XIX. Comments on the Proposed Decision

The proposed decision of the assigned Commissioner in this matter was mailed to the parties in accordance with Section 311 of the Public Utilities Code and Rule 14.2(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure. AT&T; CFC; CCTA; CCTPG/LIF; DRA; Greenlining; Los Angeles and Carlsbad Responders; Small LECs; SureWest; TURN; and Verizon filed comments on February 5, 2007. AT&T; CCTA; CCTPG/LIF; DRA; Greenlining; Los Angeles and Carlsbad Responders; Oakland; Small LECs; SureWest; TURN; and Verizon filed reply comments on February 13, 2007.

The Division of Ratepayers Advocates shall have authority to advocate on behalf of video customers regarding renewal of a state-issued franchise and enforcement of Sections 5890, 5900, and 5950. For this purpose, the division shall have access to any information in the possession of the commission subject to all restrictions on disclosure of that information that are applicable to the commission.785

DRA then argues that Public Utilities Code § 5900(k) grants DRA rights to all information held by the Commission. Furthermore, DRA states that the procedures for its access to information, as proposed in an earlier draft of this decision, are burdensome. DRA adds that "[t]he PD's restrictions placed on DRA's access to information held by the Commission are also inconsistent with Public Utilities Code § 309.5(e)."

In response, we note that the first principle of statutory interpretation is to refer to the words of the statute. Yet DRA's analysis ignores the explicit language of the statute, specifically the limiting words "[f]or this purpose." Any argument regarding the language "shall have access to information" must be reconciled with this limitation. It is clear that the statutory language seeks to provide DRA with access to the information it needs to fulfill its statutory purposes - not to provide it with the ability to make unlimited demands on the Commission for information. If the Legislature intended the latter, it would not have included the "[f]or this purpose" qualification.

In addition, we are puzzled by DRA's citation to Public Utilities Code § 309.5(e). Section 309.5(e) provides that "[t]he division may compel the production or disclosure of any information it deems necessary to perform its duties from any entity regulated by the commission, provided that any objections to any request for information shall be decided in writing by the assigned commissioner or by the president of the commission, if there is no assigned commissioner." We find that this statutory provision supports a review process which, like the one initially proposed in the draft decision, balances the (i) need to provide DRA with access to data with (ii) rights of communications companies to avoid unreasonable requests for data. Public Utilities Code § 309.5 does not support DRA's unreasonable request to receive automatically every piece of data supplied to the Commission.

We find merit only in DRA's argument that our previously proposed procedures could pose a burden to it. Although we do not believe the procedures for obtaining access to information would be as unduly burdensome as DRA claims, out of an abundance of caution, we elect to revise the procedures so that DRA has full access to the Commission's information. 

Thus, we shall provide DRA with unfettered access to any video information possessed by the Commission. Upon review of this information, however, DRA may copy only that information required for it to fulfill its obligations pursuant to DIVCA, i.e., obligations pertaining to state video franchise renewals and enforcement of Public Utilities Code §§ 5890, 5900, and 5950.

We also remind DRA that any information it accesses may be subject to our restrictions on disclosure. In particular, we note that information provided under Public Utilities Code § 5960 is subject to the protections of Public Utilities Code § 583, which states that "no information . . . shall be . . . made public except on order of the commission, or by the commission or a commissioner in the course of a hearing or proceeding." Pursuant to Section 583, the Commission, not DRA, determines which information shall be made public.

In addition to its discussion of access to Commission data, DRA argues that our proposed policies would unreasonably prohibit DRA from bringing complaints to the Commission.786 DRA argues that under DIVCA it is not "prohibited from bringing complaints to the Commission."787 Likewise, DRA argues that the "scope of investigations is not limited by DIVCA."788

We find little merit to either of DRA's arguments. First, DRA's comments fail to acknowledge that the statutory language clearly enumerates who may initiate a complaint proceeding.789 DRA is not among those enumerated. Second, DRA's argument that the Commission's scope of investigations is not limited by DIVCA simply repeats blanket assertions made in its prior comments and fails to address our express assignment to specific regulatory and enforcement duties contained in Public Utilities Code §§ 5840, 5890, 5920, 5940, 5950, and 5960.

