

**2019
TRIENNIAL
SECURITY REVIEW OF
BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR
(BART OAC)**

RAIL TRANSIT SAFETY BRANCH
RAIL SAFETY DIVISION
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
505 VAN NESS AVENUE
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

October 16, 2020

Final Report
(Confidential)

Matthew Ames, Director
Rail Safety Division



2019 TRIENNIAL SECURITY REVIEW OF BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The California Public Utilities Commission's Rail Transit Safety Branch (RTSB) staff conducted this system security program review. Staff members directly responsible for conducting review and inspection activities include:

Rupa Shitole – Utilities Engineer

Joey Bigornia – Utilities Engineer

Mike Warren – Utilities Engineer

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The California Public Utilities Commission's (Commission) Rail Safety Division (RSD), Rail Transit Safety Branch staff (Staff) conducted an on-site system security review of the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Oakland Airport Connector (OAC) in October 2019. The review is focused on verifying the effective implementation of the System Security Plan (SSP), addressing Threat & Vulnerability Assessments (TVA) and emergency response.

The on-site review was preceded by an opening conference meeting between BART personnel and Staff, on Monday, October 21, 2019. The security review took place on October 24, 2019, and focused on verifying the effective implementation of BART's SSP.

A post-review conference meeting followed the review on August 14, 2020, during which Staff provided OAC personnel with a summary of the review findings. Staff made no findings of non-compliance and issued no recommendations during the review.

The report Introduction is presented in Section 2. The Background, in Section 3, contains a description of the BART rail system. Section 4 provides a description of the 2019 security review procedures. The review's findings and recommendations are listed in Section 5. A listing of the Acronyms is in Appendix A. The BART 2019 Triennial Security Review Checklist Index and the Triennial Security Review Checklists are included, respectively, in Appendices B and C.

This report reflects Staff's triennial security review of BART OAC. The BART OAC on-site triennial safety review report is contained in a separate Report and is brought before the Commission for approval in a separate Resolution.¹

¹ Staff's safety review and report, "2019 Triennial Safety Review of Bay Area Rapid Transit District Oakland Airport Connector" is being brought before the Commission concurrently in Resolution ST-237.

2. INTRODUCTION

The Commission's General Order (GO) 164-E, *Rules and Regulations Governing State Safety Oversight of Rail Fixed Guideway Systems*, require the Commission Staff to perform a review of each rail transit agency's system safety and security program(s) at a minimum of once every three years. The purpose of the triennial review is to evaluate the effectiveness of each rail transit agency's System Security Plan (SSP) and to assess the level of compliance with GO 164-E as well as other Commission safety and security requirements. Staff conducted the previous BART on-site security review in October 2016.

Staff notified BART OAC's Manager by letter, dated September 17, 2019, of the scheduling of the Commission's Safety and Security Reviews to begin on October 21, 2019. The notification provided BART with the opportunity to review the five Triennial Security checklists which served as the basis for the Security Review, as well as to provide comments.

The Review began with an opening conference meeting on October 21, 2019, attended by Staff, BART OAC's Manager, and Safety and Security Manager, Doppelmayr Cable Car's (DCC) managers, and supervisors.

Staff performed the triennial security review on October 24, 2019, at the BART offices. Staff developed five (5) checklists for the inspection of the System Security Program. Staff derived the checklist review questions from CPUC's GO 164-E, FTA's guidance on performing triennial security reviews, Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Baseline Security Review, and BART's SSP. At the conclusion of each review activity, staff provided BART personnel a verbal summary of the preliminary findings and discussed potential recommendations for corrective actions.

On August 14, 2020, Staff conducted a post-review exit meeting with BART OAC's and DCC's managers to verbally convey all the findings from the Review. Staff indicated it did not identify any findings and did not issue any recommendations.

