4. Substantial Contributions

A party may make a substantial contribution to a decision in several ways.² It may offer a factual or legal contention upon which the Commission relied in making a decision,³ or it may advance a specific policy or procedural recommendation that the ALJ or Commission adopted.⁴ A substantial contribution includes evidence or argument that supports part of the decision even if the Commission does not adopt a party's position in total.⁵ The Commission has provided compensation even when the position advanced by the intervenor is rejected.⁶

TURN believes it substantially contributed to D.99-11-021. The limited rehearing of D.97-04-082 focused on one primary issue: how to allocate the El Paso and Transwestern surcharges related to step-down costs between core and noncore customers. The analysis of this issue involved the proper interpretation of settlements at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the size and importance of rate impacts, and equity considerations of Interstate Transition Cost Surcharge (ITCS) allocation. The Commission adopted most of TURN's factual contentions, legal analysis, and policy recommendations when it reversed its earlier decision and found that noncore customers should pay a greater share of the surcharge costs.

TURN's contributions to D.99-11-021 are reflected in the following excerpts:

· Findings of Fact Nos. 4-5; mimeo text pp. 6, 28, 38 - The Commission agreed with TURN's analysis of benefits to noncore customers from the step-downs. No other party quantified noncore benefits in their initial testimonies. (Exh. 1, Direct Testimony of Michel Florio, pp. 4-6.)

· Finding of Fact No. 8; mimeo text pp. 23-27 - The Commission agreed with TURN's position that there is no rational link between the surcharges and other terms of the FERC settlements. (TURN Opening Brief, pp. 22-30.)

· Finding of Fact No. 12 - The Commission agreed with TURN's position that there is no evidence to determine what El Paso rates would have been absent the settlement. (TURN Opening Brief, pp. 24-28.)

· Findings of Fact Nos. 13-17; mimeo text pp. 27-32, 38 - The Commission agreed with TURN's analysis that noncore customer rates are substantially lower as a result of the benefits of the step-downs, even with the concomitant surcharge payments.

· Findings of Fact Nos. 20-24; mimeo text pp. 33-37 - The Commission agreed with TURN's testimony regarding the lack of significant economic impact on noncore customers or on the overall Southern California economy from reallocation of the surcharge costs. The Commission noted that only TURN and the Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) "responded in an extensive manner" on this issue. (Exh. 9, Direct Testimony of Ian Goodman; TURN Opening Brief, pp. 40-47.)

· Finding of Fact No. 27; mimeo text pp. 39-40 - The Commission agreed with TURN's position that the refunds should be allocated based on original capacity reservations. (TURN Opening Brief, pp. 17-19.)

· Finding of Fact Nos. 34-36 - The Commission agreed with TURN's position that the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) surcharge component should be allocated on an equal cents per therm basis. (TURN Opening Brief, pp. 39-40.)

· Finding of Fact No. 37 - The Commission agreed with TURN on the proper method of balancing account treatment to fully compensate core customers for previous surcharge payments. (Exh. 1, Direct Testimony of Michel Florio, pp. 7-8.)

In summary, the Commission adopted TURN's fundamental position that the surcharges were ITCS costs and should be allocated so that the core customers did not bear the major part of the surcharge costs. The Commission, however, disagreed with TURN on one issue regarding the calculation of a surcharge component attributable to step-downs by PG&E. Even so, the Commission did agree with TURN that such a surcharge component be allocated on an equal cents per therm basis.

The Commission finds that TURN did make a substantial contribution to D.99-11-021.

4.1 Duplication of Efforts

Both TURN and ORA participated extensively in this rehearing process. Whenever a Commission proceeding involves multiple parties, we must consider both whether an intervenor claiming compensation has made a substantial contribution and to what extent, if any, that contribution duplicated the contribution of any other party. In some circumstances, the Commission may decline to reduce an award despite some duplication of contribution. For example,

" . . . because of the extraordinary level of participation required of both parties and intervenors throughout these proceedings, we find that a reduction in the amount awarded to intervenors based on duplication of effort is not warranted . . . . The cooperative efforts participated in by the intervenors, . . . are essential in building a California consensus."⁷

Following the precedent and reasoning set forth above, we decline to reduce TURN's request for compensation because of ORA's participation. Although TURN and ORA complemented each other's position, there was little duplication except on policy issues. Specifically, both ORA and TURN presented common policy positions in favor of core ratepayers against the unified position of the utilities. ORA, however, focused on the issue of rate impacts, while TURN emphasized the economic impacts that shifting the surcharge costs to core customers would have.

In this case, there was an extraordinary amount of express reliance by the Commission on the analysis and arguments presented by TURN. In fact, TURN's contributions were reflected in 19 Findings of Fact in D.99-11-021. (See Section 4, herein, where TURN's specific contributions are enumerated.) Where parties have taken identical or similar positions, the Commission had adopted a small (or no) reduction for duplication if there is objective evidence in the decision that intervenor was most influential in getting the Commission to adopt the intervenor`s position on the issue(s).