DRA also asserts that it is inconsistent for us to find that DRA has authority to initiate an enforcement action concerning cross-subsidization of video service by residential primary line service, but DRA lacks the authority to bring complaints on other matters. DRA recommends that we resolve this alleged inconsistency by granting it authority to bring complaints under DIVCA.

We are not convinced by DRA's allegation of inconsistency. As discussed in Section XV, the issue of cross-subsidization falls under both existing Commission authority and new authority granted by DIVCA. DRA already has the right to initiate a proceeding concerning cross-subsidization pursuant to its authority under Public Utilities Code § 798, which addresses payments from a public utility to its affiliates. The new assignment of specific responsibilities to the Commission to enforce Public Utilities Code § 5940 does not limit the existing regulations and enforcement procedures pursuant to Public Utilities Code § 798.

Moreover, there is no inconsistency in our reasoning: The enforcement procedures under public utilities law simply are different than those under the video franchise law. DIVCA is clear that it intends to treat state video franchise holders differently from public utilities, and we have consistently applied this principle throughout the decision.

Concerning DRA's ability to fulfill its statutory obligations under DIVCA, we find that DRA possesses ample avenues under DIVCA whereby DRA can fulfill its statutory obligations. First, DRA can always write a letter bringing a matter to the attention of the Commission, which then will be able to determine the appropriate steps to take. If the Commission opens an investigative proceeding, DRA would be able to participate fully in the proceeding. Second, DRA can partner with a local entity to bring a joint complaint before this Commission. Third, under DIVCA, DRA can protect consumers by bringing consumer protection matters before local entities or courts of competent jurisdiction, as DRA deems appropriate.790 Fourth, DRA can participate fully in any enforcement action or investigation independently initiated by the Commission.

DRA further argues that our enforcement of Public Utilities Code § 5940 requires an additional phase of this proceeding to develop detailed reporting requirements that would supplement federal reporting schemes. We are unconvinced that such reporting mechanisms are necessary. First, DRA fails to recognize the import of our tariffing basic residential rates or the FCC's long-standing Part 64 "separation" regulations.791 Federal and state provisions already make it extremely difficult to transfer funds from a regulated utility to unregulated operations. Second, DRA's proposal for broad reporting requirements does not acknowledge the narrow scope of cross-subsidization prohibition found in Public Utilities Code § 5940. DIVCA's cross-subsidization prohibition is triggered only when (i) there is an increase to stand-alone, residential, primary line, basic telephone service rates and (ii) that increase is used to finance deployment of a video network. 792 Third, DRA's comments wrongly suggest that the Commission is currently considering elimination of the requirement that carriers file tariffs applicable to this prohibition.793 As noted in Section XV, Public Utilities Code § 495.7 requires tariffing of basic residential rates, and the Commission cannot detariff these services.

TURN echoes DRA's concerns that our protections against cross-subsidization are insufficient. TURN argues that "D.06-08-030 allows the carriers to file advice letters on one day's notice, which is insufficient time for the Commission the [sic] engage in a fact-based analysis of cross-subsidization, especially with no data on costs."794 TURN further alleges that "carriers may not be complying with Part 64 rules. How AT&T can roll out significant amounts of extra fiber, and not increase its unregulated investments . . . should be of great concern to the Commission."795 Accordingly, TURN urges us to adopt our "own allocation approach . . . ."796

Concerning tariff review, we find that TURN misstates procedures adopted in D.06-08-030. The Commission need not limit its review of a tariff to "one day." Even after a tariff has gone into effect, the Commission may suspend a tariff and conduct an investigation to ensure that the new prices do not result in prohibited subsidization of video services.

Under current telecommunications law and regulation, we further note that TURN may file a complaint with the Commission if it has evidence that AT&T or any other communications company is failing to comply with accounting rules. There is no need for a new omnibus investigation into design of accounting rules. Current cost allocation procedures have been the subject of countless hours of regulatory reviews.

