DISCUSSION
PG&E requested approval of tariff sheets in compliance with D. 91548 and D. 82-06-021. An examination of the authorizing decisions, including D. 82-09-028 reveals that PG&E's proposed program is in compliance with the initial authorization.
ORA opposes this advice letter as bad policy. It does not believe it is fair for large consumers to avoid rotating blackouts. If ORA wishes to pursue this issue, it may file a Petition to Modify the decisions that adopted this policy. If it does, ORA will need to show why it is in the public interest to force blackouts on eligible customers when an equal level of load reduction can be obtained with less economic dislocation.
ORA also has several recommendations in the event the advice letter is not denied. ORA recommends that OBMC participants be charged a rate surcharge equivalent to the interruptible discount currently offered to large customers. PG&E argues that OBMC participants are not receiving premium service because they must curtail for every outage and the complete length of the outage, unlike customers on rotating blocks.
In the last rotating outage called, of the Bay Area's approximately 8900 MW of load on that day, 130 MW was curtailed. That is less than half of one percent. If this program were in place, participants would have been required to curtail the total load on their circuit by five percent. This load reduction would have reduced the amount of load that otherwise would have been subject to rotating outages, thereby benefiting customers as a whole. We will not assess a charge for this service in this Resolution.
ORA also recommends that customers who require additional metering be allowed to choose both interval meter and installation company subject to the meter being compatible with PG&E's telephone access.
Direct Access customers should not be required to buy metering equipment from PG&E. Bundled service customers, on the other hand, are currently required to purchase metering from PG&E. We will continue current policy and instruct PG&E to revise the OBMC tariff accordingly. Tariff sheet 17161-E, Part (c). Measuring Equipment to Verify Compliance shall be revised at the third sentences as follows: Where the existing meter is non-interval or is not compatible with PG&E's current telephone based meter reading systems, the customer is required to pay for the installation of an interval meter as Special Facilities pursuant to Electric Rule 2. or other required equipment. For bundled service customers, or direct access customers who elect to have PG&E install the equipment, Electric Rule 2 shall apply.
Finally, ORA recommends increasing the penalty for not complying with the required curtailment. PG&E's proposed penalty is to charge the customers for the amount of load not interrupted times the PX market clearing price for that hour. ORA recommends the penalty be the amount of load not interrupted times double the PX market clearing price for that hour.
We agree with ORA's recommendation. Non-complying participants will cause more customers to be curtailed than would have occurred without the OBMC plan.
SVMG would like to lower the required amount of load reduction to avoid rotating outage blocks. While the existing limit may be difficult for some business to reach, it ensures that the reduction in load is equal to the reduction in load required. The 20 percent limit was adopted in D. 82-09-028. If SVMG wishes the limit changed, they may file a Petition to Modify D. 82-09-0028. SVMG's protest is denied.
In response to SVMG's request, PG&E proposed reducing the increments that a curtailment may be called from five percent to two and a half percent. The change in increments will not make obtaining the required 20 percent reduction more obtainable, but will reduce the benefit of the program. PG&E's proposed modification is rejected.
PG&E, in response to SVMG, also suggested the baseline calculations be adjusted for changes over the year. The tariff language changes we are requiring concerning the baseline calculations, in the tariff issues discussed below, already address this issue. Therefore, PG&E's proposed modification is rejected.
BART is concerned that the OBMC program could affect non-participating customers, such as BART. The OBMC program should decrease the number of customers subject to rotating outages and should not negatively affect BART. BART's protest is denied. BART is also concerned that PG&E's Electric Emergency Plan is not in compliance with D. 91548. BART's interpretation of the Priority System for Rotating Outages, adopted in D. 91548, is incorrect. D. 91548 did not exempt BART from rotating outages.
Tariff Issues:
Besides the policy issues discussed above, PG&E's proposed tariff contained several items that require modification before being acceptable to this Commission. Most of the problems relate to ambiguity. It is an axiom of tariff construction that language should be clear and unambiguous, and discretion should be limited to prevent possible discrimination.
On Sheet 17160-E, a. Eligibility Requirements, there is no mention that this schedule is open to direct access customers. It should be amended to make it clear that direct access customers can participate.
On Sheet 17161-E, b., iv. Components of an Optional Binding Mandatory Curtailment Plan, PG&E states the baseline will be established from the last year's summer months. In Resolution E-3650 we adopted a baseline for the E-BID program that relies on the last 10 weekdays of service. The underlying premise for the two baselines is close enough to warrant use of a consistent methodology. PG&E shall revise its OBMC tariff to apply the same baseline in Schedule OBMC as was approved in Schedule E-BID, except for non-firm load. PG&E will retain the current tariff language that reduces the baseline for any load on the circuit that is participating in a PG&E or a CAISO load reduction or interruptible program.
On Sheet 17162-E, d. Failure to comply and Non-compliance Penalties.
The penalty for non-compliance is based upon the PX price, but that term is not defined (e.g. Day-ahead, or Hour ahead) and is therefore ambiguous. In addition, the PX day ahead price understates the real cost of supplemental power. The tariff shall be modified to require the real-time supplemental energy price at the ISO be used as the basis for the penalty.
In the second paragraph, PG&E states customers may be terminated at PG&E's sole discretion. This is unacceptable. PG&E must establish and apply a set criteria for termination. The potential for market interests, toward bundled vs. direct access customers, to affect PG&E's decision-making requires that a known uniform criteria be used. PG&E shall modify the tariff to specify that participants shall be terminated if the participant fails to fully comply with two curtailments. PG&E will remove from the proposed tariff sheets all tariff language referring to PG&E discretion in penalties or termination.
PG&E requested expedited handling of the advice letter, requesting a five day protest period and a three day comment period, over a weekend. PG&E desires expedited handling because it believes failure to authorize implementation of the OBMC program on August 3 would increase the likelihood and potential severity of rotating outages.
A review of Advice Letter 2019-E reveals it will not decrease the likelihood of rotating outages since the OBMC program is only operative when firm load curtailments have been called for, but it may reduce the severity of curtailments for the limited number of customers able to participate. We do not believe that this consideration requires reduction or waiver of the protest period. Moreover, shortening the protest period could reduce the ability of interested parties to identify problems with the proposal. PG&E's request to shorten the protest period is denied.
PG&E requests that the 30-day comment period be reduced to three calendar days. In this case, the 30-day comment period falls during the summer peak season.3 Rule 77.7(f)(9) requires this Commission to engage in a weighing of interests.4 We have balanced the public interest in avoiding the possible harm to public welfare flowing from delay in considering the Resolution against the public interest in having the full 30-day period for review and comment, as required by Rule 77.7(f)(9). We conclude that reducing the public comment period will serve the public interest while minimizing public harm. However, we do not believe that a three day comment period is appropriate, and so we will adopt a shortened comment period as described below.
3 Opinion Proposing Changes to Original Proposal for New and amended Rules on Public Review and Comment, D.99-11-052, mimeo at 8, n.5 (November 18, 1999).
4 Rule 7.7(f) and Rule 7.7.(f)(9) together provide as follows: ". . . the Commission may reduce or waive the period for public review and comment . . . (9) for a decision where the Commission determines, on the motion of a party or on its own motion, that public necessity requires reduction or waiver of the 30-day period for public review and comment." Rule 7.7(f)(9) goes on to explain that "[f]or purposes of this subsection, `public necessity' refers to circumstances in which the public interest in the Commission adopting a decision before expiration of the 30-day review and comment period clearly outweighs the public interest in having the full 30-day period for review and comment."
