8. Reasonableness of Requested Compensation

Intervenors request compensation in the amount of $168,109.50 as follows:

Attorney/Advocate Fees
Robert Gnaizda (134.4 hours at $360/hour) Susan E. Brown (149.9 hours at $260/hour) .5 multiplier for Gnaizda and Brown Itzel Berrio (195.1 hours at $125/hour) John Gamboa (39.55 hours at $250/hour) Guillermo Rodriguez, Jr. (22.85 hours at $100/hour) Total Attorney/Advocate Fees	= = = = = = =	$48,384.00 $38,974.00 $43,679.00 $24,387.50 $ 9,887.50 $ 2,285.00 $167,597.00
Additional Costs Postage Photocopying Printing & Copies Travel (Susan Brown) Total Costs Total Compensation Requested	= = = = = =	$ 55.71 $ 620.00 $ 6.00 $ 68.00 $ 750.41 $168,347.413

8.3 Hours Claimed

Intervenors apportion their efforts as follows: 50% of time to creating a consumer education fund; 25% of time to establishing the inadequacy of the

original settlement joined by all parties except Intervenors; 25% of time to targeting language minority communities for consumer education. Intervenors note that because their participation in the investigation was pursued in an integrated manner, this breakdown is only approximate. In Exhibit E a detailed breakdown is provided for the attorney and advocate hours for which compensation is sought. These tasks include meetings with other parties, preparation of motions and prehearing conference statements, in-house strategy meetings, discovery, attendance at PHCs, and drafting and review of the modified settlement agreement. The total amount of compensation sought is very close to the $166,625.00 that Intervenors estimated as their total budget in their NOI. We note, however, that the NOI contemplated a 12-month proceeding, and included expert witness fees. Based upon a review of the detailed breakdown of hours presented in Exhibit E, we conclude nonetheless that the total number of hours claimed in the Request is generally reasonable. Considerable time was spent in the successful pursuit of a settlement. The efforts expended by Intervenors appear to have been necessary to achieve this result. We find that given the contribution Intervenors made to the ultimate outcome of the proceeding, the hours claimed are not excessive.

We note that Brown's time spent working on fee petition preparation is billed at her full hourly rate for work on February 8 and 9, 1999. In D.98-04-059 we reaffirmed our conclusion that compensation requests are essentially bills for services and do not require a lawyer's skill to prepare. Parties will be compensated for an attorney's time in preparing a request for compensation at half the attorney's hourly rate. (Id., p. 51.) Accordingly, we reduce the amount of the award to reflect payment at half the hourly rate for 2.5 hours on  February 8 and 9, 1999. As described in the billing record, these hours appear to be standard activities related to preparation of a compensation request. We do not reduce the fee for 2 hours of the time spent on February 8, 1999, related to the preparation of the fee request, in recognition of the possibility that some amount of attorney time may have been necessary in the preparation of the declaration of Richard Pearl. We will allocate a total of 2 hours, which is half of the total of four hours spent, to this activity and compensate it at the full hourly rate. We note that Brown and Rodriquez have both billed for travel time to attend a PHC and what appears to be a settlement meeting. These hours have been correctly billed at one-half the hourly rate by means of billing for half of the travel time of each trip. This is in accordance with our direction in D.98-04-059, p. 51.

With the exception of the above reduction in compensation rate for 10.5 hours spent on preparation of the fee request, we find the hours billed to be reasonable and fully compensable.

8.3 Hourly Rates

The Commission's practice is to establish an hourly rate for an individual for a specific time period, and to apply that rate when similar services are performed over a substantially similar time period. In D.98-12-048, Intervenors sought hourly rates for Gnaizda, Gamboa, Rodriquez, and Brown, in excess of rates previously allowed for similar time periods. In D.98-12-048 the rate requested for each individual is analyzed and we explain the basis for the hourly rates adopted.

In D.98-12-048, we adopted hourly rates for services performed in 1998 by Gnaizda, Gamboa, Rodriquez, and Brown. Because the work that is the subject of the Request before us was all performed in 1998, we would have expected Intervenors to utilize the rates that we adopted in D.98-12-048 in their current Request.⁴ However, Intervenors have not done so for Gnaizda, Gamboa, and Brown. They seek increased rates for these three individuals.

In D.98-12-048 we discussed our concern that Intervenors were rearguing rate increase requests we had only recently addressed in D.98-04-025. We asked Intervenors to refrain from rearguing issues recently decided by us. We noted that the practice of rearguing the same issues unnecessarily exhausts the Commission's resources and in an indirect way wastes the public's resources. We have this same concern in this proceeding. Intervenors have presented arguments that we have previously considered. This reargument of positions contributes to a delay in the processing of requests for awards of intervenor compensation. Intervenors imply a necessity to reargue the issue of hourly rates in this proceeding in light of "...statutory revisions that enhance their right of appeal which became operative in January, 1999." (Request, p. 3.)

