9. Cost of Capital

SoCalGas and SDG&E propose the continuation, with certain modifications, of the MICAM, which is described46 as:

"a mechanism composed of three distinct components: a trigger that indicates when a change is necessary because market conditions for the cost of capital have changed significantly, a margin adjustment to reflect the change in the cost of capital, and a change to the authorized rate of return used in the earnings sharing calculation to reflect the change in the cost of capital."

In other words, the MICAM is a process to adjust rates in a predetermined fashion if or when certain conditions are met. By definition, the MICAM does not reflect the actual cost of capital for SoCalGas and SDG&E.

In a traditional ratesetting environment, the cost of capital would be determined by calculating and weighting the actual reasonable costs of existing long-term debt and preferred stock, the forecast cost of new securities expected to be issued in the forecast period, and a reasonable return on expected level equity (common stock and retained earnings).

Illustration of Traditional Cost of Capital

 

Amount

Cost

Weight

Weighted Cost

Debt

$500,000,000

6%

50%

3.0%

Preferred

100,000,000

8%

10%

0.8%

Equity

400,000,000

12%

40%

4.8%

Total

$1,000,000,000

 

100%

8.6%

In the traditional cost of capital proceeding, as maturing debt is retired and refinanced, the embedded cost changes to reflect the impacts of the retirement and the forecast for new debt. The only other discretionary element is the Commission's judgment to adopt a fair and reasonable return on equity (which is also required to start the MICAM). Regardless of how current capital market prices vary, the debt and preferred cost components change in the traditional mechanism only because of new issues or retirements. If the above illustration were the applicants' forecast of capital structure and costs, then the adopted rate of return would be the weighted cost of 8.6% and the authorized return on equity would be 12%.

The traditional cost of capital mechanism recalibrates annually to reflect actual reasonable costs plus any forecast changes, and the Commission authorizes a reasonable return on equity. Both ratepayers and utilities are protected from long-term harm if actual costs are out of line with the forecast because the rate of return is adjusted annually.

As proposed by SoCalGas and SDG&E, the MICAM is a mechanism that, subject to triggering events, adjusts the cost of capital in post-test year rates. They further assert that this is essentially the same mechanism as last adopted for SDG&E. None of the trigger features described above are directly attributable to specific changes in the operating conditions, financial condition or operating risks of SoCalGas and SDG&E. The cost of outstanding debt issued by SoCalGas and SDG&E does not change regardless of how the market rates change for new debt.

SoCalGas and SDG&E argue that the capital expenditure-related cost index within the proposed Gas and Electric Indices "implicitly adjust for changes in the cost of capital through the rental price of capital" feature of the index. The Base Margin Settlement does not use these indices.

Aglet opposes the use of the MICAM mechanism.47 First, Aglet argues that the MICAM relies on the published Moody's Aa Utility Bond rates48 that may not reflect the risks actually experienced by SoCalGas and SDG&E.49 SoCalGas had previously used 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds in its MICAM that were traditionally viewed as a long-term risk-free benchmark. The Treasury no longer issues 30-year bonds but does issue 10-year treasury notes, which Aglet states are now viewed as the financial market standard benchmark for risk-free investments. Aglet argues for a return to the conventional cost of capital applications for SoCalGas and SDG&E but, as an alternate, would benchmark a MICAM to the 10-year notes instead of Aa utility bonds. According to Aglet, there is no reason to link the return of SoCalGas and SDG&E to the "investor perceptions of risks" indicated by the Aa bonds and the Commission should allow ORA and other intervenors to address the facts and present evidence on the costs of capital and diversification of risks as actually faced by the applicants.

SDG&E did participate in two recent cost of capital proceedings in 1999 and 2002 when the current MICAMs were supposed to be operative.50 The Base Margin Settlement continues the use of the MICAM mechanism. We will adopt the proposed MICAM for SoCalGas and SDG&E as described in the settlement. We will order SoCalGas and SDG&E to include in the next GRC a detailed analysis comparing the actual results of the MICAM to an imputed cost of capital based on the adopted cost of capital for Pacific Gas & Electric Company and Southern California Edison Company to illustrate the differences between the MICAM and more traditional cost of capital ratemaking.

46 Ex. 155, p. DTB-10 and Ex. 156, p. DTB-13, with identical language.

47 See Ex. 800, pp. 11-13.

48 Ex. 155, p. DTB-10 and Ex. 156, p. DTB-13.

49 Ex. 800, p. 12.

50 Transcript, p. 2,695.

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