TURN also argues that the Commission has interpreted its statutory authority and responsibility under DIVCA too narrowly.797 TURN claims "the PD finds the Commission's role is primarily ministerial (although that term in never used in DIVCA)."798 In addition, TURN argues that the decision "curtails access to information,"799 and it objects to the applicability of the confidentiality protections enumerated in California Public Utilities Code § 583.800

We are not convinced by any of TURN's arguments regarding the scope of our statutory authority. First, we note that this decision finds that the determination of the completeness of an application is strictly limited by DIVCA, but this decision does not find that the Commission's primary role is ministerial. Indeed, the decision contains lengthy sections outlining the processes that the Commission will follow to enforce the provisions of DIVCA that require the exercise of administrative discretion. Second, TURN's charge that the Commission has sought to limit access to data has no merit. Our implementation of DIVCA is guided by the plain language of the statute, and the revised procedures adopted above provide DRA with unfettered access to data, as envisioned by DIVCA. Third, we are not persuaded by TURN's request that the Commission ignore Public Utilities Code § 583 when implementing DIVCA. We note that Public Utilities Code § 5960 explicitly makes data reported to the Commission subject to the protections of Public Utilities Code § 583.

Finally, TURN argues that the Commission would commit legal error if it adopted a prohibition on intervenor compensation for proceedings arising under DIVCA. TURN cites the purpose of Public Utilities Code § 1801 as "provid[ing] compensation for [fees and costs] to public utility customers of participation or intervention in any proceeding of the commission."801 TURN then references Public Utilities Code §§ 1802, 1803, and 1804 as further evidence for the proposition that "eligibility [for intervenor compensation] focuses on whether the Commission is engaged in a formal proceeding, rather than whether a regulated utility is involved in the proceeding. . . ."802

Moreover, Public Utilities Code § 5840(a) limits the Commission's ability to impose requirements on franchise holders unless "expressly provided" for in the Act.804 TURN has provided no argument that would lead us to reverse our interpretation of this provision. Thus, we stand by our conclusion that this statute prevents us from requiring a state video franchise holder to pay intervenor compensation.

CCTPG/LIF criticizes our interpretation and implementation of DIVCA provisions pertaining to applications for a state video franchise. CCTPG/LIF argues that the oversight of build-out requirements should begin at the application stage.805 According to CCTPG/LIF, proposed build-out plans "can be judged against already delineated standards, for example, such as these described in § 5890(b)."806 CCTPG/LIF calls upon the Commission to require applicants to include a high level of granularity concerning projected deployment in their applications.807 CCTPG/LIF adds that since review of applications is not ministerial, protests of applications should be permitted.808

Other CCTPG/LIF comments call for further expansion of the Commission's role as state video franchising authority. CCTPG/LIF requests further rules concerning build-out and a participatory process for review of network build-out;809 permanent rules and reporting requirements designed to prevent cross-subsidization;810 an unrestricted advocacy role for DRA;811 awarding of intervenor compensation;812 and changes in reporting requirements.813

In response, we find that we already addressed most of CCTPG/LIF's arguments concerning the application process. Our implementation strategy, which facilitates entry into the video market and enforces DIVCA requirements based on the actions of state video franchise holders, is consistent with the text of DIVCA.814 The elaborate pre-entry reviews proposed by CCTPG/LIF are not.815 We also note that the primary case relied upon by CCTP/LIF, Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, is inapposite, because it analyzes terms at issue as they appear in the California Environmental Quality Act, not DIVCA.816

Regarding build-out requirements, we note that Section XIV revises how we address build-out provisions for communications companies with fewer than one million telephone customers. DIVCA establishes clear build-out requirements for all other state video franchise holders. If the Commission determines that facts warrant an investigation of build-out compliance or a local entity files a formal complaint regarding this compliance, the resulting investigative process is fully participatory.

Concerning the points raised by CCTPG/LIF on cross-subsidization, the role of DRA, and the issue of intervenor compensation, we find that CCTPG/LIF's arguments parallel those raised by DRA and TURN. We address these arguments above; no additional changes are warranted.

CCTPG/LIF's proposed modifications to reporting requirements are addressed in Section XIII. We have nothing further to add.

