



**PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION**

505 VAN NESS AVENUE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-3298

**FILED**

11/16/21  
02:40 PM

November 16, 2021

**Agenda ID #20117  
Ratesetting**

TO PARTIES OF RECORD IN APPLICATION 19-04-014, et al.:

This is the proposed decision of Administrative Law Judge Brian Stevens. Until and unless the Commission hears the item and votes to approve it, the proposed decision has no legal effect. This item may be heard, at the earliest, at the Commission's December 16, 2021 Business Meeting. To confirm when the item will be heard, please see the Business Meeting agenda, which is posted on the Commission's website 10 days before each Business Meeting.

Parties to the proceeding may file comments on the proposed decision as provided in Rule 14.3 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. Electronic copies of comments should also be sent to the Intervenor Compensation Program at [icompcoordinator@cpuc.ca.gov](mailto:icompcoordinator@cpuc.ca.gov).

/s/ ANNE E. SIMON

Anne E. Simon  
Chief Administrative Law Judge

AES:nd3  
Attachment

Decision **PROPOSED DECISION OF ALJ STEVENS (Mailed 11/16/2021)****BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

Application of Southern California Edison Company (U338E) for Authority to Establish Its Authorized Cost of Capital for Utility Operations for 2020 and to Partially Reset the Annual Cost of Capital Adjustment Mechanism.

Application 19-04-014

And Related Matters.

Application 19-04-015

Application 19-04-017

Application 19-04-018

**DECISION DENYING COMPENSATION TO THOMAS R. DEL MONTE**

<b>Intervenor:</b> Thomas R. Del Monte	<b>For contribution to Decision (D.)</b> 19-12-056
<b>Claimed:</b> \$199,897.45	<b>Awarded:</b> \$0.00 [1]
<b>Assigned Commissioner:</b> Marybel Batjer	<b>Assigned ALJ:</b> Brian Stevens

**PART I: PROCEDURAL ISSUES**

<b>A. Brief description of Decision:</b>	<p>Decision 19-12-056 establishes the 2020 ratemaking cost of capital for Southern California Edison Company (SCE), Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&amp;E), San Diego Gas &amp; Electric Company (SDG&amp;E), and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas).</p> <p>The decision also continues the previously authorized cost of capital mechanism through the 2020 test year cycle.</p>
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**B. Intervenor must satisfy intervenor compensation requirements set forth in Pub. Util. Code §§ 1801-1812<sup>1</sup>:**

	<b>Intervenor</b>	<b>CPUC Verification</b>
<b>Timely filing of notice of intent to claim compensation (NOI) (§ 1804(a)):</b>		
1. Date of Prehearing Conference:	6/17/2019	Verified
2. Other specified date for NOI:		
3. Date NOI filed:	7/17/2019	Verified
4. Was the NOI timely filed?		Yes
<b>Showing of eligible customer status (§ 1802(b) or eligible local government entity status (§§ 1802(d), 1802.4):</b>		
5. Based on ALJ ruling issued in proceeding number:	A.19-04-014 et al.	Verified
6. Date of ALJ ruling:	9/25/2019	Verified
7. Based on another CPUC determination (specify):	N/A	
8. Has the Intervenor demonstrated customer status or eligible government entity status?		Yes
<b>Showing of “significant financial hardship” (§ 1802(h) or § 1803.1(b)):</b>		
9. Based on ALJ ruling issued in proceeding number:	A.19-04-014 et al.	Verified
10. Date of ALJ ruling:	9/25/2019	Verified
11. Based on another CPUC determination (specify):	NA	
12. Has the Intervenor demonstrated significant financial hardship?		Yes
<b>Timely request for compensation (§ 1804(c)):</b>		
13. Identify Final Decision:	D.19-12-056	Verified
14. Date of issuance of Final Order or Decision:	12/20/2019	Verified
15. File date of compensation request:	12/18/2020	February 19, 2020
16. Was the request for compensation timely?		No

<sup>1</sup> All statutory references are to California Public Utilities Code unless indicated otherwise.

