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1. Beaudoin initially obtained a charter-party permit for himself as a sole proprietorship, dba A Touch of Class Limousine, on April 23, 2003. His permit would normally have expired on April 25, 2006. However, on two occasions, after the permit was suspended due to a lapse in Beaudoin's liability insurance, CPSD reinstated the permit, based on proof that Beaudoin's insurance was back in effect, on dates after the normal expiration date for the permit, October 10, 2006 and July 24, 2007.

2. On July 17, 2007, Robert DeGroot, Senior Transportation Representative (DeGroot), sent Beaudoin a letter, which advised Beaudoin that his permit would expire on December 3, 2007, and urged him to submit a permit renewal application as soon as possible. On October 11, 2007, CPSD License Section also sent a notice to Beaudoin, advising that his permit would expire on December 3, 2007, and that he should apply for permit renewal as soon as possible.

3. On October 30, 2007, Beaudoin submitted an application for renewal (the first application) to the CPSD License Section, along with a check for the $500 permit renewal fee. The application stated the name of the applicant as Denis Marcel Beaudoin II, dba A Touch of Class Limousine, and specified that the applicant was a corporation. CPSD deposited the check for the $500 permit renewal fee, and the check cleared the bank on November 15, 2007.

4. Beaudoin received no notice from CPSD that the first application was incomplete until December 21, 2007, approximately three weeks after his original permit expired, and close to two months after the filing of the first application. On December 21, 2007, Ms. Gail Riley of CPSD License Section (Riley) sent a notice to Beaudoin that he needed to submit additional required documentation in order for his application to be processed. On January 22, 2008 and February 21, 2008, Riley sent identical notices to Beaudoin.

5. By the end of February 2008, Beaudoin had submitted all of the required documentation to the CPSD License Section, except for his drug test results, which were required to be sent directly by his drug testing company. Although the CPSD License Section did not receive Beaudoin's drug test results, in February 2008, Mrs. Samantha Beaudoin (Beaudoin's wife) made a written request that the drug testing company send the results to the CPSD License Section. Beaudoin and his wife claim that they had also made several previous requests that the drug testing company send the test results to the CPSD License Section.

6. Since Riley had questions about Beaudoin's first application, she brought it to the attention of Mr. Wilson E. Lewis, Supervisor, CPSD License Section (Lewis). Lewis reviewed the first application and became concerned about whether Beaudoin was applying for a permit for himself, as a sole proprietorship, or on behalf of a California corporation, Innovative Transportation Solutions (Innovative), formed by Beaudoin and his wife.

7. On April 23, 2008, Lewis sent Beaudoin a letter entitled "Notice of Impending Denial," stating that, based on certain discrepancies in the first application, it was unclear whether Beaudoin was applying for a permit as an individual or as a corporation. Lewis' letter advised that if Beaudoin intended to operate as a corporation, he must submit an additional complete application packet for the corporation, provide evidence of required liability insurance for the corporation, and obtain workers' compensation insurance if he had employees. Lewis enclosed an application packet in this letter and stated that if Beaudoin were to send the new application to Lewis' attention, Lewis would apply the $500 fee that Beaudoin had paid for the first application to the second application. The letter warned that if Beaudoin did not provide a satisfactory response by May 16, 2008, Lewis would consider denying the first application.

8. Beaudoin subsequently filed a second application, on behalf of his corporation, Innovative, with the CPSD License Section. Although Beaudoin and his wife dated the application as signed on March 10, 2008, CPSD did not receive the second application until June 12, 2008. Based on Lewis' statement in the April 23, 2008 letter, Beaudoin did not include an additional $500 application fee with the second application.

9. On June 13, 2008, DeGroot sent a letter to "Innovative, Attention: Beaudoin," stating that the CPSD License Section could not process the second application because Beaudoin had not submitted the required $500 application fee with the application.

