IX. Pacific's Surveys

Pacific also submitted its own surveys. One, conducted by J.D. Power, a global marketing-information firm that measures customer satisfaction, found from 1996-2001 that Pacific ranked in the top six out of sixteen local telephone service providers surveyed.144 However, Pacific submitted little information about what the survey asked customers.

Moreover, what information Pacific submitted indicated that the survey included several factors that we consider peripheral to a true assessment of service quality, such as "corporate image" (which respondents ranked as one of the top three factors relevant to customer satisfaction, with 21% finding it important), "cost of service/value" (with 24%) and "calling card," which appear to relate to Pacific's prices and calling card services, and are not elements of service quality as examined in this decision. Thus, we give the J.D. Power study little weight here.

Pacific's expert Dr. Hauser also summarized the results of a 2000 survey of various local exchange carriers by IDC, entitled "Telecommunications Consumer Brands Survey." According to Dr. Hauser, IDC is "a leading provider of technology forecasts, insights and advice."145 Dr. Hauser reported that the IDC survey found that Pacific's customers are more satisfied than the average local telephone customer for all attributes studied except one; Pacific's customers are the second most overall satisfied for customer service; Pacific's customers are the third most satisfied for voice quality; and Pacific is one of the top three providers in over 85% of the areas measured. According to Dr. Hauser, the IDC survey polled 805 households nationally, and measured local telephone service customers' satisfaction with "customer service, fees, marketing, reputation, pricing structure and voice/service quality."146

Attachment 31 to Dr. Hauser's testimony summarizes the results of the IDC study. When one examines the data contained there, it appears Pacific's performance is not as positive in the area of service quality as Dr. Hauser claims. The only two indicia of service quality contained in the survey are "customer service" and "voice or service quality."147 For "customer service," 73.8% of respondents ranked Pacific as a 4 or 5 (with 1 = not very satisfied, and 5 = very satisfied), at best placing Pacific in the middle of the range for comparable carriers. Of the non-SBC companies, GTE/Verizon's comparable result was 83.1%, Bell Atlantic's was 80.7%, and Bell South's was 72.6%, and US West's was 63.1%. Thus, of the companies SBC does not own, Pacific was worse than Verizon, and Bell Atlantic, comparable to Bell South, and better than US West.

Similarly, on "voice or service quality," 85.7% of customers ranked Pacific a 4 or 5. Of the non-SBC companies, Bell South scored 86.3, GTE scored 85.9, US West scored 83.8, and Bell Atlantic scored 83.5. Thus, Pacific's results were comparable to the other non-SBC carriers' results. Only SBC's Ameritech, with 62.5%, scored notably lower that the other carriers, who were all in the range of 83.5% to 86.3 percent.

Based on the foregoing analysis, we do not find that the IDC survey bolsters Pacific's claim that it has distinguished itself on service quality as compared to other carriers. In addition, we find a survey that only looks at Pacific's performance at a snapshot in time less useful than ORA's survey, which compares customer perceptions over the course of 6 years. Moreover, in light of Pacific's failure to produce any of its internal service quality survey results (as discussed in the following section), we are reluctant to put much store in the IDC survey.

During the audit phase of this proceeding, the Commission's consultant, Overland Consulting (Overland), found that Pacific used a third-party research firm to conduct customer satisfaction surveys during the NRF period, and that Pacific did not file the surveys with the Commission as required by the NRF monitoring program.148 According to Overland, the surveys were conducted under Pacific's Customer Service Quality (CSQ) process, and surveyed customers who had recent experience with Pacific in the areas of sales, billing, maintenance, installation, and operator services.