**C. Additional Comments on Part I: (use line reference # as appropriate)**

#	Intervenor’s Comment(s)	CPUC Discussion
16.		<p>Thomas Del Monte did not timely file the request for intervenor compensation. An intervenor may file a request for compensation within 60 days of the issuance of a decision. See Pub. Util. Code § 1804(c). D.19-12-056 was issued on December 18, 2019, and the final date for tendering for filing the request for compensation was February 18, 2020 by 5:00 p.m. Mr. Del Monte tendered his claim for filing on February 18, 2020, after the 5:00 p.m. deadline. The Commission’s Rule of Practice and Procedure 1.15 treats documents filed after 5:00 p.m. as having been filed on the next business day. Mr. Del Monte’s request is therefore not timely. Commission records show that Mr. Del Monte tendered his claim at 11:53 p.m., after the 5:00 p.m. deadline had passed. Therefore, according to Rule 1.15 his claim has an untimely filing date of February 19, 2020.</p> <p>We have previously determined that the Commission does not have the discretion to grant awards on claims that are not filed in accordance with § 1804(c). See D.15-07-017.</p> <p>The Public Utilities Code and the Commission’s Rule of Practice and Procedure are clear. If a request for compensation is not filed and served within 60 days of the issuance of a final decision or the order closing the proceeding, the request is not timely, and the intervenor is not eligible for compensation. Mr. Del Monte’s request was not timely served and</p>

#	Intervenor's Comment(s)	CPUC Discussion
		therefore, the Commission must deny the request for compensation.
1.	<p>Thomas Del Monte, JD, MBA participated in this proceeding as both an attorney and also as witness drawing on legal, policy, and economic knowledge to inform his witness testimony. For clarity, this claim will use the term "Witness Del Monte" when speaking about witness activities. Use of "Del Monte" signify activities and assertions made on behalf of Thomas Del Monte as a party to this proceeding.</p> <p>Del Monte requests that an Efficiency Adder be considered for his time as discussed in D. 98-04-059 for the efforts taken to prepare non-duplicative and supplemental testimony to Del Monte's expert witness, Mr. Ron Knecht ("Knecht").</p>	Not Evaluated.
2.	<p>Del Monte was the only party to focus exclusively on PG&amp;E matters in this proceeding. Del Monte sought to provide a valuable, more focused perspective on PG&amp;E issues to balance out the advocacy of PG&amp;E and its surrogate, Institutional Equity Investors.</p> <p>Del Monte heard well and understood President Picker's comments at the prehearing conference, "[T]hese cost of capital proceedings aren't really followed closely and don't attract large crowds, but they probably should." President Picker recognizes that the utility representatives will always be involved at full strength in cost-of-capital proceedings and without balance, the scale of what is determined to be a "just rate" can end up weighted against ratepayer interests.</p>	Not Evaluated.

**PART II: SUBSTANTIAL CONTRIBUTION**

**A. Did the Intervenor substantially contribute to the final decision (see § 1802(j), § 1803(a), 1803.1(a) and D.98-04-059): (For each contribution, support with specific reference to the record.)**

Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p><b>1. Economic Modeling</b></p> <p>The Decision chose to not include detailed descriptions of any financial models and instead cites to the record. Yet each major modeled result provided by Del Monte’s expert witness, Knecht, was referenced in the Decision.</p> <p>Del Monte’s witness Knecht used standard methods, model implementations and data sources to get his modeling results. He also produced an Empirical CAPM estimate of 7.32%. By using the full universe of firms for which data are available for the three models, his analysis recognizes both the systematic business risks and financial risks facing PG&amp;E and do not provide for returns on non-systematic or diversifiable risks, which should not be compensated in the COC. And they satisfy the legal, economic and policy standards for COC determination. Finally, his three models are the same as those used by PG&amp;E’s witness Vilbert and three of those Knecht used in his testimony in PG&amp;E’s TY2013 COC case (in which the Commission awarded party Reid compensation for Knecht’s work). – (Exh’s Del Monte-01R, pp. 3-4 and Del Monte-04R, p. 7.)</p>	<p><b>Del Monte Specific References in Final Decision</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CAPM Model Result of 6.64% cited in D.19-12-056 at 23.</li> <li>• DCF Model result of 7.37% cited at D.19-12-056 at 24.</li> <li>• Final Proposed ROE of 8.58% cited in D.19-12-056 at 41.</li> </ul> <p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p> <p>“Detailed descriptions of these financial models are contained in the record and are not repeated here.” . (D.19-12-056 at 20)</p> <p>“[W]e found no reason to adopt the financial modeling of any one party. The models are helpful as rough gauges of the realm of reasonableness.” (D.19-12-056 at 25)</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

Intervenor's Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor's Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p><b>2. Proxy Groups</b></p> <p>Del Monte's witness Knecht employed the full universe of firms for which data are available for the three models he used, a practice the Commission expressly approved in PG&amp;E's TY2013 COC case (in which the Commission awarded party Reid nearly full compensation for Knecht's work). Knecht's showing helped show that PG&amp;E's use of non-utility firms in its proxy group was inappropriate.</p>	<p><b>Del Monte Specific References</b></p> <p>Del Monte Opening Brief at pp. 26-27.</p> <p>Del Monte Exhibit-01 at pp. 54, 57.</p> <p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p> <p>"Del Monte asserts that it is inappropriate for PG&amp;E to include non-energy utility firms in its sample. Del Monte asserts that the nature of a cost of service rate regulated firm is substantially different than other firms without this characteristic." (D.19-12-056 at 19-20)</p> <p>"We agree that PG&amp;E's inclusion of CINI companies was inappropriate and counter to established policy for developing a proxy group of comparison companies. Further, we agree that the applicants selectively established a proxy group of companies and will review the model results with this in mind." (D.19-12-056 at 20)</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>
<p><b>3. Wildfire Risk Premiums on ROE in light of passage of AB 1054.</b></p> <p>Del Monte made arguments against PG&amp;E Wildfire Risk Premium proposal in several filings including testimony by Witness Del Monte and Knecht and briefing.</p> <p>In response to Institutional Equity Investors data analysis and arguments, Witness Del Monte argued against IEI's conclusion claiming that changes seen in Total Returns of CA IOUs compared to</p>	<p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p> <p>"Thomas Del Monte concludes that, regarding residual risk to shareholders that remains from catastrophic wildfires, this is a risk 'that is the fault of management controlled by the stockholders, it should not be compensated via ROE adders...'" (D.19-12-056 at 20, quoting Del Monte Opening Brief at 41)</p> <p>"We find that the <b>passage</b> of AB 1054 and other investor supportive policies in California have mitigated wildfire exposure faced by California's utilities.</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p>Non-CA IOUs demonstrated a wildfire risk premium was required due to CA’s inverse condemnation policy. Witness Del Monte researched and compiled the historical record of events corresponding to the major price movements in IEI data to show that the showed that the far more plausible interpretations of the data presented was that they were investor reactions to publicly available information that implicated negligence and fault by CA IOUs corresponding to each major fire. For instance, for the 2017 Fire Siege the PG&amp;E’s stock price only dropped after when CPUC sent PG&amp;E a letter reminding it that it is legally required to preserve all evidence related to the fire 4 full days of the fire. (See Exhibit Del Monte – 05 at pp. 4-6).</p> <p>Knecht points out that PG&amp;E’s Wildfire Adder proposals distorts the forward-looking regulatory compact by asking the Commission to assume in this case that tens of billions of dollars of potential wildfire liabilities that it incurred prior to filing bankruptcy are costs that were and will be incurred prudently, justly, reasonably, non-negligently and with exercise of due care – even though PG&amp;E has made no showing here to support such a conclusion and the Commission has made no such findings of fact, conclusions of law or orders supporting it. (See Exhibit Del Monte – 05 at pp. 8-10).</p> <p>Knecht also described how AB1054 expressly allows for possible</p>	<p><b><u>Accordingly, the Commission will not authorize a specific wildfire risk premium in the adopted ROE.</u></b> In addition to the reasons summarized above, this is further supported by the August 15, 2019 S&amp;P Global RRA Regulatory Focus that acknowledges that any residual factors of risk that may exist for investor owned utilities in California post the adoption of AB 1054 are more or less offset by the more constructive aspects of the California regulatory framework, which accounts for California’s placement within a balanced category.” (D.19-12-056 at 34, emphasis added)</p>	



Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p>recovery of some costs incurred imprudently or unreasonably from ratepayers. This undercuts PG&amp;E’s smaller post-AB 1054 Wildfire Adder proposal in that it shows that the post-AB 1054 wildfire risk is actually far lower in that it allows imprudently incurred costs to be recovered.</p> <p>(See Exhibit Del Monte – 05 at pp. 8-10).</p>		
<p><b>4. Appropriate Return on Equity (ROE) for PG&amp;E.</b></p> <p>The economic modeling and proxy groups used by Del Monte’s witness Knecht and the explanation about incrementalism produced Del Monte’s recommended 8.58% ROE for PG&amp;E. The further showings by witnesses Del Monte and Knecht definitively concluded that no wildfire-based or other modification to the modeling results is appropriate.</p>	<p><b>Del Monte Specific References</b></p> <p>Exhibit’s Del Monte-01R, -02R, -03R, -04R, -05R and -06R throughout.</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>
<p><b>5. Automatic Cost of Capital Adjustment Mechanism (“ACCAM” or “CCM”).</b></p> <p>Del Monte was the only party to affirmatively oppose continuation of the ACCAM as is the on grounds that way it currently designed and implemented leaves high authorized COC numbers unchanged despite consistent decline in overall nationwide COC and declines in interest rates. Del Monte characterized this as shifting the risk</p>	<p><b>Del Monte References in Final Decision</b></p> <p>“The only opposition to continuing the cost of capital mechanism came in Witness Knecht’s testimony for Del Monte.108 Knecht notes that “[i]t has kept allowed ROEs and rates unduly high for nearly a decade. It shifts to customers risks that should be carried by stockholders.” (D.19-12-056 at 45, quoting Exhibit Del Monte-01 at 59.)</p> <p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p>of capital costs changes generally to ratepayers.</p> <p>The Final Decision did not find Del Monte’s witness Knecht’s statement couching the ACCAM issue in terms of having kept the allowed ROE’s and rates unduly high and shifting shareholder risks to ratepayers as being strongly supported in the record. ((D.19-12-056 at 45) However, the Decision then goes on to discuss the merits and suggesting follow up actions of the arguments by SDG&amp;E’s witness Bruce MacNeil emphasizing the fact that ACCAM never triggers because the triggering deadband is so wide that it never triggers can impose unnecessary costs on shareholders or ratepayers depending on which direction interest rates move.</p> <p>This is the same point witness Knecht was making to about in that nationwide COC figures have been on a long decline around the county but staying relatively flat in California due to non-operation of the ACCAM. The point of the ACCAM is to maintain “just and reasonable” COC rates without having to conduct regularly scheduled COC proceedings. An ACCAM’s approved design is such that never operates in the face of long-term, significant downward trends in capital markets available to the utilities, it is strong evidence that the ACCAM, as designed, is failing to maintain just and reasonable COC rates. The fact that the ACCAM has</p>	<p>“There may be some merit to the proposal of SDG&amp;E and SoCalGas to narrow the dead band from the current 100 basis points in the existing and approved CCM. The applicants shall coordinate with the Commission’s Energy Division, to the extent the Commission’s Energy Division deems necessary, to assist with analysis that will determine the impact of modifying the dead band in the CCM.” (D.19-12-056 at 45)</p> <p><b>SDG&amp;E’s Quote</b></p> <p>“The Commission has made clear that a dead band that is set at a level that <i>never</i> results in triggering of a change is problematic, observing that “[a] deadband that is overly sensitive to interest rates cause needless volatility in revenues and rates. <b>Conversely, a deadband that never triggers can impose unnecessary costs on shareholders or ratepayers, depending on which direction interest rates move.</b>” (Exhibit SDG&amp;E 10 at BM 3 - BM – 4, quoting D.08-05-035 at 11 (<i>emphasis added by SDG&amp;E witness</i>)).</p>	

Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p>not triggered is in the record. The point is that while IOUs and ratepayers alike may both have the right to file an application to hold a new COC proceeding, the reality is that the vast majority (if not all) of COC proceedings are IOU initiated when it is to the IOUs’ benefit. Because of this reality, Del Monte believes that under these circumstances a non-triggering ACCAM does actually favor IOUs at the expense of ratepayers. Del Monte will ensure that this point is made more clearly in future COC proceedings.</p>		
<p><b>6. Should PG&amp;E be required to file a new Cost of Capital Application once it emerges from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings? Also, Handling of Post-Bankruptcy Adjustments to Long-term Debt and Preferred Equity Costs.</b></p> <p>Del Monte’s witness Knecht noted that adoption of the ATWACC methods for determining COC would obviate the Commission having to do anything to PG&amp;E’s allowed ROR except to make a simple computation he demonstrated when PG&amp;E emerges from bankruptcy. That would be economical as well as appropriate because it would obviate a substantive COC hearing at that time. – Del Monte Reply Brief, pp. 12-13.</p>	<p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p> <p>“Del Monte does not support the Commission directing a re-litigation of PG&amp;E’s 2020 Test Year Cost of Capital once the utility emerges from bankruptcy.” (D.19-12-056 at 46)</p> <p>“The Commission has an active docket to evaluate issues specifically pertaining to PG&amp;E and its current bankruptcy proceeding, and that is the more appropriate proceeding within which to consider this issue. This decision does not take a position or establish any orders pertaining to whether PG&amp;E should be required to submit a new cost of capital Application following its emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy.” (D.19-12-056 at 47)</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	Specific References to Intervenor’s Claimed Contribution(s)	CPUC Discussion
<p><b>7. PG&amp;E Customer Deposits</b></p> <p>After researching, Del Monte took no issue with the current treatment customer deposits.</p>	<p><b>D.19-12-056</b></p> <p>“Del Monte also supported the existing treatment of customer deposits.” (D.19-12-056 at 48, citing Exhibit Del Monte-1 at 60).</p> <p>“It appears these parties agree that the ratemaking treatment adopted in D.14-08-032 should be continued.</p> <p>PG&amp;E has fulfilled its obligation to provide a comprehensive review of the ratemaking treatment for customer deposits, as directed in D.14-08-032. There is no compelling information in the record to suggest a modification from the direction provided for the ratemaking treatment of customer deposits in D.14-08-032.” (D.19-12-056 at 48)</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>
<p><b>8. Answers to the Commissions Bulleted Scoping Memo Questions from D1707005</b></p> <p>Witness Knecht answered all questions requested in D1707005.</p>	<p><b>Del Monte Specific References</b></p> <p>Exhibit Del Monte 01R at pp. 56-60.</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

**B. Duplication of Effort (§ 1801.3(f) and § 1802.5):**

	Intervenor’s Assertion	CPUC Discussion
<p><b>a. Was the Public Advocate’s Office of the Public Utilities Commission (Cal Advocates) a party to the proceeding?<sup>2</sup></b></p>	<p>Yes</p>	<p>Not evaluated</p>

<sup>2</sup> The Office of Ratepayer Advocates was renamed the Public Advocate’s Office of the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to Senate Bill 854, which the Governor approved on June 27, 2018.