3. BACKGROUND

The Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) began operation on September 11, 1972, with 28 miles of track in Alameda County, servicing Oakland to Fremont. The second segment opened on January 29, 1973, with 12 miles of track extending the service from Fremont to Richmond. The third segment opened on May 21, 1973, with 17 additional miles of track marking the opening of the Concord Line. On November 5, 1973, service began between the Montgomery Street Station in downtown San Francisco and the Daly City Station, adding another 7.5 miles of track to the system. Transbay service began on September 16, 1974, bringing the full 71.5 miles of track into service. On May 27, 1976, the Embarcadero Station officially opened for revenue service, bringing the total station count to 34. Additional extensions have occurred over the years to expand the system.

Currently, the BART system operates six lines on 107.2 miles of track with 45 stations. These six lines are:

- Fremont – Daly City Line
- Dublin/Pleasanton – Daly City Line
- Pittsburg/Bay Point- SFO Line/Millbrae Line
- Richmond- Millbrae Line
- Richmond-Fremont Line
- Oakland Airport Connector

Oakland Airport Connector (OAC)

BART's Oakland Airport Connector (OAC), also known as BART to OAK, began revenue operation on November 22, 2014. The system was designed and constructed by Flatiron Construction and Parsons Transportation along with Doppelmayr Cable Car (DCC) who designed, manufactured, and supplied the Automated People Mover (APM) system and guideway. DCC now operates and maintains the system as part of a 20-year BART Operations and Maintenance Contract.

The OAC is a fully automated driverless transportation system operating along a 3.2 mile partially elevated, partially at-grade, partially below-grade, dual guideway, providing a comfortable and reliable link between the Airport Station and Coliseum Station. The APM system operates with up to four cable propelled 3-car trains. Each station consists of a single-sided passenger boarding platform with a barrier wall and automatic platform door system separating the passenger platform from the guideway tracks. Near the mid-point of the end stations is the maintenance and storage facility (or Wheelhouse). The Wheelhouse houses administrative offices, the Central Control Room, the ropeway drive machinery, and provisions for trains to be stored off of the mainline for maintenance. Two Tow/Maintenance Vehicles allow personnel to perform guideway inspections and maintenance activities, including towing revenue vehicles in and out of service.

The initial system consists of four 3-car trains operating in a pinched loop configuration on two separate lanes. The system is expandable, when built to ultimate capacity (4-car trains), to provide a peak period line capacity of 1900 passengers per hour per direction.

Status of the 2016 BART OAC Triennial Security Review

Staff performed the previous triennial on-site security review in 2016. No Findings or Recommendations were identified during that review. CPUC Resolution ST-203, adopted on April 27, 2017, granted Commission approval of Staff's final 2016 BART OAC On-Site Triennial Security Review report.

4. SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW PROCEDURE

Staff conducted the 2019 Triennial Security Review of Bay Area Rapid Transit District Oakland Airport Connector in accordance with Rail Transit Safety Branch Procedure Four (4), *Procedure for Performing Triennial Safety & Security Reviews of Rail Transit Systems*. Staff developed five (5) checklists to evaluate the adequacy of BART's system security plan and the efficacy of its implementation.

The security evaluation includes the BART security department, programs and processes which have system security functions and responsibilities. The review is based on Commission and FTA requirements, BART's SSP, TSA baseline review list, TSA security related documents, and the staff's knowledge of the BART transit system. The five (5) checklists are listed in Appendix C.

Staff's checklist identifies the core security-related elements and characteristics reviewed. Each checklist references Commission, BART, and other documents that establish the security program requirements. The methods used to perform the review include:

- Discussions and interviews with BART Police and DCC Management
- Reviews of rules, procedures, policies, and records

Immediately following the security review, staff summarized the findings and the preliminary recommendations (if appropriate) with BART's Director of Security Programs. The post-review summary is beneficial for clarifying findings or best-practices and provided BART an opportunity to promptly address any necessary security improvements.

5. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Review findings identify areas where changes should be made to further improve the SSP. The review results are derived from documents reviewed, issues discussed with management, and interview with BART Staff. The review identified no findings and this report makes no recommendations.

