.08-08-028 that Renewable Portfolio Standard-eligible generation with zero GHG emissions would not need GHG emissions allowances when delivered to the California grid, regardless of whether Renewable Energy Credits have been unbundled from the electricity such that the electricity is delivered as null power.
5. We recommend that ARB adopt requirements that by 2020 at least 33% of California's electricity needs be met by renewable resources, and that by 2020 each retail provider obtain at least 33% of the electricity delivered to its customers from renewable resources.
6. We recommend that ARB not require the electricity sector to reduce its emissions below the approximately 79 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent estimated in the Accelerated Policy Case modeled by consultant Energy and Environmental Economics unless such further reductions are justified based on detailed analysis of the costs of GHG mitigation in other sectors.
7. We recommend that ARB undertake the emission allowance allocation in steps for the electricity sector, determining first the total number of allowances to create for each year or other appropriate time period, for all of the sectors included in the California cap-and-trade program, and then the number of allowances to allocate to the electricity sector based on its proportion of total historical emissions in the sectors included in the cap-and-trade program (including emissions attributed to electricity imports that are included in the cap-and-trade program) during the chosen baseline year(s).
8. We recommend that the trajectory of the multi-sector emissions cap and the required annual reductions be generally a straight-line reduction between 2012 and 2020 for all sectors in the California cap-and-trade program, including electricity, although development of regional emission reduction programs may affect the schedule for implementing emission reductions.
9. We recommend that, for 2012, ARB distribute 20% of the allowances allocated to the electricity sector to retail providers, with a requirement that they sell the allowances through a centralized auction undertaken by ARB or its agent, and distribute 80% of the allowances without cost to electricity deliverers.
10. We recommend that ARB increase the portion of allowances allocated to the electricity sector that are distributed to retail providers and sold at auction by 20% each year, so that in 2016 and each year thereafter all of the electricity sector allowances are auctioned through a centralized auction undertaken by ARB or its agent.
11. We recommend that for the portion of allowances distributed to deliverers, ARB distribute the allowances using a fuel-differentiated output-based approach with distributions limited to deliverers of electricity from emitting generation resources (including electricity from unspecified sources, and regardless of whether the electricity is generated inside or outside of California), as described in this decision.
12. We recommend that, if ARB either adopts less than 100% auctioning as the ultimate goal for electricity sector allowances or phases in 100% auctioning later than 2016, ARB phase out the weighting factors used to determine allowance distributions to deliverers starting in 2016, so that the distribution methodology would transition to a pure output-based approach by 2020.
13. We recommend that, for electricity sector allowances that will be auctioned, ARB distribute all or almost all allowances to retail providers on behalf of consumers, with the requirement that each retail provider sell the allowances in a centralized auction undertaken by ARB or its agent and receive all resulting revenues. The recommendation that retail providers be required to sell their distributed allowances does not apply to allowances that a vertically-integrated entity that is both a retail provider and a deliverer may receive based on its deliveries to the grid.
14. We recommend that ARB initially distribute electricity sector allowances to retail providers (which will be required to sell them through the centralized auction) in proportion to the historical emissions of the retail providers' portfolios, transitioning to a sales basis by 2020.
15. We recommend that ARB require that all allowance auction revenues be used for purposes related to Assembly Bill (AB) 32, and that ARB require all auction revenues from allowances allocated to the electricity sector be used to finance investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy or for bill relief, especially for low income customers.
16. We recommend that ARB allow the Public Utilities Commission for load serving entities and the governing boards for publicly-owned utilities to determine the appropriate use of retail providers' auction revenues consistent with the purposes of AB 32 and the restrictions recommended in Ordering Paragraph 15.
17. We recommend that ARB require each publicly-owned utility to demonstrate annually to the Energy Commission that its use of auction revenues during the prior year was consistent with the purposes of AB 32 and the restrictions recommended in Ordering Paragraph 15.
18. We recommend that ARB, in consultation with the Public Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission, condition free distribution of allowances to each retail provider on a demonstration of adequate progress in complying with energy efficiency and renewable energy procurement targets established for the retail provider.
