8. Assignment of Proceeding
Susan P. Kennedy is the Assigned Commissioner and Meg Gottstein is the assigned ALJ in this phase of the proceeding.
1. The current administrative structure for energy efficiency was put in place as a rapid response approach during the energy crisis.
2. Placing responsibility on this Commission to make the initial selections of energy efficiency programs and to oversee the portfolio management of those selections puts the Commission in the position of both judge and jury.
3. Commission staff involvement in Program Choice and Portfolio Management stretches limited staff resources between those functions and the Quality Assurance and EM&V responsibilities that should be the primary focus of staff efforts.
4. Many innovative programs may not be discovered through an application and review process at a regulatory agency.
5. There is no single best model for how energy efficiency programs should be administered. The best administrative structure depends on each state's particular context.
6. As described in this decision, California has experienced three distinct eras of energy efficiency administration with respect to program choice and portfolio management. During "pre-restructuring/collaborative era" (1990-1997), the IOUs assumed these functions and procured energy efficiency to displace or defer more costly supply-side resources in their resource plans. During the "restructuring era" (1997-2000), with the move to full electric retail competition and privatization of energy efficiency services, the Commission attempted to shift to independent administration of energy efficiency, but without success. In the "current era", which began with the Summer 2000 Initiative, Commission staff selects programs subject to Commission approval, and plays a lead role in day-to-day portfolio management.
7. With the return of IOUs to resource procurement and the policies articulated in the Energy Action Plan, the focus of energy efficiency in California has returned to resource acquisition.
8. In California, decisions concerning the optimal levels of energy efficiency and supply-side resources will be made in the resource planning process undertaken by the IOUs, subject to Commission oversight and approval. In contrast, in Texas and other states that have implemented full retail competition, these decisions are determined entirely by the private market: IOUs are not allowed to participate in planning or delivering energy services (supply- or demand-side) within their service territories.
9. Requiring the IOUs to accept forecasts and resource projections from a third-party administrator, as proposed by the ORA/TURN Coalition, is incompatible with an integrated resource planning approach that places full accountability and responsibility with the IOUs themselves.
10. Adopting an administrative structure that relies solely on the competitive market to meet customers' energy efficiency needs, as proposed by the WEM/SESCO Coalition, would ignore the Commission's expressed concerns over California's painful history with retail competition and reliance upon competitive market theory.
11. In D.04-01-050, the Commission rejected the principle that no entity (i.e., the IOUs) should be allowed to assume both the program choice/portfolio management and implementation function for supply-side resource acquisition.
12. Placing IOUs in the role of program choice and portfolio management, as proposed by the IOUs Coalition and the NRDC/LIF Coalition, is consistent with the hybrid market structure established by the Commission in the Procurement Rulemaking for supply-side resource acquisition. In contrast, the ORA/TURN Coalition and WEM/SESCO Coalition proposals create a dichotomy between supply-side and demand-side resources in terms of the role of IOUs in portfolio selection and management.
13. The ORA/TURN Coalition and WEM/SESCO Coalition proposals presented in their April 8, 2004 filings contemplate the transfer of ratepayer funds from IOUs to independent administrator(s). Based on past rulings from the Attorney General and the Department of Finance, such transfers require statutory authority. Seeking such authority would introduce delays and uncertainty into the process, and render program funding vulnerable to borrowing by the Legislature.
14. The ORA/TURN Coalition and WEM/SESCO Coalition propose in their October 2004 legal briefs that the IOUs pay the bills of independent administrator(s), which would be subject to Energy Division review and approval of invoices. This would place an enormous contract management burden upon Energy Division staff, given the magnitude and broad range of tasks associated with the program choice and portfolio management functions and large funding levels (over $400 million per year) involved. As discussed in this decision, this approach also faces the risk of legal challenge as being inconsistent with Government Code § 19130(b).
15. Government Code § 19130(b) applies to personal services contracts, not activities that have been traditionally performed by utilities regulated by the Commission. Therefore, placing responsibility for program choice and portfolio management with the IOUs would not raise the same risk of challenge under § 19130(b).
