F. Discussion

The Commission adopted a system of priorities for statewide reduction of electric service in 1976 pursuant to Pub. Util. Code §§ 2771-2776. D.91548 directed the utilities to maintain 50% of their system load available for rotating outages while protecting essential users to the maximum extent practical.⁸ The Commission lowered 50% reserve margin to 40% in 1982.⁹ Currently utilities must have 40% of their peak load available for rotating outages.

Exemptions from rotating outages do not guarantee a continuous supply of electricity or freedom from interruption. Unanticipated and unannounced interruptions of the supply of electricity may result from factors such as an earthquake, fire, windstorm, lightning strike, and a car colliding with a power pole. Therefore, all parties should maintain contingency plans to address unanticipated and unannounced interruptions of the supply of electricity, whether or not they are granted exemptions from rotating outages.

We must be very cautious in granting exemptions from rotating outages to ensure that electric utility operating margins are maintained at safe levels, not necessarily at the minimum reserve requirement, and so as not to burden a relative small percentage of customers. We will allow exemptions from rotating outages based on public health and safety only upon the existence of hazardous conditions that could result in imminent death or severe injury and that cannot be minimized, controlled, corrected, or eliminated through mitigation measures.

The actual reserve margin available for rotating outages prior to granting any Category J exemptions in this order or a subsequent order that will address almost 10,000 requests for a Category M exemption is approximately 52% for PG&E, 53% for SDG&E, and 51% for SCE. This means that PG&E has a maximum of 12% of its reserve margin available for additional exemptions from rotating outages, SDG&E 13%, and SCE 11%.

RSCD meticulously identified those sections of track to which emergency response personnel have limited access, as listed in Appendix A, B, and C of this order. Such limited access constitutes a hazardous condition for public health and safety. We therefore grant these locations a Category J exemption from rotating outages. These exemptions do not adversely impact the respondent utilities' required level of peak load available for rotating outages.

RSCD also identified those sections of track which are accessible by emergency response personnel. RSCD does not recommend exemptions from rotating outages but does recommend mitigation measures to minimize or control the public health and safety issues at these locations. Petitioners contend that the mitigation measures proposed by RSCD will not alleviate their public health and safety concerns.

1. One-Hour Advance Notice

RSCD recommends that respondent utilities provide impacted freight and commuter railroads a one-hour person-to-person advance telephone notification of rotating outages. Respondent utilities and petitioners contend that there is no guarantee that the respondent utilities can provide freight and commuter railroads with a one-hour advance notice.

For example, SCE explains that even though Executive Order D-38-01 (Executive Order) issued by Governor Gray Davis on June 5, 2001, required the ISO to notify utilities at least one hour in advance of any firm load curtailment, that notice is actually a "1-Hour Probability Notice."¹⁰ In other words, it serves as a forecast that rotating outages may be called within the next 90 minutes or sooner. SCE concludes there can be no guarantee that the notice the respondent utilities obtain from the ISO and conveys to the rail transit systems will be sufficient to allow all trains to get to a safe location.

There may be no guarantee that respondent utilities will convey an actual one-hour advance notice of rotating outages to the rail transit systems. However, as RSCD explains, the Executive Order requires the ISO, in part, to notify the general public of the potential for rolling blackouts 48 hours in advance and to update this forecast 24 hours in advance, based upon such factors as weather, outages, supply, and demand. The Executive Order also requires frequent updates to the public during periods of forecasted electricity emergencies and notification to the utilities of any firm load curtailment at least one hour in advance. The Executive Order also requires utilities to provide notification no less than one hour in advance of any rotating outage of the time and location where the anticipated blackout will occur. That notice is to include common geographical boundaries, grid or block numbers, and maps or similar identifying information so the public and affected customers can readily understand where the rotating outages will occur.

The Executive Order `s requirement provides the utilities, rail transit systems, and general public with sufficient notice to prepare for rotating outages. They will receive a 48-hour advance notice that will be updated 24 hours in advance, and more frequently as conditions change. Planned rotating outages will not occur until after the ISO has called for a Stage I voluntary curtailment of energy usage and subsequently required Stage II mandatory curtailment. Although the respondent utilities cannot provide a guarantee, they can provide reasonable notice of the probability of imminent rotating outages.

In addition, the Presiding Officer and Assigned Commissioner ordered respondent utilities to include a customer's rotating outage block number on each customer's bill and rotating outage information on each utility's website.¹¹ This additional information provides rail transit systems with necessary information to determine which rotating outage block was last impacted by rotating outages and which of the rail transit systems services, if any, are subject to upcoming rotating outages. We affirm these requirements in this decision.