	<b>Intervenor's Assertion</b>	<b>CPUC Discussion</b>
<b>b. Were there other parties to the proceeding with positions similar to yours?</b>	Yes.	Not evaluated
<b>c. If so, provide name of other parties:</b> TURN; EPUC and IS; UCAN; POC; FEA		Not evaluated
<b>d. Intervenor's claim of non-duplication:</b>  Del Monte's compensation in this proceeding should not be reduced for duplication of the showings of other parties. In a proceeding involving multiple participants, it is virtually impossible for Del Monte to completely avoid some duplication of the work of other parties.  Del Monte participated in several coordination calls to discuss issues with other intervenors, including CalAdvocates, TURN, EPUC, and EDF, so as our efforts minimized unnecessary duplication.  Del Monte thus includes a certain about 11 hours for "coordination." Del Monte believes that this time resulted in a decrease in total time devoted to the proceeding. Any incidental duplication that may have occurred here was more than offset by Del Monte's unique contribution to the proceeding.  Under these circumstances, no reduction to our compensation due to duplication is warranted given the standard adopted by the Commission in D.03-03-031 and consistent with the conditions set forth in Section 1802.5.  Further, Del Monte's compensation in this proceeding should not be reduced for duplication of the showings between Witness Del Monte's expert witness work and that of Del Monte's expert witness Knecht. Witness Del Monte and Knecht coordinated their internal efforts to avoid undue duplication. (See for example Exhibit Del Monte – 03 at p. 3 describing the limited scope of Witness Del Monte testimony and how it would not unduly duplicate the efforts of Del Monte's witness, Knecht.)		Not evaluated

**PART III: REASONABLENESS OF REQUESTED COMPENSATION**

**A. General Claim of Reasonableness (§ 1801 and § 1806):**

				<b>CPUC Discussion</b>																				
<p><b>a. Intervenor’s claim of cost reasonableness:</b></p> <p>Del Monte requests a total intervenor compensation claim of \$197,908. This is reasonable for the scale of the proceeding, number of issues presented, duration of hearings, and the required research, evidence, testimony and briefing that could not otherwise be shared across intervenors.</p>				Not evaluated																				
<p><b>b. Reasonableness of hours claimed:</b></p> <p>Del Monte and Knecht’s hours expended are reasonable. This is Thomas Del Monte’s first proceeding at the Commission. While his hours did go over his original estimate, witness Knecht’s were under expected.</p>				Not evaluated																				
<p><b>c. Allocation of hours by issue:</b></p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 10%;">Code</th> <th style="width: 15%;">Issue</th> <th style="width: 55%;">Description</th> <th style="width: 10%;">%</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>GP</td> <td>General</td> <td>General work necessary for participation which does not necessarily vary with the number of issues.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">24.93%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Admin</td> <td>Administrative</td> <td>Icomp related admin such as NOI, Claim, motion to file financial hardship documentation under seal, etc. Billed at 1/2 time rate.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">5.99%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Test</td> <td>Testimony</td> <td>Witness Thomas Del Monte's time researching and drafting testimony filed under Del Monte's own name in this proceeding. This category is included to distinguish Del Monte's efforts as an expert witness in this proceeding as opposed to Del Monte's activities as an attorney.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">4.54%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Trav</td> <td>Travel</td> <td>Time spent traveling to and from prehearing conferences and hearings. Billed at 1/2 time rate.</td> <td style="text-align: center;">2.89%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				Code	Issue	Description	%	GP	General	General work necessary for participation which does not necessarily vary with the number of issues.	24.93%	Admin	Administrative	Icomp related admin such as NOI, Claim, motion to file financial hardship documentation under seal, etc. Billed at 1/2 time rate.	5.99%	Test	Testimony	Witness Thomas Del Monte's time researching and drafting testimony filed under Del Monte's own name in this proceeding. This category is included to distinguish Del Monte's efforts as an expert witness in this proceeding as opposed to Del Monte's activities as an attorney.	4.54%	Trav	Travel	Time spent traveling to and from prehearing conferences and hearings. Billed at 1/2 time rate.	2.89%	Not evaluated
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				<b>CPUC Discussion</b>
#	Multiple Issues	Work covering multiple issues that cannot be easily segregated.	17.01%	
ROE	ROE Advocacy	Research, modeling, and drafting related to appropriate ROE advocacy, including financial model assumptions such as proxy group and others.	7.82%	
Debt	Debt and Equity Treatment	Long-term Debt and Preferred Equity treatment. Mostly related to PG&E bankruptcy.	1.58%	
WR	Wildfire Risk	Evaluation of any unique risks to electric utilities that require an equity adder due to inverse condemnation and wildfire risk in California after the passage of AB 1054	5.00%	
Coord	Coordination	Coordination with other intervenors re. issues and to minimize duplication	2.99%	
Disc	Discovery	Discovery issues that cannot be easily categorized - writing data requests; addressing discovery disputes, responding to data requests.	2.31%	
CA Risk	California Business and Regulatory Risks	Evaluation of any unique risks in California that warrant increased equity returns due to California regulatory and energy policies that impact cost recovery	2.40%	
GH	Hearings	Attending prehearing conference and evidentiary hearings; other work related to hearings not easily allocable to issues	22.5%	

