4. Conceptual Issues
We are pleased with the results of this attempt at an all-inclusive revision to intervenors' hourly rates. We recognize, however, that it is a first attempt. As such, the process used here should be subject to refinement based on experience and further consideration of alternatives, such as that proposed by Verizon, or use of an index narrowly targeted to the cost of the professional services that representatives provide. Accordingly, while we are confident the hourly rates we approve today are reasonable, this rulemaking is not necessarily a template for future hourly rate updating.
Some intervenors and utilities debate whether the Commission, in setting intervenors' hourly rates, should rely on pay scales for in-house representatives, outside representatives, or some blend. Given the lack of controversy regarding the range of intervenor rates proposed in this proceeding, we find that the debate is not yet ripe for definitive resolution, but we will offer some guidance for future hourly rate updates.
The nature of the debate is easy to understand. Employees generally receive a salary that seems low relative to the hourly rates charged by outside representatives, even after taking account of employee benefits and overheads in addition to their base salary. Intervenors argue their circumstances and services parallel those of outside representatives, and their hourly rates should be set accordingly. Utilities argue against exclusive reliance on the rates charged by outside representatives. PG&E would use a "blend" of data from in-house and outside representatives to determine intervenors' hourly rates; Edison would rely exclusively on compensation data for in-house representatives.
Much of the debate centers on the degree of risk intervenors face in recovery of their fees and costs of representation, and whether and how we should take account of risk in setting intervenors' hourly rates. For example, according to Aglet Consumer Alliance, a "comparable market rate" as contemplated by § 1806 would be set at a level to account for (among other risks intervenors face) "payment contingencies, the risk of nonpayment, and the timing of eventual payment." PG&E suggests that intervenors exaggerate these risks, noting, e.g., that intervenors may substantially contribute to a decision, and thus qualify for compensation, without "prevailing" on the merits. Edison considers risk to be irrelevant to hourly rate determination; specifically, Edison reads "similar services" in § 1806 to refer to the type of tasks actually required in a Commission proceeding, not the circumstances of payment.
We consider that hourly rate determinations under § 1806 will involve weighing various factors and the use of sound judgment. Risk is among the relevant factors: The same sentence from which Edison extracts "similar services" also directs our attention to "market rates." To further complicate the question, risks may be asymmetric. Outside representatives must find paying clients and set budgets accordingly. Intervenors risk late payment and disallowances. Based on this record, we cannot say the level of risk is more, less or the same in considering "similar services." What we know about markets supports the intervenors' contention that risk counts. On the other hand, invoking risk does not automatically entitle intervenors to a risk premium.
We agree with PG&E about the use of a blend of data from in-house and outside representatives. Section 1806 requires consideration of the broad market for regulatory expertise, with special attention to the rates for services paid by the utilities and the Commission itself. What the statute does not provide is a simple formula for translating all these inputs ("market rates," "comparable training and experience," "similar services") into hourly rates for particular intervenor representatives. We expect, however, that analysis of the data we receive in the updating process will enable us to establish a reasonable range of rates for representatives classified by their training and their experience.
We find encouraging the fact that the actual hourly rate proposals submitted by intervenors in this proceeding do, in general, fall within a reasonable range. (PG&E itself acknowledges that, for the most part, it does not disagree with rates proposed by intervenors.) We suspect that one reason for the relative lack of controversy over the rate proposals is the qualifications that many intervenors' representatives bring to the table; they include individuals with national reputations and decades of experience. Such representatives would be highly compensated whether they were working in-house or outside.
As part of the compensation data collected, we directed utilities to develop an "effective hourly rate" for salaried in-house representatives. The rate was to reflect benefits and an allocation of overheads. The issue here is the extent to which the effective hourly rate should account for time such as vacation, sick leave, or other time not spent on regulatory work (e.g., training, administrative matters, other assignments). The PG&E spreadsheet reduces annual hours by an allowance for such non-productive time, which has the result of increasing the effective hourly rate of an in-house representative.3
We find that the PG&E spreadsheet approach regarding productive hours is appropriate. First, we note that outside representatives typically charge only for "billable" hours, i.e., those hours performing the work for which they were retained. The productive hours concept corresponds roughly to billable hours and thus enables a more realistic comparison between hourly rates for in-house and outside representatives. Second, under the statute, we may only compensate intervenors for time that is related to and necessary for their substantial contribution to a Commission decision. Thus, the statute itself suggests that we use productive hours as the basis for our hourly rate calculations.
3 As compared to Edison's preferred approach, namely, to divide the annual salary by 2,080 [40 hours per week times 52 weeks].
