

Decision 26-10-037

October 8, 2026

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Application of Pacific Gas and Electric Company for adoption of Electric Revenue Requirements and Rates Associated with its 2026 Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) and Generation Non-Bypassable Charges Forecast and Greenhouse Gas Forecast Revenue Return and Reconciliation.

Application 25-05-011

And Related Matters.

Application 25-09-015

ORDER DENYING REHEARING OF DECISION 25-12-027**I. INTRODUCTION**

The Commission issued Decision (D.) 25-12-027 (Decision) on December 23, 2025. (*Decision Approving Pacific Gas & Electric Company's 2026 Energy Resource Recovery Account Related Forecast Revenue Requirement and 2026 Electric Sales Forecast* (2025) [D.25-12-027].¹)

Among other determinations that are not at issue in this rehearing order, the Decision adopts a 2025 Energy Resource Recovery Account (ERRA) year-end balance for Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) that incorporates the revised Resource Adequacy (RA) Market Price Benchmark (MPB) methodology previously adopted by the Commission in D.25-06-049. (Decision, at pp. 15-17; see also *Decision Adopting Changes to the Calculation of the Resource Adequacy Market Price Benchmark* (2025) [D.25-06-049], at p. 34, Conclusion of Law (COL) 10 and Ordering Paragraphs (OPs) 1

¹ Unless otherwise noted, citations to Commission Decisions issued since July 1, 2000 are to the official pdf versions, which are available on the Commission's website at: <https://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/ResolutionSearchForm.aspx>

and 2 [ordering that the revised RA MPB be applied effective immediately, including to the calculation of the final 2025 RA MPB].)

In addition, the Decision addresses the valuation of “banked” Renewable Energy Credits (RECs), which PG&E anticipates using for compliance with its Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) obligations. (Decision, at p. 26.) PG&E expects to use RECs that were banked prior to 2019. This date is significant as the Commission modified its treatment of valuing banked RECs in 2019, so that the valuation methodology for RECs banked beginning January 1, 2019, is different than the methodology for RECs banked earlier than January 1, 2019. (*Id.* at pp. 27, 30, citing *Decision Refining the Method to Develop and True up Market Price Benchmarks* (2019) [D.19-10-001].)

During the course of the proceeding, the Commission was presented with two party proposals for valuing the pre-2019 banked RECs that PG&E expects to use for RPS compliance:

1. PG&E’s proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero dollars, with the end result being that bundled customers do not pay any additional credit to community choice aggregator (CCA) customers, and;
2. The California Community Choice Association’s (CalCCA’s) proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at the RPS Adder,² with the end effect being that bundled customers would pay an additional credit to the specific vintage of CCA customers who were bundled at the time of the RECs’ procurement but have since departed bundled service.

The Decision approved PG&E’s proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero dollars on an interim basis pending a more comprehensive decision on the use of pre-2019 banked RECs in the ERRA Rulemaking, Rulemaking (R.) 25-02-005.

² The RPS Adder is a means to determine the market value of a REC. More specifically, the RPS Adder is the MPB that reflects the estimated incremental value (incremental to the Energy Index) of each unit of RPS-eligible energy that is attributable to its RPS eligibility, in \$/Mega-Watt hour. (*CalCCA’s Opening Brief*, A.25-05-011 (Oct. 24, 2025); see also *Decision Refining the Method to Develop and True up Market Price Benchmarks* (2019) [D.19-10-001], at p. 7).)

CalCCA filed a timely application for rehearing of the Decision on January 12, 2026. (*CalCCA's Application for Rehearing of Decision Approving PG&E's 2026 ERRR-Related Revenue Requirement Forecast*, A.25-05-011/A.25-09-015 (Jan. 12, 2026) [hereinafter *Rehg. App.*].) CalCCA takes issue with the two aforementioned aspects of the Decision. CalCCA alleges that the Decision commits legal error by applying the revised RA MPB as directed in D.25-06-049. (*Id.* at pp. 14-24.) CalCCA asserts that D.25-06-049 engages in retroactive ratemaking in violation of Public Utilities Code section 728,³ and by applying the revised RA MPB established in D.25-06-049, the Decision at issue continues this retroactive ratemaking violation. (*Id.* at pp. 14-18.) In addition, CalCCA alleges that the Decision errs by approving PG&E's proposal to assign a value of zero dollars to pre-2019 banked RECs, and that the Commission should have instead adopted CalCCA's proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at the RPS Adder. (*Id.* at pp. 27-40.)

