Commission Jurisdiction

As we explained in a prior complaint:

The CPUC has subject matter jurisdiction over a disputed issue if that issue falls within the scope of the authority granted the CPUC by the California Constitution or the Legislature. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a fundamental defect that cannot be waived, nor can the parties confer jurisdiction by stipulation. (National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp. (1991) 235 CA3d 1718, 1724.) Further, "[a] judgment rendered by a court that does not have subject matter jurisdiction is void and unenforceable and may be attacked anywhere, directly or collaterally, by parties or by strangers. (Marlow v. Campbell (1992) 7 CA4^th 921, 928.) These fundamental principles are equally applicable to the jurisdiction of administrative agencies like the Commission. (USDA Forest Service vs. Lukins Brothers Water Company, Inc., D.99-07-01, 1999 Cal. PUC LEXIS 481, *3.)

Pub. Util. Code § 1702 (which governs the proper content of a complaint and the identity of a complainant) provides, in relevant part, that a complaint against a public utility must establish a cause of action by "setting forth any act or thing done or omitted to be done by any public utility, including any rule or charge heretofore established or fixed by or for any public utility, in violation or claimed to be in violation, of any provision of law or of any order or rule of the commission."

This complaint contends, in essence, that PG&E acted unlawfully by failing to record the 1974 easement and by failing to notify the Rodriguezes that it had not recorded the easement. They seek a Commission order compelling PG&E to (1) record the 1974 unrecorded easement, and then (2) honor the March 2002 service extension proposal. In the alternative, they ask the Commission to order PG&E to provide service to the Rodriguez parcel via some other route, which does not require an easement over the adjacent Tripp parcel and which complies with Monterey County's Building/Planning Department regulations. Finally, they ask the Commission to order that PG&E absorb the increased cost of such service extension because of its failure to record the 1974 easement.

The scoping memo rules that the relief the Rodriguezes prefer is unavailable in this forum, since the Commission lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in real property. (See Camp Meeker Water System, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 845, 850, distinguishing the Commission's lawful construction of a deed, for the purpose of ascertaining facts relevant to the merits of an application for increased rates, from resolution of disputes between parties claiming rights under a deed or enforcement of rights under a deed.) The Commission cannot determine the validity of the unrecorded easement and absent a valid easement, it cannot order PG&E to comply with the March 2002 service extension proposal.

The scoping memo also rules that the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction must be established before the Commission may consider the Rodriguezes' alternative request (that PG&E be ordered to provide service by a different and more costly route). The scoping memo identifies the relevant inquiry:

... the Commission must conclude that the law applicable at the time and enforceable by the Commission, or PG&E's own established practices and policy enforceable by the Commission under then existing law, required PG&E to act differently than it did (for example, PG&E should have recorded the easement in 1974 or notified plaintiffs in writing that it would not record the easement, etc.). (Scoping memo, p. 3.)