We now turn to the comments of Greenlining. Greenlining asks the Commission to either (i) apply GO-156 reporting requirements to state video franchise holders franchise holders or (ii) require state video franchise holders to describe their supplier diversity programs in detail.817 Greenlining further requests reports on the diversity of directors, boards, officers, and high paid employees; reports on corporate philanthropy; and reports on steps state video franchise holders are taking to surmount the Digital Divide; and reports on content diversity and on the deployment of hi-speed technologies by "racial and ethnic make-up."818 Greenlining urges the Commission to initiate annual hearings on service to underserved communities.819

With respect to participation in Commission proceeding, Greenlining, like others, requests the ability to file a protest on any matter.820 It also requests that the Commission award intervenor compensation in proceedings arising pursuant to DIVCA.821

In response, we note that Greenlining's arguments are mere policy arguments for a wish list of items that lie outside the Commission's statutory authority. Greenlining's arguments fail to "focus on factual, legal or technical errors in the proposed or alternate decision and in citing such errors shall make specific references to the record," which the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure require of all comments on a draft decision.822 We nevertheless note that to the extent that the policies proposed by Greenlining are consistent with DIVCA, we have incorporated such policies into our General Order. We also find that we have addressed protests and intervenor compensation issues at length in Section IX and XVI (respectively), and no further discussion of these topics is warranted.

CFC contends that the grant of a state video franchise is not a ministerial act. In support of this argument, CFC declares that DIVCA uses "general standards" and that this use of "general standards" makes the franchise process "discretionary."823 CFC further asserts that "the imposition of conditions on the issuance of a franchise,"824 the "waiver of a filing requirement,"825 and the "disallowance of intervenor compensation"826 demonstrate that the Commission's authority is not ministerial. CFC adds that it is inappropriate for the Commission to require a bond to determine whether an applicant has provided "[a]dequate assurance that the applicant possesses the financial legal and technical qualifications necessary to construct and operate the proposed system promptly and to repair any damage to the public right-of-way . . . ."827

We find that CFC confuses the act of interpreting and implementing DIVCA, which clearly requires an exercise of discretionary judgment, with the review of a state video franchise application, which does not. Our latter authority to review an application is strictly delineated by DIVCA. Public Utilities Code § 5840(h)(2) states that "[i]f the commission finds the application is complete, it shall issue a state franchise before the 14th calendar day after that finding." The use of the word "shall" indicates that the action of issuing a franchise directly follows whenever an evaluation is "complete." Protests serve no useful purpose in this context.

CCTA's comments express broad support for the approach taken in the draft decision.828 Nevertheless, CCTA argues that the proposed decision requires modification in three areas. First, CCTA contends that current video holders are not subject to build-out requirements.829 Second, CCTA asserts that the definition of telephone service area should be modified.830 Third, CCTA states that our decision to require a bond may result in "duplicate bonding requirements."831 It explains that "an applicant now will face a bond requirement not only to demonstrate unspecified `qualifications' necessary to be a state franchise holder . . , but also be compelled to financially assure local governments as part of their right of way management."832

In response to CCTA, we first note that we have discussed CCTA's comments on the build-out requirements in great detail in Section XIV. No further clarification is necessary here.

Section XIII above discusses our definition of "telephone service area," which currently tracks that in a carrier's CPCN. We note that to the extent a company does not have customers in a region, the company need only collect and report updated U.S. Census data for that region. No rule adopted herein requires a telecommunications company to expand its video service footprint and provide service throughout the entire state.

Concerning our bond requirement, we note that the bond is based on the plain language of Public Utilities Code § 5840(e)(9) and seeks only to provide assurance that the applicant possesses the financial, legal, and technical qualifications to provide video service. This bond does not replace any local bonds currently associated with local rights-of-way permitting processes. Our bonding requirement anticipates that these processes may continue to include bonds, but our bonding requirement does not provide any new right for a local entity to require a bond. Thus, we disagree with CCTA's contention that imposition of our bonding requirement will result in a state video franchise holder's facing "twice the bonding requirements."833

The comments of SureWest and Small LECs sound several common themes, so we address these comments together. First, SureWest and Small LECs express concerns that if AT&T and Verizon fail to apply for a state video franchise, then the methodology for assessing Year 1 user fees will prove burdensome.834 Second, SureWest and Small LECs argue that build-out requirements should not be developed for smaller video providers.835

In response, we note that we do not anticipate that SureWest's and Small LECs' fears regarding the user fee will be realized. We have no reason to believe that Verizon and AT&T will fail seek a state video franchise in Year 1. But if these companies do not apply for a state video franchise in Year 1, we invite parties to petition to modify this decision and propose a method for assessing fees that will not act as a barrier to entry.

Issues regarding build-out requirements are addressed in Section XIV above. We plan to establish related safe harbor standards in Phase II.

