

Proceeding: R.20-11-003

Exhibit No.: SDGE-6

Witness: E Bradford Mantz

**PREPARED REPLY TESTIMONY OF
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY
REGARDING DEMAND RESPONSE PROPOSALS**



**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**

July 21, 2021

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**PREPARED REPLY TESTIMONY OF
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I. INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the June 14, 2021 ruling of Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Brian Stevens, the purpose of this reply testimony is to respond to the supplemental testimony of the California Environmental Justice Alliance (“CEJA”) regarding its proposed Just Flex Rewards (“JFR”) demand response (“DR”) program.

CEJA’s supplemental testimony provides additional detail regarding its proposed JFR program, originally described in CEJA’s opening testimony dated January 11, 2021.¹ The proposed JFR program is designed to incent participation in the Emergency Load Reduction Program (“ELRP”) pilot approved by the Commission in Decision (“D.”) 21-03-056 by customers located in disadvantaged communities (“DACs”) and low-income (“LI”) households.² The program would “pay community members to reduce energy consumption during the specific hours when the ELRP is called using a text alert and self-verification process.”³ Although program participation is voluntary, eligible households would be automatically enrolled in the JFR program. The notification process would leverage the investor-owned utilities’ (“IOUs”) existing text platforms used to notify customers of outages and Public Safety Power Shutoff (“PSPS”) events.⁴ CEJA proposes a statewide budget of \$20 million to implement the proposed JFR program.⁵

¹ See Exh. CEJA-1.

² Exh. CEJA-3, p. 1.

³ *Id.* at p. 2.

⁴ Exh. CEJA-1, p. 8.

⁵ Exh. CEJA-3, p 12.

1 As explained below, while SDG&E supports the goal of increasing participation in DR
2 programs and agrees with CEJA that DAC and LI customers should be encouraged to be “part of
3 the solution” and “empower[ed] . . . to make decisions to lower their energy consumption when
4 the grid is stressed,”⁶ it does not support adoption of the proposed JFR program. First, the
5 proposed JFR program is essentially a solution in search of a problem – DAC and LI customers
6 are already encouraged to participate in existing DR programs in SDG&E’s service territory and
7 it is unlikely that adopting the JFR program would result in significant additional load reduction
8 by these customers. Second, requiring SDG&E to engage in the type of unsolicited text
9 messaging that is contemplated under the proposed JFR program raises policy and potential legal
10 concerns. Finally, several aspects of the JFR proposal are technologically infeasible or otherwise
11 problematic.

12 **II. ADOPTION OF THE JFR PROGRAM IS NOT NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE**
13 **DR PROGRAM PARTICIPATION BY DAC AND LI CUSTOMERS**

14 SDG&E supports the laudable goal expressed by CEJA of encouraging participation by
15 DAC and LI customers in DR. This aligns directly with SDG&E’s objective of increasing
16 participation by all customers in the DR programs offered in its service area. As a practical
17 matter, however, the proposed JFR program is not the optimal approach for achieving the desired
18 outcome. To the extent DAC and LI customers are even eligible to participate in ELRP and the
19 proposed JFR program (*e.g.*, residential customers have limited ability to participate in ELRP), it
20 is not clear that a strong incentive would exist to do so.

21 As discussed below, DAC customers in SDG&E’s service territory are located in coastal
22 areas with a generally temperate climate, which means that the load reduction potential (and the

⁶ *Id.* at p. 1.

1 corresponding compensation) for this sub-set of customers would be relatively low. For LI
2 customers who may be located in higher-heat areas, SDG&E's existing Technology Deployment
3 and AC Saver programs offer attractive participation options at every price point. Indeed,
4 SDG&E submits that if the Commission's goal is to generally encourage increased participation
5 in DR programs by DAC and LI customers, directing the additional funding proposed by CEJA
6 to marketing efforts aimed at boosting enrollment in SDG&E's existing DR programs would be a
7 better course of action than requiring it to implement the burdensome and technologically
8 infeasible (as discussed below in Section IV) JFR program proposed by CEJA.