Following are the results for each checklist:

1. Identify Policies, Goals and Procedures

No findings of non-compliance; no recommendations.

2. Process for Management of Threats and Vulnerability (TVA)

No findings of non-compliance; no recommendations.

3. ID Concepts for Passenger and Employee Security

No findings of non-compliance; no recommendations.

4. Process for Internal Security Reviews

No findings of non-compliance; no recommendations.

5. Process for Generating its Security Plan

No findings of non-compliance; no recommendations.

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APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS LIST

Abbreviation / Acronym	Description
APM	Automated People Mover
BART	Bay Area Rapid Transit District
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
Commission	California Public Utilities Commission
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CPUC	California Public Utilities Commission
DCC	Doppelmayr Cable Car
DMU	Diesel Multiple Unit
eBART	East Contra Costa BART Extension
FTA	Federal Transit Administration
GO	General Order
ICS	Incident Command System
ISA	Internal Security Audit
OAC	Oakland Airport Connector
OCC	Operations Control Center
RTCB	Rail Transit and Crossing Branch
RTSS	Rail Transit Safety Section
SARA	Scanning Analysis Response Assessment
SSPP	System Security Program Plan
Staff	Rail Safety Division personnel
SVRT	Silicon Valley Rapid Transit
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TVA	Threat and Vulnerability Assessment
VTA	Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority

APPENDIX B

BART 2019 TRIENNIAL SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST INDEX

- 1 Identify Policies, Goals and Objectives
- 2 Process for Management of Threats and Vulnerabilities (TVA)
- 3 ID Concepts for Passenger and Employee Security
- 4 Process for Internal Security Reviews
- 5 Process for Generating its Security Plan

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APPENDIX C

BART 2019 TRIENNIAL SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLISTS

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**2019 CPUC SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR (BART OAC)**

Checklist No.	1	Element	Identify Policies, Goals, and Objectives
Date of Audit	October 24, 2019	Department(s)	BART Police Department
Auditors/ Inspectors	Mike Warren Joey Bigornia Rupa Shitole	Persons Contacted	Mimi Bolaffi, Director of Security Programs Orville Riley – Operation and Maintenance Manager (Doppelmayer) Tony Onisko – Safety Manager Sgt. Jonathan Gurrera, BART PD Michael Forte, BART Superintendent eBART/OAC Systems
REFERENCE CRITERIA			
- General Order 164-E - BART System Security Plan (SSP) Book 484 dated February 2019			
ELEMENT/CHARACTERISTICS AND METHOD OF VERIFICATION			
Identify Policies, Goals, and Objectives Interview the person(s) in charge of BART's Oakland Airport Connector (OAC) Security Policies, Goals and Objectives. Review and evaluate the various documents as indicated below for the past year(s) to determine if: - The BART SSP is certified by BART General Manager and BART Chief of Police and Director of Security Programs. - BART has heightened security awareness among all employees, contractors, and passengers for the OAC - BART OAC has developed relations and coordination with local law enforcement agencies and local and state governmental agencies - BART System Security Plan identifies: goals of reducing the fear of crime or perceived crime, limit security breaches and resolve them, evaluate security implications of all proposed system modifications before implications, and ensure that the system modifications do not create new security risks. How are these goals measured and met?			

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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Activities:

Staff interviewed BART OAC personnel to determine the following:

