Resolution EGPB-5 Granting approval of the final report on the audit of the Moss Landing Power Plant performed by the CPSD-EGPB, and authorizing public disclosure of the final audit report
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List of Figures

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

POWER PLANT DESCRIPTION

Figure 3 -- Units 6 and 7; conventional, once-through, supercritical boiler units.

POWER PLANT PERFORMANCE

SECTION 1 - SAFETY HAZARDS REQUIRING IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION

FINDING 1.1 - SLIP, TRIP AND FALL HAZARDS AND POTENTIAL ASBESTOS CONTAMINATION

Figure 4 -- Disused equipment allowed to accumulate on Level 104 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 5 -- Disused piping and scaffolds accumulating on Level 104 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 6 -- Disused scaffolds accumulating on Level 88 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 7 -- Disused scaffolds accumulating on Level 88 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 8 -- Insulation, possibly containing asbestos, on Level 104 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 9 -- Standing water caused by a clogged drain on Level 88 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 10 -- Frangible insulation falling off an exposed pipe in the basement of Units 6 and 7. The pipes lack blue banding, which would indicate the absence of asbestos. Therefore, asbestos is assumed to be present.

Figure 11 -- Insulation from the over head pipe; no asbestos containment precautions are evident.

Figure 12 -- Scaffolding carts could be seen in many areas. These carts are surrounded with caution tape when the scaffolding is not in use. The yellow caution tape can be seen in this photo.

Figure 13 -- The plant was unable to unclog the plugged drain. Rather, the plant applied epoxy cement over it to correct the low spot and allow proper drainage. Also see Figure 9.

Figure 14 -- To prevent water accumulation, the plant used epoxy cement to re-grade the area for proper drainage.

Figure 15 -- To prevent water accumulation, the plant used epoxy cement to re-grade the area for proper drainage.

Figure 16 -- Plant staff used blue banding and dimpled aluminum wrapping to indicate non-asbestos pipe insulation.

SECTION 2 - VIOLATIONS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION

FINDING 2.1 - THE PLANT LACKS AN ADEQUATE FLOW-ASSISTED CORROSION PROGRAM

FINDING 2.2 - THE PLANT LACKS AN INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR SUPPORTS OF HIGH-ENERGY PIPING

Figure 17 -- Severely deteriorated pipe hanger spring cans as seen from turbine deck of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 18 -- Severely rusted pipe hanger spring cans visible from turbine deck of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 19 -- Severely rusted pipe hanger rods visible from Level 102 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 20 -- Severely deteriorated pipe hanger rods visible from Level 102 of Units 6 and 7.

Figure 21 -- The plant installed new galvanized spring cans to replace deteriorated supports.

Figure 22 -- Close-up view of a new spring support.

Figure 23 -- This is a close-up view of a simple spring support with the load indicator in the center of the polygon.

Figure 24 -- This is a photo of a new twin simple spring support. Note the load indicator.

Figure 25 -- An older spring support that has been painted to prevent further corrosion.

Figure 26 -- This is a photo of a new hanger and pipe support on an older pipe.

Figure 27 -- This is a photo of old rusted pipe support rods that have yet to be serviced or replaced.

FINDING 2.3 - THE PLANT HAS NEITHER DETECTED EARLY SIGNS OF FAILURE NOR PREVENTED REPEATED FAILURES OF TURBINE BLADES

FINDING 2.4 - THE PLANT HAS NO RECORDS SHOWING THAT CONTRACTORS OR PLANT STAFF ARE CERTIFIED AND TRAINED IN HAZARDOUS WASTE AND ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE

FINDING 2.5 - THE PLANT LACKS A WRITTEN POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR BOILER INSPECTION

FINDING 2.6 - THE PLANT IS NOT UP-TO-DATE WITH EMERGENCY DRILLS AND RESPONSE MEASURES

Figure 28 -- One of three emergency staging points or assembly areas. The information on the muster card, as seen here in a transparent enclosure, is to be updated semi-annually.

Figure 29 -- This is a photo of the new siren installed on Level 88 of Units 6 & 7.

FINDING 2.7 - THE PLANT LACKS A STANDARDIZED SYSTEM FOR STORING, RETRIEVING, AND REVISING PLANT DRAWINGS

FINDING 2.8 - THE JOB DESCRIPTIONS AND TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE PLANT'S WRITTEN PROCEDURES SHOULD BE UPDATED

FINDING 2.9 - THE PLANT HAS NOT COMPLETELY IMPLEMENTED ITS COMPUTERIZED INVENTORY SYSTEM AS REQUIRED BY ITS OWN PROCEDURES

FINDING 2.10 - THE PLANT DOES NOT TEST MOTOR INSULATION RESISTANCE AT INTERVALS PRESCRIBED IN THE PLANT'S PREDICTIVE MAINTENANCE SCHEDULE

FINDING 2.11 - THE PLANT HAS DELAYED INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT FOR SECURITY CAMERAS

SECTION 3 - OBSERVATIONS

OBSERVATION 3.1 - PLANT SECURITY

OBSERVATION 3.2 - HOUSEKEEPING

OBSERVATION 3.3 - PLANT SAFETY

OBSERVATION 3.4 - CONTRACTOR WORK MANAGEMENT

OBSERVATION 3.5 - TRAINING SUPPORT

OBSERVATION 3.6 - RECORDS OF OPERATION

OBSERVATION 3.7 - BALANCE OF PLANT MAINTENANCE

OBSERVATION 3.8 - SPARE PARTS AND MATERIALS

Figure 31 -- One of the three warehouses onsite; stocks are organized and labeled with bin location.

OBSERVATION 3.9 - ONLINE PROCEDURES

OBSERVATION 3.10 - OTHER STATION ACTIVITIES

OBSERVATION 3.11 - FIRE PROTECTION

OBSERVATION 3.12 - EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE MONITORING

OBSERVATION 3.13 - FEEDWATER CHEMISTRY

OBSERVATION 3.14 - REGULATORY COMPLIANCE

OBSERVATION 3.15 - CONDITION OF MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT

OBSERVATION 3.16 - VERIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS

OBSERVATION 3.17 - LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROCEDURES

1 The study looked at six performance indices established by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), which included (1) Equivalent forced outage rate during demand (EFORd), (2) Equivalent Availability Factor (EAF), (3) Net Capacity Factor (NCF), (4) Start Reliability (SR), (5) Scheduled Outage Factor (SOF), and (6) Forced Outage Factor (FOF).

2 See ASME B31 Pressure Piping Code

3 The Auditor reviewed three boiler inspection reports for Unit 6:

4 For example, see Federal OSHA regulation 1910.165 (b) (2)

5 The Auditor compared the Master Table of Contents, OMP 1-1, dated January 1, 2001, to the Table of Contents for Volume 11.

6 The Auditor reviewed the Welder Qualification Report for T.P. Jones, one of two certified welders onsite.

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