**B. Specific Claim:\***

CLAIMED						CPUC AWARD		
ATTORNEY, EXPERT, AND ADVOCATE FEES								
Item	Year	Hours	Rate \$	Basis for Rate*	Total \$	Hours	Rate \$	Total \$
Thomas R. Del Monte	2019	333	\$400.00	See Del Monte Resume and Rate Justification Explanation for Thomas Del Monte (Ruling or decision needed).	\$133,200	N/A	N/A	N/A
Thomas R. Del Monte (1/2 time Admin/Travel)	2019	31.3	\$200.00		\$6,260	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ron Knecht	2019	129.6	\$400.00	\$275 in A.12-04-015 et al. (ruling filed 7/20/12) + Plus interim relevant experience including Controller for the State of Nevada. See Knecht Bio.	\$51,840	N/A	N/A	N/A
Ron Knecht (1/2 time Admin/Travel)	2019	16	\$200.00		\$3,200	N/A	N/A	N/A
Jan Reid	2019	14.2	\$240.00	D1809043 + \$5.00 for COLA to 2019.	\$3,408	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>Subtotal: \$197,908.00</b>						<b>Subtotal: \$0.00</b>		
<b>TOTAL REQUEST: \$197,908.00</b>						<b>TOTAL AWARD: \$0.00</b>		
<p>*We remind all intervenors that Commission staff may audit the records and books of the intervenors to the extent necessary to verify the basis for the award (§ 1804(d)). Intervenors must make and retain adequate accounting and other documentation to support all claims for intervenor compensation. Intervenors' records should identify specific issues for which it seeks compensation, the actual time spent by each employee or consultant, the applicable hourly rates, fees paid to consultants and any other costs for</p>								



CLAIMED			CPUC AWARD
which compensation was claimed. The records pertaining to an award of compensation shall be retained for at least three years from the date of the final decision making the award.			
**Travel and Reasonable Claim preparation time are typically compensated at ½ of preparer’s normal hourly rate			
ATTORNEY INFORMATION			
Attorney	Date Admitted to CA BAR <sup>3</sup>	Member Number	Actions Affecting Eligibility (Yes/No?) If “Yes”, attach explanation
Thomas Del Monte	2009	265275	No

**C. Attachments Documenting Specific Claim and Comments on Part III:**  
***(attachments not attached to final Decision)***

Attachment or Comment #	Description/Comment
1	Certificate of Service
2	Resume of Thomas R. Del Monte
3	Requested Justification of Thomas Del Monte’s rate.
4	Del Monte Coded Timesheets
5	Professional Bio of Ron Knecht
6	Knecht Coded Timesheets
7	Jan Reid Invoices.

