5. Summary of the Active Parties' Positions

Although there are numerous parties to this proceeding, relatively few participated in the evidentiary hearings or filed briefs. The summaries of the parties' positions in today's decision are limited to those parties who actively participated in the hearings or who filed briefs.

PG&E's application is supported by CARE, DRA, Ruby LLC, and TURN. CARE believes the Ruby Pipeline will create pipeline-on-pipeline competition to transport gas to California, which should lower costs for California consumers. DRA states the PG&E-Ruby agreements provide economic value to PG&E's customers and all of California. Ruby LLC contends its pipeline will provide PG&E with access to the Rocky Mountains gas supplies at favorable terms. TURN states that PG&E has obtained a "great deal" for PG&E's ratepayers.

SoCalGas and SDG&E (SoCalGas/SDG&E) are concerned that PG&E's release of capacity on the GTN system will increase GTN's rates for the remaining shippers, including SoCalGas/SDG&E. They also recommend that PG&E's proposal to provide its Electric Fuels Department with both on-system and off-system delivery rights on the Redwood Path be deferred to the next Gas Accord Proceeding.

PG&E's application is opposed by GTN and Williams (together, "GTN") on the grounds that (1) the Ruby Pipeline is not the best project for California or PG&E's ratepayers, (2) PG&E's commitment to the Ruby Pipeline was made without an open and competitive process, and (3) PG&E's selection of the Ruby Pipeline was due to improper influence from its parent company. GTN urges the Commission to reject PG&E's application or, alternatively, either (1) direct PG&E to engage in an open and fair process for the acquisition of pipeline capacity to the Rocky Mountains, or (2) not act on the Ruby Precedent Agreement at this time, but require PG&E to submit the Agreement to a reasonableness review following commencement of operations by Ruby.

L. Jan Reid (Reid) opposes PG&E's application. Reid asserts that the claimed benefits of the Ruby Precedent Agreement are dubious, that the no-project alternative is the best choice for PG&E's ratepayers, and that PG&E used a flawed process to select the Ruby Pipeline.