4. VTA's Case for Limiting Commission Jurisdiction
VTA contends that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to review or approve light rail crossings of streets and highways. The transit district concedes that the Legislature has conferred jurisdiction on the Commission to oversee certain aspects of VTA's operations. However, it argues that this statutory authority is limited to approval of safety appliances and procedures and to safety review following construction. VTA asserts that the only statutory expressions of Commission jurisdiction over VTA's light rail operations are found in Pub. Util. Code §§ 100168, 778 and 99152.3
Section 100168, part of the grant of authority for provision of transit service to the Santa Clara County District (§§ 100160-100169), states:
100168. The district shall be subject to the regulation of the Public Utilities Commission relating to safety appliances and procedures, and the commission shall inspect all work done pursuant to this part and may make such further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public. The commission shall enforce the provisions of this section.
Section 778, part of the Code's Chapter 4 dealing with the Commission's regulatory responsibilities, provides:
778. The commission shall adopt rules and regulations, which shall become effective on July 1, 1977, relating to safety appliances and procedures for rail transit services operated at grade and in vehicular traffic. The rules and regulations shall include, but not be limited to, provisions on grade crossing protection devices, headways, and maximum operating speeds with respect to the speed and volume of vehicular traffic within which the transit service is operated.
The commission shall submit the proposed rules and regulations to the Legislature not later than April 1, 1977.4
Section 99152, included in miscellaneous provisions applicable to all transit districts, provides:
99152. Any public transit guideway planned, acquired, or constructed, on or after January 1, 1979, is subject to regulations of the Public Utilities Commission relating to safety appliances and procedures.
The Commission shall inspect all work done on those guideways and may make further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public.
The Commission shall develop an oversight program employing safety planning criteria, guidelines, safety standards, and safety procedures to be met by operators in the design, construction, and operation of those guideways.
Existing industry standards shall be used where applicable.
The Commission shall enforce the provisions of this section.5
In contrast to what it sees as the limited authority of the Commission, VTA argues that its status as a transit district gives it authority to "acquire, construct, own, operate, control, or use right-of-way [for] ....any and all facilities necessary or convenient for transit service...underground, upon, or above the ground and under, upon, or over public streets." (Section 100161(a); see also §§ 100164, 100071(a).) Thus, it argues, it is solely responsible for the placement and construction of light rail crossings over public streets, and the Commission's statutory role is simply to monitor safety appliances and procedures and perform a post-construction safety review.
VTA recognizes that the Commission has expansive authority over public utilities under the State Constitution and statutes. It argues, however, that this rule of expansive authority is reversed when the Commission's jurisdiction is pitted against that of a local public agency. Under Cal. Const. Art. XII, § 8, "[a] city, county, or other public body may not regulate matters over which the Legislature grants regulatory power to the Commission." VTA asserts that both the courts and the Commission have interpreted this section to require express legislation for Commission jurisdiction to regulate local districts or municipalities. For example, in People ex rel. Pub. Util. Com. v. City of Fresno (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 76, 80-81, the Appellate Court affirmed a city's power of eminent domain without interference by the Commission, stating:
Admittedly, the commission fulfills a vital and significant role in the scheme of government. In fact, it is the only public agency which is constitutionally constructed to protect the public from the consequences of monopoly in public service industries. However, the primary function of the commission is to regulate private property dedicated to a public use and to exercise control over private companies engaged in public service. Moreover, as a regulatory body of constitutional origin it has only such powers as it derives from the Constitution and from the Legislature.
Thus, in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary the commission has no jurisdiction to regulate public districts or municipalities.
VTA argues that this principle of denying Commission jurisdiction unless expressly provided by statute is supported by the cases of County of Inyo v. Public Utilities Com. (1980) 26 Cal.3d 154, and Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Utilities Com. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 655.
In County of Inyo, the Commission dismissed the complaint of a county for review of water rates charged it by a municipality located outside the county. The Commission concluded that it had no jurisdiction over municipally owned water utilities unless expressly provided by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's order, stating that the Legislature had plenary power to confer such authority on the Commission, but it had not done so by statute.
In Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's jurisdiction to grant a charter-party carrier certificate in Los Angeles County despite 1957 legislation that gave the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (the Authority) broad powers to establish an integrated mass rapid transit system in the county. The Court noted that special legislation in 1951 had given the Commission authority to regulate operations of the Authority, but the 1957 legislation had removed that regulatory authority, with the exception of certain safety regulations. The Court said:
The 1951 Act gave the Authority some of the foregoing powers, but expressly provided that it could exercise its powers only under the regulatory control of the Public Utilities Commission. The Authority's routes and rates and contracts were also subject to control by the Public Utilities Commission. Under the 1957 Act the commission has no control over the Authority with respect to any of these matters. In the absence of legislation otherwise providing, the commission's jurisdiction to regulate public utilities extends only to the regulation of privately owned utilities. (Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority, 52 Cal.2d at 661 (footnotes and citations omitted).)
VTA argues that in order for the Commission to regulate VTA's construction and placement of light rail crossings, special legislation like that applicable in the Los Angeles case prior to 1957 would be required. VTA contends that no such statutory authority exists.
According to VTA, Commission decisions also support the principle that Commission jurisdiction is limited to that provided by the Constitution and by statutes. In Rates, Charges and Practices of Water and Sewer Utilities Providing Service to Mobilehome Parks, Decision (D.) 01-05-058 (2001), the Commission based its conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over most water resale rates in mobilehome parks upon a strict construction of the term "water corporation," stating:
[W]e cannot ignore the message of Inyo County. There the Supreme Court was clear that no matter how much the behavior of a municipal utility looks like that of a public utility, this Commission has no jurisdiction over the actions of the municipal entity unless and until such time as the Legislature says so....The fact that the Legislature has not expressly conferred such jurisdiction on the Commission is a strong indication that it does not intend that we have that authority. (D.01-05-058, at 22-23.)
The Rates, Charges and Practices case, according to VTA, serves to rebut the position of Staff that transit districts are subject to the requirements of §§ 12016 and 12027 as to rail and street crossings. These statutes subject a "railroad corporation," "street railroad corporation" and "street railroad" to exclusive Commission jurisdiction over placement and construction of rail/street crossings. VTA asserts that it is not a railroad corporation or a street railroad; it is a public agency. Therefore, it contends, these statutes cannot be construed to apply to a transit district.
3 Unless otherwise noted, all section references in this decision are to the California Public Utilities Code. 4 The rules and regulations required by § 778 are set forth in General Order (G.O.) 143 (now G.O. 143-B). Section 9.08 of G.O. 143-B states that construction of crossings requires prior approval by the Commission. 5 The oversight program required by § 99152 is set forth in G.O. 164 (now G.O. 164-B). An Order Instituting Rulemaking was opened in January 2002 to review safety certification requirements of G.O. 164-B. G.O. 143-B also is made applicable to § 99152 public transit guideways under sections 1.02 and 1.04. 6 In pertinent part, Section 1201 provides as follows:- No public road, highway, or street shall be constructed across the track of any railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be constructed across a public road, highway, or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without having first secured the permission of the commission. . . . .
- The Commission has the exclusive power:
- (a) To determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use, and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a railroad, and of each crossing of a public or publicly used road or highway by a railroad or street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or of a railroad by a street.
(b) To alter, relocate, or abolish by physical closing any crossing set forth in subdivision (a).
(c) To require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any crossing established and to prescribe the terms upon which the separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the construction, alteration, relocation, or abolition of crossings or the separation of grades shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected or between these corporations and the state, county, city, or other political subdivision affected.