Overland reported that Pacific should have filed the surveys under NRF monitoring report P.A. 02-03, and that Pacific refused Overland's requests for copies of the surveys. In response to Overland's assertion that Pacific failed to file the surveys as required, Pacific states, "It is possible Overland has confused two monitoring reports, P.A-02-03 and P.A-02-04. Pacific understands that P.A-02-03, Customer Survey Report, refers to surveys initiated by the Commission. . . ."149 Pacific argues that it should not be obliged to produce its customer surveys because the requirement "has not been raised by the Commission or its staff in the last 11 years. . . ."150 Thus, Pacific argues that it is only required to file customer surveys under report P.A. 02-03 when the Commission initiates a survey. We conclude that Pacific's position is inconsistent with the reporting requirements adopted in D.91-07-056.

We have reviewed the origins and purposes of reports P.A. 02-03 and P.A. 02-04, and find the following. After completing a series of workshops in 1990, the Commission adopted a comprehensive monitoring program for Pacific and Verizon "as described and envisioned in the Commission's Advisory and Compliance Divisions (CACD) three workshop reports... [including]...the reporting requirements recommended in CACD's Workshop II Report..."151

The Commission in D.91-07-056 also directed the staff to produce "a written assessment explaining who prepares each monitoring report that the utilities provide to our staff, and what purpose each of these reports serves for the utility and for the staff."152 The staff's Monitoring Report Assessment, filed on May 1, 1992, contained the following description of "Customer Surveys" Pacific is required to file under report P.A. 02-03:

6. Customer Surveys: These surveys are given to customers who have direct contact with Pacific Bell and are used to measure customer satisfaction levels and perceptions of the company. These surveys are conducted through the Corporate Research organization at Pacific Bell, and historically have been provided to the DRA Telecommunications Rate Design Branch, and is [sic] used in DRA's ongoing service quality evaluation. The surveys are provided as initiated. It is recommended that these surveys continue."153

The Monitoring Report Assessment also describes a separate set of ongoing survey results that Pacific is required to file monthly under Report P.A. 02-04, as follows:

"7. Quality of Service Performance - Customer Opinion Surveys: These surveys are conducted by the Company Measures and Statistics organization at Pacific Bell. A monthly report identifying the percentage of customers that are satisfied with Pacific Bell's service quality is provided to the DRA Telecommunications Rate Design Branch. DRA uses the information in these reports is used in it's [sic] service quality monitoring efforts. It is recommended that these surveys continue."154

Thus, the Monitoring Report Assessment describes two separate and distinct monitoring reports addressing different kinds of customer surveys: P.A. 02-03 contains surveys conducted from time-to-time through Pacific's Corporate Research organization measuring customer satisfaction levels and perceptions of the company, while P.A. 02-04 contains a monthly report prepared by Pacific's Measures and Statistics organization on an ongoing basis identifying the percentage of satisfied customers.

Pacific asserts that the P.A. 02-03 report refers only to surveys initiated by the Commission. We find nothing in D.91-07-56, in the staff's workshop report, or in the staff's Monitoring Report Assessment supporting Pacific's assertion that only Commission-initiated customer surveys are to be filed with the Commission under report P.A. 02-03. Therefore, Pacific's position is unsupported by any evidence, and we find that Pacific has not complied with its obligation to file its surveys measuring customer satisfaction levels and perceptions of the company.

Pacific's witness states that, if Pacific's understanding of its reporting obligation is incorrect, neither the Commission nor its staff has raised it as an issue. Pacific appears to suggest that it is free to disregard its compliance obligations if it is not reminded of them. Particularly when the obligations are clear, as is the case here, it should be unnecessary to remind Pacific that it is responsible for understanding its responsibilities under our rules. Moreover, Pacific is well aware of the procedures available to it for clarifying any confusion or misunderstandings it may have about its obligations.

Customer perceptions gained through surveys can provide a valuable indicator of service quality. While ORA's survey provides useful information, Pacific criticizes the survey as flawed. At the same time, due to Pacific's failure to file information required by the Commission under its NRF monitoring program and Pacific's refusal to produce this information as requested by Overland, Pacific has deprived the Commission of information that may be useful in its assessment of Pacific's service quality under NRF. Because Pacific has not filed surveys as required under the NRF monitoring program, and has also refused to provide the information to Overland, we can only conclude that the results of those surveys are not favorable to Pacific. At the very least, we cannot find that Pacific's service quality results are enhanced by the P.A. 02-03 surveys, since Pacific has never submitted them.

