VII. Discussion of Principal Allegations

Most of the Water Division's allegations assert violations of Section 855. As previously mentioned, Section 855 authorizes the Commission to petition for a receiver if a water company "is unable or unwilling to adequately serve its ratepayers[,] or has been actually or effectively abandoned by its owners, or is unresponsive to the rules and orders of the commission, . . . ." The following discusses the evidence material to the three subparts of Section 855. I have also indicated where I believe that respondents' conduct also violates other laws or Commission orders.

A. Is the Utility Unable or Unwilling to Adequately
Serve Ratepayers?

The OII alleged, by way of example of this type of violation, that the respondents had disregarded a Commission order to install an answering machine or provide an answering service for ratepayers. In its case at hearing, the Water Division also offered evidence of tank leakages, low water pressure, and failure to install a turbidity monitor as other violations of this "unable or unwillingness" prong of Section 855.

The Commission first ordered Conlin-Strawberry to arrange for an answering service or install an answering machine in 1983. One would think that this requirement would be one of the simplest and inexpensive for the company to fulfill. Unfortunately, the answering machine (or lack thereof) has become symptomatic of the many management difficulties facing the company. A utility that is unable to provide a reliable means to contact the company, whether through an employee, answering service, or functioning answering machine, is likely unable to manage the more difficult tasks involved in running a water system.

In its 1983 decision, the Commission noted that 18 customers had complained of their inability to reach Conlin or the maintenance man.38 Accordingly, the Commission ordered the use of a telephone answering service or machine within 30 days of the decision. The Commission determined, in 1999, that the company had not complied.39 Finally, in its January 2000 resolution, the Commission found the company to be in compliance.40

Like the tank repair requirement I discussed earlier (and contrary to respondents' arguments), I consider the answering machine/service requirement to be an ongoing company obligation. Unfortunately, during a power outage in December 2002, customers were unable to reach a company representative for several days. Also, when other customers have left messages on the company's answering machine, their calls have not been returned.41

When providing such an important commodity as water, a utility has a public service obligation to provide a reliable method for contacting company personnel concerning problems affecting the delivery and quality of the water. General Order 103 requires that, upon a customer's complaint, "the utility shall promptly make a suitable investigation and advise the complainant of the results thereof."42 Conlin-Strawberry has violated GO 103 and the Commission's 1983 decision by failing to provide a reliable telephone answering system and, further, by failing to respond to customer complaints and inquiries in a prompt manner.

In the Commission's interim decision in September 1996, the Commission ordered Conlin-Strawberry to repair leaks in the Lower Dymond storage tank. The Water Division's July 2000 verification report, ratified by the Commission in Resolution W-4207, reported that the leaks had been repaired. However, I interpret the Commission's 1996 order to impose a continuing reasonable obligation on the company to ensure that post-1996 leaks are also sealed.

Photographs admitted during the hearing provide striking evidence that the Lower Dymond tank continues to leak as of May 2004.43 What is worse is that many of the holes are imperfectly plugged with branches and twigs, likely introducing foreign substances into a treated water supply.44 The photos demonstrate the casual and unprofessional attention being given by Conlin-Strawberry management to asset maintenance and the health of its customers.

While the Commission found in 1996 that the company had failed to achieve the required pump efficiency, the Water Division concedes that this condition was satisfied in July 20, 2000. Some of the witnesses at the hearing testified to low water pressure, but this problem seemed to be related to the combination of high-elevation water users and low river water conditions. The evidence of low water pressure is insufficient to support a finding that Section 855 has been violated.

The Water Division argues that Conlin-Strawberry's belated installation of a turbidity monitor is an additional violation of a Commission order. The company was ordered to install a turbidity monitor in 1983. In its 1996 interim order, the Commission found, as a matter of law, that Conlin-Strawberry had violated the 1983 order by failing to install the monitor. In its final opinion in 1999,45 the Commission determined that the company had belatedly complied by purchasing a monitor and that any sanction was barred by the statute of limitations. With no other evidence concerning the present status of the monitor, I recognize that the Commission has previously determined that no sanction can be imposed on Conlin-Strawberry for failing to promptly purchase the monitor as originally ordered in 1983.

B. Have Respondents Actually or Effectively
Abandoned the Water System?

The Water Division has argued that Conlin's physical absence from the water system constitutes actual abandonment. Also, I have issued an evidentiary and issue sanction that results in the conclusive determination that Conlin did indeed actually or effectively abandon the system.

