2. Background
On November 25, 2008, the Commission issued this Order Instituting Rulemaking (R. or OIR) 08-11-017 (Rulemaking) to determine whether intrastate commuter rail systems operating in California should implement a collision-avoidance safety system and, if so, what the minimum scope of such a safety system should be.
This Rulemaking came in the wake of the September 12, 2008 head-on collision of a Metrolink commuter train and a freight train operated by the Union Pacific Railroad (UP) in Chatsworth, California. Twenty-five lives were lost in that collision, and 135 others were injured. At the time of the collision, the Metrolink train was travelling at approximately 42 miles per hour (mph) on a single track which was shared with freight trains.1 The UP freight train proceeding in the opposite direction was on the same track, travelling at approximately 40 mph despite having applied the emergency brakes which reduced the speed, and ultimately collided with the Metrolink commuter train.2
The investigation by the Commission's Consumer Protection and Safety Division (CPSD) and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) revealed a critical series of human errors leading up to the tragic collision: 3
· After stopping, unloading and loading passengers at the Chatsworth station, the Metrolink train should have departed the station slowly, in anticipation of the need to stop before the next signal, which was red.
· The Metrolink train engineer should have stopped the train in advance of the red signal. Instead, the train operator proceeded through the red stop signal into a blind curve where the Metrolink train collided with the UP freight train approaching from the opposite direction on the same track.
· The Metrolink train operator was engaged in numerous cell phone calls and text messages during the minutes preceding the stop at the Chatsworth station. His cell phone records also indicate that his last text message occurred just before the collision impact.4
The Chatsworth tragedy brought to the forefront the urgency of reducing hazards on the railways, especially on tracks that are shared by passenger trains and freight trains. It also underscored the woeful inadequacy of having only visual signals to warn locomotive engineers and other rail personnel of other trains on the same track. The industry has made great progress in collision avoidance systems. If such a system had been in place, the Chatsworth accident could have been avoided.5 In response to this tragedy, the Commission took swift action by instituting this Rulemaking.
1 Joel Rubin, Ann M. Simmons and Mitchell Landsberg, "'Total destruction': At least 17 die in head-on Metrolink crash," Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2008, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-traincrash13-2008sep13,0,2874450.story.
2 NTSB Document Management System, File ID 409821, Metrolink Cab Event Recorder Data Speed, http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Railroad/DCA08MR009/409821.csv.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.; see also NTSB, "Cellular/Wireless Device Records Factual Report Metrolink Engineer," Exhibit 6A, Docket No. DCA-08-MR009, February 24, 2009, http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Railroad/DCA08MR009/414046.pdf .
5 Senator Diane Feinstein's October 16, 2008 testimony on Senate Floor and September 23, 2008 briefing to Congress at http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.VideoLibrary.