1. BART OAC provided February 25, 2019, BART Security Committee Meeting Minutes to demonstrate annual committee plan approval of revisions. No revisions were made. 2020 submittal will have updates for organizational changes.
 - a. SSP Signoffs:
 - i. General Manager, 4/6/18
 - ii. Chief of Police, 4/2/18
 - iii. Manager of Security Programs, 4/2/18
2. BART has a See Something, Say Something program and OAC makes the train announcements to patrons. District security alerts go out as needed to all BART employees, which includes OAC system as well. Usually in response to higher transportation seasons or national event alerts OAC system may be on heightened alert.
 - a. 8/29/19 Active shooter awareness
 - b. 8/16/19 Suspicious Package awareness
3. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is in place between BART Police Law Informant agencies for jurisdiction starting before OAC operations. BART tries to meet with other local and federal agencies at least monthly for a security intelligence swap. BART OAC invites local jurisdictions to participate in drills and exercises. BART interfaces with TSA through TSOC reports, drills, VIPR teams and is in contact with them every couple of weeks BART measures criminal activity on a daily and monthly basis. BART has 4 officers and a supervisor assigned to the Oakland area, including OAC, so coordination with local Police Department (PD) is crucial. BART provided the following case reports as examples of coordination with other jurisdictions:
 - a. 4/7/19 Incident Detail Report: BART Police/Alameda PD/Oakland PD coordination for possible rifle shooter aiming at OAC/BART. Alameda called Oakland, who called BART. 14 min for BART to respond on scene. 2 min later OAC train movement stopped. Bus bridge setup. Background checking by PD to find out info on individual using vehicle license number.
 - b. On 9/12/19, Airport police placed person on OAC to remove him from the Airport, but the individual didn't have payment and was stopped by the station attendant on Coliseum Station side for no fare and sent back to airport. BART talked with Airport about not passing on problem people to the transit system and have not seen anything since.
4. BART's SSP includes plan goals. BART performs annual threat/vulnerability assessments on all stations, including OAC. They are given numerical values to see where to focus BART resources. Any unauthorized access to OAC infrastructure will result in system shutdown and alarm. All video is automatically stored for 7 days unless pulled for

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Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

download and stored for longer. All access points have cameras (high definition) and are monitored. This year, BART has started conducting external audit annually related to access points and badge control. There have been no system modifications for the past 3 years on OAC. BART Watch app is available for patrons to call/notify BART of security concerns/events. BART can also send out alerts to patrons through the app.

Findings:

None.

Comments:

None.

Recommendations:

None.

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**2019 CPUC SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR (BART OAC)**

Checklist No.	2	Element	Process for Management of Threats and Vulnerabilities
Date of Audit	October 24, 2019	Department(s)	BART Police Department
Auditors/ Inspectors	Joey Bigornia Rupa Shitole Mike Warren	Persons Contacted	Mimi Bolaffi, Director of Security Programs Orville Riley – Operation and Maintenance Manager (Doppelmayr) Tony Onisko – Safety Manager Sgt. Jonathan Gurrera, BART PD Michael Forte, BART Superintendent eBART/OAC Systems
REFERENCE CRITERIA			
- General Order 164-E - BART System Security Plan (SSP) Book 484 dated February 2019			
ELEMENT/CHARACTERISTICS AND METHOD OF VERIFICATION			
Process for Management of Threats and Vulnerabilities Interview the BART representatives responsible for the protection against threats and vulnerabilities. Review the SSP, Threat and Vulnerability Assessments (TVAs), and related documents for the past year(s) to determine if: - BART performs TVAs that identifies facilities and systems containing critical assets related to OAC. - BART evaluated OAC trains for TVA risk assessment separately from the main line trains. - BART Police and Safety departments have conducted periodic tests and drills to evaluate and identify threats and vulnerabilities related to the OAC. - Security Infrastructure Review Committee (SIRC) places an emphasis on crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and relies upon the BART			

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Facilities Standards manual to provide guidance and practices to safeguarding patrons, the general public, employees, and property.