SureWest also argues that our reporting requirements create disparate treatment of broadband providers, as broadband providers without a video affiliate will not be subject to a reporting requirement.836 We, however, find that our reporting requirements are consistent with DIVCA. We also do not suspect that the disparate impact is so significant as to distort market competition.

Small LECs raises other concerns related to our reporting requirements. First, Small LECs argues that copies of EEO-1 reports should be provided only by state video franchise holders that are currently required to submit the report.837 Second, Small LECs states that build-out data should be treated as confidential.838 Third, Small LECs asserts that "it is unnecessary for video franchise holders to submit annual reports regarding whether their employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement."839

We find merit in some of Small LECs' arguments. Concerning the employment reporting issues raised by Small LECs, we revised Section XIII to provide that we will not require submission of EEO-1 reports from communications companies that otherwise are not obligated to complete them. We also modified Section XIII to clarify that we will consider requests for confidential treatment of build-out data on a case-by-case basis. We do, however, continue to require reporting on collective bargaining agreements. As explained in greater detail in Section XIII, we find that these reports are necessary for ensuring that collective bargaining agreements are respected during transfers of state video franchises.840

Finally, Small LECs asks that a letter of credit be deemed acceptable in lieu of the bond requirement.841 We find no statutory basis for this request, and we, therefore, decline to provide this alternative. Further justification for our position on alternatives to a bond requirement is available in Section VII.

We turn now to the comments of Verizon. Verizon comments principally on technical bonding issues, reporting issues associated with wireless broadband, and other narrow issues concerning the reporting of information required in the application and the annual reports. We have addressed the comments on these issues in Sections VI, VII, and XIII above.

Verizon also argues that the proposed decision inappropriately requires hearings for certain proceedings. Verizon asserts that we misread Public Utilities Code § 5890(g) when we find that the statute requires us to hold a public hearing whenever we conduct formal investigations regarding franchising; anti-discrimination and build-out; reporting; cross-subsidization; or user fees. According to Verizon, "[t]his view ignores the plain language of § 5890(g) and a long-standing rule of statutory interpretation, noscitur a sociis: `a word takes meaning from the company it keeps.'"842 Since "the reference to a `decision' follows immediately after the sentence that allows local governments to complain, or the Commission to investigate allegations `that a holder is not offering video service as required by this section,'" Verizon asserts that the requirement to hold hearings applies only to investigations regarding anti-discrimination and build-out provisions of Public Utilities Code § 5890. 843 Alternatively, Verizon argues that the we need not rely on Public Utilities Code § 5890(g) to define our investigative authority.844 Instead, Verizon states that the Commission should have full discretion to determine the appropriate type of hearing in any future proceeding.845

We are not persuaded by Verizon's arguments regarding hearings. In reaching this conclusion, we look to the text of Public Utilities Code § 5890(g):

Local governments may bring complaints to the state franchising authority that a holder is not offering video service as required by this section, or the state franchising authority may open an investigation on its own motion. The state franchising authority shall hold public hearings before issuing a decision. The commission may suspend or revoke the franchise if the holder fails to comply with the provisions of this division.

When we examine Verizon's principal argument, that a word in legislation derives its meaning from "the company that it keeps," we note that the requirement to hold public hearings sits closest to the statutory language that allows the Commission to open an investigation on its own motion. As a result, we conclude that whenever the Commission is conducting an enforcement investigation, then it must hold public hearings. Our application of the interpretive principle cited by Verizon simply confirms our decision to hold public hearings in conjunction with any formal enforcement investigation opened on the Commission's own motion.

784 DRA Opening Comments on the PD at 2.

785 Id. at 2 (emphasis added to citation).

786 Id. at 5.

787 Id. at 6.

788 Id. at 12.

789 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5890(g) (providing that "[l]ocal governments may bring complaints to the state franchising authority").

790 We note that statutory authority over consumer protection issues is not assigned to the Commission, but instead to local entities. We lack the authority to investigate consumer protection issues. As a result, filing a complaint before the Commission on a consumer protection matter would serve no useful purpose.

791 See Verizon Reply Comments on the PD at 3 (noting that the FCC's cost allocation rules and cost allocation manual are specifically designed to "prevent improper cross-subsidization in services to affiliates"). Telecommunications companies must meet federally mandated biennial audit requirements.

