6. Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel and Judicial Estoppel
Equilon and Shell Trading argue that Chevron should not be permitted to successfully take one position regarding buy/sell agreements in the State Action and then, seeking lower prices than those available through the buy/sell agreements, take an opposite position in this case. Defendants cite the doctrines of res judicata, or claim preclusion;12 collateral estoppel or issue preclusion; and judicial estoppel, or preclusion of inconsistent positions. As more fully discussed below, res judicata bars a losing party in one case from re-asserting the same claim in a subsequent action between the same parties; collateral estoppel bars a party who lost an issue in one case from re-litigating that issue in a subsequent action between the same parties; and judicial estoppel prevents a party from "asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or earlier proceeding."13 According to defendants, California public policy does not permit litigants "to play fast and loose with the court" by taking self-contradictory positions.14
Defendants argue that between 1985 and 1994, Chevron in the State Action contended that transporting crude oil acquired using buy/sell agreements does not qualify as providing transportation services for others and that Texaco's use of such agreements could not have resulted in the 20" Pipeline being dedicated to the public use. Later, Chevron acquired an interest in the 20" Pipeline, sold it to Equilon and ultimately sold its interest in Equilon to Shell Oil Company. According to defendants, Chevron now "seeks to obtain an unfair economic advantage by reversing the positions from which it benefited in the State Action."15
12 The doctrine of res judicata, or "a matter adjudged," holds that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights of parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. (Black's Law Dictionary, Rev. 4th ed., at 1470.)
13 Jackson v. County of Los Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181 (citations omitted).
14 Schulze v. Schulze (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 75, 83; In re Marriage of Toth (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 205, 212 (litigant may not "blow hot and cold" by taking the benefits of a doctrine "when it suits his purpose" and then repudiating the same facts "when it is no longer profitable or to his advantage to do so").
15 Motion to Dismiss, at 22.
