Discussion

We appreciate Pacific's and AT&T's effort and cooperation to make unworkable sub-measure standards workable. The changes would be an unambiguous improvement to the JPSA and the PIP in that they would enable the inclusion of this DSL service in the PIP's monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. However, the advice letter process is not appropriate for modifying elements of Commission decisions unless the Commission has explicitly arranged for specific modifications to be made through this process. To the contrary, we have required parties to file motions to amend the PIP. Modification Clarifying Implementation Details of the Performance Incentive Plan for Pacific Bell Company, D.02-06-006 at 4 and 7 (June 6, 2002). In spite of Pacific's and AT&T's characterization of these changes being "parallel" and "separate," we find that the changes are essentially the same as if the JPSA itself was changed.⁵ The net effect is the same: the measurement and assessment of these xDSL loop OSS services would be changed. The net effect is to change the provisions of a Commission decision. These changes look and function like elements of the PIP by measuring monthly OSS performance as the PIP does; assessing that performance as the PIP does; and generating monthly incentive amounts as the PIP does. Additionally, for the PIP to function as designed, it is important for elements such as these xDSL loop performance sub-measures to be integrated in the plan. Parties should request such changes through a motion consistent with previous decisions. Id.; Opinion Modifying Decision 01-05-087 to Update Performance Measures for the Performance Incentives Plan for Pacific Bell Telephone Company, D.02-06-046 (June 27, 2002).

To prevent delay of these beneficial changes, we modify these xDSL loop standards on our own motion.⁶ We will be rendering a decision on Pacific's Section 271 application soon, and increasing competition from the CLECs in local exchange service is an important part of this process. Making these xDSL loop OSS performance measures workable is important for enabling local competition, and should not be unduly delayed.

We prefer that these standards be changed for all CLECs even though only AT&T has completed an agreement with Pacific. The only unsettled issue has been whether to implement the Standard Interval or the specific number of days as the standard for Performance Measure 7. We find no difference between these positions as the Commission has previously established the number of days for this Standard Interval, as discussed supra. (See Appendix DSL, sections 1.1 and 7.3, D.00-09-074 (September 21, 2000).) After being provided this information, the CLECs active in this proceeding have agreed to accept the term "Standard Interval."

AT&T's agreement with Pacific also contains a provision that in the event parity comparisons become possible, the converted standards shall revert to the original parity standards. Parity standards more closely follow the federal criteria for performance: "the BOC must provide access to competing carriers in `substantially the same time and manner' as it provides to itself." See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971 at ¶ 44 (December 21, 1999). We prefer parity standards where possible, and we concur with this provision.