Therefore, the advance notification provided by the requirements of the Executive Order, the Presiding Office and Assigned Commissioner's April 26, 2001 ruling, and the additional mitigation measures recommended by RSCD will provide the rail transit systems with sufficient advance notice of planned rotating outages. We adopt this proposal.

2. Person- to- Person Call

RSCD recommends that PG&E, SDG&E and SCE provide telephone notification in advance of a rotating outage. SCE states that it already has procedures in place to make contact with numerous customers and stakeholder groups such as critical care customers and public safety agencies. For example, SCE recently contracted with a new vendor for an enhanced system that can send messages through multiple communication channels selected by SCE's customers. These multiple communications channels include telephone, cellular telephone, pager, telecopier, e-mail, and wireless personal digital assistance.

SCE proposes to include the rail transit systems in this multiple communications channels procedure to satisfy any advance notification obligation and provide nearly immediate notification, within five minutes of message initiation. LACMTA also believes that SCE's current notification method through the use of a passive auto dialer system is adequate and should be continued.

Person-to-person advance contact guarantees a positive two-way communication that rail transit systems have been properly notified and should be adopted. Passive auto dialer systems may replace the person-to-person contact only if the passive auto dialer system is capable of receiving a confirmation that rail transit systems personnel have received the notification. The utilities may implement these procedures if they can provide this confirmation.

3. Grade Crossing Warning Devices

LACMTA contends that the RSCD recommendations for grade crossing warning devices will not necessarily result in improved safety during rotating outages. LACMTA explains that the battery backup for its grade crossing warning devices provides power to operate the warning devices (gates, flashing lights and bells) only when utility power is available to the track circuit/train detection system. Any loss of power to the track circuit/train detection system will cause the gates to lower, and remain in the lowered, or fail-safe position until power is restored. With the loss of power, the battery backup only provides power to the flashing lights and warning bells until the batteries are exhausted. The battery backup will not operate the gates under a loss of power to the track circuit/train detection system.

All freight and commuter railroad operations must comply with federal grade crossing safety regulations contained in Part 243 of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations. Part 234.215 requires a standby source of power to be provided with sufficient capacity to operate the warning systems of grade crossings during any period of primary power interruption. In the event of an activation failure due to a power outage or other cause, Part 234.105 sets forth specific action that the railroad carrier having maintenance responsibility for the warning system must promptly initiate, including notification to law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over the crossing and providing for alternative means of actively warning motorists. Nothing being authorized by this order is intended to replace or conflict with these federal grade crossing safety regulations.

RSCD recommends the mitigation measures for grade crossing warning devices that are intended to insure that the safety of rail transit system passengers and motorists are maintained at the same level as those for freight and commuter railroads. Upon the loss of power by rotating outages, crossing gates should fail in the down position and associated backup batteries should have sufficient life to operate flashing lights and warning bells during periods of rotating outages. Although passengers and motorists may be inconvenienced, the mitigation measures recommended by RSCD for grade crossing warning devices should be adopted.

4. Station Power

Loss of power at the stations of rail transit systems could affect station lighting, escalators, elevators, public address speakers, fire/life safety systems, ventilation fans, and other safety-related systems. Mitigation measures for the loss of station power are already in place. Each rail transit system has an Emergency Plan in place that includes procedures and some back-up power facilities for power failures including rotating outages. Although passengers may be inconvenienced, these emergency plans are designed to alleviate, if not eliminate, imminent danger to public health and safety. We will therefore not exempt station power from rotating outages.

5. Traction Power

Loss of traction power for rail transit systems means that rail transit vehicles are likely to be stopped anywhere on the lines in the area affected by rotating outages including underground sections, tunnels, tubes, aerial structures, the middle of major intersections, grade crossings, or in the ballasted trackway of a freeway. If rotating outages occur, this does not affect the traction power of freight and commuter rail that use diesel-electric powered locomotives because the electric power generated aboard each locomotive runs the traction motors to propel their trains.

We do not grant additional exemptions for loss of traction power. The exemptions we authorize in this decision resolve the public health and safety concerns of petitioners for loss of traction power in ballasted tracks, underground sections, tunnels, tubes, and aerial structures. Although passengers may be inconvenienced because exemptions from rotating outages are not being granted for the major intersections, grade crossings, and street running alignments, the mitigation measures recommended by RSCD will reasonably minimize and control the loss of traction power.

6. Summary

RSCD's proposed mitigations for rail transit systems, grade crossing warning devices, freight and commuter railroads, and common corridor operations will reasonably minimize, control, and correct the public health and safety issues at these locations. We will adopt the recommendations of RSCD.