5. BART has implemented, considering implementation, and scheduled TVA recommendations for the past year.
6. BART's Police Chief has approved the TVAs.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Activities:

Staff met with BART Director of Security Programs and BART Superintendent, eBART/OAC Systems and found the following:

1. BART is required by the SSP and Security Committee to perform a TVA Annually – based on site and Physical assessments. Staff reviewed the most recent TVA which was performed on March 2019. The BART RISK ASSESSMENT 2019 – Vulnerability Scores identifies issues based on the Committee's ranking of potential threats to be addressed. The Chief of Police must review & approve it, and the TVA is presented to Security Committee for discussion for high level findings (critical infrastructures, mitigations, etc.). BART TVA identified additional yard lighting in dark areas in parking lots and yard fencing height/material requirements should be revised since the current BART standards were written in the 1970's. To mitigate the potential vulnerability, the BART fence standard and yard lighting requirements are being reviewed and revised to address the lighting levels, fence access, etc.
2. BART performs a separate TVA of the OAC. BART Security reports not very many issues have occurred along the guideway, OAC train, and OAC Station compared to Oakland Coliseum Station (eg. cell phone thefts). As a result of the OAC TVA, one change implemented was the addition of 3-emergency push buttons on the OAC train for passenger usage.
3. BART performs two drills each year (Active Full-Scale drill and a Tabletop drill). The SSRC is responsible for setting up the schedule of drills. Staff reviewed an SSRC meeting minute from October 2019. A tabletop exercise was scheduled in March 2019 and Staff verified it did occur in accordance with the 2019 drill record. The live drill is scheduled in November 2019; OAC is preparing for that live drill at the time of audit. Staff reviewed the 2018 drill report. No corrective

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actions were made to OAC's Emergency Plan. The 2018 drill report concluded a deficiency with staff communication with outside agencies and needed improvements. Staff reviewed training log titled "Contract No. 01ZK-120" verifying training has been done to update OAC staff to improve clarity of calls with outside agencies. All drill reports identifies the scenarios, goals, and provided a self-evaluation of the table top drill. The report did not identify any corrective actions necessary. All corrective actions required from drills are tracked in the System Safety Review Committee (SSRC) meetings, which identifies the agency, department and/or person responsible for implementation and closure. See Triennial Safety Checklist #11 for additional details.

BART discussed an actual scenario where medical emergency communications needed to be addressed, and issue was collectively resolved with medical responders as well. A passenger lost consciousness on train and OAC went through the emergency notification checklist to handle. Post lessons learned was for access to special elevator normally for staff should also include emergency responders. The current process is BART agents handle coordination of any issues addressed. The call came into to the BART web application which can call BART PD to report anonymously to send information. This process allows BART PD to send out an alert.

4. The Security Infrastructure Review Committee (SIRC) is a part of the SSRC review meetings that is activated during new projects only. Post revenue service is the SSRC which discusses any safety related issues. All CPTED and security vulnerabilities are discussed at the SSRC and solutions are implemented as needed. BART reports there hasn't been any modification to the OAC System.
5. See #1 above.
6. The TVA doesn't require the BART Chief of Police to formally sign off however the TVA is an SSI document. The SSP is approved by the Chief of Police which identifies in TVA Appendix D the BART District Director of Security Plans must be contacted for access to the BART risk and assessment scores.

Findings:

None

Comments:

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None

Recommendations:

None

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**2019 CPUC SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR (BART OAC)**

Checklist No.	3	Element	ID Concepts for Passenger and Employee Security
Date of Audit	October 24, 2019	Department(s)	BART Police Department
Auditors/ Inspectors	Rupa Shitole Joey Bigornia Mike Warren	Persons Contacted	Mimi Bolaffi, Director of Security Programs Orville Riley – Operation and Maintenance Manager (Doppelmayr) Tony Onisko – Safety Manager Sgt. Jonathan Gurrera, BART PD Michael Forte, BART Superintendent eBART/OAC Systems
REFERENCE CRITERIA			
- General Order 164-E - BART System Security Plan (SSP) Book 484 dated February 2019			
ELEMENT/CHARACTERISTICS AND METHOD OF VERIFICATION			
ID Concepts for Passenger and Employee Security Interview the BART representatives responsible for the Oakland Airport Connector (OAC) Security & Communication. Review the security incident reporting program for the past year to determine if: - BART has a program in place to control access and facility security related to employees and contractors. - BART Employees report any emergency conditions immediately to Central, Yard Control, or BART Police Services, as appropriate, providing as much information as possible. - BART Police Department requires specialized agents and therefore has sworn peace officers. What is the training/retraining requirement and does BART police have a			

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specific unit assigned to OAC system or all officers are trained on the OAC system response?