When we implemented NRF, we stated,

We expect DRA to closely monitor the new framework on an ongoing basis and, where its analysis identifies areas of concern, to proceed to investigate. We direct the utilities to fully cooperate in providing all necessary information. This order provides Pacific and GTEC with an unprecedented opportunity to conduct their regulated business in a more flexible manner. This increased freedom does not mean that the Commission will countenance a more restrictive information access policy, however. Indeed, we view the success of the new regulatory framework as inextricably linked to the quality of the Commission's access to utility information. To make this more credible, we will insist on more cooperation, not less, in sharing of information. We will not tolerate actions which obstruct the audits and investigations of the Commission staff, whichever division is involved. . . ."155

In the case of the surveys measuring customer satisfaction levels and perceptions of the company, it is clear that Pacific has not complied with its reporting obligations during the NRF period, nor has it cooperated with the Commission's auditor in the Commission's effort to gather important information concerning Pacific's performance under NRF. Parties should recommend in Phase 3B what action should be taken to address Pacific's failure during the NRF period to comply with its customer survey reporting obligations under the monitoring program, and what steps may be necessary to ensure Pacific's compliance in the future. Parties should also recommend ways to ensure Pacific's full cooperation with the Commission's continuing efforts to obtain service quality monitoring information.

TURN also contends that Pacific's deployment of advanced services - primarily its DSL service - threatens to create two classes of customers, those who have excellent service quality by virtue of their access to the most advanced telecommunications infrastructure, and "have nots" who have not had such architecture installed.

As Pacific admits, technological improvement does enhance service quality: "[T]he same [NRF] incentives that promised Pacific greater profit potential benefited customers through efficient investment that would reduce costs while enhancing service quality through technological improvement."156 While Pacific attempted to downplay at hearing the positive implications for service quality that its advanced services architecture delivers to customers, such claims are both counter-intuitive and contrary to its statements elsewhere.157

TURN's witness Terry Murray claimed that with Pacific's introduction of "Project Pronto," a project that involved broad deployment of advanced services technology, Pacific promised improvements in service quality from the new service. While Pacific backed off from several of its 1999 broadband network claims at hearing, in 1999 Pacific told investors that the new technology would 1) "be less vulnerable to weather conditions, thereby reducing trouble reports," 2) have "reduced activity . . . in the remaining copper plant because of improved reliability," 3) "avoid dispatches on many installations [and thereby] realize efficiencies in [SBC's] installation and maintenance operations," and 4) "substantially reduce the need to rearrange outside plant facilities when installing new or additional services."158

Pacific's witness confirmed the foregoing 1999 claims at hearing.159 For example, Pacific conceded that the use of fiber for voice service improves trouble report performance, that if fiber signal quality exceeds the minimum standard, Pacific does not reduce the quality to that minimum,160 and that, at least with regard to data transmission, fiber loops may allow data to travel at the standard 56k modem speed, while copper loops may not.161

TURN also alleges that selective deployment of broadband services creates the risk of discrimination in service provision: "The service quality enhancement of Project Pronto and similar major network improvements raises the possibility of the improvements being deployed in a manner that produces two-tiered basic service and distinct sets of `haves' served off an advanced system and `have-nots' served off the unimproved network."

While Pacific claims any such potential was mitigated in the Commission's SBC/Ameritech merger conditions addressing DSL availability in low-income neighborhoods and rural areas, there are at least three limitations on these conditions. First, the merger condition only required deployment in certain wire centers, and not to all customers served by those wire centers. Thus, for example, customers far from a wire center received no guarantee of DSL service. Second, the requirements only extended to low-income rural areas if other rural customers took DSL. Third, the merger conditions were only applicable for a limited time.162

Thus, we find that TURN's claims have merit, at least to the extent TURN alleges that technological advancement has the potential to improve service quality and that Pacific's deployment of DSL services may fail to benefit all customers equally.