PG&E filed a response to CalCCA's rehearing application on January 27, 2026. In its response, PG&E argues that CalCCA's rehearing application constitutes an improper collateral attack on D.25-06-049, and that there is no legal error in the Commission's adoption of PG&E's zero-dollar valuation for pre-2019 banked RECs. (See *PG&E's Response to Application for Rehearing*, A.25-05-011/A.25-09-015 (Jan. 27, 2026).)

The Commission has carefully reviewed and considered CalCCA's claims of legal error and finds no basis for rehearing.

II. DISCUSSION

A. CalCCA's claim of retroactive ratemaking is a collateral attack of a determination made in D.25-06-049.

In 2025, the Commission initiated R.25-02-005 to consider changes to the annual ERRR forecast and compliance proceedings, with Track 1 of R.25-02-005 focused on revising the RA MPB to ensure that RA costs were being accurately captured and

³ All subsequent section references are to the Public Utilities Code, unless otherwise specified.

distributed between bundled and unbundled customers. (See D.25-06-049, *supra*, at pp. 2-7.) Track 1 of R.25-02-005 culminated in D.25-06-049, which adopted a revised RA MPB methodology. D.25-06-049 directed that the revised RA MPB be applied effectively immediately and included a specific directive that the revised RA MPB be applied in each Investor-Owned Utility's (IOU's) ERRA forecast proceeding. (*Id.* at p. 34, COL 10 and OPs 1 and 2.)

During the course of R.25-02-005, CalCCA raised the issue of retroactive ratemaking, alleging that application of a revised methodology to the final 2025 RA MPB would violate section 728. (See *id.* at pp. 28-29.) D.25-06-049 rejected this argument, explaining that the Supreme Court in *Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Commission* held that the “prohibition against retroactive ratemaking was not intended to apply to every situation where action by the Commission results in retroactive application.” (*Id.* at p. 29 citing *Southern California Edison Co. v. Public Utilities Commission* (1978) 20 Cal.3d 813, 817.) To this end, D.25-06-049 includes a conclusion of law that the “[a]pplication of these [RA MPB] changes to the 2025 Final RA MPB does not violate the prohibition against retroactive ratemaking.” (*Id.* at p. 34, COL 9.)

CalCCA then filed a rehearing application of D.25-06-049, arguing that the Commission engaged in retroactive ratemaking by applying the revised RA MPB “midstream,” i.e., after the 2025 ERRA forecast occurred but before the 2025 ERRA true-up. (See *CalCCA Application for Rehearing of D.25-06-049*, R.25-02-005 (July 28, 2025).) The Commission denied CalCCA's rehearing application, explaining that the prohibition on retroactive ratemaking applies in the context of general ratemaking and that the California Supreme Court has already evaluated an allegation of general and retroactive ratemaking in an ERRA-equivalent proceeding and held that section 728's prohibition did not apply. (*Order Denying Rehearing of D.25-06-049* (2025) [D.25-10-061], at pp. 4-5 citing *Southern California Edison Co.*, *supra*, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 816-817.)

CalCCA then attempted to challenge D.25-06-049 at the Court of Appeal, again asserting that the Commission engaged in retroactive ratemaking. This challenge was

summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. (See *Order Denying Petition*, C105174 (June 25, 2026).) On September 23, 2026, however, the California Supreme Court granted CalCCA’s petition for review of the Court of Appeal’s summarily denial and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate the order denying the petition for writ of review and to issue a writ of review to be heard before the Court. (*Order Granting Petition for Review, CalCCA v. Public Utilities Commission*, S297373 (September 23, 2026).)

CalCCA’s rehearing application of the Decision at issue raises the identical claim of retroactive ratemaking. CalCCA again asserts that D.25-06-049 unlawfully engages in retroactive ratemaking by changing the RA MPB methodology “midstream.” (Rehg. App., at p. 10.) CalCCA alleges that the Decision at issue perpetuates this alleged legal violation by carrying out D.25-06-049’s directive to apply the revised RA MPB to the final 2025 ERRRA balances. (*Id.*, at pp. 11-12, 14-20.)