9 **A. SDG&E DACs Generally Have a Low Energy Burden**

10 As explained by CEJA witness, Dan Sakaguchi, the JFR program is premised on the
11 assumption that “[b]ased on their relative energy burden, these are the customers who are
12 likely to respond to straightforward financial incentives by taking action to reduce load in a grid
13 emergency, and they are the customers who could most benefit from this type of program.”⁷
14 While this assumption may be correct in other IOUs' service territories, it is erroneous in the
15 context of SDG&E's DACs.

16 By most commonly applied definitions of a DAC, SDG&E's DACs represent a very
17 small and urban section of the SDG&E service territory located near the coast. DACs in
18 SDG&E's territory that register within the top 25th percentile of most disadvantaged census tracts
19 statewide using the California EnviroScreen tool⁸ constitute a comparably small number of
20 census tracts located in only a handful of neighboring municipalities, which generally stretch
21 from the San Diego's Port district southward to the US / Mexico border. The illustration below

⁷ *Id.* at p. 2 (emphasis added).

⁸ Available at: <https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/report/draft-calenviroscreen-40>.

1 demonstrates this fact.




Illustration 1 – Top 25% Census Tracts to Identify DACs in SDG&E's Territory

1 In the illustration, the yellow areas denote DACs, and the purple outlined zones have a
2 high proportion of LI customers. Thus, using the CalEPA tool definition of DACs, it is clear that
3 SDG&E's DACs are materially different from the other IOUs' DACs, which are mostly inland
4 and located in portions of the California Central Valley, and have significantly higher
5 temperatures during the summer. SDG&E's DACs are mostly located near the coast where load
6 reduction through reduced use of air conditioning (a typical source of load reduction) is not as
7 viable. Given this fact, SDG&E does not believe that customers located in SDG&E's identified
8 DACs would have significant load to shed during a DR event.

9 **B. SDG&E's Existing DR Programs Enable and Encourage Participation by**
10 **DAC and LI Customers**

11 To the extent DAC and LI customers wish to participate in DR programs, SDG&E
12 currently offers programs that are open to not only to DAC and LI customers, but to all
13 customers in the service territory. Thus, economic segmentation is not a barrier to participation
14 in SDG&E's DR programs.

15 SDG&E currently offers its Technology Deployment Program, which pays an incentive
16 to customers that buy and install a smart programmable thermostat, as well as its AC Saver
17 Program, which sends signals to customers enrolled thermostats on days of high heat and grid
18 load and pays customers an annual incentive for participation. These signals are sent to the
19 customer's thermostats with a message on the device announcing the event as well as notification
20 that their thermostat will be adjusted during the event at the customer's request. Thus, the
21 program provides the added benefit of helping customers use less energy and lower their energy
22 costs and monthly utility bill. The AC Saver program also provides an annual incentive payable
23 once per year in December to customers that are active in the program to further encourage load

1 reduction. Thus, these existing programs offer clear incentives and benefits to LI and DAC
2 customers:

3 Technology Deployment:

4 The Technology Deployment program is a “bring your own device” structure for
5 residential customers that allows them to earn an enrollment incentive by agreeing to allow
6 SDG&E to signal their thermostat during demand response events. The Technology Deployment
7 program has the following characteristics:

- 8 • The program is open to all customers regardless of size.
- 9 • The program is a “Bring Your Own Device” offer for all customers.
- 10 • The program is open to technologies that can curtail load in residential and small
11 commercial customer locations.
- 12 • The program provides an incentive of up to \$50 per device once the customer has
13 registered the device with the manufacturer and also joins an IOU or third-party
14 DR program.
- 15 • The customers technology may be signaled either by the utility or by the vendor
16 for events.
- 17 • Customers will have the option to enroll in DR programs such as AC Saver or a
18 third-party DR program under Rule 32.

19 Currently the Technology Deployment Program provides incentives payable to customers
20 that purchase, install and register a smart programable thermostat and the program includes many
21 different thermostat models from ecobee, Nest and Honeywell. These thermostats have many
22 different price points and are available to all customers eligible to receive the incentive.

