Discussion

In D.00-07-050, we observed that "processing a GRC for a major gas or electric utility is a considerable task that expends an enormous amount of resources of the Commission, the applicant, and intervening parties." Now we find that the California energy crisis is imposing a substantial burden on the resources of this Commission, and it appears that utilities and other parties are similarly affected by the need to respond to the energy crisis.

Under the current circumstances, there is a compelling need to ensure that our resources and those of the utilities and other parties are not unnecessarily diverted to a GRC that might be suspended or delayed in the near future. Yet, in the absence of immediate action on our part, those who are involved in PG&E's TY 2002 GRC must continue to prepare for that case, and it is probable that those efforts will divert resources from more critical efforts to respond to the energy crisis. Depending on how we resolve PG&E's petition for modification, such efforts might be determined to be unnecessary. Finally, as PG&E notes, the filing of the petition does not stay the requirement that PG&E meet the May 1, 2001 deadline, and the Executive Director approved only partial relief that does not permit PG&E to discontinue, even temporarily, preparing for the GRC.

Therefore, until we have had an opportunity to consider PG&E's petition for modification of D.00-07-050 and to adopt a firm plan for PG&E's TY 2002 GRC, we find that approving a limited extension of time for tendering the NOI is both prudent and justified. We make this determination without prejudging our decision on the petition.

Based on the foregoing, we approve a limited extension of the NOI tender date substantially as proposed by PG&E. PG&E proposes that the extension "would equal to the number of days from March 5, 2001, to the date the

Commission issues a final decision, no longer subject to appeal, regarding PG&E's pending petition." We understand PG&E's reference "a final decision, no longer subject to appeal" to mean the date on which all rights for applications for rehearing (Pub. Util. Code § 1731, et seq.) and judicial review (Pub. Util. Code § 1756, et seq.) of the decision are extinguished and the matter is closed. We will not approve an extension of time that is subject to such an indefinite period. Instead, we will limit the calculation of the extension period to 30 days after the decision on the petition for modification is issued. This is consistent with the time set in Pub. Util. Code § 1731(b) for filing of applications for rehearing.