16. The administrative proposals recommended by TURN/ORA Coalition and WEM/SESCO Coalition create other substantial implementation challenges, including significant start-up costs and transition time, as well as the challenge of finding third-party administrator(s) capable of assuming the huge fiduciary responsibilities associated with over $400 million in annual program funding.
17. There is no guarantee under the ORA/TURN Coalition proposal that a single organization or partnership of firms capable of administering energy efficiency in California will emerge as truly "single purpose," i.e., free from conflicting financial interest with respect to energy efficiency.
18. Under the WEM/SESCO Coalition approach to independent administration, statewide programs (other than a 5% proposed budget for education and information) could cease to exist entirely, as there is no apparent coordination between the multiple administrators and no assurance that each administrator would select the statewide program for its service territory.
19. The administrative model proposed by WEM/SESCO Coalition would make coordinating different programs very difficult, if not impossible. Customers would be faced with multiple and sometimes overlapping programs that invite customers to participate in more than one program intended to achieve the same energy savings. Having an uncoordinated group of implementers design and implement a variety of uncoordinated programs will not achieve the program synergies and leveraging necessary to optimize savings from energy efficiency, as required by the Energy Action Plan.
20. The Texas standard offer program, after which the WEM/SESCO Coalition proposal is modeled, is designed to meet a relatively modest energy efficiency savings goal of 10% of the electric IOUs annual growth in demand. To meet this goal for 2004, the program contracted for 150 MWs in savings, which is the equivalent in usage to roughly 38,000 homes in Texas.
21. Experience to date in Texas suggests that standard offers may not be well suited to tapping the full potential of cost-effective energy efficiency, particularly large commercial and industrial installations.
22. The WEM/SESCO Coalition proposal relies exclusively on standard offers that use "deemed savings" calculations to estimate per measure savings. In Texas, this approach to verifying savings is considered suitable only for limited applications-primarily residential and small commercial.
23. While a standard offer program (along with other pay-for-performance approaches) may have a place in California as an implementation strategy, it does not represent a strategy that can wholly replace other, more appropriate, administrative models.
24. Returning the IOUs to a lead role in program choice and portfolio management is the most effective way to hold the IOUs accountable for the responsibilities they have been assigned by both the Legislature and the Commission to procure demand-side and supply-side resources to meet Energy Action Plan goals.
25. Returning the IOUs to a lead role in program choice and portfolio management will not create the legal obstacles experienced during the "restructuring era" and will not require statutory changes.
26. Transitioning from staff to IOU responsibilities would involve a relatively short period, and could be accomplished in an orderly pace that would not disrupt program delivery.
27. IOU administrators during the pre-restructuring/collaborative era produced an estimated $1.4 billion in net benefits to ratepayers (savings minus costs, including shareholder incentives) for programs implemented or initiated over the 1994-1997 period.
28. The IOUs have the requisite expertise and capability to administer energy efficiency consistent with the Energy Action Plan and the savings goals we establish in this proceeding.
29. Who performs the program choice or portfolio management function is not relevant to the issue of how to ensure that reported program results are credible. What is relevant is the structure of monitoring and verification, or EM&V.
30. Irrespective of what entity or entities fulfill the role of program choice and portfolio management, the Commission needs to adopt quality control measures to ensure that program administrators select programs and manage them in a manner that is consistent with Commission objectives.
31. TURN/ORA Coalition's recommendation to reject the notion of adopting performance incentives to motivate the performance of energy efficiency administrators is inconsistent with Commission direction in prior rulings and decisions. Per those directions, the issue of risk/reward mechanisms for energy efficiency should be considered in a subsequent phase of this proceeding in coordination with the development of an overall procurement incentive framework.
32. Competitive solicitations can provide an important safeguard against bias in the program selection process. Most importantly, competitive solicitations can help to identify innovative approaches or technologies for meeting savings goals with improved program performance that might not otherwise be identified during the program planning process.