The Commission made the determination to apply the revised RA MPB to the final 2025 ERRRA balances in D.25-06-049. The Decision was merely implementing this prior decision. CalCCA is using its rehearing application of the Decision to collaterally attack a determination made in D.25-06-049, which is not permitted. (See §§ 1731, 1756.) CalCCA’s direct attack of D.25-06-049 is pending and will be considered by the Court of Appeal. (*Order Granting Petition for Review, supra*, S297373). If a Court determines that the application of the revised RA MPB to the 2025 ERRRA true-up is unlawful, the Commission may modify the Decision and parties also have the option to file a petition to modify the Decision. (§ 1708; Rule of Practice and Procedure, Rule 16.4.⁴)

In sum, the determination that the revised RA MPB should apply to the 2025 ERRRA true-up was made in D.25-06-049. We decline CalCCA’s attempt to use a rehearing application of the Decision to collaterally attack the determination made in D.25-06-049.

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, all references to a Rule are to the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.

B. CalCCA fails to show that the Decision’s application of the revised RA MPB is inadequately supported by findings and fails to show that the Decision is arbitrary or an abuse of the Commission’s discretion.

CalCCA alleges that the Decision’s use of the RA MPB is inadequately supported by the Decision’s findings and is arbitrary or an abuse of the Commission’s discretion. (Rehg. App., at pp. 20-24.) CalCCA claims that the findings “do not adequately wrestle with how the use of the new, unlawfully applied [RA MPB] methodology has changed rates, the magnitude of those changes, or why the Commission believes such changes are legal and justified in the face of allegations that they are unlawfully retroactive.” (*Id.* at p. 22.) These claims of legal error fail.

CalCCA seems to suggest that the Commission is required to again justify application of the revised RA MPB. As explained, however, this issue has already been decided in D.25-06-049. (See section II.A., *supra*.) D.25-06-049 specifically directed that the revised RA MPB be applied to the 2025 final RA MPB, which is exactly what the Decision does. (See D.25-06-049, at p. 34, COL 10 and OPs 1 and 2.) D.25-06-049 already adopted findings explaining why the RA MPB “changes are legal and justified in the face of allegations that they are unlawfully retroactive.” (Rehg. App., at p. 22.) There is no legal requirement – and CalCCA points to no legal authority supporting its assertion – that the Commission must re-litigate or re-justify a final determination made in a prior decision.

CalCCA’s allegation of arbitrary decision-making or an abuse of discretion fails for similar reasons. CalCCA claims that the Commission abused its discretion “by arbitrarily approving the retroactive application of the new RA MPB methodology to the calculation of rates set in this proceeding.” (*Ibid.*) The Commission previously determined in D.25-06-049 that the revised RA MPB should be applied effective immediately and found that there was no retroactive ratemaking. (See D.25-06-049, *supra*, at p. 34, COL 9.) There is nothing arbitrary about complying with a prior decision.

CalCCA also takes issue with what it construes as a failure to publish an “Alternate Final 2025 RA MPB,” using the prior iteration of the RA MPB. (Rehg. App., at p. 23.) CalCCA claims that this figure is “necessary to identify the precise impact of the Commission’s decision to calculate the 2025 Final RA MPB using the new RA MPB methodology instead of the existing RA MPB methodology.” (*Ibid.*) CalCCA points to no legal authority for the notion that the Commission must engage in a hypothetical inquiry as to what would have occurred had prior determinations not been adopted.

C. CalCCA fails to show legal error in the Commission’s adoption of a zero-dollar value for pre-2019 banked RECs.

CalCCA argues that the Decision errs by adopting PG&E’s proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero dollars, as opposed to CalCCA’s proposal to value pre-2019 banked RECs at the RPS Adder. (Rehg. App., at pp. 24-25.) CalCCA alleges that a zero-dollar value for pre-2019 banked RECs is a violation of the indifference mandate as set forth in sections 365.2, 366.2(a)(4), 366.2(g), and 366.3. (*Ibid.*)

CalCCA fails to show a violation of the indifference mandate. The code sections relied on by CalCCA require the Commission to hold bundled and unbundled customers indifferent by ensuring that bundled customers “do not experience any cost increases as a result of retail customers of an electrical corporation electing to receive service from other providers” and likewise, that “departing load does not experience any cost increases as a result of an allocation of costs that were not incurred on behalf of the departing load.” (§ 365.2; see also §§ 366.3 and 366.2 (a)(4) [stating substantially similar language].)

