ALJ/CAB/sid Mailed 4/24/2002

Decision 02-04-051 April 22, 2002

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County, Complainant, v. Southern California Edison Company, Defendant.

Case 99-10-037 (Filed October 27, 1999)

OPINION GRANTING COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO THE 3RD CAUSE OF ACTION

I. Summary

This decision grants Complainant County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County's (District) Motion for Summary Judgment as to the 3rd cause of action: violation of Southern California Edison Company's (Edison) Tariff Rule 12 (Rule 12). This decision also vacates and replaces Decision (D.) 02-03-008, that was erroneously included on the Commission's March 6, 2002, Consent Agenda, Item CA-3. Through inadvertence, D.02-03-008 did not include the dates of receipt of the comments and reply comments, a discussion of the comments, or the non-substantive changes incorporated in this decision.

We grant this motion because we have determined that Defendant (Edison) failed to meet its Rule 12 obligation to use "reasonable means" to inform District that a more favorable pricing option was available for the purchase of stand-by electric service. As a result, District did not become aware of the "compensated metering option" until early 1999, and thus, did not take advantage of a pricing option that would have saved District approximately $6,000 per month for electrical service from April 24, 1990 (the date "compensated metering" became available) until January of 1999, when the District inquired of Edison as to a more favorable rate.

Because Edison failed to use reasonable means to notify District of the option for compensated metering, District claims reparations in excess of $250,000.

However, we will apply the three-year statute of limitations as set forth in Pub. Util. Code¹ § 736, and incorporated in Edison's Tariff Rule 17(c), and reduce District's refund accordingly. We therefore order Edison to refund the difference between the amount District was billed for standby service and the amount District would have paid under the revised rates for the period of time from January of 1996 to January of 1999.

To understand why we grant District's motion for summary judgment, it is necessary to review the procedural history of the proceeding that is the basis for our decision.