Conlin argues that the Commission itself brought this condition on by ordering active water system management to be transferred to a qualified operator or manager (discussed further in Part VII(C)(2), infra). The Commission never ordered Conlin to abdicate all responsibilities for the system. His failure during summer 2004 to ensure the most-recent operator's continuity or replacement indicates such effective abandonment.

The Water Division also alleged that excessive management salaries to Conlin, failure to deposit surcharge collections, and improper use of loan proceeds are additional indications of abandonment (all discussed infra). I agree that Conlin's receipt of excessive management salaries is also evidence of effective abandonment, since it depletes the utility of financial resources. The loan repayment surcharges, however, were payments ratepayers did not need to make in order for the company to meet its loan obligations. The excessive surcharges did not cause direct harm to the utility and do not constitute abandonment. Finally, I do not believe the Water Division has carried its burden of proving improper use of the loan proceeds.

C. Have Respondents Been Unresponsive
to the Rules and Orders of the Commission?

The OII frames this issue: "Are respondents unresponsive to the rules or orders of the Commission when they failed to timely comply by September 30, 2000, or any time thereafter with all Commission orders as directed by Resolution W-4207?" This question frames issues concerning the engineering plan, system operator, and tank leaks. I also believe that all of the financial issues can be addressed under this issue as well although they may constitute other violations of statute or Commission orders.

The Water Division sought to prove respondents' noncompliance with the Commission's 1983 order to prepare a plant improvement and progressive maintenance plan. The Commission's precise order was as follows:


The Company shall, within 30 days of the date of this order, contract with a licensed civil engineer to formulate a plan for plant improvement and proper progressive maintenance, as set forth in Finding 7. A copy of the engineering report shall be furnished to this Commission, Attention Hydraulic Branch, and to the Department of Health Services (DHS).46

In April 2000, respondents submitted a letter authored by R.F. Walter, a consulting engineer, to the Water Division in an effort to satisfy this requirement.47 On July 20, 2000, the Commission approved a "verification resolution" prepared by the Water Division summarizing the company's compliance with prior Commission orders.48 The Commission determined that the company had not satisfactorily completed the engineering report, described the Walter letter as a "laundry list-not an engineering report," and ordered the company to correct all deficiencies.

In their brief, respondents argue that the original Commission order was imprecise in its requirements. They also argue that when the Water Division rejected the Walter letter in 2000, staff was using criteria set forth in GO 103 and DHS Guidelines that were never part of the original order.

Respondents ignore the most significant fact that 17 years had passed before they made a serious effort to satisfy the engineering report requirement set forth in the Commission's 1983 decision. The three-page letter authored by Walter does discuss maintenance and capital improvement needs, but in the most cursory way. The letter does not constitute a plan in the commonly understood sense of prioritizing needs, estimating costs, and establishing a timetable. At most, the letter is a preliminary assessment of the types of improvements that should be considered.

William Rugg, President of the Association, is also the retired community development director for the City of San Leandro. In that capacity, he was the department head for five city government divisions: engineering, traffic engineering, planning, redevelopment, and building inspection. With this background, Rugg was qualified to provide an expert opinion on the general requirements of an engineering plan, which he described as including (a) an existing "as-built" plan; (b) a long-range projection of useful life; (c) a plan for gradually replacing or restoring elements of the facility to avoid a disaster; (d) a preventive maintenance plan; and (e) an emergency response plan.49 Of these components, the Walter letter only makes the most general comments about asset replacement and maintenance. It does not qualify as an engineering plan.

On this point, however, my evaluation of the plan or report is unnecessary. The Commission itself, in Resolution W-4207, determined the letter to be unsatisfactory as a plan and ordered compliance by September 30, 2000. In the absence of any other evidence indicating that Conlin-Strawberry cured or sought to cure this deficiency, the Commission's determination on this issue is conclusive. Conlin-Strawberry is in substantial violation of the Commission's 1983 order concerning the preparation of an engineering report.