19. We recommend that ARB provide comparable GHG regulatory treatment for all combined heat and power (CHP) facilities that exceed a minimum size threshold, regardless of whether they deliver electricity to the grid or solely serve on-site load, and regardless of the metering configuration used.
20. We recommend that, for CHP facilities that exceed the minimum size threshold that ARB uses for other deliverers, ARB include the emissions associated with CHP-generated electricity consumed in California in the electricity sector in any multi-sector GHG emissions cap-and-trade program.
21. We recommend that ARB treat entities that deliver CHP-generated electricity to the grid just like other deliverers for GHG regulatory purposes, and that ARB treat CHP operators comparable to deliverers for purposes of regulating GHG emissions associated with CHP-generated electricity used on-site, as described in this decision. Recognizing that they may be the same entity, the deliverer for the CHP electricity delivered to the grid and the CHP operator for CHP electricity used on-site should be responsible for surrendering allowances for the portion of CHP-generated electricity delivered to the grid and the portion used on-site, respectively. To the extent that allowances are distributed for free to deliverers, the deliverer for CHP delivered to the grid and the CHP operator for CHP electricity used on-site should receive allowances on the same basis as deliverers of electricity from other sources.
22. We recommend that ARB treat CHP operators comparable to retail providers for the portion of CHP-generated electricity that is used on-site. To the extent that allowances are distributed to retail providers, the CHP operator should receive allowances on the same basis as retail providers and should be required to sell the received allowances through a centralized auction undertaken by ARB or its agent and use the proceeds for purposes consistent with AB 32. The recommendation that CHP operators be required to sell their distributed allowances through the centralized auction does not apply to allowances that they may receive pursuant to Ordering Paragraph 21.
23. We recommend that, if ARB adopts a cap-and-trade program, ARB not pursue a California-only program, but rather pursue bilateral linkage with other states in the Western Climate Initiative to help create a regional cap-and-trade market, and pursue bilateral linkage with other local, regional, national, and international GHG cap-and-trade systems that have comparable stringency, monitoring, compliance, and enforcement provisions.
24. We recommend that ARB, in developing a cap-and-trade program, avoid creating any price triggers or safety valves.
25. All issues in the Scoping Memos have been addressed and this proceeding is resolved for the purpose of compliance with Pub. Util. Code § 1701.5. However, the proceeding remains open to address pending petitions for modification and intervenor compensation requests.
This order is effective today.
Dated October 16, 2008, at San Francisco, California.
We will file a concurrence.
/s/ RACHELLE B. CHONG
/s/ JOHN A. BOHN
/s/ TIMOTHY ALAN SIMON
Commissioners
I reserve the right to file concurrence.
/s/ DIAN M. GRUENEICH
Commissioner
Concurrence of Commissioner Rachelle Chong
Opinion on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies
R.06-04-009
October 16, 2008
I support the general thrust of these recommendations to the California Air Resources Board (CARB), but I write separately to express some views on parts of this recommendation.
First, I particularly support the focus on including the electricity sector in a cap-and-trade system. I want the record to reflect my strong belief that California needs a market-based approach to unleash innovative solutions to the climate challenge. I have been very encouraged by the inventive clean green technologies that are coming out of Silicon Valley. In fact, Silicon Valley is fast becoming "Clean Green Valley." I predict we will see even more green investments once a cap-and-trade system is put into place.
Nor do I think California should "go it alone" with its own unique cap and trade system. It is imperative that California should join with other Western states in a cap-and-trade system serving all our markets through the Western Climate Initiative. Further, we should assume we should create linkages with other parts of the country. After all, climate change is a global problem, demanding global solutions.
Our decision today recommends gradually moving to a full auction of emissions allowances in 2016. During the transition period, some allowances will be given away for free to deliverers. While a transition period may be reasonable in this situation, I would like to emphasize my philosophical preference for auctions. Based on my experience overseeing spectrum auctions as a federal regulator, I know auctions can work. I strongly disagree with some parties' characterizations of auctions as "complex" and "difficult."