The Decision’s determination to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero does not result in either bundled or unbundled customers paying increased costs. Under the Decision’s adopted REC value, neither bundled nor unbundled customers pay an additional amount associated with pre-2019 banked RECs.

CalCCA also fails to show a violation of section 366.2(g). This code section requires that estimated net unavoidable electricity costs paid by CCA customers be reduced by the value of any benefits that remain with bundled customers, unless CCA

customers are allocated a fair and equitable share of those benefits. CalCCA interprets this code section to mean that departed load customers are owed a credit from bundled customers, now that a pre-2019 banked REC is anticipated to be used for RPS compliance. (See Rehg. App., at pp. 26-29.)

However, the record evidence shows that there was a system in place to comply with section 366.2(g) prior to 2019, with the result being that bundled customers paid an amount associated with the value of the REC to CCA customers – via the Power Charge Indifference Adjustment (PCIA) – at the time the REC was generated. (See e.g., *Opening Brief of PG&E*, A.25-05-011 (Oct. 24, 2025), at p. 28; Reporter’s Transcript, Volume 1, A.25-05-011 (Oct. 13, 2025), at pp. 88-89.) Thus, section 366.2(g) compliance was achieved when the pre-2019 banked REC was generated.

The Decision explains that the Commission modified this then-existing process in its 2019 decision – D.19-10-001. (See Decision, at pp. 30-31 citing *Decision Refining the Method to Develop and True up Market Price Benchmarks* (2010) [D.19-10-001].) In contrast to a REC banked before 2019, under D.19-10-001, a REC is valued at the time it is used for RPS compliance, rather than when banked. However, D.19-10-001 specifically states that “[t]he methods adopted in this Decision apply to RECs generated commencing January 1, 2019, and going forward.” (*Id.* at p. 47, FOF 8.)

As explained in the Decision, D.19-10-001 does not conclusively resolve what methodology should be used to value pre-2019 banked RECs. (*Id.* at p. 31.) Further, since 2019, the Commission has not held that section 366.2(g), or any related indifference statute, *requires* bundled customers to again pay an additional amount associated with a pre-2019 banked REC once that REC is used for RPS compliance in a later year. (See e.g., *Southern California Edison Company’s 2024 ERRRA Forecast* (2023) [D.23-11-094] at pp. 53 [“the Commission has not, to this date, found that [a utility’s] bundled service customers owe additional credits to Departing Load customers when [a utility] uses RECs banked in or before 2018”].)

CalCCA does not appear to dispute that, prior to 2019, bundled customers paid an amount to departed load customers to reflect the REC’s value via the PCIA at the time of

REC procurement, or that PG&E complied with this then-existing process. However, CalCCA offers an interpretation of section 366.2(g), and the other indifference-related statutes cited above, in which bundled customers would be required to pay an additional amount associated with the REC to departed load customers, once the REC is used for RPS compliance.

This interpretation does not follow from the plain language of the statute. Section 366.2(g) requires electricity costs paid by CCA customers to be reduced by the value of any benefits that remain with bundled customers, unless CCA customers are allocated a fair and equitable share of those benefits. Prior to 2019, bundled customers paid a credit via the PCIA to CCA customers to reflect the value of a REC, at the time the REC was generated. Compliance with section 366.2(g) was achieved under the pre-D.19-10-001 process, and nothing in the code section requires this indifference adjustment to be redone merely because additional customers have departed bundled service for CCA service or that a generated and banked REC is now being used for RPS compliance.