792 Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5940 (focusing only on one specific issue: whether "[t]he holder of a state franchise under this division who also provides stand-alone, residential, primary line, basic telephone service . . . increase[s] this rate to finance the cost of deploying a network to provide video service").

793 DRA Opening Comments on the PD at 10.

794 Id.

795 TURN Opening Comments on the PD at 5.

796 Id. at 6.

797 Id. at 7.

798 Id. at 7.

799 Id. at 9.

800 Id. at 9.

801 Id. at 11.

802 Id. at 11-12.

803 Cal. Pub. Util. Code §§ 1801.3; id. at 1807.

804 Id. at § 5840(a).

805 CCTPG/LIF Opening Comments on the PD at 1.

806 Id. at 2.

807 Id. at 4.

808 Id. at 3.

809 Id. at 6.

810 Id. at 7.

811 Id. at 8-10.

812 Id. at 11.

813 Id. at 5-6.

814 See e.g., Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5840(h)(2) (limiting Commission review of an application to a determination of whether the application "is complete"); id. at § 5840(h)(1) (requiring that the Commission reach its determination of whether an application is complete within thirty days of receipt of the application).

815 CCTP/LIF also disregards the legislative history associated with DIVCA, which states that "[u]like the local franchising process, the state franchising process is intended to be largely ministerial." Senate Floor Analysis (Aug. 28, 2006).

816 Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 191 Cal. App. 4th 1177 (2005). See also Verizon Reply Comments on the PD at 2 (providing further discussion of this case).

817 Greenlining Opening Comments on the PD at 5.

818 Id. at 14, 16.

819 Id. at 18.

820 Id. at 22.

821 Id. at 25.

822 Rule 14.3 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

823 CFC Opening Comments on the PD at 2.

824 Id. at 6.

825 Id. at 8.

826 Id. at 9.

827 Id. at 3 (citing Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5840(e)(9)). CFC argues that "[i]f the legislature had intended to only require a bond, it would have said so." Id. at 4. We are puzzled by this statement, because, in fact, the Legislature did say it would allow for a bond to satisfy the required showing of financial, legal, and technical qualifications. The complete text of Public Utilities Code § 5840(e)(9) declares that an applicant must provide "[a]dequate assurance that the applicant possesses the financial, legal, and technical qualifications necessary to construct and operate the proposed system and promptly repair any damage to the public right-of-way caused by the applicant. To accomplish these requirements, the commission may require a bond." Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5840(e)(9) (emphasis added).

828 CCTA Opening Comments on the PD at 1.

829 Id. at 4.

830 Id. at 7. See also SureWest Opening Comments on the PD at 4 (making a similar argument).

831 CCTA Opening Comments on the PD at 8.

832 Id. at 8.

833 Id. at 9.

834 SureWest Opening Comments on the PD at 3; Small LECs Opening Comments on the PD at 3.

835 SureWest Opening Comments on the PD at 5; Small LECs Opening Comments on the PD at 8.

836 SureWest Opening Comments on the PD at 1.

837 Small LECs Opening Comments on the PD at 6.

838 Id. at 10.

839 Id. at 11.

840 See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 5970(b) (providing that a state video franchise may not be transferred unless "[t]he transferee agrees that any collective bargaining agreement entered into by a video service provider shall continue to be honored, paid, or performed to the same extent as would be required if the video service provider continued to operate under its franchise for the duration of that franchise unless the duration of that agreement is limited by its terms or by federal or state law"). See also id. at § 5810(c) ("It is the intent of the Legislature that collective bargaining agreements be respected.").

841 Small LECs Opening Comments on the PD at 7.

842 Verizon Opening Comments on the PD at 14.

843 Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted). Specifically, Verizon states that, under DIVCA's provisions, "the Commission must hold hearings in only two instances: (1) if a holder requests an extension of time to meet its non-discrimination or build-out obligations, and (2) before issuing a decision regarding a violation of § 5890 pursuant to a complaint by local government or investigation on the Commission's own motion." Id. at 14-15.

844 Id. at 16.

845 Id. at 17.

846 Los Angeles and Carlsbad Responders Opening Comments on the PD at 1.

847 Id. at 4-7.

848 Id. at 7.

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