While I was a Commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the FCC conducted the first ever auctions of wireless radio spectrum for services like advanced wireless, wireless cable, and direct broadcast satellite. During my FCC tenure, from 1994 to 1997, the FCC conducted 16 auctions that brought in $23 billion for the federal government. To date, the FCC has conducted 82 auctions, bringing the total auction revenues to $78 billion. And the U.S. has not been alone. The governments of Canada, Sweden, Germany, the UK, Austria, and the Netherlands, among others, have auctioned off wireless radio spectrum.
The experience of the FCC shows that auctions are not difficult or complex. In fact, auctions have proven to be an effective way for government to get radio spectrum into the hands of the businesses that value them the most, while extracting the highest value for the American public. I believe that auctions of greenhouse gas allowances can be just as smooth and successful.
In recommending auctions, we need to carefully consider how the revenues should be spent. In the case of the FCC spectrum auctions, the auction revenues went to the United States Treasury because the American public owns the airwaves under federal law. In the case of Assembly Bill 32, similarly, I believe it is important that the revenues are returned to Californians who are energy consumers. Accordingly, I support the recommendation that auction revenues go toward offsetting the costs of energy efficiency and renewable energy. Otherwise, these programs could raise costs to our energy consumers. Beyond that, any extra revenues should be returned directly to consumers, particularly low income consumers.
This Commission has promoted advanced metering and new dynamic pricing rates. Through these initiatives, we expect to engage energy consumers with more information about their energy use, and to encourage them to reduce their environmental impact and also save money. We also should make sure that consumers understand that using energy generates expensive greenhouse gas emissions, and that causes climate change. Therefore, I support the recommendation that auction revenues be returned to consumers in a way that does not hide the cost of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, lump sum payments or dividends would be good ways to provide bill relief.
There are several areas where I would have preferred a somewhat different approach:
First, the decision recommends allocating some emissions allowances for free from 2012 to 2015 based on what is called a fuel-differentiated output-based approach. I have some concerns with this approach. First, it could distort the market price for electricity. Second, during this time period, it could encourage coal-fired generation, which in turn increases greenhouse gas emissions. I believe a historical emissions-based approach would be a better method, because it would not have these negative impacts.
Second, I also have some concerns with the output-based approach that is recommended for allocating auction revenues to utilities. This approach could discourage utilities from promoting energy efficiency and distributed generation. I do not think this problem can be easily fixed by adding back in energy efficiency savings, as suggested by some parties. I am pleased that the final language in the decision mitigates my concern by recommending that a utility should be required to demonstrate progress toward energy efficiency and renewable energy goals before receiving auction revenues. I encourage CARB to take a look at other approaches like historical output or number of customers.
Third, this decision generally does not address the natural gas sector. However, I do want to emphasize the importance of bringing natural gas into the cap-and-trade framework quickly. If CARB puts some energy-related sectors in the cap-and-trade framework and leaves others out, we could have problems down the road. For example, if natural gas vehicles become more popular, greenhouse gas emissions could shift from gasoline to natural gas. Uneven regulation could influence the decisions of consumers in ways that increase greenhouse gas emissions and raise costs. I am encouraged that the CARB's Proposed Scoping Plan recommends including natural gas in the cap-and-trade system.
Finally, I am very pleased that the California Public Utilities Commission and our sister agency, the California Energy Commission, were able to agree on these recommendations. To speak as one voice makes our recommendations more effective.
Dated October 17, 2008, at San Francisco, California.
/s/ RACHELLE B. CHONG
RACHELLE B. CHONG
Commissioner
Concurrence of Commissioner John Bohn
This decision is a major step forward in creating a statewide program for limiting and ultimately reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. With this decision we are making the transition from discussing and debating policies to making a commitment to a new way of doing business and a commitment to pay the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in California. Let me be clear, the efforts to reduce GHG emissions contained in this decision will significantly increase costs for generators, for retail electric service providers, and ultimately for the consumers of electricity in California.
I do not take the imposition of billions of dollars of costs onto ratepayers lightly. However, the actions we take today are necessary. We must act because our state has identified greenhouse gas emissions as a major threat, and the legislative requirements of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, Assembly Bill (AB) 32 are clear. Under AB 32, we are required to reduce GHG emissions to their 1990 level by 2020, with further reductions by 2050. Dramatic action is needed to meet these goals, and this decision is a critical step in meeting AB 32 goals.