What's more, PG&E raised valid concerns about the legal, policy, and practical implications if the Commission were to adopt such an interpretation. For instance, CalCCA's proposal arguably violates the indifference requirements set forth in sections 365.2, 366.3, and 366.2 (a)(4). These code sections expressly require that both bundled and unbundled customers be held indifferent by "not experienc[ing] any cost increases." CalCCA's proposal directly calls for bundled customers to pay an additional credit associated with a banked REC, despite the fact that those customers already paid for the REC when that REC was generated prior to 2019. Because this is an issue that was to be thoroughly considered in the ERRA Rulemaking, the Decision at issue avoids making a determination as to whether a zero-dollar valuation, a valuation based on the RPS Adder, or some other valuation methodology is legally required. (Decision, at pp. 26, 31, 67, FOF 15.) After thoroughly considering the legality of adopting CalCCA's proposal in Track 2 of the ERRA Rulemaking, the Commission adopted a methodology of valuing pre-2019 banked RECs that is consistent with the Decision at issue. (See *Decision Resolving Track Two Issues* (2026) [D.26-09-047], *supra*, at p. 2.)

In sum, in the absence of any legal requirement to adopt the RPS Adder, the Commission's determination to adopt PG&E's proposal as an interim measure is reasonable and supported by the record. CalCCA fails to show a legal requirement to adopt its RPS Adder valuation methodology.

D. CalCCA fails to show that the Decision's determination regarding pre-2019 banked RECs is not supported by adequate findings.

CalCCA alleges that the Decision's determination on pre-2019 banked RECs is not supported by adequate findings pursuant to section 1757(a)(3). CalCCA asserts that the Decision errs because it does not evaluate the merits of PG&E's methodology, but "instead punt[s] the entire issue to a separate proceeding," referring to the ongoing ERRA Rulemaking. (Rehg. App., at p. 35.) As such, CalCCA asserts that the Decision errs because it does not rely on the merits of PG&E's methodology. (*Id.* at pp. 35-36.)

The Decision's determination to adopt PG&E's proposed valuation is supported by Findings of Fact 15 and 16, which find that it is reasonable to adopt PG&E's pre-2019 banked RECs methodology on an interim basis, and that the proposal to address conflicting understandings regarding the pre-2019 banked RECs valuation methodology is appropriate for consideration in a rulemaking. (Decision, at p. 67.) CalCCA does not explain why these findings are inadequate pursuant to section 1757(a)(3). What CalCCA's argument really amounts to is a disagreement with the Commission's determination to approve PG&E's proposal. However, merely because the Decision does not reach the rehearing applicants' preferred findings does not equate to a legal error. (See *Order Denying Rehearing of Decision 21-03-056* (2021) [D.21-09-045], p. 7.) Regardless, we examine additional substantive support for the Decision's determination further below.

E. CalCCA fails to show that the Decision's determination regarding pre-2019 banked RECs is not supported by substantial evidence on the record.

CalCCA asserts the Decision is not backed by substantial evidence on the record because – according to CalCCA – a reasonable person could not have adopted PG&E's

methodology in light of the whole record. (Rehg. App., at p. 36.) As explained, the Decision’s explanation and resulting determination is reasonable. The burden is on the rehearing applicant to show a reasonable person could not have reached that conclusion and CalCCA fails to meet this burden. (*See Securus Technologies, LLC v. Public Utilities Com.* (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 787, 802.) CalCCA fails to meet this burden.

CalCCA also asserts that the Decision does not analyze or tie its conclusion to the record and instead “acknowledges the impossibility of evaluating and determining a pre-2019 banked REC valuation methodology in an expedited ERRA Forecast proceeding.” (Rehg. App., at p. 36 citing Decision, at p. 31.) CalCCA thus asserts that the Decision is “fundamentally dissonant” because it simultaneously “avoids wading into the record” while also finding it reasonable to approve PG&E’s methodology. (*Ibid.*)

As explained, the Commission’s 2019 decision established a REC valuation methodology for 2019 and thereafter but did not clarify whether the Commission should continue to treat pre-2019 banked RECs in the same manner it had prior to the 2019 decision. In this proceeding, the Commission was presented with two proposals for treating pre-2019 banked RECs and opted to adopt the utility’s proposal as an interim measure while the issue was being thoroughly examined, and a definitive rule formulated, in the ERRA Rulemaking. (*Ponderosa Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Com.* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 999, 1013 [“It is for the agency to weigh the preponderance of conflicting evidence, and its findings are not open to attack for insufficiency if they are supported by any reasonable construction of the evidence.”].) The Decision’s approach is reasonable and CalCCA fails to show otherwise.