This is not the phase of the proceeding in which to attempt to remedy the foregoing problems, and the parties have not suggested anything more than vague regulatory action at this stage. ORA simply states that "[b]ased on the record of this proceeding and on that of other proceedings before it, the Commission needs to verify the service quality impacts of Project Pronto. . . ."163 TURN suggests no regulatory changes either. We urge these parties to suggest realistic and concrete measures for our consideration in Phase 3B.

Pacific makes the point that its "service quality performance should be viewed in the context of developments during the NRF period . . . [including] growth in demand."164 It points not only to changes in the California economy that increase or decrease demand, but technological change that stimulates demand for more telephone lines. Pacific further cites unbundling and interconnection requirements imposed in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

We do not find that any of these factors excuse poor service quality. Nor is steady service quality during times of economic expansion and contraction something for which we should reward a company. Our standards and those imposed by the FCC apply regardless of such external factors. Moreover, growth in the number of lines and customers served, such as characterized most of the 1990s, provides a commensurate opportunity to increase revenues and earnings. Thus, we do not believe Pacific should be excused for declining service quality requirements in times of growth, whether internal or external to the company.

As ORA's Mr. Piiru stated, "I don't think management would have the kind of force that is dependent on recessions and the weather to have good service quality. I think they would have a service quality standard as a goal and do whatever kind of labor force or whatever kind of capital expenditures are needed to meet those standards."165

TURN further alleges that Pacific has cut staff in customer-facing areas, harming service quality. It cites evidence that field staff positions were reduced at Pacific from 1989-95.166 It claims the number of splicing technicians decreased by 26%, the number of systems technicians decreased by 35%, and that the average years of experience of Pacific's service technicians declined over that time period.

TURN also challenges Pacific's increasing use of outside contractors to perform field work. On this latter point, TURN calculates that outside field contractors caused 14% of the cable cuts causing 911 outages in 2001.167 Pacific does not refute this statistic.168 TURN claims that Pacific's "outsourcing" of its DSL business to an unregulated affiliate - SBC's Advanced Services, Inc. (ASI) - caused a rise in service quality complaints, leading to C.02-01-007.

ORA makes similar claims, and also points out that Pacific lent service employees to other states without regard for the impact these employee transfers would have on Pacific's service quality back in California.

Pacific focuses on a different, later time period, and states that evidence TURN's own witness presented shows that from 1996-2001, Pacific increased its staffing levels of personnel with direct customer interaction by over 30%. TURN concedes that Pacific increased the number of service representatives by 61% from 1996 to 1998.169 Pacific's witness Mr. Resnick explained further that, after the recession in the early 1990s when demand slowed for Pacific's services, Pacific actually increased these staffing levels by over 57%.

However, Pacific's numbers vary depending upon how one examines them. For example, the net growth in total jobs from 1997-2001 was only approximately 5.6%.170 As ORA testified, "[There has been] very little net growth in job growth [at Pacific] as demand for services has grown. Furthermore, even if there has been growth in [customer-facing] employees as Pacific contends, this stability in total jobs would suggest that non-[customer-facing] positions would have likely declined over time to some extent in order to offset this growth in [customer-facing] employees."171

Moreover, Pacific does not dispute TURN's claim about the experience level of its new hires, stating only that, "TURN does not contest the adequacy of the training [of these employees]."172

While the record supports the claim that Pacific's staff decreased during the early years of NRF, it also appears Pacific made up for those losses in the second half of the 1990s, at least in the area of the customer-facing employees who have the most direct impact on service quality. We do not find that the record of this proceeding, standing alone, supports the claim that Pacific's customer-facing staffing levels caused problems with service quality, especially since the uncontradicted evidence shows that Pacific increased its customer-facing staff in the latter part of the decade.