I am pleased that in this time of financial uncertainty and distrust of market mechanisms, we have approved a market-based cap and trade program as an integral means of achieving GHG reductions. Competitive markets provide an important discipline to the process. In addition, as regulators we must recognize that no one, including us, knows everything about how best to do things. The cap and trade mechanism will promote innovative approaches and technologies to address the global warming crisis, and will allow us to move beyond the status quo and the standards that we have relied upon to date.
The market-based system we recommend in this decision is and will remain controversial. There is no simple correct answer on how to assign and allocate costs of compliance. There are many competing interests, all with reasonable, but differing, points of view of the measures we adopt. This decision reflects extensive consideration of the various interests put before us and a well thought out compromise of the issues. We have presented a plan that should be both equitable to the various interests and effective in promoting decreases in GHG emissions.
However, we must recognize that this process is far from over, and that considerable political pressures will come to bear to modify the structure we adopt today. We should expect that compromises will be proposed as this process moves forward, and we must remain vigilant to ensure that it retains the balance of equity and effectiveness that we are striving to achieve.
In particular, I am concerned that the large amounts of money that will be generated by auctioning of emission allowances could be tempting for government officials, who may wish to dip into these funds, particularly at this time of budgetary shortfalls. Given the high costs already being imposed on consumers for programs to directly reduce GHG emissions, from solar initiatives to increased energy efficiency efforts, and to clean coal research, it is of the utmost importance that the auction proceeds be kept within the electric sector to offset some of these costs. Otherwise, the combination of these programmatic costs and compliance with the GHG cap and trade costs may result in onerous electric rates that could plague California for years to come.
/s/ JOHN A. BOHN
John A. Bohn
Commissioner
San Francisco, CA
October 16, 2008
Joint Concurrence of Commissioners Simon and Grueneich
on the Proposed Decision on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies
With the passage of Assembly Bill 32, California set the stage for its own transition to a sustainable clean energy future, has helped to put climate change on the national agenda, and has spurred action across a wide range of economic sectors and actors. We are proud to be on the frontlines with our State's proactive leadership on this issue. After careful evaluation of the Proposed Decision in this docket on Greenhouse Gas Regulatory Strategies, we chose to support the joint efforts by this Commission, the California Energy Commission, the California Air Resources Board (ARB), and parties with a "yes" vote. While this Decision marks the culmination of substantial effort and analysis, and we support many of its findings and conclusions, we file this concurrence to highlight a few aspects of the decision which merit particular attention and, in some cases, further analysis.
While the Decision recommends a combination of increased program mandates and a market-based cap-and-trade system for reducing emissions, it states clearly that energy efficiency shall be "the cornerstone" of California's strategy for achieving greenhouse gas reductions within the electricity and natural gas sectors. We wholeheartedly endorse this approach. Addressing climate change will come with a considerable price tag for our consumers. The decision is therefore a delicate balancing act as it walks a tightrope of difficult policy tradeoffs under aggressive carbon constraints and currently harsh economic realities. As we work broadly to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions associated with energy use in our State, we must seek to protect our environment in the most expeditious and cost-effective manner possible. No other emission reduction measure is so readily available as energy efficiency, both in terms of cost and the immediacy with which it can be employed.
In step with this finding, both this decision and the ARB's Proposed Scoping Plan count on dramatic reductions in energy use in order to achieve their emission reduction targets -- in many cases far beyond what our most successful efforts have delivered to date. These reductions are possible, but they will not fall out of the sky. Achieving them will require concerted effort on our part to ensure our energy efficiency policy framework is as robust as possible -- encouraging the achievement of stretch goals and delivering real savings. It will also require that we forge new strategies and partnerships to push the frontiers of action on energy efficiency statewide, many of which are outlined in the California Long Term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan, approved by our Commission just two meetings ago. The implementation of this Plan should be the cornerstone of our approach to meeting AB 32 objectives for the electricity and natural gas sectors, in order to ensure a low-cost, high-impact path to a low-carbon future.