**D. CPUC Comments, Disallowances, and Adjustments**

Item	Reason
[1]	Mr. Del Monte’s claim was filed late, and therefore is ineligible to seek intervenor compensation in this proceeding. <i>See</i> Discussion in Part I.
[2]	Mr. Del Monte filed a Motion on February 25, 2020, requesting the Commission waive the 5:00 p.m. filing deadline for his intervenor compensation request and accept the document as submitted on February 18, 2020, at 11:53 p.m.. Mr. Del Monte states due to family

<sup>3</sup> This information may be obtained through the State Bar of California’s website at <http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/MemberSearch/QuickSearch>.

Item	Reason
	<p>commitments he was unable to submit his claim prior to the 5:00 p.m. deadline.</p> <p>By his own admission, Mr. Del Monte states he had an unexpected change in family obligations that prevented him from filing his claim, in a timely manner although he had 60 days to do so. These facts do not support a deviation from the Commission’s rules. The Commission grants intervenors ample time to file claims for intervenor compensation and will not waive the rules.</p>

**PART IV: OPPOSITIONS AND COMMENTS**  
**Within 30 days after service of this Claim, Commission Staff**  
**or any other party may file a response to the Claim (see § 1804(c))**

<b>A. Opposition: Did any party oppose the Claim?</b>	No
<b>B. Comment Period: Was the 30-day comment period waived (see Rule 14.6(c)(6))?</b>	No

Party	Comment	CPUC Discussion

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

1. Thomas R. Del Monte’s request for Intervenor Compensation was filed after the February 18, 2020, 5:00 p.m. deadline.

**CONCLUSION OF LAW**

1. Thomas R. Del Monte’s request for Intervenor Compensation was filed late.
2. Thomas R. Del Monte’s request for Intervenor Compensation fails to satisfy all requirements of Pub. Util. Code §§ 1801-1812.
3. Thomas R. Del Monte’s motion to waive Rule 1.15 and accept the late-filed claim and amended claim as timely filed on February 25, 2020, is denied.

**ORDER**

1. Thomas R. Del Monte is awarded \$0.00.

This decision is effective today.

Dated \_\_\_\_\_, at San Francisco, California.

**APPENDIX****Compensation Decision Summary Information**

<b>Compensation Decision:</b>		<b>Modifies Decision?</b>	No
<b>Contribution Decision(s):</b>	D1912056		
<b>Proceeding(s):</b>	A1904014, A1904015, A1904017, A1904018		
<b>Author:</b>	ALJ Stevens		
<b>Payer(s):</b>	N/A		

**Intervenor Information**

<b>Intervenor</b>	<b>Date Claim Filed</b>	<b>Amount Requested</b>	<b>Amount Awarded</b>	<b>Multiplier?</b>	<b>Reason Change/ Disallowance</b>
Thomas R. Del Monte	2/18/2020	\$197,908	\$0.00	N/A	Claim denied due to late filing

**Hourly Fee Information**

<b>First Name</b>	<b>Last Name</b>	<b>Attorney, Expert, or Advocate</b>	<b>Hourly Fee Requested</b>	<b>Year Hourly Fee Requested</b>	<b>Hourly Fee Adopted</b>
Thomas	Del Monte	Attorney	\$400	2019	N/A
Ron	Knecht	Expert	\$400	2019	N/A
Jan	Reid	Expert	\$240	2019	N/A

**(END OF APPENDIX)**