II. SoCalGas October 20, 2003 Motion to Strike
A. Kern River Testimony
SoCalGas' motion to strike the testimony of Kern River as discussed above is granted.
B. ExxonMobil
SoCalGas contends that the testimony of William E. Nicas on behalf of ExxonMobil Gas and Power Marketing Company (EM) should be stricken because it proposes to modify the CSA. EM responds that Nicas' testimony responds directly to the SoCalGas compliance case by identifying an inconsistency between the language of the CSA and the language of SoCalGas' proposed compliance tariffs.
EM has raised a factual issue concerning the interpretation and implementation of the CSA. EM should be entitled to an opportunity at hearing to show that an inconsistency exists which requires resolution in this implementation proceeding. Consequently, the motion of SoCalGas to strike the testimony of Nicas should be denied.
C. Coral Energy
SoCalGas moves to strike testimony (page 2, line 13) concerning statements expressing opposition to the CSA by Amy Gold on behalf of Coral Energy Resources L.P. (Coral). In addition, SoCalGas moves to strike language opposing imposition of separate balancing for the core and noncore customer classes (page 8, lines 12-13). In response, Coral states that the statements in question represent introductory remarks intended to place in context Coral's objections to specific provisions of the CSA.
Based on Coral's representation that the language in question (page 2, line 13 and page 8, lines 12-13) is only intended as introductory remarks and not specific proposals, I agree with Coral that the language is appropriate to provide a context for its testimony. Consequently, the motion of SoCalGas to strike the testimony of Gold at page 2, line 13 and page 8, lines 12-13 should be denied.
SoCalGas objects to language at page 4, lines 5-13, of Gold's testimony. SoCalGas asserts that Coral proposes to modify the CSA by proposing that SoCalGas refund any reservation charges or volumetric charges it receives during a diversion event. Coral responds that the CSA is silent on the above implementation issue. However, Coral contends that SoCalGas treatment of backbone transmission charges during a diversion event (Rule 23(e), sheet 6, paragraph 4) is not found in the CSA. Coral believes that SoCalGas interpretation of the CSA on this issue is in error and should be corrected.
Given Coral's allegation that the CSA is silent on the issue of reservation charges or volumetric charges SoCalGas receives during a diversion event, Coral should be permitted to explore SoCalGas' treatment of the issue in its tariffs and offer an alternative approach. Consequently, the motion of SoCalGas to strike language at page 4, lines 5-13 of Gold's testimony should be denied.
SoCalGas objects to language at page 6, lines 5-7 of Gold's testimony in which Gold states that "prompt notification must be a precondition for the imposition of any penalty for the unauthorized use of involuntary diverted supply." SoCalGas asserts that Coral proposes to modify the CSA by imposing a new "precondition" to the imposition of penalties for unauthorized use of gas. Coral agrees that the CSA does not state how or under what procedures SoCalGas must notify balancing entities in the event of a supply diversion. Coral contends that notification provisions are implementation details.
Coral raises an issue concerning what constitutes an implementation detail versus a change to the CSA. The CSA did not contain tariffs for implementing the CSA, consequently SoCalGas was left the task of proposing tariffs to implement the CSA. The issue raised by Coral is factual in nature. Coral should be given an opportunity to demonstrate whether its notification requirement proposal constitutes an implementation detail and if such burden is met, SoCalGas should have an opportunity to argue that Coral's proposal is really a change to the CSA. Accordingly, the motion of SoCalGas to strike language at page 6, lines 5-7, of Gold's testimony should be denied.
SoCalGas moves to strike the language from page 8, line 13 to page 9, line 15, of Gold's testimony in which Gold addresses SoCalGas' actions in Stage 1 OFOs. SoCalGas contends that the obligations imposed by Coral's proposed tariff language is unsupported by the CSA or D.01-12-018. Coral agrees with SoCalGas that the CSA does not include the provisions proposed by Coral. Instead, Coral argues that the scope of the proceeding should be expanded to "flesh-out SoCalGas' obligation to minimize the number of OFOs."
Coral's proposals concerning SoCalGas' actions in Stage 1 OFOs go beyond mere implementation details and impose new obligations not contained in the CSA. Consequently, the motion of SoCalGas to strike language at page 8, line 13 to page 9, line 15, of Gold's testimony should be granted.
D. Edison
SoCalGas moves to strike testimony of Michael S. Alexander on behalf of Southern California Edison Company (Edison) concerning reservations about the CSA and need for changes (page 5, lines 12-15 and page 5, line 17 to page 6, line 3). SoCalGas observes that Edison does not proceed to propose any changes to the CSA, but nonetheless SoCalGas contends that it is improper to express an opinion as to whether the CSA should be changed.
Edison responds that the testimony in question provides an explanation as to the limited scope of Alexander's testimony. Edison states that the questions and answers in dispute do not propose any specific changes or modifications to D.01-12-048.
I agree with Edison that it should be allowed to provide an explanation concerning the scope of its testimony. Based on Edison's representation that the testimony in question is not intended to propose any changes or modifications to the CSA, the motion of SoCalGas to strike Edison's testimony at page 5, lines 12-15 and page 5, line 17 to page 6, line 3 should be denied.
SoCalGas also moves to strike the testimony of Alexander at page 17, lines 9-14, concerning Edison's request for an "exemption from receipt point concentration limits" adopted in D.01-12-018. SoCalGas also objects to Edison's alternative proposal for "set-aside rights." SoCalGas argues that the CSA as adopted in D.01-12-018 neither exempted or Edison from market concentration limits nor granted Edison "set-aside rights" and consequently Edison's proposal constitutes a modification of the CSA and is outside the scope of this proceeding.
Edison responds that an internal consistency in D.01-12-038 exists that the testimony in question resolves. Edison asserts that its purported "right" to bid may be made illusory due to market concentration limits. Edison argues that its testimony should not be stricken because the testimony in question advances the Commission's ability to fully implement D.01-12-018.
I tend to agree with SoCalGas' position that the testimony in question is outside the scope of this proceeding since it purports to modify the CSA. However, in erring on the side of caution, Edison should be allowed an opportunity to demonstrate at hearing that an inconsistency exists requiring Commission review in this implementation proceeding. Therefore, the motion of SoCalGas to strike Edison's testimony at page 17, lines 9-14 should be denied.
E. Indicated Producers
SoCalGas moves to strike testimony of Jean Marie Zaiontz on behalf of Indicated Producers concerning a statement about reserving the right to amend her testimony if a stipulation is not agreed to concerning issues identified as resolved in SoCalGas' report on the August 18, 2003, meet and confer. SoCalGas argues that it would be prejudicial to it and other parties to allow Indicated Producers to file such additional testimony. Indicated Producers did not file a response.
The request of SoCalGas is premature. Although, SoCalGas makes a compelling argument for why additional testimony should not be allowed, there may a compelling reason for considering the admission of additional testimony. SoCalGas' motion should be made if and when any such additional testimony is filed. Accordingly, the motion of SoCalGas to strike testimony of Indicated Producers should be denied.