As one outcome of the Association's complaint, the Commission ordered in 1996 that Conlin-Strawberry "should replace its current system manager [Danny Conlin] with one who is qualified and willing to comply with past Commission and DHS orders. Commission Staff should approve the selected system manager and/or operator."50 The Commission later reaffirmed this requirement, stating, "We did not err in ordering Conlin-Strawberry to replace a manager we lack confidence in with a qualified manager or operator."51

In April 1997, Conlin-Strawberry was successful in hiring Jim Pingree as the full-time operator for the system. Danny Conlin became less involved, spending substantial amounts of time in Southern California. Pingree was qualified to operate the system since he holds the requisite operating and treatment certificates issued by DHS. Some evidence indicates that system operation improved when Pingree was frequently present. At the evidentiary hearing, however, both Pingree's and Conlin's testimony indicated that responsibility for daily operations had deteriorated into a haphazard arrangement. Pingree indicated that, since May 2004, he had gone to work full-time for the Tuolumne Development Authority. While he was attempting to work on the Conlin-Strawberry system three times per week, he indicated that his status with the company was uncertain. While other persons, such as Andy Cranston, were more immediately available, they are not certified to make adjustments in water treatment. Conlin testified that Cranston was making water readings and Pingree was making water treatment adjustments every other day. Conlin also indicated that it was difficult to hire a certified system operator and that a full-time position commands $40,000 to $50,000 per year (Pingree was hired in 1997 for $24,000 per year full-time).

The Water Division and respondents disagree over whether Conlin-Strawberry has satisfied the Commission's orders concerning the hiring of a system manager or operator, and they have parsed the meaning of these words. The Water Division argues that Conlin has compounded the problem by continuing to draw a management salary, but Conlin indicates the salary is only a draw of earnings (to be addressed later). Respondents also say the evidence does not support the requirement of a full-time manager.

This statement misses the point. What is important from the Commission's perspective is that the Conlin-Strawberry system, from May to at least September 2004, did not have in place a reliable, routine method of water quality and supply management by qualified and properly certified individuals. To his credit, Pingree was attempting to continue work on the Conlin-Strawberry system, but these efforts were in addition to his full-time work elsewhere. Communications between Conlin and Pingree during this critical period appeared to be infrequent. In its January 22, 2004, letter to Conlin, DHS indicated that when Pingree is unavailable, the only other certified operator available to manage all aspects of the treatment plant is Conlin. Yet, according to DHS, "you [Conlin] are absent over extended periods due to your commercial logging business."52

Nothing in this haphazard management arrangement provides water users or the Commission with any assurance that even minor system repairs or water quality problems, much less major breakdowns or severe water quality problems, will be promptly and professionally remedied.

One of the allegations contained in the OII was that Conlin had received unauthorized and excessive management salaries from the company. In his Supplement to OII 2003 Audit Report,53 Water Division expert witness Herbert Chow reports Commission-authorized management salaries from 1983 through 2002. Management salaries were initially authorized at $2,960 per year by the Commission's 1983 decision, increased to $3,630 per year by a Commission resolution in 1989, and increased again to $12,430 per year by a Commission resolution in 1994. Over this 19-year period, Conlin was authorized to receive management salaries in the amount of $143,863. According to annual reports filed with the Commission, however, Conlin-Strawberry reported the payment of $305,878 in management salaries. According to corporate cash disbursement records for the same period, Conlin-Strawberry reported a somewhat different total of $289,000 in management salary payments.

Based on these figures, Chow estimates that the company paid out between $145,837 (based on cash disbursements) and $162,015 (based on annual report information) in unauthorized management salaries for the 19-year period. If cash disbursement figures are used, the company shows a cumulative net loss of $154,841 for the period. If the excessive salaries had been left in the company, Conlin-Strawberry would have shown a modest cumulative net loss of $9,004 for the 19-year period (with individual years varying from almost $18,000 net loss (1987) to almost $16,000 net gain (1984)).

Respondents' position is two-fold. First, because the Commission engages in traditional ratemaking for water utilities, its adoption of test years as part of a rate decision does not prevent the company from spending more or less in an operating expense account. All the company is required to do is to charge the authorized rates. Second, respondents argue that Danny Conlin took his authorized rate of return out of the company through salary payments rather than as dividend payments.

Respondents' second argument points out a significant weakness in the Water Division's theory of the case. Chow could identify no specific expenditures (other than through the payment of management salaries) indicating that Conlin was receiving dividend payments or other returns on his capital contributions to the company. Respondents calculate that, since 1983, the Commission's rate-of-return decisions and resolutions through 2003 have authorized the recovery of approximately $283,000. This is close to the sum of $293,875 that Chow estimates was paid to Conlin in management salaries during those years.