4. BART has a list of all Public Stations, Support Facilities, and Additional Assets along with the locations, descriptions, security issues, and security solutions.
5. BART distributes security awareness information and enhances security (brochures, message boards, PAs, Community Outreach, Community Services Officers, etc. such as Transit Watch) throughout the system.
6. BART has an internal security incident reporting program and courtesy phones/call boxes for passengers to report incidents or suspicious activity to BART Police.
7. BART documents, tracks, and resolves all internal and external security issues unto completion.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Activities:

Staff interviewed BART OAC representatives and found the following:

1. Only OAC employees have access to the facility with a badge and the access code is updated yearly. If a visitor is at the gate, they must sign in the Visitor Log upon entering the facility. OAC employees have limited access to certain areas since all doors are locked and access is provided as needed to employees and contractors as per their responsibilities. There are different types of keys and depending upon their job duties the key is assigned to the employees for access. If access is needed to certain areas, employees must request it directly from OAC Superintendent.
2. All OAC system incidents are reported to BART Police Department (PD) and BART Operations Control Center (OCC). When the notification is sent as a non-emergency event, BART OCC will handle the incident per defined protocols. BART OAC representatives shared email examples of the following:
 - 9/17/19 Skateboarders in Airport Parking Lot
 - 2/19/19 Lost Child
 - 9/6/19: BART Passengers loitering after hours
 - 3/28/19: Passenger Arrest for smoking inside the train and urinating in public.
3. BART PD trains all their sworn peace officers on the overall BART and OAC BART systems. A specific unit is trained to respond to the OAC BART system.

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Four officers and a supervisor are assigned to the Oakland area including all BART Stations. Refer to BART SSP Section 5.4 Security Awareness Training information for BART Police.

4. BART reports no changes have occurred since OAC revenue service. BART PD has all the necessary access point information and facilities support details. Total access points are seven (7) some of which are fire access points. The list of facilities is included with the overall BART core system which includes the OAC system.
5. Core BART System distributes security awareness brochures to their passengers, announcements on the trains are made, Public Information Systems are used system-wide, and "See Something Say Something" is recording is announced on the system continuously.
6. BART OAC has 6-emergency telephones (ETELS) at the station platforms and there are some on the OAC trains for passengers to use. In total, there are 30 ETELS throughout the system. When an ETEL button is pushed, it goes directly to Operations Control Center. The OAC CCTV is facing the area where the ETEL call is generated from and BART OCC is also contacted. Most of the incidents are people asleep on the train or an unruly patron. All calls are answered by the OAC Operations Control and BART PD is contacted immediately for response if needed. BART reports no security incidents on the OAC system for the past three years.
7. Safety Security Review Committee (SSRC) Hazard Log captures data from Year 2014 revenue service to present (five years) for rule violations, employee accidents, probability matrix, mitigation, status of closure, etc. All incidents are tracked to closure. The SSRC meetings minutes have the hazard log that tracks every incident on the OAC system to date.

Findings:

None.

Comments:

None.

Recommendations:

Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

None.

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**2019 CPUC SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR (BART OAC)**