33. Competitive, open bid solicitations should be designed to improve performance of the portfolio in terms of producing cost-effective energy savings that meet or exceed our savings goals. Any current program or group of programs (IOU or non-IOU designed and implemented) that can be improved upon in this way may be subject to open bids to replace, augment or otherwise enhance current efforts as part of the minimum competitive bidding requirement. However, as discussed in this decision, not all program activities lend themselves to a competitive solicitation.
34. In particular, it would be counterproductive to require open bids in instances where, for example, current or future partnerships between IOUs and local governments can take advantage of the unique strengths that both partners bring to the table to deliver cost-effective energy efficiency services, or a combination of partnerships and bilateral contracting arrangements with private or public entities can deliver effective statewide initiatives that enhance portfolio performance, such as a statewide public awareness campaign or an upstream lighting program. Such activities should be funded out of the 80% (maximum) core portfolio that is not put out to bid.
35. Non-IOUs parties are currently involved in program delivery either as implementers of programs that they have designed themselves or under contract with IOU implementers for IOU-designed programs.
36. All program implementers-IOU and non-IOU alike-need to be selected and evaluated based on their ability to best meet our resource procurement goals, including the specific savings targets the Commission establishes in this proceeding.
37. Decisions on whether non-IOUs should be program implementers responsible for designing and delivering the program (rather than working to implement IOU-designed programs) should be made based on an evaluation of whether the program designs and delivery mechanisms proposed by non-IOUs are superior to those currently being implemented or planned for the future, based on the Commission's goals for energy efficiency.
38. Competitive bidding in energy efficiency should focus on soliciting good, new program ideas to achieve the Commission goals of procuring cost-effective energy efficiency savings to meet or exceed adopted savings goals, rather than allocating a specific percentage of program funding to particular implementers.
39. A 20% minimum requirement for open bidding, as described in this decision, captures the potential benefits of competition and serves as an added safeguard against selection bias. At the same time, it provides sufficient flexibility to avoid imposing competitive bidding on program offerings that are more effectively delivered using other approaches. This 20% minimum requirement should apply for the next funding cycle, beginning in 2006, but may be modified for subsequent funding cycles, as appropriate.
40. Cream skimming only becomes a problem when lost opportunities are created in the process, that is, when long-lived, cost-effective savings are lost irretrievably or rendered much more costly to achieve, if not exploited promptly.
41. IOUs and non-IOU implementers should pursue the most cost-effective energy efficiency resource programs first, if doing so does not create lost opportunities. This policy should also be reflected in the competitive bid solicitation and evaluation criteria.
42. IOUs should develop the portfolio plans, identify components of the plans to put out for bid, develop bid evaluation criteria and RFPs for these bids, evaluate the bidders and make final selections with working group input, as described in this decision.
43. Advisory groups can help to safeguard against the potential for bias in program selection and portfolio management by: (1) promoting transparency in the program administrator's decision-making process; (2) providing a forum to obtain valuable technical expertise from stakeholders and non-market participant; (3) encouraging collaboration among stakeholders and; (4) creating an additional venue for public participation.
44. For the program choice and portfolio management functions, advisory groups can be a valuable component of the administrative structure on two levels. On one level, they create the forum for an open and informative exchange of information among program administrators, industry experts and stakeholders as the IOUs develop their program selections for Commission consideration, and manage their program portfolio throughout the funding cycle. On another level, advisory groups can serve an important "peer review" function by providing an independent assessment of the IOUs' portfolio design and program selections.
45. The advisory structure adopted in today's decision can deliver the benefits described above while keeping the administrative structure manageable.
46. In addition to considering region-specific customer and program needs, the IOUs and their PAGs should closely collaborate and coordinate on statewide programs that cut across IOU service territories, as discussed in this decision. In addition, they should collaborate on statewide program designs and implementation strategies that increasingly integrate energy efficiency with demand response and distributed generation offerings to end- users. The IOUs and PAGs should also ensure that statewide residential and nonresidential program offerings take advantage of "best available practices" and avoid customer confusion by being as uniform as possible. The IOUs are responsible for ensuring that the design of statewide programs proceeds in this coordinated manner.
47. The Focus Plan presented by Cal-Ucons would create an additional layer of advisory committees that would potentially be duplicative of the PAG membership and structure.