10. Since Beaudoin did not pay an additional $500 application fee for the second application, the CPSD License Section never processed the second application and did not determine whether it was complete. CPSD contends that since Beaudoin apparently sent the application to the CPSD License Section generally, rather than directly to Lewis' attention as directed in the April 23, 2008 letter, the CPSD License Section had no obligation to apply the first $500 application fee that Beaudoin paid for the first application to the second application or to process the second application.

11. On July 22, 2008, the CPSD License Section sent Beaudoin a notice denying his first application, solely on the grounds that Beaudoin failed to respond to Lewis' April 23, 2008 letter.

12. The CPSD License Section sent the above notice of denial over a month after Beaudoin had submitted the second application on behalf of his corporation, as directed in Lewis' April 23, 2008 letter. Although Beaudoin did not submit the second application by May 16, 2008, Lewis' April 23, 2008 letter did not establish May 16, 2008 as a firm deadline for submitting a new application if Beaudoin wished to operate as a corporation, but stated that Lewis would consider denial of the application if Beaudoin did not make a satisfactory response by that date.

13. As testified by Lewis at the appeal hearing, Lewis did not know that Beaudoin had filed the second application at the time that CPSD License Section denied Beaudoin's first application, because CPSD License Section employees did not bring the application to his attention, and he does not recall receiving the second application addressed to his attention. Lewis would not have denied the first application if he had known that Beaudoin had filed the second application. Further, if Lewis had learned of the filing of the second application within a reasonable time after the denial, he would have considered reversing the denial of the first application.

14. In addition, Lewis testified that if he had known about the filing of the second application, the CPSD License Section would have processed the second application without requiring Beaudoin to pay an additional $500 application fee.

15. On November 13, 2008, Beaudoin faxed a note to DeGroot, stating that his company had been trying to get in touch with Lewis regarding his permit application for the past six months, had made 47 phone calls and sent one fax in its attempts to do so, and that Lewis had not returned Beaudoin's calls. Beaudoin attached phone records documenting that he made the phone calls and sent a fax in his efforts to reach Lewis between February 2008 and August 26, 2008. Beaudoin's note also stated that he did not understand the reason for the denial of his application, because he had previously paid a $500 application fee.

16. Forty-four of the calls documented in Beaudoin's phone records faxed to DeGroot were made directly to Lewis' line during business hours, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Some of the calls were made by Beaudoin, and some of the calls were made by Beaudoin's wife. Forty-three of the calls lasted two minutes or less. Thirty-five of the 43 calls were made in rapid succession, with less than one minute between them, so that there may not have been time to leave a voicemail message. During the remaining eight calls, which were longer, there may have been sufficient time to leave a voicemail message for Lewis. The phone records show that a six minute conversation between Beaudoin and Lewis occurred on May 1, 2008.

17. At the appeal hearing, Beaudoin's wife testified that she made some of the calls in rapid succession, based on the advice of CPSD License Section staff that since Lewis is often in the office but away from his desk, she should keep calling until she reached him. Both Lewis and Ms. Moira Simmerson, Supervisor, Transportation Enforcement Branch, CPSD (Simmerson) confirmed in their testimony that Lewis is frequently either on the phone or away from his desk when he is in the office, because his job as a supervisor requires him to confer with other CPSD License Section staff. Lewis often receives phone calls that leave no message. Simmerson further testified that it is not only possible but likely that a person could call Lewis' phone extension 40 times during business hours and not be able to reach him directly.

18. Lewis testified that he does not recall speaking with Beaudoin after a six-minute phone conversation that occurred on May 1, 2008 or receiving voicemail messages from Beaudoin. Lewis stated that he would have returned the calls if messages were received. Beaudoin and his wife testified that they left voicemail messages for Lewis, but never received a return call.

19. At the appeal hearing, Beaudoin introduced additional phone records into the record, which show that Beaudoin and his wife made a total of 77 calls combined to Lewis; the CPSD License Section toll-free phone number; DeGroot; Mr. Mark Clairmont (Clairmont), an employee of the CPSD License Section; and Mr. Paul Wuerstle, Manager, Transportation Enforcement Branch, CPSD (Wuerstle) between April 16, 2008 and November 17, 2008 regarding their permit applications.