However, to the extent we found such problems in the records of the formal proceeding TURN cites (see Section entitled "Formal Complaints - Pacific," above), for example in connection with the DSL complaint (C.02-01-007), we cannot ignore that evidence. Moreover, we have just opened a new investigation into Pacific's most recently announced staff cuts, in connection with which SBC was quoted as saying that the cuts could one day have an impact on service.173 In Phase 3B, we will consider whether Pacific should report staffing trends to the Commission, as well as other steps to ensure we are aware of staff cuts that might compromise service quality.

Pacific claims that rainfall increased its trouble ticket rates and that findings regarding its service quality during periods of excessive rainfall should be tempered by this fact. However, as ORA points out, Pacific's data showed that trouble tickets actually increased as rain declined in certain years.174 ORA's witness, Dale Piiru, therefore points out that Pacific's witness "does not provide an adequate correlation between extreme weather events (rainfall totals) and resulting protracted out-of-service intervals."175

According to Piiru, ORA found that in 1994-95, when rainfall was higher and economic damage throughout the state 355% higher as compared to 1998, Pacific's average residential repair intervals in 1994-95 were 49.25% less than in 1998. Overall, Pacific's average residential out-of-service repair interval increased by 130% from 1994 to 1998, with a 70.6% increase between 1996 and 1998.176 Piiru concludes that Pacific's assertions about weather and its impact on service quality are "overly general and unsupported."177

Pacific contends that ORA erroneously bases its analysis of weather on the dollar value of economic devastation in 1994-95 as compared to the El Niño year in 1997-98, and that the damage in the San Francisco area, where Pacific serves "millions of customers" was far higher during the El Niño season. An examination of weather data reveals that during the 1997-98 El Niño season, rainfall in downtown San Francisco was 47.19 inches,178 230% of normal seasonal rainfall.179 In the 1994-95 season, the comparable total was 34.02 inches.180

Thus, Pacific is correct that the 1997-98 season had greater rainfall in San Francisco (the location on which Pacific focused) than did the 1994-95 season; that difference may explain some of the increase in trouble reports for the El Niño season as compared to 1994-95.181 However, the increase is disproportionate to the increase in rainfall, in our view, and the evidence supports the conclusion that during the 1997-98 season, factors other than simply the weather contributed to a deterioration in Pacific's trouble report performance.

Nor should rainfall be an excuse for poor service. The carriers have extensive outside plant and can expect rain-related damage. El Niño was not a phenomenon that took anyone by surprise, but rather was long anticipated before it happened. For example, the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration reports with regard to the 1997-98 El Niño that, "[b]ecause the El Niño developed so rapidly, with record high sea surface temperatures in the equatorial Pacific by July 1997, forecasters could predict a full 6 months in advance with some reliability that the winter over the US would be very unusual."182 Indeed, the carriers should be gearing up for El Niño again, as it recurs on a regular basis.

In connection with our investigation of Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E's) storm response in early 1995, we found that PG&E's customer call centers were designed to handle average traffic without seasonal adjustments or contingencies to accommodate inclement weather. While the record here is unclear on whether staffing varies seasonally at Pacific, we stated with regard to PG&E that it should: "We conclude PG&E could have and should have had more [customer service representatives] on station December 12, which would have mitigated its severe call center problems."183

The same standard should apply to our local exchange telephone carriers.

The Commission's authority over service quality encompasses more than network technical performance.184 The Commission recently stated it "believe[s] that service quality measures should go beyond technical performance measures, and should also include measures of customer service and related consumer impact measures."185 Thus, it is appropriate to consider trends and patterns in customer-affecting practices such as cramming, slamming and other marketing abuses during our assessment of service quality under NRF.

