Findings of Fact

1. To the extent that CLECs lose access to the UNE-P, they will require an efficient "hot cut" process for migrating customers from ILEC switches served via UNE-P to CLEC switches utilizing UNE-L.

2. The increased demand for hot cuts resulting from the elimination of
UNE-P will be attributable both to the embedded base of UNE-P lines that must be cut over to UNE-L as well as to ongoing new CLEC customer growth and customer churn.

3. In order to achieve operational and economic efficiencies not available when loops are migrated sequentially on a line-by-line basis, the TRO directed that the ILECs develop a process for the simultaneous cut over of two more loops on a "batch" basis.

4. Batch cut processing still limits the potential loop processing capacity as a result of the labor-intensive nature of the work and space limitations involved.

5. While the vast majority of migration orders under UNE-P can be processed without the need for manual intervention, UNE-L hot cut migration will require manual provisioning and testing that increases risks of error and delay.

6. To the extent that hot cuts are not processed on a timely basis or in an efficient manner, there is potential for interruption in the customer's service, both in connection with temporary loss of dial tone and the porting of the number to a different switch.

7. To the extent that a customer's service is adversely affected as a result of delays, errors, or inefficiencies in the hot cut process, the CLEC serving that customer is denied a seamless, efficient migration of the customer from UNE-P to UNE-L. .

8. SBC and Verizon each presented separate proposals to augment their existing hot cut processes, including provision for batch processing, to accommodate the increased hot cut demand anticipated with the elimination of UNE-P.

9. SBC's hot cut processes are designed to accommodate a batch size of 100 loops per day per CLEC per central office.

10. Verizon's hot cut processes are designed to accommodate an indeterminate batch size depending upon when Verizon determines that a "critical mass" of orders has been accumulated sufficient to make optimum use of staffing.

11. Because Verizon's process fails to inform the CLEC of a date certain as to when the hot cut will be performed, such uncertainty creates for the CLEC administrative difficulties, inefficiencies, and customer satisfaction problems.

12. Depending on the extent, pace, and timing of the transition for replacing UNE-P with UNE-L that may be ultimately determined, there is uncertainty as to whether the ILECs' proposed hot cut batch sizes and processing (both batch and sequential) will accommodate sufficient batch sizes and workforce capabilities to avoid delays, errors, or inefficiencies in meeting hot cut demand for basic voice-only service in a seamless, efficient, and low-cost manner.

13. The ILECs' assumptions concerning their capabilities to process hot cut volumes have not fully considered potential transition volumes from UNE-P to UNE-L, continued CLEC market share growth, and intercarrier customer churn.

14. In order to provide reasonable assurances that the ILECs will be able to satisfy hot cut demand (both on a batch and sequential processing basis) resulting from the replacement of UNE-P with UNE-L, a system of performance metrics and testing is needed.

15. SBC has not demonstrated why its 13-day provisioning interval for hot cuts cannot be reduced to 6 days, as long as the order specifies that the hot cut must be processed between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays in accordance with the terms of its union labor contracts.

16. Although electronic loop provisioning is not currently feasible, in order to maximize the efficiencies and seamlessness of hot cut processing, continued progress toward cost-effective mechanization of manual processes is important.

17. Verizon has not yet developed a process for hot cuts to flow through the Verizon West OSS.

18. The ILECs have not provided evidence that their hot cut processes can handle 911 database changes 100% of the time and, as a result, there could be a time during the cut over transition where the 911 system has incorrect information on the network service provider.

19. In order to avoid 911 data base problems, the LEC needs to send the 911 order at the time that the customer's number is ported, oversee development of a standard process to coordinate 911 database changes and ensure that the PSAP database can handle the increased processing volume that will arise in a UNE-L environment.

20. It is questionable as to whether the National Number Portability Administration Center will be able to handle the increased volume of transactions that would have to be processed to port the customer's number to the CLEC switch as part of the hot cut.

21. It is questionable as to whether the ILECs hot cut processes are adequate to handle the increased volume of directory listing changes that would need to be processed in connection with UNE-P to UNE-L conversions.