48. Participation in the PAGs, including the PRGs described in this decision, makes a significant contribution to effective implementation of this decision and parties eligible to receive intervenor compensation awards in this proceeding should be eligible to seek compensation for their work in these groups.
49. A ban on affiliate transactions in the context of energy efficiency recognizes that the IOU administrators may have a clear financial rationale for preferring their affiliates as program implementers, depending on the Commission's determinations regarding incentive structure. Moreover, the task of monitoring the IOUs energy efficiency portfolio design decisions is a much larger task for the PRG than that assigned to the supply-side counterpart, without the added complication of trying to assess potential conflicts of interests associated with affiliate transactions.
50. The most direct and effective means to avoid any potential conflict of interest between IOU administrators and their current or future affiliates is to simply prohibit the transactions. A broad ban on affiliate transactions is appropriate and reasonable in the context of energy efficiency. This is because many of the cornerstone energy efficiency efforts are designed to "transcend borders" with respect to individual IOU service territories, and provide energy efficiency services and resource savings on a statewide basis. Adopting a broad affiliate transactions ban at the outset avoids the need to revisit the issue of "who's affiliate" each time a program is deployed in more than one IOU service territory.
51. The EM&V administrative proposals presented by the IOUs Coalition, the NRDC/LIF Coalition and the Collaborating Parties fall short of ensuring the necessary independence of EM&V, for the reasons discussed in this decision.
52. Today's adopted two-track approach to EM&V administration effectively balances the need to facilitate effective feedback to IOU program administrators and program implementers, so that they can make mid-course changes to increase the effectiveness of the programs, with the need to protect against potential conflicts of interest.
53. By splitting the responsibilities for EM&V administrative, the adopted approach addresses the two major concerns that various parties have raised. First, that an entity other than the one standing to profit from inflated program achievements should be responsible for substantiating program performance. Second, that Portfolio Managers and program implementers should be able to manage a limited subset of program design evaluations and market assessments as long as there is no potential for conflict due to the nature of the study, and Energy Division has a lead role in the selection of contractors.
54. Allowing EM&V consultants (or their firms) that perform program and portfolio impacts-related studies to also be involved in energy efficiency program delivery--as either a non-IOU program implementer or as a subcontractor to IOU implementer(s)--creates conflict-of-interest problems. These problems can be effectively addressed by prohibiting entities from performing these types of EM&V studies at the same time they are under contract for program delivery work.. As discussed in this decision, excluding program design evaluation and market assessment studies from this strict firewall and allowing the narrow exception that TURN, ORA and CCSF propose, will mitigate some of the practical concerns raised by parties regarding a firewall without compromising the principle guiding our choice of EM&V structure, i.e, that of ensuring non-biased program evaluation results.
55. Allowing structurally separate non-IOU affiliates to separately perform EM&V and program implementation work if they sign non-disclosure agreements serves to provide a clear demarcation as to what either business entity has been hired for and creates an effective firewall between the affiliated companies when performing work.
56. It is reasonable to begin today's adopted firewall with a "clean slate" in the 2006 program cycle, so that all current implementers and evaluators of the 2004-2005 programs may choose which option to pursue for the 2006 program cycle and beyond.
57. For the reasons discussed in this decision, technical review committees created on an as-needed basis by Energy Division will be more valuable and effective under our adopted EM&V administrative structure than the formal standing measurement advisory groups proposed by various parties.
58. Providing the opportunity for public input and the opportunity for implementers, administrators and evaluators to share information and concerns during the evaluation process, as described in this decision, should go a long way toward minimizing the number of disputes over evaluation study results that may need to be resolved by the Commission.
59. As described in this decision, the adopted approach to energy efficiency administration provides significant opportunities for public input throughout the process of planning, designing, funding and evaluating the results of individual programs and the overall energy efficiency portfolio.
60. In order to further delineate the implementation details associated with EM&V and Research and Analysis, such as more specific lists and definitions for the studies that fall under the two EM&V study categories and those to be undertaken under Research and Analysis, Energy Division and CEC staff should jointly prepare an implementation roadmap, consistent with today's direction.
