
Attachment 2-1

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 106/22
Performing Safety Culture Assessments, Safety 4
Report Series No. 83, Transition to Action
(2016), pp. 19, 47-49.



Performing Safety Culture Self-assessments



- (iii) Violation of confidentiality and anonymity commitments may inhibit staff involvement.
- (iv) The team may assign too many findings for the organization to deal with effectively.
- (c) Dealing with the results of the assessment:
 - (i) The organization may be unable to folmulate effective solutions to cultural issues, resulting in ineffective action.
 - (ii) Results may be inappropliately used to assign blame.
 - (iii) The results may be rationalized or responded to defensively, especially if there are surplises.
 - (iv) Management may fail to share the inf01mation or accept ownership of the personal implications of the results.
 - (v) There may be a desire to use the results as a report card for compalison with others ratller than comprehending that the results are self-referential by nanrre - asking 'How are we relative to someone else?' as opposed to 'Are we who we want to be?'; the focus needs to be on the organization itself, as each organization is a unique culture which cannot be compared directly to another culture.
 - (vi) Management may rely on traditional approaches when translating outcomes into actions (i.e. more training, more expectations, and procedure enhancements) rather than encouraging ownership, leadership development and demonstrating commitment to understanding and improving.

Despite these issues, SCSAs provide broader, more useful inf01mation than limited approaches focused on human pe1fonnance and behaviour. They help management to understand organizational tendencies that give rise both to organizational strengths and latent weaknesses. Depending on how effective the level of engagement throughout the assessment is, the assessment can expose potential risks and heighten both awareness and vigilance.

4. SAFETY CULTURE SELF-ASSESSMENT PROCESS

4.1. ORGANIZATIONAL READINESS

In undertaking an SCSA, there are several considerations related to the organization's level of readiness for perfolming an assessment. Importantly, the absence of these factors does not preclude doing a self-assessment, as the

report. Management needs to obtain a clear understanding of tendencies within themselves and the organization at large that might cause unsafe behaviour or decisions.

The approach should be focused on maximizing the learning value to the organization. The following points are to be considered when summarizing and communicating the results:

- Consider graphical representations, talding care to avoid misleading pictures;
- Use a vailety of communication vehicles to communicate to management and personnel;
- Include context to avoid misinterpretation
- Request feedback as a reality check and confirm the messages have been understood as intended.

7.3. TRANSITION TO ACTION

Successful implementation of any programme requires an assessment of potential barriers. With respect to safety culture enhancement initiatives. potential batTiers include:

- A lack of vision, understailding aild an integrated plan focused on the desired state.
- Rewai·d systems based on cost and production rather thail a culture for safety;
- Complacency and natural defensiveness that 'we ai e safe enough and do not need more safety culture effo1t';
- Failw-e to take both a systemic and systematic view;
- 'One size fits all' approaches that import concepts such as enor reduction methods without considering the culnire in which they are to be applied;
- Mechanistic approaches that favour 'perfect systems' and rely on technical fixes, without due consideration of the human system.

Senior management is advised to use the results of the self-assessment to determine what can be done to reframe the understanding or reshape tendencies that do not support a strong safety culture. Improvements require a long term strategy and plan in addition to ongoing promotion of continuous in1provements. The approach taken in this Safety Repolt is that the self-assessment and the resulting repolt are separate from the action plan. Management may wish to give some indication of its approach to developing the plan and some key

considerations that might be included. However, the plan is not to be finalized without significant engagement with the groups affected. Their involvement results in a higher degree of commitment to successful implementation compared with top-down direction.

Some considerations in the continuous improvement of safety culture include:

- Talcing a systematic approach to developing a safety culture progra1mne;
- Utilizing safety culture experts knowledgeable in behavioural science, organizational psychology, and sociology, supplemented by training in nuclear technology:
- Using multidisciplinary, cross-functional teains to assist in m.1derstanding cultural aspects;
- Providing safety culture training to management;
- Providing workshops on safety culture for all levels and functions (managers, employees, contractors and colporate organizations) to ensure understanding of the fundamentals and not simply the use of human perf01mance and enor reduction methods;
- Positioning human pelfolmance techniques and enor reduction in telms of organizational culture at all levels, rather than focusing on field workers and front line supelvisors;
- futegrating a systemic approach to safety through for example placing organizational emphasis on doing the light things in the right context (e.g. building pre-job briefs into outage plans);
- Developing reward systems that suppolt safety and long term thinking:
- Taking a 'plan to learn' approach that aggressively seeks to 'learn what we do not know';
- hlvolving colporate organizations in safety culture enhancement to enslu-e trnnspareucy in tenns of what is needed in tinle and resources, aild communicating an understanding that safety culture enhancement contributes to long telm production results;
- Identifying management champions and advocates;
- Embracing transparency on safety matters throughout the organization.

Safety culture programmes involve integrated, genelic and specific activities. Generic activities involve the entire organization including corporate personnel and long term contractors in a systematic manner. Specific activities include job related training needs, responding to issues niggered by events, identification of safety deviations and acting on assessment results. h1tegrated

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activities take place when cultural improvement inventions are integrated into the ongoing, daily activities. Intervention may involve the entire organization or specific groups, depending on the nanre of the issue.