1 This allows all classes of customers, including LI and DAC customers, to purchase and
2 install a device of their choice that 1) can be used for a DR event and 2) helps them to save
3 energy and lower their bills for the remainder of the year.

4 An additional benefit of using smart thermostats is the customer has the ability to utilize their
5 mobile phone to manage their thermostat or device as well as to opt out of an event if necessary.

6 AC Saver Program

7 The AC Saver Program is SDG&E's thermostat program available to both residential
8 and commercial customers. AC Saver participants have either a direct load control switch
9 installed on their air-conditioner or a thermostat with settings that can be adjusted by the
10 manufacturer. Events last between two and four hours and may be called between April and
11 October. The maximum number of annual events is 20 with 5 additional events that may be
12 called by the California Independent System Operator ("CAISO") or SDG&E during grid
13 emergencies only.⁹ The current AC Saver program design meets the CAISO guidelines as a
14 supply resource product that can be bid into the CAISO market and meet the minimum load
15 requirements.

16 The combination of the Technology Deployment incentive and the AC Saver annual
17 incentive payment offers all customers an opportunity to participate in a DR program. These
18 programs are available at any price point. They are mature programs that offer the additional
19 benefit of helping customers to manage their energy use. SDG&E believes that these existing
20 programs provide DAC and LI customers with ample opportunity to be "part of the solution"
21 related to DR.

⁹ D.21-03-056, Attachment 1, p. 19.

III. POLICY AND POTENTIAL LEGAL CONCERNS

CEJA’s proposal to automatically enroll DAC and LI customers in the ELRP program and to subject them to related unsolicited communications is highly problematic. First, SDG&E’s DR programs are, by design, voluntary and require proactive participation by customers. As a practical matter, it makes little sense to impose the significant burden associated with implementation of a mandatory enrollment and an opt-out process (discussed in more detail below) if customers are disinclined to participate. CEJA fails to make the case that the public interest would be served by doing so.

Moreover, CEJA ignores the potential negative impact of its proposal on the relationship between SDG&E and its customers. SDG&E strives to meet its customers’ service and communication expectations and aims to support its customers’ preferences to the greatest extent possible. It communicates with customers through the customer’s preferred designated messaging channels and *for the reasons* they have approved (*e.g.*, alerts related to outages or other programs in which they may have enrolled). Some customers elect to opt out of *all* messaging – CEJA’s proposal would have the effect of reversing those customers’ election. Adoption of CEJA’s proposal and issuance by SDG&E of multiple and repeated unsolicited text messages could result in customer confusion and result in a negative customer experience. Customers may be frustrated and upset to receive text notifications they did not approve – particularly where data rates apply to incoming text messages.

In addition, it may be the case that CEJA’s proposal regarding automatic opt-in to ELRP and unsolicited text messaging would violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”).¹⁰ The TCPA is a federal law pertaining to telephone calls and text messaging to

¹⁰ 47 U.S.C. § 227.

1 residential lines and mobile phones. The TCPA generally restricts text messaging unless the text
2 message recipient has given express prior approval to receive those messages. This makes
3 CEJA’s automatic enrollment and unsolicited text messaging proposal legally suspect
4 (especially where a DAC/LI customer had previously opted-out of receiving all text messaging).
5 Given the substantial penalties for willful violation of the TCPA – \$1,500 per incident¹¹ –
6 adoption of CEJA’s proposal could have major negative financial impacts. Further legal analysis
7 is required to determine whether CEJA’s proposal is consistent with the TCPA.