We are disturbed that Intervenors have ignored our instruction in D.98-12-048 at footnote 17. In that decision, we noted that Intervenors had not provided information on previously adopted rates for some of the attorneys and staff for whom compensation was sought. We stated that in the future, information about previously adopted rates should be provided as part of the justification of the hourly rates requested. This information should be readily available to the party seeking compensation. Information should be provided about past rates

awarded and increases in rates over time, as was provided by the Commission in D.98-12-048. This information is necessary to fairly review a request for an increase in hourly rates. Intervenors' failure to provide this information in its current Request increased the amount of administrative time necessary to review the Request, and delayed our issuance of a decision. Because Intervenors did not provide this information in their Request, we summarize the relevant hourly rates adopted in the past:

Gnaizda 1995-96 $260 D.96-08-040

1996 $260 D.99-04-023

1996-97 $260 D.98-04-025

1997 through

1998 $270 D.98-12-048

Brown 1995-96 $225 D.96-08-040

1996 $225 D.98-04-025

1996 $225 D.99-04-023

1997 $240 D.98-04-025

1998 $250 D.98-12-048

Itzel Berrio 10/97-3/98 $ 85 D.98-12-058

Gamboa 1994-96 $125 D.96-08-040

1996-97 $125 D.98-04-025

1996 through

3/31/97 $125 D.98-12-048

Rodriquez 1994-96 $ 95 D.96-08-040

1996-97 $100 D.98-04-025 6/97 through

1998 $105 D.98-12-048

In its Response to Request, GTEC objects to the increased hourly rates that Intervenors propose for Gnaizda, Gamboa, and Berrio. GTEC argues that the hourly rates far exceed the rates previously ordered by the Commission for these

individuals, which we have summarized above. In Reply Comments, Intervenors assert that Section 1806 requires the Commission to award prevailing market rates for counsel. They argue that the Commission has "capped" fee rates in contravention of California law. To support the hourly rate increases sought, Intervenors have provided the Declaration of Richard M. Pearl as

Exhibit C to the Request. Pearl, a California attorney with experience on the issue of hourly rates billed by attorneys, provides information about hourly rates in other venues, and opines that the hourly rates sought by Intervenors in this proceeding are within the range of market rates charged by attorneys of equivalent experience, skill, and expertise. Intervenors also have filed under seal documents prepared by attorneys at three law firms setting forth the hourly billing rates charged for the services of attorneys with varying levels of experience. Redacted versions of these documents are attached as Exhibit D to the Request.

We are not persuaded to change the hourly rates previously adopted for Gnaizda, Brown, and Berrio. In D.95-08-051 we discussed the Section 1806 requirement that in setting compensation rates, we take into consideration the market rates paid to persons of comparable training and experience who offer similar services. Reviewing the appropriate hourly rate for Gnaizda's services, we discussed our application of this requirement to attorneys appearing before the Commission and set a rate of compensation for Gnaizda and several other attorneys. In D.96-08-040 we discussed in detail our reasoning in setting the appropriate rates for Intervenors' attorneys and staff. We also addressed requests by these same parties for increases to previously determined hourly rates in D.98-12-048, D.98-12-058, and D.99-04-023. In short, we have reviewed Intervenors' hourly rates regularly and methodically, in decisions that have long since become final. We do not disturb our finding that the rates set in D.98-12-048 for Intervenors' work performed in 1998 are reasonable and consistent with our past treatment of attorney and expert fees for comparable work. Accordingly, we will base the fees awarded for the services of Gnaizda, Brown, Gamboa, and Rodriquez upon the hourly rates adopted in that decision. This is consistent with our practice, outlined in D.98-12-048, of establishing an hourly rate for a specific time period (generally a calendar year) and applying that rate to work performed during that time period. Consideration is given to requests for upward adjustment of rates for future time periods.

All work performed by attorneys and staff in this proceeding occurred in 1998. D.98-12-048 set the hourly rate for services performed by Gnaizda in 1998 at $270 per hour. We will adopt this hourly rate for the work performed by Gnaizda in this proceeding. The rate for work performed by Brown in 1998 was set at $250 per hour. We will adopt this rate for work performed by her in this proceeding. The hourly rate set in D.98-12-048 for staff member Gamboa, is $125 per hour for work performed in 1996 through March, 1997. We note that this is the same hourly rate that was awarded for Gamboa's services from 1994-1996. Accordingly, while we do not find justification for increasing Gamboa's rate to the level sought by Intervenors, we will increase his hourly rate for work performed in 1998 to $135 per hour. This $10 per hour increase is the increase allowed for staff member Rodriquez between 1994 and 1998. The hourly rate for work by Rodriquez in 1998 is set at $105 per hour in D.98-12-048. We will adopt this rate for work performed by him in this proceeding.

We set the hourly rate for Itzel Berrio in D.98-12-058 for work performed in that proceeding from October, 1997 through March, 1998. The adopted hourly rate is $85 per hour. We indicated this rate reflects that Berrio is a 1997 graduate of New York University, and a member of the Illinois and California bars since 1997. We adopt the previously set hourly rate of $85 for all work performed by Berrio in 1998. We find this an appropriate rate for work performed by an attorney during the first full year of practice in the profession.

8.3 Other Costs

Intervenors request compensation for $750 in expenses. These expenses include $682.41 for the costs of photocopying and mailing of pleadings and other documents in this proceeding, and $68 for Brown's travel expenses. We find that the request for compensation for the costs of photocopying and mailing is reasonable. We have reviewed the "transaction report" (Exhibit E) where Brown's travel expenses are itemized. We have compared the dates on which travel expenses were incurred with Brown's daily record of work performed in this proceeding (Exhibit E.) We find that on the dates for which travel expenses are claimed, Brown's daily record of work does not reflect activities involving travel in this proceeding. Because the $68 in travel expenses claimed is not adequately justified, we will disallow this amount. We will award compensation for expenses in the amount of $682.41.