Intervenors request that a multiplier of 50% be applied to the award for the work of Gnaizda and Brown. They indicate that this multiplier is justified due to the efficiency and efficacy of their work. Intervenors enumerate a number of factors that they believe justify the application of the 50% multiplier. In its Response, GTEC strongly objects to the application of a multiplier. Intervenors respond to GTEC's objections in their Reply Comments. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with GTEC that the application of a multiplier is not warranted in this case.

As a preliminary matter we observe that Intervenors claim that they have not included in their compensation request the work of paralegal services

totaling approximately $1,200. Additionally, Brown is said to have waived at least 20 hours expended in fee petition preparation (a value of $2,500 using half her adopted hourly rate), and Gnaizda has waived an unspecified number of hours related to the fee request. (Request, p. 8.) Intervenors appear to suggest that this voluntary waiver of fees, itemized at approximately $3,700, provides support for a finding that the work of Gnaizda and Brown merits payment of an additional $36,225 (applying the previously adopted hourly rates.) We disagree. Efficiency adders and fee enhancements are not intended as a substitute for claiming compensation in an itemized request. We do not speculate on why Intervenors chose not to itemize hours they now claim they are "waiving." Nor can we assume, in the absence of itemization of these hours, that they would have been found reasonable.

We have previously stated, and it is still our policy, that we believe that we should generally exercise restraint in enhancing hourly rates. Enhancement should only be granted in exceptional cases. (See D.95-05-018.) We have applied an "efficiency adder" in cases where an advocate's contribution clearly has gone beyond the normal duties and responsibilities of an attorney. For example, in D.95-04-003 we allowed an efficiency adder where the attorney had acted in a dual role of attorney and expert witness. That is not the case in this proceeding, where the attorneys did not act in a dual capacity.

We have also granted a "fee enhancement" in cases where the results achieved were exceptional. In D.96-08-029 we listed factors to be considered by the Commission in awarding a fee enhancement. We noted that these factors are not to be applied in a rigid manner, and that not all factors are applicable in all cases. We will not restate all of the factors that are listed in D.96-08-029. We have reviewed those factors and have considered their applicability to Intervenors' request for a fee enhancement or multiplier. We have also reviewed the case law cited by Intervenors, wherein courts have applied a multiplier to fee awards in exceptional circumstances. We conclude that the efforts of counsel in this proceeding do not justify a fee enhancement.

Intervenors claim that a number of factors warrant the application of a multiplier. They cite to the contingent nature of the intervenor fee award, the risk undertaken, and the need to forego other legal work in order to work on this case. If we were to consider these factors alone to justify a fee enhancement, then it would appear that all intervenors would be eligible for a fee enhancement. Nor do we consider the fact that opposing counsel are highly experienced, and presented a unified opposition, to justify an enhancement. Both Gnaizda and Brown are compensated at the high end of hourly rates for attorneys appearing before us with similar experience. Their compensation rates reflect the fact that they are expected to be in the lead role in litigation against senior counsel representing other parties. To the extent that novel legal issues were presented, we note Intervenors do not contest GTEC's claim that Intervenors fought for the establishment of the Fund, but did not draft any of the motions supporting the all-party settlement and justifying the Fund's adoption. (Response, p. 11.) We acknowledge the substantial contribution that Intervenors made to the outcome of this case, but we conclude that the efforts of counsel did not exceed what we normally view as the duties and responsibilities of an attorney whose efforts merit an award of intervenor compensation. Accordingly, we deny Intervenors' request for a fee multiplier.

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