8 **IV. IMPLEMENTATION CONCERNS**

9 While well-intentioned, CEJA’s proposed JFR program would be extremely challenging
10 to implement. Significant information technology (“IT”) system changes would be required to
11 accommodate the proposal and costs would likely be considerable. The following examples
12 illustrate this point:

- 13 • The existing ELRP program is a voluntary “opt-in” program. Thus, IT system
14 changes would be required to allow customers to “opt out” of the ELRP program.
- 15 • If a customer located in a DAC census tract is automatically opted-in to the
16 program and then moves out of the DAC census tract, the system would need to
17 be configured to recognize that movement, track it, and unenroll that customer
18 from the program. To address the customer confusion that would potentially
19 result, SDG&E would also need to communicate with that customer regarding
20 their unenrollment from the program (a program that they never actually enrolled
21 in to begin with). While CEJA implies that the logistics would be relatively

¹¹ 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) and (g)(1).

1 simple,¹² suggesting that the IOUs can use the existing communication platforms
2 used for PSPS events, this ignores the fact that such systems would need to be
3 reconfigured to communicate with different sets of customers who would be fluid,
4 moving into or out of DAC census tracts, and flagged by some indicator such as
5 being on a California Alternate Rates for Energy (“CARE”) rate discount
6 program.

- 7 • Under CEJA’s proposal, customers automatically enrolled in ELRP would be
8 ineligible to participate in other DR programs.¹³ Thus, IT system changes would
9 be required to identify DAC and LI customers who are already enrolled in other
10 DR programs (as well as in third party DR programs) and unenroll (without
11 permission) them from their existing DR programs or alternatively to determine
12 that they are ineligible for ELRP. This would require a multi-layer filtering of
13 customer for DAC/LI and program eligibility. It would also be necessary for
14 SDG&E to build system changes into its Electric Rule 32 automation to
15 accommodate the requirement to prevent automatic ELRP enrollment for
16 customers enrolled in a third-party DR program participating in the CAISO
17 markets directly, or to unenroll such customers from Rule 32.¹⁴
- 18 • CEJA proposes a text message script to be used that includes the days and times
19 of the event, the actions that the customer should take, the reward, and the

¹² Exh. CEJA-3, p. 2.

¹³ *Id.* at p. 6.

¹⁴ SDG&E’s Electric Rule 32 governs the obligations of SDG&E and the related activity of Demand Response Providers and customers in the CAISO market. Information regarding SDG&E’s Electric Rule 32 can be found here: <https://www.sdge.com/electric-rule-32>.

1 requirement that the customer press a keypad number to indicate their
2 participation (or non-participation) to enable the IOU to anticipate the load
3 shed. SDG&E does not currently possess technology that allows customers to
4 indicate via pressing a keypad number response to a text message to indicate if
5 they will participate in a demand response event. The record contains no
6 information regarding estimated cost or rate impact related to procurement,
7 implementation and/or maintenance of such functionality.

- 8 • CEJA proposes that customers who are spot checked and are found to have not
9 dropped load when called upon to do so should then be excluded from the
10 program.¹⁵ IT system changes would be required to facilitate the additional step of
11 unenrolling customers (from a program they did not ask to participate in in the
12 first place).

13 CEJA also offers implementation-related recommendations that are not workable. For
14 example, CEJA suggests that text messages sent to DAC and LI customers remind customers of
15 upcoming events and how to coordinate with community-based organizations (“CBOs”) in order
16 to sign customers up for such event notification.¹⁶ CEJA proposes that the IOUs work with the
17 CBOs with whom they are already working for PSPS events. However, none of SDG&E’s
18 DACs are in high-risk fire areas. Thus, the marketing efforts for DACs in SDG&Es service
19 territory could be considerable as they would not presumably leverage PSPS efforts at all.

20 In addition, CEJA proposes a “self-certification” process to verify load shed from
21 participants for purposes of incentive payment, again by using their phones and pressing a

¹⁵ Exh. CEJA-3, p. 8.

¹⁶ *Id.* at p. 6.