Both TURN and ORA point to cases in which the Commission found that Pacific engaged in marketing abuse to show problems in Pacific's service quality. While Pacific has already been penalized in connection with those cases, they tend to corroborate our other findings in this decision and so we refer to them here. As with complaints concerning service quality, since the inception of NRF, the Commission has had to intervene more frequently to address marketing abuses than it did prior to NRF.

The most notable marketing abuse case prior to NRF was addressed in D.86-05-072, which required Pacific to refund over $62 million to customers and to contribute $16.5 million to the Ratepayer Education Trust Fund.186 In a separate matter, C.86-07-013 alleged that Pacific falsely advertised its Touch Tone service. The complaint was dismissed as moot, because Pacific had refunded the complainant's charges and changed its advertising.187

However, Pacific subsequently filed advice letters to discontinue Touch Tone charges for subscribers served by step-by-step switching equipment, and to refund up to $5 million to existing residential Touch Tone subscribers served by that equipment.188 Pacific's advice letter was protested as inadequate, arbitrary and discriminatory, and the Commission modified Pacific's request by ordering it to extend its refund with interest to all current and former Touch Tone subscribers served by step-by-step switches.189

We find no other cases addressing significant or widespread marketing abuses prior to NRF's inception. By contrast, there have been at least two cases involving Pacific's marketing practices after the Commission adopted NRF. In D.01-09-058, we found that "customer service quality is compromised when Pacific Bell representatives ask each caller, at the beginning of every call, for permission to access the subscriber's proprietary network information and to repeat the question if the answer is `no,' and force customers to listen to unwanted sales pitches prior to providing a response to a customer service inquiry. Therefore such practices are inconsistent with reasonable service quality."190

In D.01-10-071, Pacific was accused of deceptively marketing its "Saver 60" intraLATA toll calling plan. For some customers, Pacific was shown to have marketed the program to customers for who it did not produce savings, despite Pacific's claims that it would. Pacific settled by agreeing to provide customers notification of the error, make refunds and establish a two-way feedback/complaint mechanism for telemarketing services.191

We find that it is appropriate for us to consider Pacific's marketing record as one indication of its level of service quality. We also find that Pacific has demonstrated at least twice since NRF that it engages in marketing abuses. Thus, Pacific's service quality in the area of marketing warrants attention in Phase 3B of this proceeding.

While the parties listed this heading in their joint outline, we deal with the points they made in the Section entitled "Technological Change," above, and do not discuss the matter further here.

Finally, TURN points to changes since NRF that it contends also merit a reexamination of the incentives the framework creates. It claims that "to enhance revenues, utilities under incentive regulation will seek to charge for services that were formerly free." It cites Pacific's decisions to restrict the availability of free telephone directories and to charge more for directory assistance calls.

Pacific takes issue with TURN's facts regarding directories and directory assistance calls, but does not comment on TURN's contention that NRF is the root cause of these changes. We have insufficient evidence to find a connection between the NRF mechanism and the changes TURN alleges, and therefore do not recommend changes to the mechanism based on TURN's allegations.