61. Creating one or more standing policy advisory groups to the Commission, as recommended by some parties, would be a far too structured and cumbersome approach to obtaining research and analysis in support of policy decisions. Instead, Energy Division and CEC staff should take the lead in this role, as discussed in this decision, and solicit input from working groups of experts or hired consultants, as they deem appropriate to the circumstances.
62. To meet the Energy Action Plan goals for resource procurement, the focus for spending ratepayer dollars should be to capture the most cost-effective demand-side resource as possible over both the short- and long-term that can meet our exceed our savings goals. Focusing efforts in this way is the most equitable way to distribute program benefits: By keeping IOU resource procurement costs as low as possible through the deployment of cost-effective energy efficiency, all customers will share in the resource savings from energy efficiency programs.
63. This phase of the proceeding is not the forum for evaluating the performance of either IOU or non-IOU implemented programs during 2003. SESCO's evaluation of the IOUs performance as implementers during 2003, presented in its May 6, 2004 reply comments, is selective and does not comprehensively consider all of the performance attributes we established for that program year.
1. Returning IOUs to the lead role in program choice and portfolio management will best meet California's goals for integrated resource procurement.
2. With the quality control measures adopted in this decision, the IOUs can both select and sponsor programs without bias.
3. In order to ensure the necessary independence of portfolio and program-related EM&V, EM&V studies should be managed and contracted for under the two-tiered EM&V administrative structure adopted by this decision and subject to the firewall described herein.
4. For the reasons discussed in this decision, it is reasonable and appropriate to ban affiliate transactions between IOU administrators and program implementers.
5. As discussed in this decision, the Energy Efficiency Policy Rules should be updated as soon as practicable.
6. Our interpretation of "administrator" for purposes of AB 117, as articulated in D.03-07-034 and reiterated in this decision, is consistent with the competing interests articulated in Section 381.1 as well as the requirements for handling ratepayer money. Nothing in today's decision prevents the Commission from modifying the process for allocating PGC funds to Community Choice Aggregators in the future, or revisitng the question of whether CCA customers should be relieved of their responsibility for energy efficiency PGC and procurement surcharges if the CCA elects to take over these functions.
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. As described in this decision, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison Company (SCE), San Diego Gas & Electric Company (SDG&E) and Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas), collectively referred to as the investor-owned utilities (IOUs), shall assume the program choice and portfolio management functions for post-2005 energy efficiency programs. Those functions are described in Attachment 1. The administrative structure for Evaluation, Measurement and Verification (EM&V), Research and Analysis in Support of Policy Oversight, Quality Assurance and other administrative functions described in today's decision are adopted for post-2005 energy efficiency programs.
2. As discussed in this decision, transactions between the IOUs and any program implementer that is an affiliate of PG&E, SCE, SDG&E or SoCalGas are prohibited, without exception. This ban becomes effective for the 2006 program year and beyond.
3. The IOUs shall put together the advisory groups and implement the program design and selection process consistent with today's decision. The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in consultation with the Assigned Commissioner, may provide the IOUs with additional clarification and direction on these issues. The Assigned Commissioner, ALJ or Energy Division may request periodic informational submittals from the IOUs describing the composition of the advisory groups, planned schedule for public workshops and other implementation tasks that the IOUs are responsible for under today's adopted administrative structure, as needed. The IOU administrators shall inform the Assigned Commissioner and ALJ by letter of the individuals selected to serve on the Program Advisory Group and Peer Review Groups (PRGs).
4. Energy Division may hire an independent consultant or consultants to assist in its PRG, EM&V and related responsibilities, which shall be paid for out of energy efficiency program funds. Energy Division shall convene technical review committees as needed to assist in its EM&V responsibilities, the cost of which shall also be paid for out of energy efficiency program funds.