The Water Division has failed to make its case that Conlin engaged in wholesale looting of the company through excessive management salaries. Indeed, in its annual reports, Conlin-Strawberry was reporting to the Water Division, in a reasonably accurate fashion, the actual salary being paid to Conlin.54

The evidence does demonstrate that Conlin-Strawberry disregarded the corporate form and failed to adhere to Commission's accounting orders. Respondents suggest that the Water Division "has ignored Mr. Conlin's right to earn the `fair rate of return' to which the [California] Supreme Court makes reference in" California Manufacturers Association v. Public Utilities Commission.55 As a separate corporate entity, however, it is Conlin-Strawberry's right to earn a fair rate of return-not Conlin. In such legal arguments, as in their business practices, respondents impermissibly ignore the distinction between the company as a corporation and the sole shareholder.

Effective January 1, 1985, the Commission adopted a Uniform System of Account for Class B, C, and D water utilities including Conlin-Strawberry. The Uniform System of Accounts requires that management salaries, which are "chargeable to utility operations," be posted to Account No. 671. Dividends, however, are to be charged to Account 215, "Retained Earnings." But since 1983, Conlin-Strawberry was consistently showing negative retained earnings that ultimately totaled $80,000 in 2002. The company had no retained earnings from which to draw dividend payments to its sole shareholder, Conlin. By admittedly taking larger salaries than set forth in test years reviewed by the Commission, however, Conlin was in many years receiving a preference over competing operating expenses. In some years, when the company had positive net income, even after Conlin's excess salary is factored back in, the salary payment may not have had any detrimental effect. In other years, such as 1989, Conlin's salary preference diminished the amount of money available for other operating expenses. In Resolution W-3445, the Commission approved rates for test year 1989 funding an estimated $42,754 in operating expenses (before depreciation and taxes), including $3,630 in management salaries, and a rate of return of 10.5%.56 Conlin-Strawberry's annual report for 1989 shows actual operating expenditures of $59,533 and a net loss of $16,895.57 No dividends could have been paid from earnings this year but Conlin was paid a management salary of $12,100. Regulatory expenses were also $5,000 more than estimated in W-3445. Only $346 was spent on materials, which is miniscule on a capital-intensive water system. Under such an arrangement, Conlin's excess salary payments directly competed with other necessary operating expenses, setting up circumstances for the decline of the water system.

Conlin-Strawberry has failed to account for operating expenses, retained earnings, and dividends in the manner ordered by the Commission in the Uniform System of Accounts. While respondents argue that utilities are free to expend whatever is necessary, so long as approved rates are honored, this is an over-simplification of ratesetting for two reasons. First, Commission staff process rate applications and advice letters using Standard Practice U-3-SM.58 The Standard Practice requires staff to carefully review major items, including how management salaries are estimated. This review forms the basis of the summary of earnings set forth in the Commission-approved decision or resolution. These estimates form an implicit but material element of the Commission's approval of rates. While actual revenues and expenditures may vary, the burden is on the utility to explain significant departures.

Second, the only explanation advanced by respondents for management salaries, consistently in excess of those set forth in the summary of earnings included in Commission decisions and resolutions, is that these payments were a means for Conlin to recover the authorized rate of return. This explanation admits that the payments were not properly chargeable to utility operations.

These management salary expenditures are significant deviations from the proposed expenditures set forth in summaries of earnings included in the Commission's rate decisions and resolutions for Conlin-Strawberry. Given this pattern of significant deviations, the burden is on the utility to provide a reasonable explanation. Respondents have failed to provide an acceptable explanation and, indeed, have admitted that such payments were a means for Conlin to obtain an authorized rate of return. This practice, because it allowed Conlin to convert the authorized rate of return into a guaranteed return to himself regardless of the impact on the company, violates the Uniform System of Accounts, has afforded a shareholder an unauthorized preference over other approved operating expenses, and violates the prior decisions and resolutions setting rates for this utility.

The OII alleges that respondents failed to deposit surcharges into the SDWBA Trust Account for repayment of the SDWBA loans. In its 1983 decision authorizing Conlin-Strawberry to apply for a SDWBA loan, the Commission required:


To assure repayment of the loan, company shall deposit all rate surcharges and upfront cash payment revenue collected with the fiscal agent approved by the Department of Water Resources. Such deposits shall be made within 30 days after the surcharge and up-front cash payment moneys are collected from customers.59

In his prepared testimony, Chow calculates that from April 1984 through December 2003, Conlin-Strawberry over-collected loan repayment charges by $64,842. His calculations are based on a methodological comparison of surcharge collections as reported by the company's cash journal and bank deposits with the fiscal agent. Chow further calculates the interest on these over-collections as $41,716.60

Respondents counter that the significance of these allegations is "overstated" since the necessary loan payments have been timely made over the years and, in any event, the amount of over-collection was only 7.45% of total collections or 77 cents per customer per month. Such is the novel justification for a skimming operation that has lasted 20 years and, with interest, totals almost $107,000.