22. It is questionable as to whether the ILECs hot cut processes are adequate to handle the increased volume of updates to the Line Information Database and Caller Name Database necessary to obtain information regarding caller identity and blocking options.

23. The ILECs have omitted certain types of customer migration scenarios from their batch hot cut processes that prevent CLECs from being able to offer a seamless, efficient migration from UNE-P to UNE-L to customers served under such scenarios.

24. Verizon cannot currently provision IDLC loops through a batch cut process, and further study would be required to identify what steps would be required to overcome present constraints toward development of such a migration scenario.

25. The ILECs' batch cut processes do not accommodate line-splitting migration scenarios in which two CLECs in partnership use a single loop to jointly provide voice and data services to a customer.

26. To the extent that line-split loops use circuit switching for providing voice service over a portion of the loop, the line-splitting migration scenarios belong within the broad requirement for a batch cut process.

27. To the extent that CLECs seek to compete with the ILECs by offering a package of voice and DSL data services over a single loop, they will be unable to match the service reliability available from the ILEC to the extent that UNE-P is eliminated and no batch cut process is available to cut over such lines in an efficient and seamless manner.

28. Because SBC currently refuses to provide cross-connects between the two CLECs in a line-splitting arrangement with a jumper on the applicable SBC distribution frame, CLECs desiring to interconnect their own facilities must provision their own cage-to-cage cross connection.

29. One of the ways that a migration process for line-splitting arrangements could be accommodated would be for the ILEC to provide for cross connects on its main distribution frame.

30. The batch cut processes developed by the ILECs do not take into account CLEC-to-CLEC migration scenarios.

31. The TRO required that seamless batch hot cut processes be developed not just for ILEC-to-CLEC migrations, but also CLEC-to-CLEC migrations.

32. In order for a CLEC-to-CLEC hot cut migration process to be developed, carriers need a standardized process for exchanging customer service records and obtaining circuit identification with adequate quality assurance processes.

33. By allowing CLECs to port the customer's number after the hot cut is completed, Verizon would be relieved of the need to do the number port.

34. The ILECs' proposed processes do not accommodate migrations involving an Enhanced Extended Loop facility.

35. Without access to EELs, CLECs that are not collocated in wire centers in which they have UNE-P customers would be unable to offer switch-based UNE-L service to those customers if UNE-P were eliminated.

36. The TRO required that prices be adopted for the ILECs' batch cut processes based upon the TELRIC methodology.

37. Both SBC and Verizon presented proposed prices for their various hot cut options.

38. Because a mechanized frame technology is not currently developed, TELRIC-based prices applicable to hot cut processes cannot incorporate such technology.

39. Because MCI has not shown how IDLC loops could be unbundled using currently available technology, no factual basis is provided to disallow SBC's IDLC loop costs on a TELRIC basis.

40. Adjustments to SBC's costs are warranted (1) to distinguish per-order versus per-loop costs; (2) to exclude costs unrelated to hot cut tasks, (3) to reduce the task time estimates, (4) to remove overtime and shift differentials, and (5) to consolidate tasks. The Commission-adopted TELRIC prices as set forth in Appendix 1 incorporate these adjustments, as detailed in Appendix 2.

41. MCI was unable to complete its analysis of Verizon's proposed prices given the complexity of Verizon's model and delays in receipt of supporting data.

42. Although Verizon has not thoroughly explained all of the layers of cost included in its labor rate, TELRIC principles are not violated merely because Verizon has used its actual costs as the basis for its labor rate.

43. MCI has raised valid questions concerning the reliability of Verizon's estimated work activity durations utilized to develop its estimated hot cut costs.

44. Further review of Verizon's costs in a subsequent proceeding is necessary to support findings concerning its compliance with TELRIC and whether its proposed prices should be adopted.

45. Performance measures are necessary to ensure that the ILECs' hot cut processes are working as intended.

46. Although third-party testing is not necessary, some form of testing and validation of hot cut processes by the ILECs is warranted to provide assurance that the ILECs can meet the anticipated increase in hot cut demand without delays, service interruptions, errors, or other inefficiencies that would impede CLECs ability to compete with ILECs.