In addition, we have some concerns about the exposure of ratepayers to risk in a potential cap-and-trade system, if one is ultimately adopted by ARB. While we are hopeful that providing a market incentive to realize emission reduction opportunities will benefit the program as a whole, California's experiences with market failure in the energy sector give us pause as we recommend a market-driven regulatory system that has the potential to cost our ratepayers billions of dollars. Here we underscore three critical needs with regard to the design of the market mechanism.
First, although we hope for a robust market, we are concerned about the potential for gaming and other risk factors which could undermine environmental outcomes and emissions price stability. Particularly given the economic crisis we have been experiencing nationally, and now globally, it is essential that we take a more cautious approach at the outset to ensure ratepayer protection in California's nascent regulatory regime. We should endorse the implementation of adequate cost containment mechanisms to minimize volatility in an emissions market. In particular, the ARB should give serious consideration to the implementation, at least initially, of a reasonable price cap on emissions allowances to prevent runaway auction prices. Any such regulatory safeguards would of course have to be implemented in a balanced manner that does not compromise or defeat the purpose of a cap-and-trade system.
Second, we want to reiterate the importance of regional collaboration with regard to our recommended cap-and-trade market. As the joint Commissions' own analysis has shown, a California-only cap-and-trade scenario would run a higher risk of gaming than a more robust regional market. We strongly urge the ARB to work toward the concurrent and coordinated deployment of a regional cap-and-trade system with consistent rules between Western States, as recommended by the Decision. This point is critical to ensuring a robust and functioning market.
Third, we have some concerns about the impact of our recommended cap-and-trade system on consumers across the state, particularly for the disproportionately large number of low-income consumers in the service territories of some of our Publicly Owned Utilities (POUs). We recognize that the California Energy Commission and the ARB have jurisdiction over California's POUs. We also believe that the burden of emissions reductions must be shared by all Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and ratepayers. However, we have to be particularly vigilant of the potential for unintended financial consequences in this very difficult economy. The Decision attempts to moderate impacts on Southern California municipal utilities' customers through a gradual move toward a 100% auction and a transition to a sales-based allocation approach in 2020. However, there will still be winners and losers under this scenario and we encourage particular attention be paid to impacts on low-income populations throughout the implementation process.
Similarly, although it will ultimately be ARB's decision as to how to parse out the overall responsibility for emissions reductions across sectors, we must continue our dialogue with the CEC and the ARB to ensure that a disproportionate share of the State's emissions reduction responsibility is not placed on the electricity sector.
The key drivers behind our greenhouse gas policy should be cost and equity. We must continue to work with ARB to determine the most cost-effective and equitable mix of policy mandates and market-based emissions reductions rather than picking arbitrary targets for both. Mandating a disproportionate share of the responsibility to reduce total emissions could result in unnecessarily higher costs for electricity consumers. Moreover, if we are going to adopt a multi-sector cap-and-trade system, then we should allow it to function as intended: to find innovative emissions reductions across all sectors at marginal cost. Politics and the traditional ease of regulation of the electricity sector should not compromise the most cost-effective path to meeting AB 32 objectives.
Finally, producing our electricity responsibly and using it more intelligently will require a fundamental shift in human capital. We will not achieve the goals outlined in this recommendation if we fail to develop a workforce capable of turning our policies into realities. This is an opportunity to call upon California's best qualities and once again, demonstrate that our state is capable of reinventing itself through innovations in technology, policies, and practices.
We should urge the ARB to use emissions allowance auction revenue not only for investment in emissions reducing policies and customer rebates, but also to help fund statewide Workforce Development. Green collar job development must move from the periphery to the forefront with real metrics and targets. This has been identified as a priority aspect in the implementation of the California Long term Energy Efficiency Strategic Plan. There is no language in this Proposed Decision that addresses the need to cultivate economic stimulus in the form of green jobs. New career tracks and job classifications will clearly be a requirement to meet our energy efficiency, RPS, and AB 32 objectives.
In closing, we hope and expect this Commission will represent these matters in its continued discussions with ARB during the implementation of the recommendations in this Decision.
/s/ TIMOTHY ALAN SIMON
Timothy Alan Simon
Commissioner
/s/ DIAN M. GRUENEICH
Dian M. Grueneich
Commissioner
San Francisco, California
October 16th, 2008
