Discussion

The Law Applicable in 1974

We first examine whether PG&E's actions in 1974 complied with existing law, including its own tariffs and any applicable Commission mandates. Neither PG&E nor the Rodriguezes point to any statute, Commission general order or Commission decision that governs the respective obligations of a utility and applicant regarding fact patterns such as this one, and we are aware of none.

We turn next to PG&E's tariffs. In 1974, like today, extensions of electric distribution lines were governed by PG&E's Rule No. 15 (entitled "Line Extensions") and Rule No. 16 (entitled "Service Connections and Facilities on Customer's Premises"). As the title suggests, Rule No. 16 pertains to various kinds of equipment and connections on the property of the service extension applicant and, thus, is not relevant to the facts presented by this case. Therefore, we focus exclusively on Rule. No. 15.

The 1974 version of Rule No. 15 forms part of the 1974 service extension proposal package that the Rodriguezes received from PG&E. PG&E has also included the Rule as Attachment A to its Opening Brief. The 1974 Rule provides, in relevant part:

A. General

The utility will construct, own, operate and maintain lines only along public streets, roads and highways which the utility has the legal right to occupy, and on public land and private property across which rights of way satisfactory to the utility may be obtained without cost or condemnation by the utility. (Rule No. 15.)

Thus, as it does today, in 1974 PG&E required a valid right of way, such as an easement, before undertaking a line extension project. The Rule does not address the respective rights or obligations, of the utility or of any of the property owners, when an easement is obtained for a service extension and that service extension does not go forward. Since the tariff is silent on this point, there is no legal basis for finding that PG&E violated its Rule No. 15.

PG&E's Policy and Practice in 1974

The Rodriguezes assert that PG&E treated the Tripps differently than it treated them because it recorded the 1973 easement that benefited the Tripps but did not record the 1974 easement that benefited them. We examine whether PG&E complied with its established practices and policies when it did not record the 1974 easement or advise the Rodriguezes, in writing, that it would not record the easement. The distinguishing facts are undisputed-the Tripp service extension was built in 1973 but the proposed service extension to the Rodriguez parcel in 1974 was not built because the Rodriguezes declined to execute the proposal and proceed with construction.

PG&E's brief includes the declaration of Alfred Soller (Soller), Senior Land Rights Specialist in PG&E's Corporate Real Estate Department. Soller states that he has been employed by PG&E in that Department and its predecessor, known as "General Services--Land Department," since 1967. Soller describes PG&E's recordation policy from 1974 to the present as one designed "not to over-encumber the lands of third parties or the applicant, or unnecessarily encumber these lands." (Soller declaration, paragraph 4.) Soller explains the process followed upon the cancellation of a service extension proposal: PG&E would retrieve any easements that it had obtained from the Document Information Center, the PG&E office charged with filing such documents, and then either would return them to the grantor or mark them "cancelled" and retain the documents in the closed file. If cancellation of the service extension proposal occurred after the easement had been recorded, then upon the grantor's request, PG&E would quitclaim its interest in the easement. Soller states that PG&E had no policy or practice, upon cancellation of the service extension proposal, to notify the applicant that it would not record the easement because the applicant already had actual knowledge that the project was not going forward.

PG&E argues that it acted in accordance with these internal practices and policies. When the Rodriguezes declined to execute the 1974 service extension proposal, PG&E cancelled the project and placed the unrecorded easement from the Tripps in the closed file, since PG&E had no operational need for the easement. The Rodriguezes respond that, nevertheless, PG&E's conduct, on which they relied, led them to think it would act otherwise:

At the time of the original agreement, Rodriguez was asked by both Tripp and PG&E to enter into reciprocal easements with the Tripps, to facilitate the installation of powerlines to their respective properties. It was reasonably understood between the parties that a timely recordation of these documents would be accomplished by PG&E. (Rodriguez Brief, p. 1.)

These allegations (that the Rodriguezes "reasonably understood" PG&E would record both easements) raise contractual issues, which we address below. The undisputed facts, however, indicate that PG&E acted in conformance with its internal practices and policies when it did not record the 1974 easement. As such, there is no legal basis to find that PG&E did not deal with the Rodriguezes in accordance with its internal policies and procedures.

Contractual Theories

The Rodriguezes argue that because of the parties' mutual understanding that PG&E would record the 1974 easement, as a matter of equity the Commission should order PG&E to extend service to them via an alternative route and to bear the cost differential as damages. Though contractual theories were not discussed at the PHC or identified in the scoping memo, we address them-and dispose of them--here, since language in the complaint that refers to "verbal, implied, and written agreements," arguably can be construed to raise such theories. (See form Complaint, Paragraph (F.2), subparagraph 3.(c).)

Quite simply, the Commission is not the appropriate body to adjudicate the private agreements alleged or the expectations arising from them. While such allegations may create a cause of action in the courts, they suffer from a jurisdictional defect here. Over the years the California Supreme Court consistently has held that the Commission lacks jurisdiction over private contracts between public utilities and individuals. (See Cal. Water & Tel. Co. v Public Util. Com. (1959) 51 C.2d 478, 488-89 [Commission cannot modify a public utility's contract or order a public utility to perform a contract, whether modified or unmodified]; Atchison, etc. Ry. Co. c. Railroad Comm. (1916) 173 Cal. 577, 582 [Commission is not a body charged with enforcement of private contracts].)

We must conclude that we have no jurisdiction to determine the legal or equitable rights and obligations of the Rodriguezes and PG&E with respect to the 1974 unrecorded easement under any verbal, implied, or written agreements.

Dismissal of the Compliant is Warranted

Because the complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1702, we must dismiss it. Construed in the light most favorable to the Rodriguezes, the complaint asserts theories that concern matters beyond our jurisdiction (i.e. rights in real property, rights and obligations under a private contract or contracts). Moreover, as discussed above, the subsequent briefing identifies no factual issues for hearing-instead, we conclude, as a matter of law, that PG&E's actions did not violate its tariffs, or other law which this Commission may enforce.