20. In addition to many shorter calls, the above 77 phone calls included nine longer phone calls placed by Beaudoin and his wife, as follows:

21. On November 26, 2008, Beaudoin sent a letter to Wuerstle, which also enclosed phone records from Beaudoin's company showing that Beaudoin had attempted to contact Lewis 47 times in the past six months. Beaudoin's letter stated that he had received no return call from Lewis, and that Beaudoin did not understand the reason for denial of the permit, because he had previously submitted all required documents with a check for the $500 application fee.

22. On December 17, 2008, Wuerstle sent a letter to Beaudoin stating that it was not unreasonable for Lewis to have denied Beaudoin's application, because Lewis' April 23, 2008 letter had warned that if Beaudoin did not submit a satisfactory response by May 16, 2008, Lewis would consider denying the application. The letter further stated that although the phone records show that Beaudoin dialed Lewis' phone extension 47 times, the records do not establish that Beaudoin ever left a message for Lewis. Wuerstle's letter did not acknowledge the filing of Beaudoin's second application.

23. On March 8, 2009, Beaudoin filed a third permit application, for himself as a sole proprietor, dba A Touch of Class Limousine. Beaudoin included a check for an additional $500 application fee with the third application.

24. On May 5, 2009, the CPSD License Section granted the third application and issued Beaudoin a permit, which will expire on May 5, 2012.

25. Beaudoin had no permit in effect from December 3, 2007 until May 5, 2009.

26. Based on the evidence presented by CPSD, we find that Beaudoin operated as a carrier without a permit, in violation of Public Utilities Code Section 5379, and did not include all of the information required by GO 157-D, Part 3.01 in the driver trip ticket section of his waybills on 15 occasions on the dates charged in Citation FC-308. Beaudoin also failed to provide documentation of required liability insurance coverage on file with the Commission on the dates charged in the citation in violation of GO 115-F (9), but later provided evidence that he had the required insurance coverage in effect during this period.

27. The permitting process for carriers enables the CPSD License Section to protect the public by ensuring that carriers transporting passengers have valid drivers' licenses, have adequate liability insurance for their vehicles, have submitted negative drug test results for their drivers, and meet other requirements specified by law.

28. At the appeal hearing, Beaudoin admitted on the record that he had no permit in effect in September 2008.

29. Based on the numerous notices and letters from the CPSD License Section, Beaudoin knew or should have known that he did not have a permit in effect on the dates of the violations charged in Citation FC-308.

30. Although the manner in which the CPSD License Section handled Beaudoin's first and second applications may have been frustrating or confusing to Beaudoin, he was not justified in operating as a carrier without a permit.

31. The circumstances of this case, and the manner in which the CPSD License Section handled Beaudoin's first and second applications, warrant a reduction in the fine imposed by Citation FC-308 from $750 to $250, as follows:

Commissioner Dian M. Grueneich, being necessarily absent, did not participate.

1 This Resolution addresses the specific violations charged in Citation FC-308 and other relevant circumstances which occurred between Beaudoin and the Commission's Consumer Protection and Safety Division (CPSD). Although this Resolution may generally not be precedent in other proceedings or citation appeals, we do not wish to preclude the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on this Resolution in appropriate cases involving Beaudoin. The Commission may also take official notice of this Resolution in other proceedings and citation appeals as appropriate pursuant to Rule 13.9 of the Commission Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules).

2 For cause, both parties sought and received leave to submit their comments on the resolution late.

3 Collateral estoppel involves a second legal action between the same parties on a second cause of action. The first legal action operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to the issues in the second legal action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action. The doctrine of collateral estoppel may apply to the final decisions of administrative agencies acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. (Murray v. Alaskan Airlines, Inc., 50 Cal. 4th 860 (2010).

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