Checklist No.	4	Element	Process for Internal Security Reviews
Date of Audit	October 24, 2019	Department(s)	BART Police Department
Auditors/ Inspectors	Michael Warren Rupa Shitole Joey Bigornia	Persons Contacted	Mimi Bolaffi, Director of Security Programs
REFERENCE CRITERIA			
- General Order 164-E - BART System Security Plan (SSP) Book 484 dated February 2019			
ELEMENT/CHARACTERISTICS AND METHOD OF VERIFICATION			
Process for Internal Security Reviews Interview the BART representatives responsible for the Internal Security Audit (ISA) Process. Review the appropriate procedure(s) and audit report(s) for the past year(s) to determine if: - BART is scheduling an annual ISA to address all of the required security program elements within its three-year audit cycle. - BART will provide CPUC Staff with the ISA schedule and checklist 30 days before scheduling. - BART's ISA annual report includes the findings and corrective actions. - BART submits its ISA to its General Manager for approval and certification. A copy of the ISA report is submitted to CPUC Staff to show compliance with its SSP and to show the status of subsequent Corrective Actions. - BART prepares, implements, and tracks the corrective action plans and schedules to completion.			
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS			
<u>Activities:</u> Staff interviewed BART Safety and Security personnel responsible for performing Internal Security Audits and determined the following: - BART has conducted audits and submitted annual reports as follows: 2018 Annual Report dated 2/8/19: audited element D			

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Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

- b. 2017 Annual Report dated 2/8/18: audited elements B, C, F
- c. 2016 Annual Report dated 1/23/17: audited elements A, D, E, F
- 2. BART notifies CPUC of upcoming scheduled internal security audits via email. The notifications come at least 30 days prior to the scheduled audit and have a draft checklist for the audit attached.
- 3. Bart's ISA Annual Reports all include their findings and corrective actions for the audited elements within the audit checklists.
- 4. BART's annual compliance letter is part of the BART Annual Report transmittal letter, which is certified by the BART General Manager.
- 5. The ISA corrective action Tracking Matrix is sent as an appendix of the Annual Report. There have been no corrective actions related to BART security audits.

Findings:

None.

Comments:

None.

Recommendations:

None.

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**2019 CPUC SYSTEM SECURITY REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT DISTRICT
OAKLAND AIRPORT CONNECTOR (BART OAC)**

Checklist No.	5	Element	Process for Generating its Security Plan
Date of Audit	October 24, 2019	Department(s)	BART Police Department
Auditors/ Inspectors	Michael Warren Rupa Shitole Joey Bigornia	Persons Contacted	Mimi Bolaffi, Director of Security Programs

REFERENCE CRITERIA

1. General Order 164-E
2. BART System Security Plan (SSP) Book 484 dated February 2019

ELEMENT/CHARACTERISTICS AND METHOD OF VERIFICATION

Process for Generating its Security Plan

Interview the BART representative(s) responsible for SSP administration. Review the SSP implementation, and update process of the SSP for the past year(s) to determine if:

1. BART conducts an annual review of the SSP related to OAC and documents any changes as needed.
2. BART sent a letter to Commission Staff detailing plan modifications, if any.
3. BART has an existing process for revising the SSP (for example, found through day-to-day operation, internal concerns, external concerns, and drill concerns).
4. BART has an existing process to track all Corrective Action Plan(s) incorporated, or to be incorporated, in the SSP from beginning to end.
5. BART has an existing process to communicate and disseminate new and revised procedures of the SSP to BART personnel.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Activities:

Staff interviewed BART Security personnel responsible for SSP updates and determined the following:

1. BART Security Committee reviews SSP for changes. Individual concerns can be brought to Security Management and then to the committee for consideration. Plan updates were presented to the committee at the following meetings and verified in meeting minutes:

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Sensitive Security Information (SSI)

- a. 2/26/19
 - b. 12/18/17
 - c. 7/18/16
2. BART appropriately sent letters to CPUC regarding plan review and updates. Letters dated as follows:
 - a. 2/6/19
 - b. 1/29/18
 - c. 1/14/17
3. BART's process for updating the SSP is through the Security Committee. Requested changes are sent to the committee for consideration.
4. Corrective actions that result in an SSP are tracked through the programs corrective action tracking process, i.e. internal security audit, exercise drill report, etc.
5. SSP revisions are given to all Committee members and Department heads outside the committee. Any other employee that would like a copy can request a copy and the request will be evaluated as needed.

Findings:

None.

Comments:

None.

Recommendations:

None.

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