5. Energy Division, or its consultant(s), shall work with the IOUs to compile all administrative and non-administrative costs and energy savings data on current programs in a standard format that will facilitate direct comparisons across programs, and make any needed refinements to the existing reporting requirements to facilitate such a comparison. Energy Division may convene a workshop with interested parties to discuss this format, as it deems appropriate. This information shall be made available to the advisory groups no later than March 15, 2005, and shall be updated in the applications filed by the IOUs pursuant to Ordering Paragraph 6.
6. The IOUs shall file applications by June 1, 2005 for Commission approval of energy efficiency program plans and funding levels via the public goods charge and procurement rates for the three-year program implementation and funding cycle beginning January 1, 2006. The applications shall include a description of the portfolio composition, the components that will be put out to bid consistent with today's adopted minimum requirement, and the IOUs' proposed evaluation criteria. The written assessments of the PRGs shall be appended to these filings. The IOUs shall also provide in these applications all information required by Decision (D.) 04-09-060, Ordering Paragraph 4.
7. The energy efficiency applications described in Ordering Paragraph 6 shall include EM&V plans, funding levels and budget allocations across study categories that are jointly developed by the IOUs and Energy Division after obtaining input from the public and the California Energy Commission (CEC), as directed in this decision. The applications shall include a description and scope of work for studies that the IOUs or program implementers plan to manage and/or directly contract for under the program design evaluation and market assessment category. As directed in this decision, they shall include proposed funding for the Energy Efficiency Groupware Application as a separate line-item, and address whether the current or modified versions of standard contract agreements with non-IOU implementers should be returned. The applications shall be filed and served in accordance with the Electronic Service Protocols appended to the Assigned Commissioner's December 22, 2003 ruling in this proceeding.
8. The IOUs shall promptly pay the contractor invoices for all EM&V studies managed by Energy Division upon approval of those invoices by the staff project manager. All EM&V studies shall continue to be funded from public goods charge collections.
9. For 2006 and beyond the IOUs shall submit compliance filings for Commission approval of final programs and make public all winning bids, as described in this decision. Written assessments of the PRGs shall be appended to these filings. If the PRG and IOU reach consensus in support of the proposed compliance plans, the IOU may file an advice letter. If consensus is not reached, the IOUs shall file supplemental compliance applications in the same docket that they filed their program planning applications. The IOUs shall file these compliance filings as soon as practicable after the Commission issues its approval of program plans and after completion of the peer review process described in this decision. The compliance filings shall be served in accordance with the Electronic Service Protocols appended to the Assigned Commissioner's December 22, 2003 ruling in this proceeding.
10. Energy Division shall provide the Assigned Commissioner and assigned ALJ with a written assessment of the effectiveness of the advisory group structure on an annual basis. Energy Division may conduct this assessment itself or hire an independent contractor for this purpose, whose costs will be paid for out of energy efficiency program funds. The first Energy Division assessment shall be due 14 months from the effective date of this decision, and every year thereafter unless otherwise directed by the Assigned Commissioner. The Assigned Commissioner may direct the assigned ALJ to serve the Energy Division assessments on the parties, issue them for comment, or take other steps as appropriate with this information.
11. The Program Advisory Groups established in today's decision shall provide an annual, joint report to Energy Division with recommendations on how the IOUs can improve their effectiveness as administrators in managing the portfolio of programs, including how the program selection process could be improved to better meet the Commission's procurement goals. The first joint report shall be submitted to Energy Division no later than March 15, 2006, and annually thereafter unless otherwise directed by the Assigned Commissioner. The Energy Division, in consultation with the Assigned Commissioner and assigned ALJ, may serve the reports on the parties, issue them for comment, or take other steps as appropriate with the information.
12. As described in this decision, Energy Division shall perform research and analysis in support of the Commission's policy oversight of energy efficiency (Research and Analysis), as specific needs arise. This Commission shall also explore creating a more formal arrangement with the CEC for collaboration in this area and in EM&V, building on the working relationship established between the two agencies in this proceeding. Accordingly, we direct the Executive Director to contact his counterpart at the CEC with the goal of developing an interagency memorandum of understanding for CEC staff participation in EM&V and Research and Analysis, as described in this decision. As described in this decision, we also direct the Executive Director to address energy efficiency staffing issues with the management team without delay, and to reallocate or augment Commission staff resources as needed to fulfill Energy Division's responsibilities for energy efficiency.