Certainly, ratepayers lost the use of money that was not actually needed for loan repayment. How these surcharge over-collections affected overall company finances, however, is hard to decipher. Some of the money may have been used for water system operations. Some of the money, as the Water Division argues, may have made its way into Conlin's pockets through excess management salaries. I do not need to unravel these financial mysteries. In its 1983 decision, the Commission authorized Conlin-Strawberry to borrow money and to impose a surcharge for loan repayment. The Commission imposed the specific obligation upon Conlin-Strawberry to apply all collections to the repayment of the loan.

Conlin-Strawberry's practice of collecting these surcharges violates Sections 532 and 734. The practice violates Section 532 because Conlin-Strawberry received different compensation than specified in its schedules on file and in effect at the time. All the company's tariffs since the Commission approved the surcharge in 1983 carried the provision, "The surcharge is in addition to the regular metered water bill. The surcharge must be identified on each bill. The surcharge is specifically for the repayment of the California Safe Drinking Water Bond Act loan authorized by Decision 83-05-052." The company, however, was collecting and using portions of the surcharge for purposes other than repayment of the loan. Under these circumstances, Conlin-Strawberry also violates Section 734 since, by engaging in a practice prohibited by Section 532, the company was charging unreasonable and excessive rates.

The Water Division has alleged that the respondents misappropriated SDWBA loan monies for personal or other unauthorized purposes other than system improvements. If proven, the Water Division believes these allegations would constitute abandonment, as well as violations of other statutes or Commission orders.

The Commission authorized respondents to borrow a total of $411,200 from the DWR in 1983 to satisfy DHS's requirements.61 The described scope of work included a filtration system ($96,000), supply line and distribution line replacement ($165,700), and a new tank ($58,000). An 8% contingency amount, engineering and overhead charges, and DWR's 3% fee added another $91,500 to the estimated and approved expenditures.62 In 1986, the Commission approved an additional loan of $51,500 because pipeline installation in rocky ground exceeded original estimates.63

There is no indication that DHS, DWR, or even the Water Division dispute that these water system improvements were made in substantially the manner proposed in 1983. There is no evidence before me that DWR has questioned the use of the loan proceeds over the years. Yet, in its case, the Water Division maintains that $224,612 of the SDWBA loan proceeds are "unsubstantiated" and "misappropriated."64

Chow used a multi-step methodology to reach this conclusion. He starts with the 16 DWR loan reimbursement checks, totally $448,337, issued by DWR in response to 16 billings submitted by Danny Conlin Excavating. These checks were deposited in a "loan disbursement account" maintained by Conlin-Strawberry at a local bank. Chow then traces the 77 checks drawn on the "loan disbursement account" and finds that payments (other than bank charges) were made to three sets of recipients: (a) Danny Conlin ($59,177); (b) Conlin-Strawberry ($269,608); and (c) outside contractors ($119,251). The vast majority of these disbursements were made in 1984-87.

At this point, Chow makes several unwarranted assumptions. With reference to the $59,177 paid to Conlin, Chow concludes that the total amount is unsubstantiated because Conlin has "failed to specify and document the SDWBA costs or work claimed for this amount."65 Of the $269,608 loan proceeds paid to Conlin-Strawberry, Chow concludes that $104,174 paid by the company to third-party contractors was "substantiated" but the remaining $224,612 is "unsubstantiated." For some reason, Chow again includes in this total the $59,177 disbursed directly from the loan disbursement account (not from the company) to Conlin.

Respondents are correct in their arguments that Chow has recognized as "substantiated" only payments from the loan disbursement account to outside contractors or payments from the company to outside contractors and suppliers. Chow effectively considers any labor provided by Conlin, his employees, or employees of the company to be "unsubstantiated" expenditures.