1 number on the keypad to confirm they took steps to conserve.¹⁷ In addition to the technology-
2 related barrier that exists to this proposal, CEJA fails to propose any ratepayer protection
3 mechanism. CEJA proposes merely that “spot checking” be employed to check samples of
4 customers to confirm that load shed occurred. Practically speaking, this is unlikely to deter
5 customer fraud. Moreover, it makes little sense to implement this burdensome and expensive
6 program design. If the Commission were to adopt CEJA’s proposal, SDG&E possesses all meter
7 data of all its distribution system customers and can calculate actual load drop based on its meter
8 data. Indeed, this is the approach used in all other SDG&E DR programs. Thus, CEJA’s
9 proposed self-certification process and “spot checks” are ill-conceived and should not be
10 adopted.

11 CEJA suggests that implementation and administration costs for all three IOUs would be
12 covered by approximately \$4 million “for initial outreach and administration costs.” It bases this
13 estimate on the expectation that “outreach and administration costs will be low.”¹⁸ This
14 assumption is deeply flawed; the JFR program could not use existing SDG&E infrastructure
15 without extensive system additions and changes. Implementation costs are likely to be much
16 higher than \$4 million for SDG&E alone. Thus, if the Commission adopts CEJA’s proposal, it
17 should direct that appropriate costing options be developed prior to any budgets being allocated
18 in this matter.

¹⁷ *Id.* at p. 7.

¹⁸ Exh. CEJA-3, p. 12.

1 **V. CEJA OFFERS MINIMAL SUPPORT FOR ITS PROPOSAL**

2 As support for its proposal, CEJA points to programs offered by out-of-state utilities and
3 within California by OhmConnect.¹⁹ CEJA fails to address whether the referenced out-of-state
4 utilities operate under the same constraints as California IOUs and offers no analysis or
5 comparison of these other utilities' rates with electric rates in California. It is not clear, for
6 example, whether the out-of-state utilities referenced are subject to the same type of rate pressure
7 that California IOUs face. Indeed, CEJA provides no analysis of rate impact whatsoever.

8 Similarly inapposite is CEJA's discussion of OhmConnect. OhmConnect is a non-
9 regulated, for-profit company; it is not a program. SDG&E acknowledges that OhmConnect
10 operates throughout California, however as a private company rather than a regulated entity,
11 information regarding OhmConnect's costs, budget, debt, profitability, etc. is generally not
12 publicly available. OhmConnect's specific focus, if any, on DAC and LI customers, or its
13 effectiveness in this area, is also not discussed. Thus, CEJA's reference to OhmConnect's
14 activities is misguided and not particularly relevant.

15 CEJA proposes a \$2 (and higher) per kWh payment for load shed to customers.²⁰ This
16 incentive is twice as high as the current ELRP incentive of \$1 per kWh that is available for
17 verified load shed. However, CEJA cites no analysis or other evidence to support the assumption
18 that the doubling of the ELRP incentive rate for DAC and LI customers will encourage
19 significantly higher participation by these customers and materially increase levels of customer
20 load shed. Rather, CEJA relies on speculation that fails to account for specific circumstances
21 present in SDG&E's service territory (*e.g.*, that DACs are not located in high-heat areas, as

¹⁹ *Id.* at p. 8.

²⁰ Exh. CEJA-3, p. 11.

1 discussed above). Also, CEJA presents no data regarding how much load a customer situated in a
2 DAC might shed versus a non-DAC residential customer. Similarly, CEJA fails to address the
3 discriminatory effect of its proposal, which provides an enhanced incentive to only a sub-set of
4 ELRP customers and denies the incentive to other customers in SDG&E's service area who are
5 also enrolled in the ELRP. Thus, CEJA fails to make the case that the significant burden and
6 cost associated with its proposal is warranted and will further the public interest— for this reason,
7 CEJA's proposal should not be adopted.

8 **VI. CONCLUSION**

9 CEJA's proposed JFR program would be costly and extremely challenging to implement
10 and there exists no record evidence to suggest that it would result in materially increased levels
11 of customer load shed. The proposal fails to consider important policy and legal issues, ignores
12 relevant aspects of SDG&E's service territory, and is presented without critical analysis.
13 Accordingly, CEJA's proposal should not be adopted.

14
15 This concludes SDG&E's prepared reply testimony.