13. As soon as practicable, the Assigned Commissioner and ALJ shall establish a procedural schedule and process for updating the Energy Efficiency Policy Rules.
14. Consistent with the direction in today's decision, Energy Division and CEC staff shall jointly prepare an implementation roadmap for EM&V and Research and Analysis for the 2006 program planning cycle and hold a public workshop to obtain input before finalizing the roadmap for the ALJ's consideration. The joint roadmap shall be submitted to the ALJ within 60 days from the effective date of this decision. A final roadmap for the 2006 program planning cycle will be adopted by ALJ ruling, after interested parties have an opportunity to provide written comments on the Energy Division/CEC joint proposal. The ALJ may provide additional clarification and direction on EM&V and Research and Analysis administrative issues, or make modifications to the roadmap during the program planning cycle, as needed.
15. The Commission shall perform quality assurance and policy oversight functions necessary to ensure that program results are accurate and that ratepayer funds are being spent and managed in a responsible and productive manner, including, but not limited to, the functions described in Section 5.3.3 of this decision.
16. The Assigned Commissioner or ALJ may, for good cause, modify the due dates established by this decision.
17. This proceeding remains open to address ongoing issues related to energy efficiency policies and programs.
18. The Motion to Intervene filed by Sempra Energy Global Enterprises on December 20, 2004 is granted.
This order is effective today.
Dated , at San Francisco, California.
ATTACHMENT 3
List of Acronyms
Page 1
AB |
Assembly Bill |
AEAP |
Annual Earnings Assessment Proceeding |
ALJ |
Administrative Law Judge |
CCAs |
Community Choice Aggregators |
CADMAC |
California DSM Measurement Advisory Council |
CALMAC |
California Measurement Advisory Council |
Cal-Ucons |
Cal-Ucons, Inc. |
CBEE |
California Board For Energy Efficiency |
CCSF |
City and County of San Francisco |
CEAC |
California Efficiency Advisory Council |
CEC |
California Energy Commission |
CPA |
California Power Authority |
CSEA |
California State Employees Association |
D. |
Decision |
DEER |
Database for Energy Efficiency Resources |
DSM |
Demand-Side Management |
DSP |
Division of Strategic Planning |
EEGA |
Energy Efficiency Groupware Application |
EM&V |
Evaluation, Measurement and Verification |
ESCOs |
Energy Service Companies |
I. |
Investigation |
IEP |
Independent Energy Producers |
ISO |
Independent System Operator |
IOUs |
Investor-Owned Utilities |
LIEE |
Low-Income Energy Efficiency |
LIF |
Latino Issues Forum |
MEC |
Measurement and Evaluation Council |
MOU |
Memorandum of Understanding |
MW |
Megawatts |
ATTACHMENT 3
List of Acronyms
Page 2
NAESCO |
National Association of Energy Service Companies |
NOI |
Notice of Intent |
NRDC |
Natural Resources Defense Council |
ORA |
Office of Ratepayer Advocates |
PACs |
Project Advisory Committees |
PAGs |
Program Advisory Groups |
PG&E |
Pacific Gas and Electric Company |
PGC |
Public Goods Charge |
PHC |
Prehearing Conference |
PIER |
Public Interest Energy Research (PIER) |
PRG |
Procurement Review Group |
QFs |
Qualifying Facilities |
RESCUE |
Residential Energy Service Companies' United Effor |
R. |
Rulemaking |
RFP |
Request For Proposal |
SCE |
Southern California Edison |
SDG&E |
San Diego Gas & Electric Company |
SDREO |
San Diego Regional Energy Office |
SEGE |
Sempra Energy Global Enterprises |
SESCO |
SESCO, Inc. |
SoCalGas |
Southern California Gas Company |
SPB |
State Personnel Board |
TURN |
The Utility Reform Network |
UCAN |
Utility Consumers' Action Network |
WEM |
Women Energy Matters |
WPTF |
Water Power Trading Forum |
(END OF ATTACHMENT 3)