Chow's prepared testimony, however, contains a table of billing claims for Conlin Excavating Company workers for the years 1984-87. The table includes the names for at least 35 individuals (only first names for many) who, according to respondents' records, performed work during those years. The wages total $113,198. The table is accompanied by 17 pay slips indicating the payment of wages by Conlin-Strawberry or Conlin during 1984-86. Chow, however, considered these records to be unsatisfactory since they were not collaborated by "tax withholding, Social Security tax. Also the SDI, all these taxes to provide whether such a person existed. We don't have anything."66

I acknowledge that respondents' record-keeping practices are substandard, but a principal reason "we don't have anything" is because Chow was attempting to audit transactions that occurred 17 to 20 years ago. I would expect that many of the construction-related records would be destroyed or lost in the normal course of business over so many years. Respondents have no legal obligation to maintain tax records beyond seven years of filing (tax records concerning construction completed in 1987 would be retained until 1994). The Commission did authorize an audit in 1996 and mandated that it be filed within 12 months. Had the audit been completed at that time, the Commission would have been in a better position, as early as 1997, to determine whether loan proceeds had been properly used. If respondents resisted the audit, the Commission could have dealt with any obstruction forcefully at that time.

The Water Division has alleged wholesale misappropriation of public loan monies, but its premise that Conlin and the company provided no labor in exchange for payments is ultimately unconvincing. The documents that do exist refute the Water Division's position. The Water Division has not carried its burden of proof on the alleged misappropriation of SDWBA loan proceeds.

The OII asserts other conduct that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or Commission orders. I have already determined, as an evidentiary and issue sanction, that Conlin-Strawberry denied Commission staff access to the utility's books and records and engaged in improper accounting methods.67

As to other allegations, I conclude that the evidence concerning false entries for water pumps is inconclusive and any problem concerning untariffed exemptions, benefiting Conlin personally, has been cured.

38 D.83-05-052, supra note 8, at 5, 1983 Cal. PUC LEXIS 916, at *6. 39 D.99-11-044, supra note 17, at 20, 1999 Cal. PUC LEXIS 875, at *30. 40 Res. W-4187 (Jan. 20, 2000). 41 Ex. No. 96: Deposition of Evelyn C. Olson at DT 43:16-44:4 (April 16, 2004) & Declaration at 4-5 (April 9, 2004) (exhibit to deposition). 42 GO 103, Rules for Governing Water Service Including Minimum Standards for Design and Construction at tit. I(8) (1956 as amended). 43 Ex. Nos. 71-74: Series of Photographs. 44 GO 103, supra note 42, at tit. IV(2), requires that "[a]ll new mains, pumps, tanks, wells and other facilities for handling potable water and insofar as practicable, repaired mains and other facilities, shall be thoroughly disinfected before being connected to the system." While there is no evidence on how the twigs were placed in the tank, I have serious misgivings that the twigs and branches were disinfected before they were thrust into the side of the tank. 45 D.99-11-044, supra note 17, at 19-20, 1999 Cal. PUC LEXIS 875, at *29. 46 D.83-05-052, supra note 6, at 29, 1983 Cal. PUC LEXIS 916, at *36. 47 Ex, No. 28: Letter from R.F. Walter, Frank Walter and Associates, to Danny Conlin (April 26, 2000). 48 Resolution W-4207, supra note 20. 49 RT at 142:19-144:28 (May 11, 2004). 50 Conclusion of Law 4, D.96-09-043, supra note 4, 1996 Cal. PUC LEXIS 910, at 42. 51 D. 97-10-032, supra note 16, at 9-10, 1997 Cal. PUC LEXIS 954 at *15. 52 Ex. No. 112: Letter from DHS to Danny Conlin (June 9, 2004). 53 Ex. No. 116: H. Chow, Supplement to OII 2003 Audit Report (2004). 54 Id. at AD000001. 55 24 Cal. 3d 251 (1979). 56 Ex No. 116: supra note 53, at JD000081. 57 Id. at AD000030. 58 Ex. No. 84: Standard Practice for Preparing Results of Operation Reports for General Rate Increase Requests of Water Utilities Other than Major Companies, Standard Practice U-3-SM (rev. Sept. 2001). 59 Ordering Paragraph 10, D.83-05-052, supra note 6, at 30, 1983 Cal. PUC LEXIS 916, at *37. 60 Ex. 116, supra note 53, at JD000055 to JD000060. 61 D.83-05-052, supra note 6, 1983 Cal. PUC LEXIS 916. 62 Id. at 19-20, 1983 Cal. PUC LEXIS 916, at *23. 63 D.86-11-004, supra note 7, at 2, 1986 Cal. PUC LEXIS 670, at *1. 64 Ex. No. 116, supra note 53, at 9-10. 65 Id. at 9. 66 RT 12:1369:3-6 (Aug. 19, 2004). 67 See discussion at Part VI, supra.

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