144 Exh. 2B:509. 145 Exh. 2B:354 at 31:3-4 (Hauser Direct Testimony). 146 Exh. 2B:354 (Hauser Direct Testimony). 147 The other indicia, "overall satisfaction," "fees and costs," "marketing style," "reputation of the provider," and "simplicity of pricing structure" either do not measure service quality at all, or pertain to measures in addition to service quality. 148 Exh. 2A:404, at 21-19 (Audit Report) 149 Exh. 2B:340 at 22-23 (Hayes Direct Testimony). 150 Id. 151 D.91-07-056, Ordering Paragraphs (OP) 1 and 3, 41 CPUC 2d at 128-30. 152 Id., OP 6. 153 New Regulatory Framework Monitoring Report Assessment, I.87-11-033, Commission Advisory and Compliance Division, May 1, 1992, at 6 and 60 (emphasis added). 154 Id. 155 D.89-10-031, 33 CPUC 2d at 196 (emphasis added). 156 Pacific Opening/Service Quality at 7-8 (emphasis added). 157 As we show in our discussion of the same argument as it applies to Verizon, Verizon concedes that new technology enhances service quality. See Section entitled "Technological Change - Verizon," below. 158 Exh. 2B:505A (Confidential Exhibits to Murray Direct Testimony), SBC Investor Briefing, "SBC Announces Sweeping Broadband Initiative," dated Oct. 18, 1999, at 7. There is nothing confidential about the investor briefing; indeed, the parties referred to its contents during the hearing. 159 Exh. 2B:360 at 9:10-23 (Boyer Reply Testimony); 23 RT 2915:11-14 & 2916:22-24 (Boyer) ("[T]he use of fiber to provide voice services could positively affect certain facts that contribute to trouble reports. . . . ALJ Thomas: And trouble reports affect customers? Witness Boyer: I will agree with that."). 160 23 RT 2914:23-26 (Boyer). 161 Exh. 2B:357 at 45:9-12 (Resnick Reply Testimony) ("Although some customers have been able to use their 56 kbps [computer] modems to transmit data over voice-grade lines, transmission speeds of 56 kbps may not be attainable on POTS voice-grade lines for a number of reasons, such as bridge tap or loop length. Load coils and loop lengths can inhibit data transmission . . . ."). 162 18 RT 2251-54 (Murray). For a timeline setting forth the merger conditions, see the FCC website at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/mcot/SBC_AIT/timeline/. 163 ORA Opening Service Quality at 25. 164 Pacific Opening/Service Quality at 46. 165 21 RT 2639:17-23. 166 TURN Opening/Service Quality at 17, citing Exh. 2B:507 at 8, table 1 (Schilberg Direct Testimony). 167 TURN Opening/Service Quality at 36-37. 168 Pacific Reply/Service Quality at 57. 169 TURN Opening/Service Quality at 24. 170 Exh. 2B:139 at 8 (Piiru Reply Testimony). 171 Id. Piiru also pointed out - in response to Pacific's evidence of an increase of 25% between 1996 and 2001 in its network investment - that the investment is not commensurate with Pacific's size. Mr. Piiru presented evidence that "Pacific is spending less on infrastructure than the national median for annual investment." Id. (citation omitted). 172 Pacific Reply/Service Quality at 5. 173 I.02-11-008, filed Nov. 21, 2002. 174 ORA Opening/Service Quality at 23, citing Exh. 2B:356 (Resnick Direct Testimony) (Q2-Q3 1997, Q2-Q3 1998, Q2-Q3 1999 and Q2-Q3 2000). 175 Exh. 2B:139 at 3 (Piiru Reply Testimony). 176 Id. at 4. 177 Id. at 2. 178 Another website lists the total as 47.22 inches. http://ggweather.com/sf/daily.html#b. 179 See http://ggweather.com/nino/calif_flood.html & http://tornado.sfsu.edu/geosciences/elnino.html. Mr. Piiru cited the former website, and his testimony was admitted into the record without objection. Exh. 2B:139 at 4 & n.3 (Piiru Reply Testimony). 180 http://ggweather.com/sf/daily.html#b. We may take official notice of rainfall totals pursuant to Rule 73. 181 Comparable totals were as follows:

182 http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tao/elnino/faq.html#climate-predict. 183 D.99-06-080, mimeo., at 61. 184 "The Commission shall require telephone corporations to provide customer service to telecommunication customers that includes, but is not limited to... reasonable statewide service quality standards, including standards regarding network technical quality, customer service, installation, repair, and billing." Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2896(c). 185 R.02-12-004, mimeo., at 29. 186 21 CPUC 2d 182 (1986). 187 D.88-11-028, 29 CPUC 2d 485 (1988). 188 See Resolutions T-14067 and T-14068, respectively. 189 Resolution T-14068. 190 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS 914, at *155, conclusion of law 40. 191 D.01-10-071, 2001 Cal. PUC LEXIS 961, at *9-10.

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