5. Staff's Assertion of Commission Jurisdiction

Staff argues that the California Supreme Court has held that the State Constitution authorized Commission safety jurisdiction over all "transportation companies," and that this authority encompasses transit districts like VTA and light rail transit systems. Similarly, the Legislature has provided the Commission with statutory authority over safety practices of all transit agencies within California.

Staff further argues that when the Legislature provided the Commission with exclusive jurisdiction over rail crossings over streets, roads and highways under §§ 1201, et seq., there were no transit districts or publicly owned transit guideways. Hence, the statutes spoke only to existing rail systems, i.e., railroads, street railroad corporations and street railroads. Staff contends that the courts have subsequently recognized that entities and modes of transportation that evolved after those statutes were adopted also fall within the Commission's grant of authority over transportation entities. Staff reasons, therefore, that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over rail/street crossings constructed by transit districts or other public agencies, just as it does over crossings constructed by railroads and other privately owned rail companies.

In contending that the Legislature properly granted the Commission safety jurisdiction over transit agencies, Staff points to the Supreme Court's decision in Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Public Util. Com. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 863. There, the transit authority challenged Commission jurisdiction on the basis of an earlier decision, City of Pasadena v. Railroad Com. (1920) 183 Cal. 526. The Court in Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority held:

The observation was made in City of Pasadena v. Railroad Com. that the apparent intent of the framers of section 23 of article XII [of the California Constitution] was to provide for regulation by the commission of privately owned and operated public utilities, as opposed to publicly operated utilities. But section 23 plainly states that "Every private corporation...and every common carrier, is hereby declared to be a public utility subject to such control and regulation by the Railroad Commission as may be provided by the Legislature...." Such clear constitutional language must be read according to its expressed, rather than possible intended meaning. Moreover, the provisions of our Constitution "`must receive a liberal, practical common-sense construction'" and be "construed where possible to meet changed conditions and the growing needs of the people." Thus "every common carrier" in section 23 includes the petitioner as a publicly owned transportation utility. This view necessitates disapproval of statements in City of Pasadena v. Railroad Com., especially the observation at page 533 that regulatory jurisdiction under article XII includes only the subject of private utility corporations.⁸

Staff notes that the Legislature subsequently defined Commission safety jurisdiction over the successor to the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority (§ 30646), stating:

The district shall be subject to regulations of the Public Utilities Commission relating to safety appliances and procedures, and the commission shall inspect all work done pursuant to this part and may make such further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public.

The district shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission with respect to safety rules and other regulations governing the operation of street railways. (Emphasis added.)

The Commission was given similar authority over VTA in § 100168. According to Staff, these statutes and the Supreme Court's analysis set forth a clear legislative intent to delegate safety oversight of transit district rail systems to the Commission. In addition to statutes that specifically name transit agencies like VTA, Staff notes that the Legislature has enacted § 309.7, which makes the Commission's safety division responsible for "inspection, surveillance, and investigation of the rights-of-way, facilities, equipment, and operations of railroads and public mass transit guideways...."

Staff argues that §§ 100168 and 99152 are sufficiently broad to incorporate unsafe crossing conditions like those it alleges for an at-grade crossing of Hamilton Avenue, and it notes that the Commission has taken an aggressive view of its safety jurisdiction under this authority. (Brown v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency (1994) 56 CPUC2d 554, 559.)

Staff contends that, in addition to the Commission's safety authority over VTA as a transit agency, the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over VTA's rail/street crossing under the extensive crossings authority set forth in §§ 1201 and 1202. Under § 1202, the Commission has "the exclusive power" to determine and prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, of a publicly used road or highway by a railroad or street railroad. Staff contends that VTA's rail transit system extension is in fact both a transit system and a street railroad.

The Borello Neighborhood Committee supports the position of Staff, asserting that the Commission has clear authority to "inspect all work" and to regulate the "design, construction, and operation" of the VTA system under § 99152 and has exclusive authority to regulate rail crossings under § 1202. The Committee also faults VTA for resisting full environmental review of its proposed elevated crossing, and it asserts that the Federal Transit Administration on July 23, 2002, ordered a full Environmental Assessment.⁹

The Committee contends that since VTA has filed no evidence in support of its plan for an elevated crossing of Hamilton Avenue, the Commission has no choice but to deny this unamended application for an at-grade crossing. The Committee urges the Commission to enjoin VTA from proceeding with the crossing until VTA complies with the Commission's safety oversight.