Further, record evidence presented to the Commission raises various issues with regard to CalCCA's RPS Adder proposal. For instance, PG&E established that, according to the practice at the time, when RECs were generated prior to 2019, bundled customers paid a credit to unbundled customers via the PCIA to reflect the value of these RECs. (Reporter’s Transcript, Volume 1, A.25-05-011 (Oct. 13, 2025), at pp. 88-89.) PG&E raises a reasonable argument that requiring bundled customers to pay again for these RECs violates the indifference mandate. (PG&E Opening Brief, at pp. 25-33.)

PG&E also raised valid questions about the accuracy of assigning banked RECs a value based on the RPS Adder. PG&E points out that applying the RPS Adder would assign a value to pre-2019 banked RECs as if they were a renewable credit on the market today, which has value from being both tradeable or transferable. A banked REC is not tradeable or transferable, nor is it a product of the currently existing renewable market, and treating it as such, may be overvaluing the banked REC. (See *id.* at pp. 35; see also Exhibit PGE-4, at pp. 4-21 to 4-22.)

Given the absence of a demonstration that the Commission was legally required to adopt CalCCA's RPS Adder proposal, the Decision's determination to adopt PG&E's zero-dollar value as an interim solution while these significant issues were thoroughly examined in the ERRA Rulemaking is reasonable and supported by the record.

F. CalCCA fails to show that the Decision's determination regarding pre-2019 banked RECs is an arbitrary departure from prior practices.

CalCCA argues that the Decision constitutes an abuse of discretion because it arbitrarily departs from what CalCCA describes as the Commission's "prior, consistent practice" without providing evidentiary support for doing so. (Rehg. App, at pp. 37-38.)

CalCCA misconstrues the Commission's approach to pre-2019 banked RECs. While it is true that the Commission has previously approved PG&E's request to value pre-2019 banked RECs at the RPS Adder, the Commission has also approved utility requests to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero. (Compare *Decision Approving PG&E's 2025 ERRA Related Forecast Revenue Requirement and 2025 Electric Sales Forecast* (2024) [D.24-12-038], at COL 1 [approving PG&E's undisputed request to value pre-2019 and 2020 banked RECs using the RPS Adder] with D.23-11-094, *supra*, at pp. 53, 58-60 [approving Southern California Edison Company's request to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero dollars].) As the Commission has explained, we have not held that bundled customers owe additional credits to departing load customers when a utility uses RECs banked in or before 2018. (D.23-11-094, *supra*, at p. 53; see also *Decision Denying Petition for Modification of D.23-06-006* (2024) [D.24-08-004], at p. 5 [stating

that there was an insufficient record in the proceeding before it to determine how to value pre-2019 RECs but that the Commission may consider the issue in a future rulemaking].

Taking this together, it is more accurate to summarize the Commission's approach to valuing pre-2019 banked RECs as adopting interim approaches until this issue is examined in an industry-wide rulemaking. The Decision is consistent with this approach, and in any event, is consistent with the determination to value pre-2019 banked RECs at zero that has been reached in the ERRA Rulemaking. (See D.26-09-047, *supra*, at p. 2.)

For these reasons, CalCCA fails to show legal error.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained herein, CalCCA fails to show legal error in the Decision and otherwise fails to justify rehearing. As such, CalCCA's application for rehearing is denied, as is CalCCA's request for oral argument. (See Rule 16.3(a) ["The Commission has complete discretion to determine the appropriateness of oral argument in any particular matter."]; *Ordering Denying Rehearing* (2024) [D.24-06-027], at p. 12 [noting same].)

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The application for rehearing of Decision 25-12-027 is denied.
2. This proceeding is closed.

This order is effective today.

Dated October 8, 2026, at Sacramento, California.

JOHN REYNOLDS
President

DARCIE L. HOUCK
KAREN DOUGLAS
CHRISTINE HARADA
MATTHEW BAKER
Commissioners